SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
Case No. 6D2026-1004
Lower Tribunal No. 2026-CJ-000036
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and TAYLOR N. HATCH, in her official
capacity as Secretary of Children and Families,
Petitioners,
v.
M.V., and STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents.
Petition for Writ of Prohibition to the Circuit Court for Orange County.
September 30, 2026
KAMOUTSAS, J.
Petitioners, the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”), and Taylor N.
Hatch, in her official capacity as Secretary of Children and Families, filed an
Emergency Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or Certiorari. For the reasons that
follow, we grant Petitioners the relief they seek.
In a delinquency proceeding governed by Chapter 985, the trial judge sitting
in the juvenile division issued a release order, which ordered that DCF take custody
of the child. The order, however, was never served on DCF. 1
When DCF failed to shelter that child, the same judge issued an order to show
cause about two weeks later requiring Secretary Hatch, to explain why she should not
be held in indirect civil contempt for her agency’s “fail[ure] to pick up the child as
directed.” This emergency petition followed. The order to show cause was served on
DCF, and a hearing was set. DCF petitions our Court for a writ of certiorari requesting
relief from the release order and a writ of prohibition precluding further action on the
order to show cause. 2
DCF is an administrative agency within the executive branch. See § 20.04(1),
Fla. Stat. (2026). The Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he administration of each
department, unless otherwise provided in this constitution, shall be placed by law . .
. .” Art. IV, § 6, Fla. Const. As announced by the Florida Constitution and echoed in
case law, “[a]dministrative agencies are creatures of statute and have only such
powers as statutes confer.” Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc. v. Calvin, 356 So. 2d 908, 909
1
It is uncertain whether a DCF representative was present in the court room during the hearing to receive oral notice of the release order. Even assuming a DCF representative was present, this alone would not constitute proper service or notice to accomplish personal jurisdiction over DCF.
2
Although the lower court cancelled the hearing for the order to show cause, the order itself has not been vacated, and thus, remains an issue for consideration.
2
(Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (citing State ex rel. Greenburg v. Fla. State Bd. of Dentistry,
297 So. 2d 628, 634 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)).
DCF is statutorily authorized to take custody of children in certain, narrowly
proscribed circumstances. See, e.g., § 39.401(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2026) (“A child
may only be taken into custody . . . [p]ursuant to the provisions of this part, based
upon sworn testimony, either before or after a petition is filed; or . . . [b]y a law
enforcement officer, or an authorized agent of the department, if the officer or
authorized agent has probable cause to support” specific statutory findings); see also
§ 985.19, Fla. Stat. (2026) (discussing criteria for a child to be committed to DCF
when found incompetent to proceed in delinquency cases).
The release order here was issued in the context of a delinquency proceeding,
wherein the court found that the child, who was previously detained, should now be
released. Section 985.115, Florida Statutes (2026), sets forth the procedure for
releasing or delivering a child from custody and provides in pertinent part:
(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the court under s.
985.255 or s. 985.26, and unless there is a need to hold the
child, a person taking a child into custody shall attempt to
release the child as follows:
(a) To the child’s parent, guardian, or legal custodian or,
if the child’s parent, guardian, or legal custodian is
unavailable, unwilling, or unable to provide supervision
for the child, to any responsible adult. Prior to releasing
the child to a responsible adult, other than the parent,
guardian, or legal custodian, the person taking the child
into custody may conduct a criminal history background
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check of the person to whom the child is to be released. If
the person has a prior felony conviction, or a conviction
for child abuse, drug trafficking, or prostitution, that
person is not a responsible adult for the purposes of this
section. The person to whom the child is released shall
agree to inform the department or the person releasing the
child of the child's subsequent change of address and to
produce the child in court at such time as the court may
direct, and the child shall join in the agreement.
(b) Contingent upon specific appropriation, to a shelter
approved by the department or to an authorized agent.
§ 985.115(2)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2026).
As used in section 985.115, Florida Statutes, “department” is defined as the
Department of Juvenile Justice, and “authorized agent” is defined as “a person or
agency assigned or designated by the department to perform duties or exercise powers
under this chapter and includes contract providers and their employees.” §§
985.03(6), (16), Fla. Stat. (2026). Section 985.115 goes on to list four additional
release options—none of which includes releasing a child to DCF. See §
985.115(2)(c)-(f), Fla. Stat. (2026).
It is well settled that a circuit court has inherent jurisdiction over minor
children. See § 26.012(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2026) (“Circuit courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction . . . [i]n all cases in equity including all cases relating to juveniles
except traffic offenses as provided in chapters 316 and 985); Pollack v. Pollack, 31
So. 2d 253, 254 (Fla. 1947) (“Courts of equity have inherent jurisdiction to protect
infants.”); Cone v. Cone, 62 So. 2d 907, 908 (Fla. 1953) (it is a “well-recognized
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principle that, independent of statute, a court of chancery has inherent jurisdiction to
control and protect infants and their property.” (citing Fisher v. Guidy, 142 So. 818,
821 (Fla. 1932))). But jurisdiction in the broadest sense simply means “[a] court’s
power to decide a case or issue a decree.” Jurisdiction, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th
ed. 2024). However, the circuit court’s jurisdiction over juveniles does not give the
circuit court authority to compel a non-party, who was not served, and who is not
otherwise authorized by statute to participate, to shelter a child upon release.
Here, the lower court included DCF on a release order in a delinquency
proceeding which is governed by Chapter 985. To be clear, this was not a dependency
proceeding under Chapter 39, and jurisdiction over DCF was not established pursuant
to either chapter. Before the release order, DCF was a stranger to the proceedings
and, under the circumstances of this case, was not an authorized party to take custody
of the child under Chapter 985. Cf. § 985.19, Fla. Stat. (2026). Because the trial court
subsequently issued an order to show cause for DCF’s failure to comply with the
release order, DCF seeks this Court’s review by petition for certiorari.
Writs of certiorari require a petitioner to demonstrate that the trial court’s order
constitutes “(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting
in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on
postjudgment appeal.” Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822
(Fla. 2004) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Snyder, 826 So. 2d 382, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA
5
2002)). “The last two prongs are related and ‘together are referred to as irreparable
harm.’” Valyou v. Navedo, 406 So. 3d 1081, 1081 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (quoting
CPPB, LLC v. Taurus Apopka City Ctr., LLC, 375 So. 3d 327, 329 (Fla. 6th DCA
2023)).
In the instant case, the required elements for the issuance of a writ of certiorari
have been met. While a circuit court has broad jurisdiction over children, the exercise
of such authority within that jurisdiction is limited by applicable law. See Coates v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 375 So. 3d 168, 174 (Fla. 2023) (“[A court’s] job is to
faithfully apply the law as written.”); see also State v. Rife, 789 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla.
2001) (“[I]t is not this Court’s function to substitute its judgment for that of the
Legislature as to the wisdom or policy of a particular statute.”). And to that end, a
court is “not free to alter or supplement the statutory scheme.” Gomez v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 357 So. 3d 198, 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). The lower court’s order
required DCF to pick up a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding, which it lacked
statutory authority to do, and thus, it departed from the essential requirements of law.
Furthermore, as recognized by our sister courts, requiring DCF to take custody
of a child without legal authority causes irreparable harm which cannot be remedied
on appeal. See, e.g., Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Musa, 321 So. 3d 908, 911 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2021) (finding that where the trial court committed a defendant to DCF without
the authority to do so, the “trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, and its commitment
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order causes irreparable harm to the Department which cannot be remedied on
appeal.” (citing Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Garcia, 245 So. 3d 919, 922 (Fla. 3d DCA
2018))); see also Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. J.B., 154 So. 3d 479, 481 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2015) (“A court may order an executive department to spend funds when a
statute or constitution authorizes a court to do so. Courts, however, have rejected the
idea that there is a ‘doctrine of inherent judicial power’ that allows a court to direct
how an executive department exercises its discretion to spend funds appropriated to
the department.” 3 (citing Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. J.H., 831 So. 2d 782, 783 (Fla.
4th DCA 2002))). Further, this harm cannot be corrected on appeal since DCF is not
a party in the delinquency matter, and a release order is a non-appealable, non-final
order. See generally King v. Brown, 55 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 1951) (“It is the rule
that before a person may bring an appeal he must be a party or privy to the record
and must show that he is, or will be, injuriously affected by the order sought to be
reviewed.” (emphasis added)); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.130. It follows, that the
petition for certiorari should be granted and the release order quashed.
DCF also seeks relief from the order to show cause requiring Secretary Hatch
to appear and explain “why she should not be held in indirect civil contempt for
failure to obey the duly issued court order . . . by failing to pick up the child as
3
While this points to a separation of powers argument, we need not address that issue here.
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directed.” As the trial court lacked authority to issue the release order as to DCF,
which was never served, it follows that the release order with respect to DCF was
void. See State v. S.M.G., 313 So. 2d 761, 763 (Fla. 1975) (“Since the Juvenile Court
attempted to act beyond its power, its contempt order attempting to enforce its initial
order against Respondent was void . . . .”); De La Osa v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
208 So. 3d 259, 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“After all, ‘by definition a void order is a
nullity.”’ (quoting McMurrer v. Marion Cnty., 936 So. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. 5th DCA
2006))); In re Elrod, 455 So. 2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (“[A] person may
safely disobey the command of a court even though it has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties, if it attempts to enter a particular order that transcends its
power or authority.”); Abdo v. Abdo, 320 So. 3d 791, 795 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)
(“[D]isobedience of a void order, judgment, or decree, or one issued by a court
without jurisdiction of the subject-matter and parties litigant, is not contempt.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Synchron, Inc. v. Kogan, 757 So. 2d 564, 566 (Fla.
2d DCA 2000))).
We conclude that the lower court did not have authority to order DCF to take
custody of the child, and therefore, the order was void as to DCF. Secretary Hatch
cannot be required to comply with a void order, nor can she be held in contempt for
DCF’s failure to observe the order which was never properly served and which
erroneously expanded the scope of DCF’s duties under the law. See Hudson v. Marin,
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259 So. 3d 148, 159 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“As our sister court explained long ago, ‘it
appears settled that prohibition can be invoked when the very basis of the contempt
charge is an invalid one and the proceeding is in violation of the requirements of due
process.’” (quoting Scussel v. Kelly, 152 So. 2d 767, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA
1963), quashed on other grounds by 167 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1964))).
Accordingly, we grant the writ of certiorari to quash the release order and the
writ of prohibition to prohibit the lower court from taking further action relating to
the order to show cause.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI GRANTED and PETITION FOR
WRIT OF PROHIBITION GRANTED.
STARGEL and NARDELLA, JJ., concur.
Logan Bartholomew, Assistant Regional Counsel, of the Department of Children and Families, Orlando, for Petitioners, Department of Children and Families and Taylor N. Hatch, in her official capacity as Secretary of Children and Families.
Stephanie C. Zimmerman, Deputy Director & Statewide Director of Appeals, of Children’s Legal Services, Bradenton, for Petitioner, Department of Children and Families.
Mike DeVoe, of DeVoe Law Firm, Orlando, for Respondent, M.V.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah A. Chance, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent, State of Florida.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
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