Judgment rendered September 30, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 57,105-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
DE’ANDRUS LONG, JR. Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Madison, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 215051
Honorable Laurie Reis Brister, Judge
*****
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT SERVICE Counsel for Appellant By: Remy V. Starns
Summer Vicknair
JAMES EDWARD PAXTON Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
EDWIN MOBERLEY
BRADLEY T. SLOANE
Assistant District Attorneys
*****
Before STONE, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.
MARCOTTE, J.
This criminal appeal arises from the Sixth Judicial District Court,
Parish of Madison, the Honorable Laurie Brister presiding. Defendant,
De’Andrus Long, Jr. (“Long”), pled guilty to manslaughter and was
sentenced to 27 years at hard labor. He appeals his conviction on
jurisdictional grounds and his sentence on constitutional excessiveness
grounds. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Long was 17 years old at the time of the offense and was in the tenth
grade at Madison High School. He had a history of school disciplinary
issues, including reports for willful disobedience, disrespect toward
authority, and instigating or participating in fights. Long also had a
diagnosis of attention deficit disorder (“ADD”) for which he had been
prescribed Adderall.
On April 16, 2023, the Madison Parish Sheriff’s Department
responded to a 911 call regarding a shooting at the Old Truck Stop on
Highway 65 South, where Kirean Harris (“Harris”) had been shot in the
parking lot near the fuel pumps. Harris later died during surgery from
multiple gunshot wounds.
Surveillance video of the incident showed that Immanuel Dockery
(“Dockery”) and Long, also known as “Dump,” entered the store to take a
picture. This was described as a customary practice at that location. As the
boys were leaving the store, Harris entered. While Dockery and Long left
the store, audio/video footage captured Long stating, “I’d die behind mine”
and “I’d die for my gang.” Dockery and Long then entered a vehicle, with
Dockery driving. Dockery stopped before entering Highway 65, and Long exited the passenger side and walked toward the pumps where Harris’
vehicle was parked.
Long opened Harris’ passenger door and confronted him. Long then
punched Harris and walked back toward his vehicle. Harris exited his
vehicle, walked around to the driver’s side, opened the door, and bent down
as if looking for something. Audio captured Long asking, “What you
digging for?” Harris then stepped from the vehicle holding what appeared to
be a handgun and walked toward the front of the car with his hands slightly
out to his sides, asking Long, “What it is?”
Long immediately opened fire before Harris raised his weapon.
Harris was struck, fell to the ground, and, while falling, fired one round,
after which his 9mm pistol stovepipe jammed. Harris lay motionless on the
ground while Long continued firing an entire magazine at him. Several
bullets missed Harris and penetrated the casino wall of the truck stop,
narrowly missing patrons and shattering glass near an elderly woman seated
at a video poker machine.
According to the defense sentencing memorandum, the surveillance
video showed that the incident was not planned, and although Long initially
walked over and punched Harris, Harris then retrieved a gun from under the
driver’s seat before Long fired shots that struck Harris. The defense
acknowledged that Long initiated the encounter and could not legally claim
self-defense under the aggressor doctrine but argued that the victim’s
retrieval and brandishing of the firearm substantially mitigated Long’s
conduct.
The court found that Long was the initial aggressor because he
punched Harris but also found that Harris approached Long’s vehicle
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carrying a loaded gun, that both young men were armed, and that the initial
confrontation had been “no more than a simple battery” before the presence
of guns and the responses of immature individuals caused Harris’ death.
On May 8, 2023, a Madison Parish grand jury returned a true bill
charging Long with second degree murder, illegal possession of a handgun
by a juvenile, possession of a firearm at an alcoholic beverage outlet, and
aggravated criminal damage to property, all committed on April 16, 2023.
That morning, defense counsel filed a pleading captioned “In the Interest of
Deandrus Long,” “Division: Juvenile,” with the docket number left blank,
styled “Request for Mental Health Examination to Determine Juvenile’s
Competency to Proceed and Appointment of Competency Commission.”
The trial court found that it never signed an order appointing a
competency commission, never appointed any commission members, and
never set the motion for hearing. The trial court stated that “this court here
in the Sixth District did not have a pending competency commission motion
pending in this court when the indictment was returned.” The court held that
divestiture of juvenile jurisdiction under La. Ch. C. art. 305 was
accomplished by the indictment and distinguished State in the Interest of
T.C., 09-1852 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/12/10), 35 So. 3d 1088, because there, a
commission was already appointed and set for hearing. The court deemed
the motion moot, and advised counsel regarding competency that “you are
free to raise that issue at any time” in the criminal court.
On May 10-11, 2023, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity over defense counsel’s refusal to plead. By
written order signed May 11, 2023, the court withdrew that plea and stayed
all proceedings pending a determination of Long’s mental capacity,
3
expressly invoking La. Ch. C. art. 832. Defense counsel noticed an intent to
seek writs and obtained a return-date and stay order but never pursued the
issue further.
On May 11, 2023, the defense filed an application under La. C. Cr. P.
arts. 641 et seq. On August 9, 2023, the court appointed Dr. Candi L. Hill
and Dr. Jennifer L. Russell to a competency commission. On September 6,
2023, both parties stipulated that Long was then incompetent to proceed.
The court so found, ordered restoration treatment, and on September 8,
2023, committed Long to the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System
(“ELMHS”) Forensic Division.
ELMHS returned a restoration report dated May 28, 2024, by Dr. John
Roberts, III, and Dr. Shannon Sanders. The court held a contradictory
competency hearing on September 4, 2024. Dr. Roberts testified that
ELMHS observed Long for roughly two months and recommended a finding
of competence. He stated that Long “was provided with plea bargain
scenarios” and “chose correctly in each scenario.” He further stated that
Long “can maintain a consistent defense and inform his attorney of
distortions and misstatements of others,” and “can tolerate the stress of
trial.”
The defense called Dr. Loretta Sonnier-Dumontet, who testified that
she had never examined Long and never opined that Long was incompetent,
instead recommending a further evaluation on competency to plead. Dr.
Sonnier-Dumontet further stated that her recommendation “doesn’t imply
that he’s incompetent.”
The court ruled as follows: “the court does find that Mr. Long is
presently able to understand the proceedings against him and is able to assist
4
counsel in his defense … he is found competent to proceed to trial,” and a
written judgment was issued.
On November 3, 2025, the matter came before the court for purposes
of setting a plea date. Counsel advised the court that the parties had
discussed an offer involving manslaughter, and the court stated that any plea
of that nature would need to be taken in person in open court. The parties
discussed taking the plea first and sentencing later after a presentence
investigation.
On November 17, 2025, pursuant to a negotiated agreement, the state
amended count one from second degree murder to manslaughter and
dismissed the remaining three felony counts. The state advised the trial
court that, in anticipation of a plea, the state had offered Long the
opportunity to plead guilty to the amended charge of manslaughter, subject
to court approval.
The court conducted a plea colloquy and specifically found that Long
understood the crime and penalties, understood his rights, and knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived those rights. Long then pled guilty to
the amended charge of manslaughter. No reservation pursuant to State v.
Crosby, 338 So. 2d 584 (La. 1976), was made.
As the factual basis for the plea, the state contended that on or about
April 16, 2023, Long was at the Old Truck Stop on Highway 65 and was
seen on video shooting Harris. Long agreed that those facts were what he
did to commit the offense of manslaughter, and the court found a factual
basis for the plea. The court ordered a presentence investigation report
(“PSI”).
5
On January 12, 2026, the matter came before the court for sentencing.
The trial court stated that it had received the PSI and had provided redacted
copies to the state and defense. After reviewing the PSI and hearing victimimpact statements from the victim’s grandmother and aunt, the court
sentenced Long to serve 27 years at hard labor, with credit for two years and
243 days served. The court read extensive written reasons into the record
and discussed several aggravating and mitigating factors, all in compliance
with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. Defense counsel’s oral motion to reconsider
was denied, over objection. Long now appeals.
DISCUSSION
Trial Court Jurisdiction
Long argues that the trial court erred in concluding that juvenile
jurisdiction was divested merely because the state returned an indictment
after his counsel had already raised his incapacity to proceed in juvenile
court. Long contends that the mandatory protections of La. Ch. C. arts. 832
and 833 were triggered once he filed his motion in juvenile court for a
mental health examination and appointment of a competency commission.
Long claims that the trial court improperly treated the motion as moot,
imposed a nonstatutory requirement that a commission already be appointed
or a hearing already be set, and allowed the state’s indictment to supersede a
pending juvenile competency issue. Because competency is a fundamental
prerequisite to prosecution, and because juvenile competency protections
limit the ordinary transfer mechanism under La. Ch. C. art. 305, Long argues
that his conviction and sentence should be vacated or, alternatively, that the
matter should be remanded for proper determination of the effect of the preindictment competency filing.
6
By its terms, La. Ch. C. art. 305(E)(1) operates only “if a competency
or sanity commission is ordered.” It does not operate upon the filing of a
request. The word choice was deliberate. La. C. Cr. P. art. 642 and La. Ch.
C. art. 832, which govern how the issue is raised, each provide that mental
incapacity “may be raised.” La. Ch. C. art. 305(E) does not use that word
but rather requires an order. This distinction has been drawn before in State
v. M.C., 10-1107 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/18/11), 60 So. 3d 1264, 1274, writ
denied, 11-0570 (La. 10/7/11), 71 So. 3d 306 (Bonin, J. concurring in part):
It is worthwhile to note that the triggering mechanism under
Article 305(E)(1) is that the competency commission has been
ordered, not simply that the mental incapacity of the accused
has been raised. Cf. La. C. Cr. P. art. 642, and La. Ch. C. art.
832. This is a salutary safeguard against tactics designed solely
to obstruct or unjustifiably delay the divestiture of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction when the grand jury has decided to indict a
child.
The order requirement is thus important because a district attorney’s
charging decision could otherwise be held hostage to defense timing.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reads the parallel adult provision the
same way. In State v. Lee, 03-0032 (La. 6/27/03), 852 So. 2d 987, the court
directed the district court on remand to determine whether “the trial judge
granted the defendant’s motion for appointment of a sanity commission …
thereby finding reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant’s competency to
proceed and staying all further proceedings by operation of La. C. Cr. P. art.
642.” In other words, the stay arises from the granting, not the filing.
Appointment of a sanity commission is never automatic. See, e.g., State v.
Carmouche, 01-0405 (La. 5/14/02), 872 So. 2d 1020, 1041-42 (“the
appointment of a sanity commission is not a perfunctory matter, a ministerial
duty of a trial court, or a matter of right.”). A court must first find the
7
question “bona fide and in good faith,” State ex rel. Seals v. State, 00-2738,
p. 6 (La. 10/25/02), 831 So. 2d 828, 833, because “the fact that a defendant
calls his capacity to proceed into question does not for that reason alone
require the trial court to order a mental examination.” State v. Lott, 574 So.
2d 417, 424 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 666 (La. 1991).
Here, the trial court found it had ordered nothing, appointed no one,
and set no hearing before the true bill was returned. This finding was
supported by the record and is not clearly wrong. The pleading was
captioned in the juvenile division with no docket number and was filestamped and delivered to the prosecutor after the grand jury had convened
that morning. No sanity commission was ordered, and La. Ch. C. art.
305(E)(1) does not operate absent such an order.
In any event, La. Ch. C. art. 305 is not jurisdictional. La. Ch. C. art.
305(E) prescribes the sequence in which a court may act rather than
conferring or withdrawing subject matter jurisdiction. As such, any
violation is a procedural error subject to the ordinary rules of preservation,
waiver, and harmless error. We note that after the arraignment on May 10-11, 2023, at which the court entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by
reason of insanity over counsel’s refusal to plead, the court by written order
of May 11, 2023, withdrew that plea and stayed all proceedings pending a
determination of Long’s mental incapacity. Thus, three days after the
indictment, on its own written order, the trial court granted Long the exact
relief La. Ch. C. art. 832 affords. The stay held for nearly 16 months, until
the competency litigation concluded on September 4, 2024, during which
Long was committed and restored. Under these circumstances, we find no
prejudice to Long. Where, as here, a defendant receives the substance of the
8
protection the statute contemplates, any irregularity in the order in which he
received it does not warrant vacating a conviction entered 2 ½ years
afterward. This assignment of error has no merit.
Competency to Plead
Next, Long argues that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea
without first ordering a competency-to-plead-guilty evaluation. He notes
that the record shows he was 17 at the time of the offense, had ADD, low
IQ, learning deficits, had previously been found incompetent, required
accommodations to maintain competence, and was the subject of an expert
recommendation for a plea-specific competency evaluation. Long concedes
that the trial court conducted a standard Boykin colloquy and that his trial
counsel assured the court that he was competent, but he maintains that this
was not enough to adequately establish that he actually understood the rights
he was waiving, the sentencing exposure he faced, or the consequences of
pleading guilty to manslaughter in adult criminal court. Long avers that the
trial court failed in its independent duty to ensure that the plea was knowing,
intelligent, voluntary, and competent under the totality of the circumstances.
In Louisiana, “a defendant is presumed to have the mental capacity to
proceed.” La. R.S. 15:432; La. C. Cr. P. art. 641. The defendant bears the
burden of proving incapacity by a preponderance of the evidence. State v.
Frank, 96-1136 (La. 10/4/96), 679 So. 2d 1365. The determination is
judicial, not medical; the court is not bound by expert opinion, and the ruling
is entitled to great weight, undisturbed absent abuse of discretion. La. C. Cr.
P. art. 647; State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So. 2d 877.
In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. Ed. 2d
321 (1993), the Supreme Court held that the competency standard for
9
pleading guilty is identical to the competency standard for standing trial –
the Dusky standard of rational and factual understanding and sufficient
present ability to consult with counsel. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960). The court declined a higher
“reasoned choice” standard for guilty pleas. La. C. Cr. P. art. 641 defines
mental incapacity to proceed in a single formulation applicable to all stages:
“a defendant lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or
to assist in his defense.” There is no article in Louisiana law prescribing a
separate competency-to-plead evaluation. We therefore cannot find error in
the trial court’s decision not to order one.
Additionally, voluntariness is determined from the entire record, not
the colloquy transcript alone, and a properly executed written waiver-ofrights form is part of the record, examined together with the colloquy and
minutes. State v. Shelton, 621 So. 2d 769 (La. 1993). Here, the record
contains a “waiver of constitutional rights and plea of guilty” executed on
November 17, 2025, bearing the correct docket number, Long’s name, and
the charge written in as “manslaughter.” Additionally, each of the three
Boykin rights was individually articulated and expressly waived.
The form also recites that the judge “asked me if I could read
and write the English language,” that Long “acknowledge[s] that I am guilty
of the offense charged and do knowingly and voluntarily waive such rights,”
was not “induced to plead guilty or sign this statement by any threat,
pressure or force,” is “satisfied with the way my attorney and the court have
handled my case,” understands the two-year post-conviction period, and that
“[t]he judge has addressed me personally as to all of these matters.
10
The written waiver is signed by Long, his counsel, and the trial judge,
dated November 17, 2025. Above the judge’s certification appears: “This
plea of guilty is accepted by the court after having determined that it is
knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily made by the defendant.”
Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court erred
in finding that Long was competent to proceed, and that his plea was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This assignment of error lacks merit.
Excessive Sentence
Finally, Long argues that the trial court erred in imposing a
constitutionally excessive 27-year hard labor sentence for manslaughter
given his youth, diminished intellectual functioning, ADD, lack of prior
criminal convictions, and the mitigating circumstances surrounding the
offense. Long complains that the sentence imposed was more than twothirds of the 40-year maximum sentence. He asserts that this sentence is
grossly disproportionate when measured against his limitations and the
circumstances of the offense. Long maintains that the sentence makes no
meaningful allowance for his youth, cognitive issues, and reduced
culpability.
Appellate courts employ a two-prong test when reviewing an
excessive sentence claim: (1) the trial record must demonstrate that the trial
court complied with the guidelines in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 (list of
sentencing factors); and (2) the appellate court must determine if the
sentence is constitutionally excessive. State v. Davis, 56,118 (La. App. 2
Cir. 2/26/25), 408 So. 3d 1086, writ denied, 25-00332 (La. 4/29/25), 407 So.
3d 624; State v. Sanders, 54,261 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 335 So. 3d 527;
11
State v. Cooksey, 53,660 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/26/21), 316 So. 3d 1284, writ
denied, 21-00901 (La. 10/12/21), 325 So. 3d 1074.
Articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr.
P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v.
Duncan, 53,194 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/20), 290 So. 3d 251. Important
elements to be considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family
ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior criminal record,
seriousness of the offense, and likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones,
398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); State v. DeBerry, 50,501 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied, 16-0959 (La. 5/1/17), 219 So. 3d 332.
The trial judge is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating
circumstance so long as the record reflects that he adequately considered the
guidelines of the article. State v. Shipp, 30,562 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/8/98), 712
So. 2d 230.
If the record supports the sentence imposed, the appellate court shall
not set aside a sentence for excessiveness. Id. There is no requirement that
specific matters be given particular weight at sentencing. DeBerry, supra;
State v. Shumaker, 41,547 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/13/06), 945 So. 2d 277, writ
denied, 07-0144 (La. 9/28/07), 964 So. 2d 351.
A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of
proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Kennon,
19-0998 (La. 9/1/20), 340 So. 3d 881; State v. Jackson, 51,575 (La. App. 2
Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 764.
A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime
12
and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the
sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166;
DeBerry, supra; State v. Modisette, 50,846 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/28/16), 207
So. 3d 1108. As a general rule, maximum or near-maximum sentences are
reserved for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto,
07-2031 (La. 2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665; State v. Gibson, 54,400 (La. App. 2
Cir. 5/25/22), 338 So. 3d 1260, writ denied, 22-00978 (La. 3/7/23), 356 So.
3d 1053.
Trial courts have wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within
the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as excessive
in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v. Trotter, 54,496
(La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116. On review, an appellate court
does not determine whether another sentence may have been more
appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Burns,
53,920 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 322 So. 3d 928.
Here, the trial court ordered, received, and reviewed a PSI, then read
detailed written reasons into the record, reciting the procedural history,
quoting La. R.S. 14:31 and the 40-year maximum, and canvassing Long’s
age, education, disciplinary history, and family background. The trial court
found several aggravating factors under La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(B),
including: (1) deliberate cruelty to the victim; (2) knowingly creating a risk
of death or great bodily harm to more than one person; (3) use of threats of
or actual violence in the commission of the offense; (4) use of a dangerous
weapon. The trial court also took into account several mitigating factors,
including: (1) the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct
would cause or threaten serious harm; (2) there were substantial grounds
13
tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s criminal conduct, though failing
to establish a defense; and (3) the victim of the defendant’s criminal conduct
induced or facilitated the commission. The trial court also expressly
credited Long’s youth and cognitive limitations as the reason the sentence
was 27 rather than 40 years. In our view, the trial court did an exemplary
job in complying with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and Long’s claim that the
article was not adhered to is without merit.
Long also received a substantial benefit from his plea agreement with
the state. He was indicted for second degree murder, which carries a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of
parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. By pleading to manslaughter,
Long reduced his exposure to a maximum of 40 years, and secured dismissal
of three additional felony counts. The trial court also declined to enhance
the sentence under La. C. Cr. P. art. 893.3.
A substantial reduction in sentencing exposure through a plea
agreement weighs heavily against excessiveness. In State v. Little, 52,131
(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/15/18), 252 So. 3d 1038, writ denied, 18-1582 (La.
3/25/19), 267 So. 3d 594, this court affirmed the maximum sentence 40-year
manslaughter sentence for a 17-year-old whose second degree murder
charge had been reduced by plea, noting the “very substantial reduction” in
exposure and that the killing bore “the mark of an execution.” Long is 20
years old, has no prior felony convictions, and received 13 years less than
the maximum sentence, which is markedly more lenient for similar conduct.
We also do not find that Long’s sentence shocks the sense of justice.
This was a defendant who left a vehicle, walked to a stranger’s car, opened
the door, and punched him. When the man armed himself, Long fired first,
14
before the victim’s weapon was raised, then emptied an entire magazine into
a motionless body on the ground, endangering bystanders by sending rounds
through the wall of an occupied casino. The trial court weighed the
mitigating circumstances at length and imposed 27 of a possible 40 years.
Under these circumstances, the sentence imposed does not shock the sense
of justice and it was not an abuse of discretion. This assignment of error is
without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, Long’s conviction and sentence are
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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