IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
Hunter Warfield, Inc., Sep 30 2026, 9:17 am
Appellant-Defendant CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
Alexandra Mai,
Appellee-Plaintiff
September 30, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CT-48
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Circuit Court
The Honorable Sean M. Persin, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79C01-1908-CT-114
Opinion by Judge Altice
Judge DeBoer concurs.
Judge Brown concurs in part and dissents in part with separate
opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 1 of 45
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Purdue University student Alexandra Hustedt-Mai (Tenant) signed a lease for
an apartment at the conclusion of which the property management company,
Granite Management, LLC (Granite), assessed Tenant around $110 in charges,
which Tenant disputed that she owed. Granite eventually referred the account
to Hunter Warfield, Inc. (HW), a national debt collection company. HW later
reported the debt to two credit reporting agencies (CRAs), and Tenant
continued to dispute it.
[2] Tenant filed a complaint against HW in Tippecanoe Circuit Court (the trial
court) that, as amended, alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The case was
removed to district court but remanded to the trial court for lack of federal
standing. The case proceeded to a jury trial, with the jury awarding Tenant
$200,000 in actual damages and $1,750,000 in punitive damages. Additionally,
the trial court ordered HW to pay Tenant $306,984 in attorney’s fees and
$47,393 in costs.
[3] HW raises six issues, which we restate:
1. Did the trial court err by denying HW’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings that asserted Tenant lacked standing?
2. Did the trial court err by denying HW’s motion for summary
judgment on Tenant’s FDCPA and FRCA claims?
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 2 of 45
3. Did the trial court err by denying HW’s motion for judgment
on the evidence?
4. Did the trial court apply the wrong evidentiary standard to
Tenant’s FRCA claim for punitive damages when it instructed
the jury that Tenant needed to establish her claim by a greater
weight of the evidence?
5. Did the trial court err in its costs award?
6. Did the trial court err when it denied HW’s motion to correct
error and refused to reduce the punitive damages award?
[4] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts & Procedural History 1
[5] While a graduate student at Purdue, Tenant leased an apartment at a complex
owned by a company called MSCI for the period of August 15, 2016 through
July 31, 2017. During that tenancy, Tenant executed another one-year lease, in
February 2017, for a different unit, Apartment 102, beginning August 1, 2017
through July 31, 2018 (the Lease). The Lease required Tenant and her
roommate to return their unit in as good a condition as when they received it,
ordinary wear and tear excepted. A couple months after Tenant signed the
Lease, MSCI sold the complex to Tailwind West Lafayette, LLC, who in turn
1
We held oral argument on August 5, 2026, at the Indiana Court of Appeals courtroom in Indianapolis,
Indiana. We thank counsel for their excellent written and oral advocacy.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 3 of 45
contracted with Granite to manage the property, including the handling of
leases, move out inspections, and assessment of charges.
[6] The prior tenant’s lease of Apartment 102 did not end until July 31, 2017 – the
day before Tenant’s Lease was to begin. In June, Tenant electronically executed
a Lease Addendum (As Is Addendum). It provided:
Granite Management, LLC, in agreement with [Tenant and
roommate], tenant(s) of . . . Apartment #102 shall deliver said
premises in as-is condition without having any cleaning, painting
or carpet cleaning done before move in per the request of [Tenant
and roommate]. The move-in date shall be August 1, 2017. No
walk thru checklist will be given, and the previous walk thru
checklist will serve as the reference for this lease term also.
Appendix Vol. 5 at 51. Granite did not perform a move-out inspection of
Apartment 102 to assess its condition, or otherwise see it, before Tenant moved
in. Tenant completed her own move-in checklist, which she electronically
submitted to Granite via its portal. Tenant received a reply from Granite
indicating receipt of the checklist.
[7] Tenant moved out in May 2018, a few months before the end of the Lease, as
she was graduating and moving out of state; her roommate remained in the
apartment for the duration of the lease term. The day after the Lease ended,
Granite inspected the apartment. On September 6, 2018, Granite issued an
Itemization of Security Deposit Return, charging Tenant $140.91, consisting of
cleaning and painting, carpet cleaning and flooring replacement, and
maintenance labor and supplies. Tenant disputed the charges. Granite revisited
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 4 of 45
the assessment and, after considering Tenant’s move-in checklist that she had
submitted, reduced the amount owed to $110.58. Tenant continued to maintain
that she did not owe the charges, telling Granite that she was being charged for
things that were listed on her move-in checklist as having been already
damaged. Granite ultimately referred the outstanding $110.58 to HW for
collection. 2
[8] In March 2019, HW sent a collection letter to Tenant, and, thereafter, Tenant
and HW exchanged phone calls and letters, in which Tenant disputed the
charges. Consistent with its collection practices for Granite, HW, in June 2019,
began reporting the claimed obligation to two CRAs, Equifax and TransUnion.
In July 2019, Tenant sent letters, by certified mail to the CRAs, disputing the
reporting. To verify the debt, HW reached out to Granite, who on July 10,
2019, advised HW that Tenant owed the $110.58 balance and that the charges
had been properly and timely itemized and sent to Tenant as required by
Indiana law. After receiving Granite’s response, and after reviewing the Lease
and the itemization of charges, 3 HW continued with reporting the debt to the
CRAs until October 2020, when Granite withdrew the account from collections
and wrote off the balance.
2
Under HW’s contract with Granite, HW would be paid forty percent of any charges successfully collected.
3
HW either did not have or did not consider the As Is Addendum at that time.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 5 of 45 [9] On June 2, 2021, Tenant filed a complaint in Tippecanoe County against HW
alleging violation of the FDCPA, 4 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq., for HW’s conduct in
attempting to collect the claimed debt. The complaint alleged that Tenant “was
harmed by [HW]’s continued attempts to collect debt that she never owed” and
that she was seeking actual and statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs for
violations of the FDCPA. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 111. The complaint’s
numerous factual allegations detailed HW’s alleged actions or failures in
collecting a debt that Tenant maintained she did not owe, including sending
letters and reporting a debt to CRAs that HW knew or should have known to be
false to CRAs. The factual allegations alleged that, in response, Tenant had sent
letters to HW, disputing the charges. Tenant also alleged damages:
58. HW’s action [sic] concerning [Tenant] have caused damages,
including not by way of limitation: costs of sending one or more
certified letters and [Tenant]’s time.
4
The FDCPA’s purpose is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors [and] to insure
that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively
disadvantaged…” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The act regulates communications in connection with debt collection,
including when and under what circumstances a debt collector can communicate with a consumer, and with
whom, besides the consumer, a debt collector may communicate. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c. A debt collector “may
not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Violative conduct includes “[t]he false representation of [] the character, amount,
or legal status of any debt[,]” “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken[,]”
“[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which
should be known to be false[,]” and “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or
attempt to collect any debt[.]” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), (5), (8) and (10). A debt collector “may not use
unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Violative
conduct includes “[t]he collection of any amount . . . unless such amount is expressly authorized by the
agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 6 of 45
59. HW’s communications with [Tenant] caused [her] anxiety
and stress.
Id. at 115.
[10] On July 26, 2021, Tenant filed an amended complaint, which added a claim for
violation of the FCRA, 5 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. The amended complaint
included additional factual allegations pertaining to HW, including that HW
had failed to review all relevant information, furnished inaccurate information
to CRAs, and failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of her dispute. The
two paragraphs specifically alleging damages caused by HW due to mailing
costs, lost time, anxiety, and stress had been removed from the first amended
complaint. The amended complaint added factual allegations pertaining to
actions that Tenant had taken in response to the debt collection, namely, she
5
The FCRA’s purpose is “to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for
meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit … in a manner that is fair and equitable to the
consumer…” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). Furnishers – entities that provide consumer credit information to CRAs –
are prohibited from providing any information to a CRA if the furnisher knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that the information is inaccurate. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a). If a furnisher determines that previously
reported information is not complete or accurate, it must promptly notify the CRA of that determination,
provide any necessary corrections, and refrain from thereafter furnishing the information that remains
incomplete or inaccurate. Id.
When a furnisher is notified by a CRA that a consumer has disputed the accuracy or completeness of
information that the furnisher provided, the furnisher has a duty to conduct an investigation (sometimes
referred to as a “reinvestigation”). 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). Courts have held that the investigation must be
“reasonable.” See Woods v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 27 F.4th 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2022) (holding the investigation
must be reasonable and “pro forma inquiries will not do”); Walton v. EOS CCA, 885 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir.
2018) (“Whether the furnisher’s investigation is reasonable is a factual inquiry.”). If a furnisher cannot verify
the disputed information, it must delete it. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E).
A consumer who demonstrates that a furnisher was negligent in breaching Section -2(b) is entitled to actual
damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. If the consumer can establish that a furnisher willfully violated one of its duties,
the consumer may recover actual or statutory damages, as well as punitive damages under 15 U.S.C. §
1681n. Costs and reasonable attorney’s fees are authorized under both §§ 1681n and 1681o.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 7 of 45
“notified [] Equifax and TransUnion that she did not owe anything to HW or
Granite” and “requested a reinvestigation[.]” Id. at 123.
[11] On August 31, 2021, HW removed the action to federal court based on federal
question jurisdiction. On October 12, 2021, Tenant filed (in federal court) a
second amended complaint, which was, in large part, the same as the first
amended complaint. 6 Tenant also moved to remand the case back to state court,
arguing that she did not allege any injury in fact in her second amended
complaint sufficient to support Article III standing. In opposing remand, HW
argued that Tenant had alleged injury sufficient for standing and, further, had
intentionally removed from her complaint the specific allegations of injury in an
attempt to avoid federal standing.
[12] On January 24, 2022, the district court granted Tenant’s motion for remand. In
its order, the court observed the “topsy-turvy” nature of the situation, with
Tenant “trying to convince [the court] she has no concrete injury, while [HW]
insists [Tenant] has indeed been injured by its conduct.” Id. at 155. The court
explained that standing in federal courts requires an “injury in fact” which is
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical” and that, here, Tenant had alleged only that HW reported
allegedly inaccurate information to CRAs, “but nothing beyond that – not that
6
Several factual allegations pertaining to “[t]he CRA Defendants” that had been in the first amended
complaint were not included in the second amended complaint, with HW explaining at a hearing that CRAs
had never been named as defendants and the allegations had been inadvertently included in the first amended
complaint that was filed. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 124; Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 8 at 224-232.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 8 of 45
those agencies had provided inaccurate credit reports or scores . . . to any thirdparties, or that [Tenant] had otherwise been concretely and negatively impacted
by HW’s sharing of erroneous information.” Id. at 156, 164. The district court
concluded that HW failed to demonstrate how the operative complaint alleges a
concrete injury in fact so as to establish [Tenant]’s standing to bring the action 7
and remanded the case to the trial court. 8
[13] On December 9, 2022, HW moved for judgment on the pleadings under Ind.
Trial Rule 12(C), asserting that the second amended complaint did not allege
any actual harm or injury and that Tenant lacked standing. The trial court held
a hearing on January 24, 2023, taking the matter under advisement. While that
was pending, our Supreme Court decided Hoosier Contrs., LLC v. Gardner, 212
N.E.3d 1234 (Ind. 2023), involving whether a homeowner, who had brought
statutory claims against a contractor, had brought forth sufficient evidence of
injury to establish standing to withstand the contractor’s motion for summary
judgment. The trial court set HW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings for an
additional hearing to address the impact of Hoosier Contrs.
7
The court recognized that, unlike some circuits, “the Seventh Circuit has taken a very restrictive view on
the standing requirement in FCRA and FDCPA cases, dismissing many cases over the past couple years on
standing grounds.” Id. at 158.
8
Tenant’s action against HW was consolidated with a case that Tenant had filed against Granite and
Tailwind in August 2019. On January 19, 2023, summary judgment was granted in favor of Granite and
Tailwind on Tenant’s then-remaining claims, which were under Indiana’s Deceptive Consumer Sales Act
(DCSA) and Indiana’s Crime Victim’s Relief Act (CVRA). See Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 3 at 148.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 9 of 45 [14] While HW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was pending, Tenant and
HW each filed a motion for summary judgment. Tenant sought partial
summary judgment under certain sections of the FDCPA on the basis that HW
was seeking to collect money for damages that existed before she moved into
the apartment and that she did not cause. HW’s motion asserted it was entitled
to summary judgment on both the FCRA and the FDCPA claims, in part,
because the As Is Addendum was enforceable and made the debt valid and
owed, precluding Tenant’s statutory claims. HW also argued that, as required,
it had contacted Granite to verify the debt and notified the CRAs that the
account was being disputed.
[15] Following a hearing, the trial court issued an Order on Dispositive Motions on
July 31, 2023, which (1) denied HW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings for
lack of standing and (2) granted, in part, the parties’ motions for summary
judgment. As to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court made
several initial observations: Tenant had not suffered a denial of credit, a loss of
credit previously extended, a lowering of credit limits or a requirement to pay a
higher interest rate as a result of the reporting of the alleged debt to the CRAs;
although Tenant’s postage costs were pecuniary losses, “these voluntary
expenses are not the types of ‘actual damages’ contemplated by the FCRA or
FDCPA”; and “procedural violations and statutory damages are insufficient to
confer standing” and that Tenant “does not seek injunctive relief or a
declaratory judgment.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 70. The court then
determined:
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 10 of 45
[T]he court finds that unless there is some binding authority
holding that emotional damages alone are insufficient to confer
standing in Indiana, then [Tenant] should not be denied her day
in court. It is undisputed that the FCRA and FDCPA allow for
actual damages, which can include emotional harm. [HW] cites
no Indiana authority suggesting that emotional harm alone is
insufficient to confer standing. Importantly, Hoosier Contrs. does
not address emotional harm.
The court is not concerned with lack of references to emotional
harm in the Second Amended Complaint, which requests
“damages” and “all other relief just and proper in the premises.”
Indiana’s notice pleading requires only a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief” and “a demand for relief to which the pleader deems
entitled.” Ind. Trial Rule 8(A). A pleading need not adopt a
specific legal theory of recovery or state all elements of a cause of
action. A complaint’s allegations are sufficient if they put a
reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues. Here,
[Tenant] has consistently claimed emotional harm.
Id. at 70-71 (internal citation omitted).
[16] The court granted Tenant’s motion for summary judgment only to the extent
that Tenant was a “consumer,” HW was a “debt collector,” and the obligation
was a “consumer debt” under the relevant statutes. As to HW’s motion for
summary judgment, the court determined, in part, that the As Is Addendum
was “enforceable to the extent it applies to routine and regular cleaning, paint
touch up, or carpet vacuuming or cleaning.” Id. at 73. The court denied HW’s
motion in all other respects due to genuine issues of material fact.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 11 of 45 [17] On June 4-7, 2024, the case proceeded to jury trial on Tenant’s FCRA and
FDCPA claims. Tenant testified that the apartment was in poor condition when
she moved in, including broken locks, scuffs and holes in the walls, stained and
fraying carpets, a broken stove, a stained toilet, a non-functional sink, and a
front door that did not shut properly. There was also testimony that she and her
then boyfriend (now husband) cleaned the apartment, he took pictures of its
condition, and she left it in a better condition than she had received it. The
move-in checklist from the prior tenant reflected some of the same unclean and
damaged conditions that Tenant noted in her move-in checklist that she had
submitted to Granite. Exhibits Vol. 2 at 82, 84 (Plaintiff’s Exhibits 9 and 10).
Tenant testified that, as a result of HW’s reporting, she experienced increased
anxiety, reputational embarrassment, intrusive thoughts, inability to focus, and
emotional withdrawal and required an increase in anti-anxiety medication. She
did not apply on her own for either an apartment or a car loan, anticipating
denial.
[18] In her case-in-chief, Tenant also presented the testimony of: an FRCA/creditreporting industry expert; an attorney with Purdue legal services; chief
executive officer of Granite; another expert who was formerly an Experian
dispute agent and, later, its corporate representative; Tenant’s husband; and
HW’s manager of operational strategies, who was HW’s corporate
representative at trial. Tenant presented portions of video deposition testimony
of four HW employees: two dispute agents, a manager who oversees dispute
agents, and a compliance officer.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 12 of 45 [19] HW called Granite’s collection manager and HW’s corporate trial
representative. Generally speaking, HW’s trial position was that, under the
Lease and the As Is Addendum, Tenant owed the $110 in charges to Granite,
that HW’s agents communicated with Granite and verified that the amount was
owed, such that HW’s reporting of it to the CRAs was accurate as required by
law, and that HW’s investigation of the dispute was reasonable and proper.
[20] At the conclusion of Tenant’s evidence, HW moved for Ind. Trial Rule 50
judgment on the evidence, which the trial court denied. The parties briefed and
presented argument pertaining to the appropriate burden of proof applicable to
punitive damages, with HW maintaining it was a clear and convincing standard
and Tenant maintaining that, pursuant to federal law, it was by a
preponderance/greater weight of the evidence. Ultimately, the trial court
instructed the jury with a greater weight of the evidence burden of proof.
[21] The jury returned a verdict in favor of Tenant on all claims, determining that
HW was liable under both the FCRA and FDCPA and that HW had willfully
violated the FCRA, which allowed for recovery of punitive damages. The jury
awarded Tenant $200,000 in actual damages and $1,750,000 in punitive
damages. 9 Tenant moved for statutory attorney’s fees and costs, which HW
9
Following trial, the parties stipulated that Tenant was entitled to $1,000 in statutory damages under
FDCPA with HW retaining the right to appeal the jury’s verdict. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 8 at 245.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 13 of 45
opposed in part. The trial court reduced the hourly rates sought by counsel but
awarded the full amount of costs sought by Tenant, $47,393.
[22] HW filed a combined renewed motion for judgment on the evidence and
motion to correct error to reduce the jury award, arguing, in part, that the
punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive and that the costs
award exceeded statutory limits. The trial court denied the motion. HW now
appeals.
Discussion & Decision
1. Denial of HW’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
[23] HW asserts that the trial court erred in denying its T.R. 12(C) motion for
judgment on the pleadings, in which HW argued that Tenant’s operative
complaint did not include any allegation of injury and thus she lacked standing.
Like a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to
Trial Rule 12(B)(6), a motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Trial Rule 12(C) tests the sufficiency of the complaint to
state a redressable claim, not the facts to support it. A judgment
on the pleadings is proper only when there are no genuine issues
of material fact and when the facts shown by the pleadings
clearly entitle the moving party to judgment. A trial court should
grant such a motion only when it is clear from the pleadings that
the non-moving party cannot in any way succeed under the facts
and allegations therein. In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings this court conducts a de
novo review. We look only to the pleadings in making this
assessment. We will accept as true the well-pleaded material facts
alleged. The moving party is deemed to have admitted wellCourt of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 14 of 45
pleaded facts in favor of the nonmovant, and this court will draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.
Lockerbie Glove Co. Town Home Owner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Indianapolis Historic Pres.
Comm’n, 194 N.E.3d 1175, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). A trial court may grant a motion for judgment on the
pleadings if the party bringing the action lacks standing to do so. Id.
[24] Standing is a threshold issue: if it is lacking, the court cannot consider the
merits of the claim. Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212,
215 (Ind. 2022). Standing is a “significant restraint on the ability of Indiana
courts to act, as it denies the courts any jurisdiction absent an actual injured
party participating in the case.” Hoosier Contrs, 212 N.E.3d at 1238. Standing is
a legal question reviewed de novo. City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349,
351 (Ind. 2022).
[25] To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the
outcome of the litigation. Red Lobster Restaurants LLC v. Fricke, 234 N.E.3d 159,
167 (Ind. 2024). “Indiana law is clear that standing requires an injury, which is
met if the party shows it ‘ha[s] suffered or [is] in immediate danger of suffering
a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct.’” Hoosier Contrs., 212
N.E.3d at 1238 (quoting Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 217) (internal citation omitted);
McLinden v. Tangoe U.S., Inc., 263 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). HW
maintains that Tenant, who removed from her complaint the specific damage
allegations of stress, anxiety, and mailing costs, “intentionally pled her way out
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 15 of 45
of federal court. But in doing so, she also pled her way out of state court.”
Appellant’s Brief at 26. After careful consideration, we disagree.
[26] Our decision today is particularly informed by Hoosier Contrs., where our
Supreme Court recognized that “[a]t the pleading stage, a claimant’s general
factual allegations of injury arising from the defendant’s conduct may suffice to
satisfy standing.” 212 N.E.3d at 1239. There, a homeowner, Gardner,
contacted Hoosier Contractors (Hoosier) to inspect his roof and obtain an
estimate for repairs, and Hoosier required Gardner to first sign a contract
agreeing to hire Hoosier for any necessary repairs. Gardner ultimately hired
another company to perform the work.
[27] Hoosier sued Gardner for breach of contract, and Gardner counterclaimed on
behalf of a class, alleging that Hoosier’s form contract violated the Home
Improvement Contractors Act (HICA) and that the violations constituted
deceptive acts under the DCSA. Hoosier moved for summary judgment on the
basis that Gardner and the class lacked standing because they did not suffer
actual injury, designating evidence that Garner hired another company to do
the repairs for a cheaper price. Gardner and the class asserted that all those who
signed the noncompliant-HICA contract had suffered statutory damages under
the DCSA. The trial court denied Hoosier’s motion.
[28] Our Supreme Court reversed, finding that the DCSA provides that a person
who relies on a deceptive act may bring an action “for the damages actually
suffered” as a result of relying on the deceptive act and that Gardner’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 16 of 45
documents submitted in response to summary judgment “showed [that]
Hoosier’s deceptive acts did not harm him at all” given that he hired another
company for the repairs at a lower cost. Id. at 1241. Because statutory violations
“are insufficient by themselves to confer standing,” and Garder and the class
did not set forth designated evidence to show that they suffered actual injury,
the Court concluded that Hoosier was entitled to summary judgment. Id. at
1242. Of significance here, in reaching its decision, the Court recognized that,
in his counterclaim,
[Gardner] claimed that he and the other class members “relied upon
[the] deceptive acts perpetrated by Hoosier” and “suffered damages as a
result of the deceptive acts.” These injury allegations were sufficient to
confer standing at the litigation’s pleading stage. . . . But the summaryjudgment phase raises the threshold for proving an injury.
Id. at 1241 (internal citation omitted) (emphases added). The Court’s
observation that the bar for standing at the pleading stage is lower than that
necessary to survive summary judgment is a recognition of Indiana’s liberal
notice pleading requirements.
[29] Ind. Trial Rule 8(A) sets forth our general rules of pleading and provides that to
state a claim for relief, the complaint must contain: (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a
demand for relief to which the pleader deems entitled. “In practice, [our] liberal
standard merely requires that a ‘complaint ... put the defendant on notice
concerning why it is potentially liable and what it stands to lose.” NFI Interactive
Logistics LLC v. Bruski, 239 N.E.3d 63, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (affirming trial
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 17 of 45
court’s denial of T.R. 12(B) motion for failure to state a claim, where complaint
did not plead a specific theory of liability, noting that other means less drastic
than dismissal can be used to clarify, such as discovery and pretrial
conferences), trans. denied. A plaintiff need only plead the operative facts
involved in the litigation. Id.
[30] Here, the second amended complaint opened with the allegation that Tenant
“was harmed by [HW]’s continued attempts to collect debt that she never
owed.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 199. The complaint then set forth several
pages of factual allegations, including what HW was claimed to have done or
not done, in response to which Tenant sent letters to HW to dispute the debt
and challenge HW’s reporting of it to CRAs, notified two CRAs that she did
not owe Granite or HW, and requested a reinvestigation of the matter. Her
efforts necessarily required her to expend time and effort and some mailing
costs.
[31] Just as the homeowner’s allegations that he relied upon deceptive acts
perpetrated by the contractor and “suffered damages as a result” were sufficient
to confer standing at the pleading stage in Hoosier Contrs., we find that the
allegations of Tenant’s second amended complaint were adequate to confer
standing and survive judgment on the pleadings. We thus affirm the trial court’s
denial of HW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 18 of 45
2. Denial of HW’s Motion for Summary Judgment
[32] HW asserts that the trial court should have granted its motion for summary
judgment on Tenant’s FDCPA and FCRA claims. We review the denial of
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court:
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of . . . the non-moving
parties, summary judgment is appropriate if the designated
evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. A fact is “material” if its resolution would affect
the outcome of the case, and an issue is “genuine” if a trier of fact
is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth,
or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable
inferences.
The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to
demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a
determinative issue, at which point the burden shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with contrary evidence showing an
issue for the trier of fact.
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (cleaned up). Indiana
consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the
merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims. Id. at 1004.
[33] In partially granting the motion, the trial court made several legal
determinations regarding the As Is Addendum. In addition to finding that it
was supported by consideration and was not ambiguous, the court determined
that the As Is Addendum “is enforceable to the extent it applies to routine and
regular cleaning, paint touch up, or carpet vacuuming or cleaning.” Appellant’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 19 of 45
Appendix Vol. 2 at 73. The trial court clarified that the As Is Addendum did not
provide a “blank check” to Granite, as “it would be unconscionable for a
landlord to ask a tenant to accept all property damage from a prior tenant, sight
unseen.” Id. HW’s motion for summary judgment was denied in all other
respects due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact.
[34] HW’s position is that the trial court’s ruling that the As Is Addendum was
legally enforceable necessarily established that Granite could charge Tenant for
the items that it did – and therefore, the debt was accurate – making HW’s
attempts to collect it and its reporting to the CRAs not violative of either the
FDCPA or FCRA. This conclusory reasoning is flawed, however. While the
trial court made the legal determination that the As Is Addendum was
enforceable to a limited extent, that determination did not resolve the factual
dispute as to whether the assessed charges represented damage or conditions for
which Tenant was liable.
[35] The Lease required Tenant to return the apartment in as good a condition as
she received it, ordinary wear and tear excepted. In opposing summary
judgment, Tenant maintained that she turned over the apartment without
damage and in clean condition and that the As Is Addendum did not make her
responsible for preexisting damage. Tenant designated evidence, including her
move-in checklist that she had submitted to Granite and her supplemental
affidavit, in which she averred that Granite’s itemization of security deposit
return “contain[ed] charges for conditions in the apartment that pre-existed my
tenancy.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 5 at 248. She also designated deposition
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 20 of 45
testimony of Granite’s collection manager stating that Granite would not
charge a tenant for damage the tenant did not cause and from an HW dispute
operator who, from looking at Tenant’s move-in checklist, could not verify that
what Tenant was being charged for was correct. HW did not put forth evidence
that Tenant had damaged the apartment or as to the condition of it at any time.
The condition of the apartment upon delivery to Tenant and upon her move out
was relevant to whether she owed the charges, i.e., whether the reported debt
was accurate. Tenant’s designated evidence created a genuine issue of material
fact as to the condition of the apartment and whether the charges HW sought to
collect and reported to the CRAs were owed.
[36] Further, under the FCRA, a furnisher such as HW must conduct a reasonable
investigation once notified by the CRA that a consumer has disputed a
reporting. Indiana courts have recognized the reasonableness of a party’s
investigation is a fact-sensitive question ordinarily unsuited to summary
judgment. Westra v. Credit Controls of Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005)
(furnisher’s investigation reasonableness is a factual question normally reserved
for trial, and summary judgment only proper if reasonableness is beyond
question).
[37] In sum, the enforceability of the As Is Addendum did not foreclose the factual
questions of whether the charged damages were owed and whether HW’s
investigation was reasonable; those questions were for the jury. We affirm the
trial court’s denial of summary judgment to HW on Tenant’s FDCPA and
FCRA claims.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 21 of 45
3. Denial of HW’s Motion for Judgment on the Evidence
[38] HW asserts that the trial court erred by denying its motion for judgment on the
evidence. Under T.R. 50(A), a court shall withdraw an issue from the jury and
enter judgment on the evidence where all or some of the issues are “not
supported by sufficient evidence or a verdict thereon is clearly erroneous as
contrary to the evidence because the evidence is insufficient to support it.”
When ruling on a T.R. 50(A) motion, “a judge may assess both the quantity
and quality of the evidence presented by the nonmovant but may not weigh the
conflicting evidence or assess witness credibility; these are fact-finding functions
within the jury’s sole province.” Cosme v. Clark, 232 N.E.3d 1141, 1148 (Ind.
2024). A court views the evidence with all reasonable inferences for the
nonmovant. Id. at 1150. We review a trial court’s decision on a T.R. 50(A)
motion de novo. Id. at 1152.
[39] Tenant’s claims rest on the FDCPA’s prohibitions against false, deceptive, or
misleading representations concerning the character, amount, or legal status of
a debt and the FCRA’s imposition of duties on a furnisher to, among other
things, report correct and complete information and conduct reasonable
investigations of a disputed debt. HW asserts that the As Is Addendum allowed
Granite to assess the charges against Tenant that it did, pre-existing or not, and
thus “for the same reason [the court] should have granted [HW]’s motion for
summary judgment,” the trial court should have granted its motion for
judgment on the evidence. Reply Brief at 11. That is, HW argues that the items
charged “were covered by the enforceable ‘As Is’ Addendum” and thus
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 22 of 45
Tenant’s trial evidence failed to establish that HW’s credit reporting was not
accurate or complete. Appellant’s Brief at 36. HW further contends that Tenant
failed to identify facts that HW should have uncovered in any additional
investigation that would have changed the outcome. As a result, HW argues,
Tenant did not present sufficient evidence on either the FDCPA or the FCRA
claim, and the trial court should have granted its motion for judgment on the
evidence.
[40] Tenant’s theory at trial was that she was only responsible for conditions she
caused beyond normal wear and tear and not for repair of damages that
predated her tenancy. Tenant testified about the condition of the apartment at
the time of her move in, including a patch on the wall, dirty doors, loose lock,
front door that did not shut properly, stained toilet, problem with sink, walls
with holes and chipped paint, broken blinds, and chipped mirror. She also
testified about the condition of the apartment at the time of her move out,
maintaining that she returned it in the same or better condition than when she
received it. Tenant presented evidence of the items marked by a Granite
employee in the company’s move-out inspection report as needing repair,
Tenant’s own move-in checklist, and the prior tenant’s move-in checklist.
Tenant presented the testimony of a Granite collection manager who testified
that Granite would not charge a tenant for pre-existing damage or for
conditions the tenant did not cause. Tenant presented evidence from HW’s
dispute processors about how dispute investigations are handled. And she
presented expert testimony that HW’s reporting was not accurate/complete and
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 23 of 45
fell below industry standards, HW did not conduct a reasonable investigation,
and the debt was not actually verified and should have been deleted.
[41] Viewing the evidence with all reasonable inferences in favor of Tenant, we find
that she presented sufficient evidence for her FDCPA and FCRA claims to go
to the jury for its determinations of whether the charges were owed, in part or in
full, whether the debt collected upon and reported was complete and accurate,
and whether HW’s investigation was reasonable. We thus affirm the trial
court’s denial of HW’s motion for judgment on the evidence.
4. Punitive Damages Burden of Proof
[42] HW asserts that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that Tenant
needed to prove her FCRA claims, including her claim for punitive damages,
by a greater weight of the evidence. HW argues that, as to punitive damages,
this was an incorrect statement of the law because “Indiana law requires
punitive damages to be established by clear and convincing evidence.”
Appellant’s Brief at 33 (citing to Ind. Code § 34-51-3-2, 10 the Indiana Punitive
Damages Act (IPDA)). HW asks us to set aside the award and remand for a
new trial on punitive damages. When an instruction is challenged as an
10
The IPDA provides: “Before a person may recover punitive damages in any civil action, that person must
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the facts that are relied upon by that person to support the
recovery of punitive damages.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 24 of 45
incorrect statement of the law, appellate review is de novo. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Wright, 774 N.E.2d 891, 893-94 (Ind. 2002).
[43] The FCRA provides that one who willfully fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under the act is liable for actual or statutory damages,
attorney’s fees, and “such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow.”
15 U.S.C. § 1681n. The FRCA does not prescribe the standard of proof
necessary to establish punitive damages.
[44] HW maintains that the appliable burden of proof is a procedural, not
substantive, matter and that Indiana’s clear and convincing standard applies. In
support, HW relies on Chi. S. Shore & S. Bend R.R. v. Brown, 320 N.E.2d 809,
812 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), where a claim arising under Illinois law was brought
in Indiana, and this court determined that Illinois substantive law was to be
applied but that “remedial and procedural matters,” including “questions with
regard to the burden of proof at trial,” would be controlled by Indiana law. HW
argues that the jury thus should have been instructed with Indiana’s clear and
convincing standard found in the IPDA. However, as Tenant observes, the
burden of proof issue before us is not an interstate choice-of-law matter but is a
Supremacy Clause 11 question, as Tenant’s claims are federal statutory claims
brought in state court. Thus, the Chi. S. Shore case is inapposite to the matter
before us.
11
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 25 of 45 [45] Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, state courts must apply substantive federal
law to federal claims. See Eggers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 198 N.E.3d 688, 691 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2022) (recognizing in a federal FELA action adjudicated in state court
that “federal substantive law governs the merits”); Slay v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 603 N.E.2d 877, 884 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding in a § 1983 claim
litigated in Indiana state court that “federal substantive law controls, and any
state laws or rules which inhibit the prosecution of a § 1983 action are
preempted by the Supremacy Clause”), trans. denied. Federal courts treat the
burden of proof as a substantive aspect of a claim. Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue,
530 U.S. 15, 20-21 (2000) (“Given its importance to the outcome of cases, we
have long held the burden of proof to be a ‘substantive’ aspect of a claim.”).
Preponderance of the evidence is the default standard for federal civil litigation.
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983); Ramirez v. T&H
Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 2016) (recognizing in Title VII action
that preponderance is the default standard in civil cases unless the governing
statute specifies a higher burden or the Constitution demands a higher burden
because of the nature of the individual interests at stake), cert. denied. The
United States Supreme Court has confirmed that the Due Process Clause does
not require a burden higher than preponderance for punitive damages. See Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.11 (1991).
[46] Neither the Seventh Circuit nor any Indiana federal district court has squarely
addressed the burden of proof standard for recovery of punitive damages under
the FCRA. However, several circuits have affirmed a jury’s willfulness finding
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 26 of 45
and punitive damages awards under the FCRA without indicating that any
heightened burden of proof was required. See Williams v. First Advantage LNS
Screening Solutions Inc., 947 F.3d 735 (11th Cir. 2020); Cortez v. Trans Union,
LLC, 617 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2010); Saunders v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. of VA,
526 F.3d 142 (4th Cir. 2008).
[47] In Jones v. Credit Bureau of Huntington, Inc., 399 S.E.2d 694 (W.Va. 1990), an
FCRA action was brought in state court, and the jury was instructed that the
plaintiffs needed to prove their claims for willful violation of the FCRA and
punitive damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 703 n.8. Although
the jury instruction was not at issue on appeal, the West Virginia supreme
court, in rejecting the reporting agency’s state-law challenges to the damages
awards, pointed out that “substantive rights created by [the FCRA] are
controlled by federal law and not subject to fifty different rules of
interpretation.” Id. at 698. Notably, HW has provided us with no federal or
state authority requiring a FCRA plaintiff to establish punitive damages by clear
and convincing evidence.
[48] Moreover, federal courts have consistently applied preponderance of the
evidence to punitive damages claims arising under other federal statutes. See
e.g., Karnes v. SCI Col. Funeral Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 1077, 1981 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding in Title VII action that “preponderance of the evidence” standard of
federal civil rights law, rather than “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of
Colorado punitive damages statute, applied to punitive damages); Florez v.
Delbovo, 939 F.Supp. 1341, 1344-45 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (rejecting claim in federal
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 27 of 45
civil rights case that jury should have been instructed with clear and convincing
standard for punitive damages and holding that punitive damages may be
imposed under preponderance standard); Bird v. Figel, 725 F.Supp. 406, 412
(N.D. Ind. 1989) (affirming preponderance of the evidence standard for
damages in civil rights case and rejecting argument that Indiana’s clear and
convincing standard should have applied, recognizing the scope of punitive
damages in federal statutory actions is governed by the federal common law of
damages).
[49] HW acknowledges that “federal courts typically employ the greater weight of
the evidence standard for punitive damages under the FCRA” but asserts that,
because neither the United States Supreme Court nor Congress has prescribed
the standard of proof, “there is no federal authority binding on the Trial Court
or this Court.” Appellant’s Brief at 34. Seizing on the absence of controlling
federal authority, HW contends the trial court “was obligated to apply” I.C. §
34-51-3-2’s clear and convincing standard. Id. We remain unpersuaded.
[50] Indiana’s courts have repeatedly interpreted I.C. § 34-51-3-2’s clear and
convincing standard as applying only to common law, not statutory, punitive
damages claims. In Andrews v. Mor/Ryde Int’l, Inc., 10 N.E.3d 502, 503 (Ind.
2014), the Court found the IPDA inapplicable to a state statutory claim,
explaining: “Indiana significantly restricts recovery of common-law punitive
damages including a heightened burden of proof, a cap on their amount, and
diverting 75% of such awards to the State” but that “those restrictions do not
reach statutory treble-damage awards under the [CRVA] . . . [or] ‘exemplary
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 28 of 45
damage’ awards under the Indiana Sales Representative Act.” (Emphasis
added). In Staggs v. Buxbaum, 60 N.E.3d 238, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans.
denied, this court rejected the argument that treble damages under the CRVA
required a clear and convincing evidentiary standard pursuant to the IPDA and
that the trial court’s award under a preponderance standard was erroneous. In
doing so, the Staggs court reaffirmed that the applicable standard “depends not
upon whether damages are mandatory or discretionary, but instead upon
whether they are based in common law or are a creature of statute.” We agree
with Tenant that there is no legal basis under Indiana law for applying the
heightened burden of proof to Tenant’s federal statutory claim.
[51] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s greater weight of the evidence
instruction.
5. Costs Award
[52] HW asserts that the trial court erred in its award of costs to Tenant. While
courts generally review an award of attorney’s fees and costs for an abuse of
discretion,
the [c]ourt reviews any findings of fact for clear error and any
legal conclusions de novo. Where a trial court’s decision involves
an issue of statutory interpretation, the standard of review is de
novo.
Nardi v. King, 253 N.E.3d 1098, 1103 (Ind. 2025).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 29 of 45 [53] As the prevailing party, Tenant was entitled to recover “the costs of the action
together with reasonable attorney’s fees.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(a)(3) and
1681o(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). On August 30, 2024, the trial court
conducted a bench trial on Tenant’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses
that requested an award of $474,413.84. On October 21, 2024, the trial court
issued an order reducing some hourly rates and awarding $306,984 in fees for
three attorneys and an additional $47,393 in expenses and costs.12 HW appeals
only the costs portion of the award, arguing that the trial court misapplied the
law and awarded Tenant costs that were in excess of those to which she was
statutorily entitled. We agree.
[54] The right to recover costs is determined by federal statutes: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821
and 1920. Section 1821 provides for a witness fee of “$40 per day for each day’s
attendance” and for travel to and from the place of attendance. 28 U.S.C. §
1821(b). It also provides for the recovery of travel expenses with proof of a
receipt (or mileage if a personal vehicle is used), as well as allowances for
housing and subsistence, which vary based on location. Id. at (c)-(d).
12
The relevant portion of the trial court’s order, awarding the full amount of costs/expenses sought, stated:
Expenses
The overriding concern in determining whether a fee-shifting provision should be upheld is whether
enforcement makes the prevailing party whole, and requiring a prevailing party to absorb fees or
costs would not fully compensate a plaintiff for enforcing her rights. See generally White v. Szalasny,
191 N.E.3d 260, 264-265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The Court cannot say that Plaintiff’s expenses are
unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court awards reasonable expenses in the amount of $47,393.
Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 58
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 30 of 45 [55] Section 1920 allows for “the taxation of costs” (that is, litigation expenses
statutorily shifted to the losing party) of the following: (1) fees for the clerk and
marshal; (2) fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
obtained for use in the case; (3) fees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses; (4) fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5)
docket fees under section 1923 of this title; and (6) compensation of court
appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and
costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920 (emphasis added). Non-taxable costs are everything else a litigant spends
to prosecute a case that falls outside of that enumerated list.
[56] The U.S. Supreme Court has explained:
In the general “costs” statute, codified at §§ 1821 and 1920 of
Title 28, Congress has specified six categories of litigation
expenses that a federal court may award as “costs,” and Congress
has detailed how to calculate the amount of certain costs.
Sections 1821 and 1920 in essence define what the term “costs”
encompasses in the subject-specific federal statutes that provide
for an award of costs.
Sections 1821 and 1920 create a default rule and establish a clear
baseline against which Congress may legislate. Consistent with
the default rule, some federal statutes simply refer to “costs.” In
those cases, federal courts are limited to awarding the costs
specified in §§ 1821 and 1920. If, for particular kinds of cases,
Congress wants to authorize awards of expenses beyond the six
categories specified in the general costs statute, Congress may do
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 31 of 45
so. For example, some federal statutes go beyond §§ 1821 and 1920 to
expressly provide for the award of expert witness fees or attorney’s fees.
Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2019) (emphasis
added). Because the FCRA and FDCPA do not expressly provide for awards
beyond the six categories specified in the costs statute, the trial court was
limited to awarding costs as outlined in §§ 1821 and 1920.
[57] HW challenges the trial court’s costs award in three respects: (1) expert fees; (2)
deposition-related expenses; and (3) attorney out-of-pocket expenses. We
address each in turn, finding that the trial court erred in part.
5.1 Expert Fees
[58] The trial court ordered that HW pay the full costs of Tenant’s two expert
witnesses (who were not court-ordered), including expert witness fees, totaling
around $27,531. However, such expert fees are not recoverable absent explicit
statutory authority, not present here. See Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank FSB, 706
F.Supp.2d 916, 925 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (under the Truth in Lending Act’s feeshifting provision – which uses the “costs of the action, together with a
reasonable attorney’s fee” language found in the FCRA and FDCPA – expert
witness fees not recoverable as fees or as § 1920 costs); Bankston v. State of Ill., 60
F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fair Labor Standing Act’s fee-shifting
provision did not support recovery of expert witness fees, which were limited to
§ 1920’s $40 per day). Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to
calculate the costs recoverable under §§ 1821 and 1920 associated with Tenant’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 32 of 45
two expert witnesses, including witness/attendance fees, lodging, and food on
dates of court appearance and travel. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), (c)(2), (d)(1)-(2).
5.2 Deposition Expenses
[59] The trial court awarded $13,765.36 in deposition-related expenses, related to
the depositions of: HW dispute operators Fabiola Mansilla and Wendy Santos;
HW compliance officer Richard Stoltenborg; HW quality control manager Ana
Ventura; and Tenant’s expert Evan Hendricks. The costs included transcript
and video conversion/sync expenses, transcription expenses, video court
reporting expenses, editing service expenses, and certified mailing cost. HW
argues that because § 1920 provides for recovery of “fees for printed or
electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case,” that
statute “makes clear” that Tenant is entitled to either the cost for transcribing
the deposition or videotaping it but not both. Appellant’s Brief at 41. We disagree
that the statute precludes both.
[60] In Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2008), the
Seventh Circuit held that a district court was authorized under § 1920 to award
a prevailing party the costs of both video-recording and stenographically
transcribing the same deposition. The Little court reiterated, however, that §
1920 authorizes such costs only if “necessarily for use in the case” and, even if
the cost is authorized by statute, it “must be both reasonable and necessary for a
prevailing party to recover it.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 33 of 45 [61] We observe, as persuasive authority, that district courts in our circuit have
allowed both video recording and stenographic transcription of the same
deposition, as well as video encoding/synchronization fees, where reasonable
and necessary. See Magnuson v. Trulite Glass & Aluminum Sols., LLC, No. 19 C
6158, 2024 WL 5485913 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2024); Olivarius v. Tharaldson
Prop. Mgmt. Inc., No. 08 C 463, 2012 WL 1117468 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3,
2012); Treat v. Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-0173-WCLRBC, 2010 WL 3672230 at *2 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 2010). We find that, here,
remand is warranted for a determination of reasonableness and necessity of
both the transcription/videotaping and the editing/syncing of the depositions at
issue. 13
5.3 Attorney Expenses
[62] The trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to attorney Ian Lyngklip included
$2,416.90 for a Certificate of Good Standing and hotel fees for a trial that was
continued and the trial that went forward. While HW asserts there was no basis
for this award, we disagree and find that these costs fall within the scope of
recoverable attorney’s fees and affirm that portion of the cost award. See Henry
v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 192 (7th Cir. 1984) (out-of-pocket expenses
13
We note that factors to consider include but are not limited to whether the video was played at trial or used
in a motion, whether the witness was outside the court’s subpoena power or unavailable for trial, whether the
opposing party was given advance notice that the deposition would be recorded by both methods and raised
no objection, or whether a court order or protocol required both formats. See Little, 514 F.3d at 702;
Magnuson, 2024 WL 5485913 at *5; Treat, 2010 WL 3672230 at *2-3; Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc.,
917 F. Supp. 2d 503, 511 (E.D.N.C. 2012).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 34 of 45
“normally bill[ed]” to clients separately from the hourly rate, such as travel,
lodging, postage, long-distance calls, photocopying, held recoverable as a
component of the attorney’s fee); Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 817
F.Supp. 737, 752 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (awarding hotel, mileage, and facsimile
costs).
6. Denial of Motion to Correct Error - Punitive Damages
Award
[63] HW asserts that the trial court erred when it denied its motion to correct error
that sought, as relevant here, to reduce the $1,750,000 punitive damages award,
which HW claims is unconstitutionally excessive. The parties agree that our
review of a constitutional challenge to punitive damages is de novo. Stroud v.
Lints, 790 N.E.2d 440, 442 (Ind. 2003); Gracia v. SigmaTron, Int’l, Inc., 842 F.3d
1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 2016).
[64] In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003), the
United States Supreme Court directed that, in reviewing such claims, “all
courts, state and federal,” are required to consider: “(1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the
jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”
Reprehensibility is the “most important indicum of [a] punitive damages
award’s reasonableness.” Id.; see also BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575
(1996).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 35 of 45 [65] Reprehensibility is assessed through consideration of five subfactors:
[1] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; [2] the
tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard
of the health or safety of others; [3] the target of the conduct had
financial vulnerability; [4] the conduct involved repeated actions
or was an isolated incident; and [5] the harm was the result of
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. HW maintains that Tenant did not establish any of
the five subfactors. We agree with HW that the harm caused was not physical
nor did HW’s conduct evince a disregard of the health or safety of others – the
first two considerations. See Saccameno v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 943 F.3d 1071, 1086-87 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied; Bach v. First Union Nat. Bank, 486 F.3d 150, 155
(6th Cir. 2007). However, we disagree with HW’s assessment as to the
remaining subfactors.
[66] At the time of the events, Tenant was a graduate student living in a shared
apartment, working as lab assistant and making “barely enough to cover living
expenses,” and, upon graduation, she worked an unpaid externship. Transcript
Vol. 5 at 194. In seeking assistance with challenging Granite’s charges that she
believed she did not owe, Tenant initially sought the assistance of free student
legal aid services. Upon graduation, Tenant’s externship was out of state and,
due to the stain on her credit report, Tenant believed she would not be able to
obtain an apartment in a safe area, or perhaps at all, and relied on her boyfriend
to apply. She also was in need of a replacement vehicle but was afraid of likely
credit denial. While her financial circumstances may not rise to the equivalent
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 36 of 45
of the plaintiffs in Bach, a retired plaintiff on a fixed income, or Saccameno,
where the individual had just come out of bankruptcy, we find that Tenant’s
situation nonetheless exhibited a degree of financial vulnerability worthy of
consideration.
[67] As to the fourth subfactor, repeated conduct, a court may consider whether the
defendant engaged in repetition of the misconduct as to the plaintiff (repetition)
as well as whether the defendant has visited the same conduct on other
occasions (recidivism). Stewardson v. Titus, 126 F.4th 1264, 1273 (7th Cir. 2025).
We find both present in this case. Despite being notified by phone calls and
letters that the account was disputed, HW continued to report Tenant’s account
twice per month for about a year. Tenant presented evidence that HW received
and processed roughly 8,000 disputes per month in a system that Tenant argued
lacked substantive means of investigation and was essentially a rubber stamping
of the creditor’s report of the debt.
[68] As to the fifth consideration, HW’s conduct may not have risen to the level of
trickery or deceit but it clearly was not the result of accident. And courts have
recognized that reckless indifference, not just intentional malice, satisfies this
subfactor. See E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 839 (7th Cir. 2013).
Tenant presented evidence that HW’s practices and policies for dispute
investigation included pre-populated forms and processes that emphasized
speed, with dispute operators having arguably unattainable quotas that gave
them approximately two to three minutes to handle a dispute. They lacked
resources, such as phones or access to internet, to conduct a legitimate
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 37 of 45
investigation, with their task primarily being limited to comparing the debt with
paperwork the creditor had initially reported. HW’s corporate representative
and manager of operational strategies acknowledged that HW refused to
provide information about its dispute process or identify the employees who
handed Tenant’s dispute until compelled by court order. While HW ultimately
provided its net worth of $5,525,462, it refused to disclose its revenue or profit
figures. Reprehensibility determinations are fact intensive, and, on balance of
the subfactors, we are satisfied that the reprehensible nature of HW’s conduct
was established.
[69] We next turn to the other two State Farm considerations: the disparity between
the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award, and the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 14 Here, the
actual damages were $200,000, making the ratio of punitive to actual damages
8.75:1. HW argues that this ratio is far outside of constitutional bounds and
should be reduced.
[70] In State Farm the Supreme Court reviewed a $145 million punitive damages
award against a $1 million compensatory damages award – a 145:1 ratio – and
14
Some courts have observed that the factor calling for comparison of the punitive damages award and civil
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct is “not particularly useful” to the constitutional
excessiveness analysis in a FCRA case. See Drew v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. C 07-00726 SI, 2010 WL
5022466, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2010) (citing to Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuit cases that found the factor
not useful and observed that Congress chose not to limit punitive damages in the FRCA and that there is no
truly comparable civil penalty to a FCRA punitive damages award).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 38 of 45
found it unconstitutional. The Court declined to impose a bright-line rule
delineating the constitutional limit of damages but found that “single-digit
multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving
the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than award with ratios in range
of 500 to 1,” noting its previous approval of a 4:1 ratio. State Farm, 538 U.S. at
425; see also Curry v. Revolution Labs., LLC, 124 F.4th 441, 457 (7th Cir. 2024)
(“few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio ‘to a significant degree’ will satisfy
due process”). The present 8.75:1 ratio falls within State Farm’s presumptive
single-digit range, albeit at the upper end.
[71] Not long after State Farm, the Seventh Circuit decided Mathias v. Accor Econ.
Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003), where the court upheld a 37:1 ratio –
$186,000 punitive and $5,000 compensatory – in a case involving a hotel’s
deliberate concealment of a bed bug infestation, reasoning that the
compensatory damages were small and difficult to quantify, the defendant may
have profited from the misconduct, and the conduct was highly reprehensible.
Mathias stated that State Farm “did not lay down a 4-to-1 or single-digit-ratio
rule,” but rather said there is a presumption against a 145:1 ratio. Id. at 676.
[72] In Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sports Inc., 698 N.E.2d 834, 844 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998), trans. denied, this court rejected any mathematical formula and upheld a
14:1 ratio, $1,000,000 punitive and $78,000 compensatory, as not
unconstitutionally excessive, noting that “the harm that might be inflicted on
other victims if similar future behavior were not deterred” is a consideration.
See also Rainey v. Taylor, 941 F.3d 243, 255 (7th Cir. 2019) (upholding as
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 39 of 45
constitutional a 6:1 ratio, $6 million in punitives and $1.13 million in
compensatory, where the defendant’s conduct was considered “truly
egregious”); but see Saccameno, 943 F.3d at 1090 (FRCA case reducing $3
million punitive award to 1:1 as $582,000 “was a considerable compensatory
award” consisting mostly of emotional damages); Bach, 486 F.3d at 157
(reducing a $2.2 million punitive award to $400,000 in a FCRA case where
court found that only financial vulnerability was present).
[73] We, like the trial court, recognize that the punitive award is “substantial.”
Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 61. However, the jury heard the evidence and
evaluated the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses. And it decided that
Tenant did not owe the $110 charges, HW did not conduct a reasonable
investigation, and HW’s actions were willful. The jury clearly was persuaded
that HW’s manner of doing business was systematically geared toward profitmaximizing over fairness, accuracy, and completeness, and we are reluctant to
override the jury’s assessment of what amount would result in adequate
punishment or deterrence. Concluding that the jury’s determination of punitive
damages falls within constitutional boundaries, we affirm the trial court’s denial
of HW’s request to reduce the punitive damages award.
[74] Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for calculation of
recoverable costs associated with the expert witnesses and a reasonableness and
necessity determination as to deposition expenses.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 40 of 45 DeBoer, J. concurs.
Brown, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Crystal G. Rowe
New Albany, Indiana
Matthew J. Goldsmith
Indianapolis, Indiana
David Grassi
Chad Echols
Rock Hill, South Carolina
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Duran L. Keller
Lafayette, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 41 of 45
Brown, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[75] I concur with the majority’s conclusion to reduce costs. I respectfully dissent
from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s denial of HW’s motion
for judgment on the evidence and its conclusion that the determination of
punitive damages in the amount of $1,750,000 fell within constitutional
boundaries.
[76] With respect to HW’s motion for judgment on the evidence, the Indiana
Supreme Court has held that mere speculation is insufficient to overcome a
motion for judgment on the evidence. Cave Quarries, Inc. v. Warex LLC, 240
N.E.3d 681, 685 (Ind. 2024). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
held that “[n]onpecuniary harms, including reputational damage and emotional
distress, may also follow an FCRA violation, though these harms must be
described in ‘reasonable detail’—conclusory statements are insufficient.”
Persinger v. Sw. Credit Sys., L.P., 20 F.4th 1184, 1194 (7th Cir. 2021). With
respect to the FDCPA, “[i]t’s not enough for the plaintiff to just spout off some
buzzwords in order to get her case to a jury. She can’t just say in a conclusory
way that ‘I’m a wreck’ or ‘my grief is overwhelming’ and then expect to get her
case to a jury.” Rosen v. MLO Acquisitions LLC, 505 F. Supp. 3d 823, 827 (N.D.
Ind. 2020). Although not dispositive, I note that, while Hustedt-Mai testified
that she has had “an anxiety diagnosis since [she] was a child,” and that she
took more of her medication due to “the stress and anxiety about that situation”
with HW, Transcript Volume V at 198-199, she introduced no testimony from a
mental health professional. Further, Evan Hendricks, Hustedt-Mai’s expert
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 42 of 45 witness, testified that he did not see any evidence of a lower credit score for
Hustedt-Mai or any evidence of a credit denial. Under these circumstances, I
would conclude that the trial court erred in denying HW’s motion for judgment
on the evidence and would vacate the award of $200,000. See Davenport v. Sallie
Mae, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 574, 581-583 (D. Md. 2015) (discussing the FCRA;
noting that the Fourth Circuit has held that the statutory requirement of “actual
damages” acts as a “gatekeeping function [to avoid] tremendous
overcompensation of plaintiffs whose damages evidence fails to establish any
meaningful injury at all” (quoting Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 181 n.6 (4th Cir.
2002), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 957, 123 S. Ct. 2640 (2003), aff’d, 540 U.S. 614,
124 S. Ct. 1204 (2004)); holding that the plaintiff’s claims were too speculative
to survive a motion for summary judgment where he claimed he lost
employment opportunities but did not provide a single example where the
reported delinquency had any bearing on a hiring decision and, “[t]he same
holds true with respect to [the plaintiff’s] claim that he was chilled from even
applying for a home loan refinance” where “[t]here can be no compensable
injury when he never even applied for such refinancing”; and holding that, with
respect to the plaintiff’s claims regarding emotional distress, “a showing of ‘very
minor emotional distress,’ which, one supposes, would have to include any
amount of momentary annoyance, angst, or irritation that might support a
nominal damages award, cannot possibly suffice to establish ‘actual damages’”
(quoting Doe, 306 F.3d at 181 n.6), and plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress
did not rise above conclusory assertions that he suffered embarrassment and
stress related to his credit issues), aff’d, 623 F. App’x 94 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 43 of 45
Johnson v. Waypoint Res. Grp., 596 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1196-1197 (S.D. Ind. 2022)
(addressing actual damages under the FDCPA, observing that plaintiff had no
evidence of being denied credit, having credit terms change, or other financial
harms, and holding that plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress fit squarely into
the category of conclusory and unreasonably detailed allegations which could
not alone support an award of actual damages for emotional distress).
[77] To the extent HW asserts that the trial court erred when it denied its motion to
correct error seeking to reduce the $1,750,000 punitive damages award, as
acknowledged by the majority, the first two subfactors for reprehensibility
weigh in favor of reversal as the harm caused was not physical and HW’s
conduct did not evince a disregard of the health or safety of others. As for
financial vulnerability, the majority acknowledged that Hustedt-Mai’s
circumstances may not rise to the equivalent of the plaintiff in Bach v. First
Union Nat. Bank, 486 F.3d 150 (6th Cir. 2007), a retired plaintiff on a fixed
income, or the plaintiff in Saccameno v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 943 F.3d 1071 (7th
Cir. 2019), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, cert. denied, 590 U.S. 906, 140 S. Ct.
2674 (2020), where the individual had just come out of bankruptcy. The
majority also acknowledged that HW’s conduct may not have risen to the level
of trickery or deceit. With respect to the disparity between the actual or
potential harm suffered by Hustedt-Mai and the punitive damages award of
$1,750,000, which both the trial court and the majority recognize as substantial,
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 44 of 45
given that I would vacate the verdict of $200,000, I easily conclude that the
disparity is excessive and would reduce the punitive damages award to $8,750. 15
[78] For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the $200,000 verdict, reduce the
$1,750,000 punitive damages award to $8,750, affirm the $1,000 in statutory
damages under the FDCPA to which the parties stipulated, and affirm the
award of attorney fees.
15
Even if the $200,000 award remained, I would find the award of $1,750,000 in punitive damages excessive.
See generally Saccameno, 943 F.3d at 1091 (“Considering all the factors together, we are convinced that the
maximum permissible punitive damages award is $582,000. An award of this size punishes [defendant’s]
atrocious recordkeeping and service of [plaintiff’s] loan without equating its indifference to intentional
malice. It reflects a 1:1 ratio relative to the large total compensatory award . . . .”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CT-48 September 30, 2026 Page 45 of 45