[Cite as State v. Cantrell, 2026-Ohio-3847.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 2025CA0061-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
VICTORIA CANTRELL WADSWORTH MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CRB2400553
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 30, 2026
STEVENSON, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Victoria Cantrell appeals the judgment of the Wadsworth
Municipal Court finding her guilty of assault. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Ms. Cantrell was charged with assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a
misdemeanor of the first degree. She pleaded not guilty and the matter proceeded to a bench trial.
{¶3} S.W. testified that she worked at Altercare of Wadsworth (“Altercare”) with Ms.
Cantrell and that the two were working together on December 2, 2024. According to S.W., she
informed Ms. Cantrell that she was having to do “a little extra than what [she] was supposed to [be
doing]” and Ms. Cantrell responded with “a smart remark.” S.W. decided that she was going to
leave work early that day to “avoid altercation” with Ms. Cantrell. S.W. went to the nurses’ station
to fill out paperwork before leaving.
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{¶4} S.W. testified that Ms. Cantrell “proceeded to talk to [her] and say nasty things”
while she was sitting on a stool at the nurses’ station completing paperwork. She testified that Ms.
Cantrell then proceeded to pull her off the stool and hit her. According to S.W., she did nothing to
provoke Ms. Cantrell. S.W. acknowledged that she had one verbal altercation with Ms. Cantrell
prior to December 2, 2024, but she testified that nothing physical had occurred between the two
prior to this incident.
{¶5} S.W. testified that she sustained “[a] busted lip” that was “bleeding really bad” in
the incident and that her injury hurt. Photographs of S.W.’s lips and face were introduced at trial
and admitted into evidence.
{¶6} S.W. provided a written statement to the police, and her statement was admitted
into evidence at trial. S.W. wrote in her statement that Ms. Cantrell came to the nurses’ station and
“punched [her]” and that the two “were tussling.”
{¶7} Susan Bowers was a supervisor at Altercare and she testified that she witnessed the
December 2, 2024, incident. Ms. Bowers testified that she saw S.W. “filling out paperwork, getting
ready to go home” when Ms. Cantrell “came around . . . and . . . attacked [S.W.]” When asked
what she meant by “attacked,” Ms. Bowers testified:
So we have this little stool – doesn’t have a back – that the girls sit on and chart
paperwork, . . . and [S.W.] was sitting on it and [Ms. Cantrell] snatched her off of
it. . . . [Ms. Cantrell] had [S.W.] pinned to the floor, hitting her[.]
Ms. Bowers was able to separate Ms. Cantrell and S.W. “[a]fter a few minutes.” Ms. Bowers
testified that “[t]here was blood everywhere” after the incident, that S.W.’s “face was busted up[,]”
and that S.W.’s “lip was split.”
{¶8} Ms. Bowers provided a written statement to the police, and her written statement
was admitted into evidence at trial. Ms. Bowers read her statement on the record, which stated:
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[S.W.] was sitting [at the] desk getting ready to leave. [Ms. Cantrell] came to use
toilet. [Ms. Cantrell] said something to [S.W.]; I told her to stop that [S.W.] was
going home. [Ms. Cantrell] said good [and] kept saying not so nice things [and
S.W.] said she was leaving [and Ms. Cantrell] grabbed her off [the] stool [and]
proceeded to beat on her.
{¶9} Ms. Bowers testified on cross-examination that she never saw S.W. approach, push,
or swing at Ms. Cantrell prior to the incident. She testified that she “saw [Ms. Cantrell] grab [S.W.]
around the neck, pull her to the floor, pin her to the floor, and proceed to hit her.”
{¶10} City of Wadsworth Police Officer Anthony Merlene was dispatched to Altercare in
response to a call that “two female employees were actively fighting.” Officer Merlene testified
that an employee informed him when he arrived that Ms. Cantrell had left the premises. He testified
that a search of the property was conducted for Ms. Cantrell’s vehicle and that her vehicle was not
located.
{¶11} Officer Merlene took pictures of S.W.’s injuries. He testified that S.W. “had some
redness to her nose and cheek . . . along with . . . there being blood, and her upper lip was split
wide open.” Officer Merlene did not observe any injuries on S.W. that would lead him to believe
that S.W. threw punches or that she did anything physical towards Ms. Cantrell.
{¶12} Ms. Cantrell testified in her defense at trial. She testified that she had argued with
S.W. prior to December 2, 2024, when S.W. offended her and insinuated that she “wasn’t doing
[her] job[.]” Ms. Cantrell testified that S.W. offended her on December 2, 2024, when she “told
[her] about the residents that she got up[,]” again insinuating that Ms. Cantrell was not doing her
job. Ms. Cantrell decided that she was not going to put up with S.W. that day and that she was
going to leave work. Ms. Cantrell “had a job interview for a different job the next day anyway,”
and was not worried about any repercussions from leaving work early.
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{¶13} Ms. Cantrell testified that her coat was at the nurses’ station and that S.W. and Ms.
Bowers were sitting at the nurses’ station when she went to get her coat to leave. Ms. Bowers
allegedly said at the nurses’ station that Ms. Cantrell and S.W. had to figure out how to get along.
Ms. Cantrell was “not doing that” and she “turned back around and grabbed [her] coat.”
{¶14} Ms. Cantrell testified that S.W. stood up and pushed her when she went to grab her
coat. She contends that she “dodged” S.W.’s first swing and that she pushed “[Ms. Bowers] into
[S.W.’s] other hit so [S.W.] wouldn’t hit [her][.]” Ms. Cantrell testified that she “proceeded to hit
[S.W.]” only after S.W. had already swung at her two times. She contends that she pulled herself
and S.W. up “by her hair” after the physical altercation.
{¶15} Ms. Cantrell denies leaving Altercare immediately after the altercation. She
testified that she “moved very slowly, . . . because, honestly, I was trying to wait for [the police
officer] to come in.” She contends that “everybody pushed [her] and rushed [her] out” after the
incident and that she talked to a resident “[f]or about twenty minutes” before leaving Altercare.
{¶16} The court found Ms. Cantrell guilty of assault and sentenced her to 180 days in jail,
with all 180 days suspended provided she comply with the terms of one-year community control.
She was ordered to have no contact with S.W., engage in anger management counseling, and
perform 24 hours of community service. Fines and court costs were also imposed. Ms. Cantrell
appeals, asserting four assignments of error for this Court’s review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
MS. CANTRELL WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
5
{¶17} Ms. Cantrell argues in her first assignment of error that she was denied the effective
assistance of counsel. She maintains that trial counsel was ineffective as he failed to file a notice
of self-defense pursuant to Crim.R. 12.2 and he “failed to seek a continuance or other remedial
relief when it became clear that the trial court would exclude self-defense evidence due to lack of
notice.” We disagree.
{¶18} “[I]n Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed competent.” State v. Gondor,
2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 62. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Ms. Cantrell
must establish (1) that her counsel's performance was deficient to the extent that “counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) “that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). A deficient performance is one that “fall[s] below an objective standard of reasonable
representation[.]” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that a court, however,
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be
considered sound trial strategy.”
Strickland at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). To establish prejudice,
Ms. Cantrell must show that there existed “a reasonable probability that, but for [her] counsel's
error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Sowell, 2016-Ohio-8025,
¶ 138. Both prongs under Strickland must be established to support an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Strickland at 687.
{¶19} Ms. Cantrell argues that “self-defense was plainly the central theory of the defense”
and that “[t]here is no reasonable strategic justification for [counsel’s] fail[ure] to file a Crim.R.
12.2 notice[.]” She argues that because “no notice was filed, . . . the trial court refused to consider
6
[her] testimony that S.W. initiated the physical confrontation[.]” Ms. Cantrell maintains that “the
outcome of the bench trial would have been different” if “self-defense [had] been properly
preserved and considered[.]”
{¶20} The State argues that “[t]here was absolutely zero evidence to suggest [Ms.
Cantrell] was acting in self-defense and so [her] trial counsel was not ineffective in not raising it
as an affirmative defense prior to trial.” It points out that the trial court still allowed Ms. Cantrell
to testify over objection to her point of view and her claim that S.W. had pushed and swung at her.
{¶21} The elements of self-defense are:
(1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the
affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he [or she] was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm and that his [or her] only means of escape
from such danger was in the use of such force; and (3) that the defendant did not
violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger.
(Bracketed text in original.) State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Barnes,
94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24 (2002). “A defendant satisfies [her] burden of establishing self-defense when
‘the defendant's evidence and any reasonable inferences about that evidence would allow a rational
trier of fact to find all the elements of a self-defense claim when viewed in the light most favorable
to the defendant[.]’” State v. Williams, 2026-Ohio-2363, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), quoting Messenger at ¶
25.
{¶22} The trial court allowed Ms. Cantrell to testify as to her point of view on what
happened on December 2, 2024. Ms. Cantrell testified that she was grabbing her coat to leave work
when S.W. “pushed [her][,]” causing her to “stumble[] back[.]” According to Ms. Cantrell, S.W.
then started swinging at her. Ms. Cantrell testified that she hit S.W. only after S.W. pushed and
swung at her, explaining:
I didn’t just go off and hit [S.W.]. She pushed me first. I don’t just go around just
hitting people. That doesn’t make sense.
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{¶23} Assuming without deciding that counsel’s failure to file a notice of self-defense
constituted deficient performance, Ms. Cantrell has made no showing that she was prejudiced. The
trial court permitted Ms. Cantrell to testify as to her point of view and she testified that she pushed
and swung at S.W. only after S.W. had swung at her. Hence, the trial court heard her testimony
that S.W. initiated the confrontation. Ms. Cantrell has not shown that she suffered prejudice and,
consequently, this Court cannot conclude that she received ineffective assistance from trial
counsel. Ms. Cantrell’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ENFORCING OHIO CRIMINAL RULE
12.2 IN A MANNER THAT EXCLUDED OR REFUSED TO CONSIDER
SELF-DEFENSE AS A DEFENSE-THEORY WITHOUT ADEQUATELY
EXERCISING ITS “INTEREST OF JUSTICE” DISCRETION, THEREBY
DENYING MS. CANTRELL A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO
PRESENT HER DEFENSE.
{¶24} Ms. Cantrell argues in her second assignment of error that the trial court erred and
denied her a meaningful opportunity to present her defense because it did not consider “in any
meaningful way” her arguments of self-defense at trial. We disagree.
{¶25} Crim.R. 12.2, titled “Notice of self-defense” provides
Whenever a defendant in a criminal case proposes to offer evidence or argue selfdefense, . . . the defendant shall, not less than . . . fourteen days before trial in a
misdemeanor case, give notice in writing of such intent. . . . If the defendant fails
to file such written notice, the court may exclude evidence offered by the defendant
related to the defense, unless the court determines that in the interest of justice such
evidence should be admitted.
“Accordingly, ‘under Crim.R. 12.2, a trial court has discretion whether to exclude a defendant’s
evidence of self-defense after the defendant fails to file the requisite notice, and an appellate court
reviews the trial court’s determination for an abuse of discretion.’” State v. Kashat, 2026-Ohio2254, ¶ 51 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Hawkins, 2024-Ohio-1253, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). An abuse of
8
discretion is something more than an error of law or in the exercise of judgment; “it implies that
the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Emphasis added.) Blakemore
v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When applying this standard, a reviewing court is
precluded from simply substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med.
Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993).
{¶26} Although Blakemore is often cited as the general standard for reviewing
discretionary decisions, the Ohio Supreme Court has provided additional guidance about the nature
of an abuse of discretion:
Stated differently, an abuse of discretion involves more than a difference in opinion:
the “‘term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of
a determination made between competing considerations.’” State v. Jenkins, 15
Ohio St.3d 164, 222 [](1984), quoting Spalding v. Spalding, 355 Mich. 382, 384
[](1959). For a court of appeals to reach an abuse-of-discretion determination, the
trial court’s judgment must be so profoundly and wholly violative of fact and reason
that “‘it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of
judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or
bias.’” Id., quoting Spalding at 384-385[].
State v. Weaver, 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶ 24.
{¶27} Ms. Cantrell acknowledges that she did not file a notice of self-defense as required
by Crim.R. 12.2. Notwithstanding the absence of notice, she asserts that the trial court erred in
failing to consider self-defense and that it should have done so “in the interest of justice.” See
Crim.R. 12.2. She argues that “[b]y refusing to evaluate the testimony through the lens of selfdefense, the court prevented [her] from presenting her defense in any meaningful way.” The State
points out that the trial court allowed Ms. Cantrell to testify as to her point of view of what
happened in the altercation and to cross-examine the State’s witnesses “about who started the
affray.” It contends that the trial court “properly acted within its discretion by allowing [Ms.
9
Cantrell] to present her defense without unfairly shifting the burden of proof to the State to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Ms. Cantrell] did not use force in self-defense.”
{¶28} In this case, after Ms. Cantrell testified in her own defense and explained her
version of the relevant events. The trial court considered her testimony and it stated when rendering
its verdict and addressing Ms. Cantrell:
I’m also going to find that you’re not credible. In other words, I didn’t believe your
testimony.
{¶29} Upon a review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court acted in an
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner when it acted within its discretion and enforced
Crim.R. 12.2. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219. Even if we assume, without deciding, that the trial
court abused its discretion when it enforced Crim.R. 12.2, she has not established that the error
was anything other than harmless. State v. Watson, 2011-Ohio-2882, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.) (“[E]ven
assuming, without deciding, that the trial court abused its discretion in calling the witnesses as
court’s witnesses, [the appellant] has not established that the error was anything other than
harmless.”). Crim.R. 52(A) governs harmless error and provides that “[a]ny error, defect,
irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” “Whether
the defendant's substantial rights were affected depends on whether the error was prejudicial, i.e.,
whether it affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 18. We cannot say
that any error in the trial court in enforcing Crim.R. 12.2 affected the outcome of trial. Ms.
Cantrell’s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MS. CANTRELL’S CRIM.R.
29 MOTION BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE THAT SHE KNOWINGLY CAUSED OR ATTEMPTED TO
CAUSE PHYSICAL HARM[.]
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{¶30} Ms. Cantrell argues in her third assignment of error that the trial court erred when
it denied her Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. We disagree.
{¶31} “There is no difference between the standard of review for a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence and that for a motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29.” State v. Rivera,
2023-Ohio-1788, ¶ 37 (9th Dist.). The issue of whether a conviction is supported by sufficient
evidence is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio S.3d 380,
386 (1997). When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must
determine whether the prosecution met its burden of production. Rivera at ¶ 37. The Ohio Supreme
Court explained this Court’s role as follows:
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind
of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶32} Ms. Cantrell does not dispute that she was involved in a physical altercation with
S.W. Ms. Cantrell acknowledged at trial that she “hit” S.W. and that she “pulled her up by her
hair” after the altercation. She argues that the State failed to present evidence as to how the
altercation began and that she acted with intent. It is her position that the State failed to establish
that she knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to S.W. The State points to the
testimony of Ms. Bowers, who witnessed the incident, and S.W. It argues that it established that
Ms. Cantrell started the physical encounter and she knowingly caused or attempted to cause
physical harm to S.W.
11
{¶33} Ms. Cantrell was found guilty of assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A). R.C.
2903.13(A) provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to
another . . . .” R.C. 2901.22(B) describes the culpable mental state required to prove a violation
of R.C. 2903.13(A):
A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the
person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that
such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular
fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person
subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to
make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
{¶34} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s assault conviction. Contrary to Ms. Cantrell’s
contention that “[n]o witness testified that [she] initiated the physical encounter[,]” Ms. Bowers
testified that she witnessed the incident and that Ms. Cantrell started the altercation when she
“snatched” S.W. off a stool and started “hitting her[.]” Ms. Bowers testified that she never saw
S.W. approach, push, or swing at Ms. Cantrell prior to the incident. S.W. similarly testified that
Ms. Cantrell initiated the incident when she pulled her off a stool and started hitting her. She
testified that she did not make any prior threats towards Ms. Cantrell nor did she swing at Ms.
Cantrell before she was pulled off the stool and hit. Officer Merelene testified that the injuries he
observed were consistent with an assault.
{¶35} Based on a thorough review of the record, this Court concludes that there is
sufficient evidence upon which the court could reasonably conclude that all elements of assault in
violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we cannot
say the trial court erred when it denied Ms. Cantrell’s Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.
Ms. Cantrell’s third assignment of error is overruled.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
MS. CANTRELL’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE[.]
{¶36} Ms. Cantrell argues in her fourth assignment of error that her assault conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶37} When considering a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court is
required to consider the entire record, “weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier
of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.
1986). “A reversal on this basis is reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.” State v. Croghan, 2019-Ohio-3970, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.). This Court
“will not overturn a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because
the trier of fact chose to believe the State's version of events over another version.” State v. Barger,
2016-Ohio-443, ¶ 29 (9th Dist.).
{¶38} Ms. Cantrell again argues incorrectly in her fourth assignment of error that “[n]o
witness testified that [she] initiated the physical encounter.” It is her position that “[t]he State’s
case rested almost entirely on limited and internally thin testimony, while [she] provided a
consistent account of how the altercation began and why she acted as she did.” The State points to
the testimony of Ms. Bowers, S.W., and Officer Merlene and argues that it “met its burden of
persuasion in this matter.”
{¶39} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that Ms. Cantrell’s conviction of
assault is against the weight of the evidence. First her claim is based on the faulty assertion that no
one else witnessed the incident. While Ms. Cantrell testified that S.W. initiated the physical
13
altercation, witness Ms. Bowers testified that Ms. Cantrell initiated the altercation when she
“snatched” S.W. off a stool and started “hitting her[.]” S.W. also testified that Ms. Cantrell initiated
the altercation when she pulled her off the stool and started hitting her. Officer Merlene testified
that he observed S.W.’s injuries and that he could not locate Ms. Cantrell after the incident. Ms.
Cantrell mischaracterizes this evidence and otherwise does not establish it is not credible.
{¶40} Lastly, it is well-established that “a trier of fact enjoys the best position to assess
the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Tyus, 2020-Ohio-4455, ¶ 57 (9th Dist.). “As the trier of fact
in a bench trial, the trial court ‘determines the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
the evidence.’” Quester v. Quester, 2024-Ohio-1456, ¶ 34 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Lavery,
2001-Ohio-1638, *2 (9th Dist. Oct. 24, 2001). The trial court judge stated that she did not find Ms.
Cantrell to be credible. Ms. Cantrell has not met her burden to establish that the trial court’s
credibility determination was incorrect.
{¶41} Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we cannot conclude that
this is an exceptional case where the trial court clearly lost its way in finding that Ms. Cantrell was
guilty of assault. Accordingly, we conclude that Ms. Cantrell’s conviction is not against the weight
of the evidence and her fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶42} Based on the foregoing, Ms. Cantrell’s assignments of error are overruled, and the
judgment of the Wadsworth Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
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We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wadsworth Municipal
Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
SCOT STEVENSON
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
SUTTON, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
YU KIM-REYNOLDS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
JARED C. ROBERTS, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.