FILED
Sep 30 2026, 9:34 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Nicholas G. Alexander,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
September 30, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-2705
Appeal from the Crawford Circuit Court
The Honorable Justin B. Mills, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
13C01-2207-F3-2
Opinion by Judge Bailey
Judge Brown concurs.
Judge Weissmann dissents with separate opinion.
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 1 of 33
Case Summary
[1] Nicholas G. Alexander appeals his convictions and sentence for three counts of
contributing to delinquency, as Class A misdemeanors. He raises the following
three restated issues on appeal:
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
his convictions for contributing to delinquency, as Class A
misdemeanors.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing.
3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offenses and his character.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On Friday, July 8, 2022, minors E.B., R., and E.H. had a sleepover at E.H.’s
residence, where they set up a tent in the loft of a barn by E.H.’s house. The
next day, R. left, and S.C., whom E.B. had met on Snapchat, came over to
continue the sleepover on Saturday night. E.B., E.H., and S.C. were all sixteen
years old at the time. S.C. contacted Alexander, who was nineteen years old at
the time, and requested that he bring alcohol to her and the other two girls.
Alexander brought them “a lot” of alcohol—specifically, a bottle of vodka and
several small, shot-sized bottles of Fireball whiskey. Tr. v. 5 at 82. After
dropping off the alcohol, Alexander left.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 2 of 33 [4] The three girls drank “a lot[,]” id., and E.B. in particular drank until she “got
really drunk[,]” Tr. v. 4 at 75. E.B. started “passing out and waking back up[,]”
and she vomited on herself. Id. E.B. testified that E.H. and S.C. removed her
clothing and did not give it back to her. After the girls had been “drinking for
about an hour[,]” Tr. v. 5 at 85, S.C. contacted Alexander again and asked if he
would come back so that they could “have sex[,]” id. at 91. Alexander agreed
and had sex with all three girls when he returned to the barn. About two hours
later, Alexander left, and the three girls continued their sleepover.
[5] E.B. subsequently reported the events of the night to the Crawford County
Sheriff’s Department (“CCSD”). Chief Deputy William Breeding of the CCSD
began an investigation and conducted a recorded interview with Alexander on
or around July 12. Alexander stated in that interview that he had never heard of
E.B. or E.H. and that he had not talked to S.C. in a “long time[.]” Tr. v. 4 at
156. Alexander also stated that he was not in Crawford County at all on the
night of July 9th but that he was in Harrison County, Floyd County, and New
Albany. He stated that he did not have a Snapchat account and that the account
“N_Alexander1422” was not his. Id. at 158. Chief Deputy Breeding informed
Alexander that he had a warrant for the N_Alexander1422 Snapchat account
and took a photograph of Alexander to use in a lineup.
[6] On July 24, Alexander called Chief Deputy Breeding multiple times and
requested to talk to him again. That same day, Chief Deputy Breeding
conducted another recorded interview with Alexander. At the beginning of the
interview, Alexander stated, “I gotta get all the sh** off my chest, dude. I feel
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 3 of 33
guilty as f**k for lying – lying to you about that social media[] and sh**.” Id. at
192. Alexander then stated that he gave alcohol to S.C. and “two other girls [he
did] not know” at around 10:00 p.m. on the night of Saturday, July 9. Id. at
195.
[7] On July 26, the State charged Alexander with rape, false informing, three
counts of contributing to delinquency, and sexual battery. Following a five-day
jury trial that took place between August 25 and September 2, 2025, the jury
found Alexander guilty of false informing 1 and all three counts of contributing
to delinquency but not guilty of rape or sexual battery. At his October 2
sentencing hearing, Alexander’s counsel argued that the court should find it
mitigating that there was no serious harm to a person or property, that the
victims induced the offenses, and that Alexander had a limited prior criminal
history. The trial court rejected these proposed mitigators, finding that there
was harm to the community, that the victims did not induce the offenses
because they were minors, and that Alexander received new criminal charges
between his conviction and the sentencing hearing. The trial court found no
mitigating circumstances.
[8] As aggravating factors, the trial court found that Alexander posed a threat to
the safety of the community, that he lacked remorse as evidenced in part by his
quickness to reoffend, and that he shows a propensity to reoffend. The court
1
Alexander does not appeal that conviction or the sentence for it.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 4 of 33
sentenced Alexander to one year on each count, to run consecutively for a total
sentence of four years in the Crawford County Jail. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[9] Alexander challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his three
convictions for contributing to delinquency, as Class A misdemeanors. When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal
conviction,
we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of
witnesses. We only consider the evidence supporting the
judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
such evidence. A conviction will be affirmed if there is
substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element
of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the
job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a
particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and
we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the [factfinder’s] ruling.
Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015) (citation modified).
[10] To support Alexander’s convictions of contributing to delinquency, as Class A
misdemeanors, the State was required to prove that (1) he was at least eighteen
years of age and (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) encouraged, aided, induced,
or caused (4) S.C., E.B., and E.H. (5) who were “child[ren]” (6) to commit an
act of delinquency. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a); see also I.C. § 31-37-2-6 (“A child
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 5 of 33
commits a delinquent act if, before becoming eighteen (18) years of age, the
child violates IC 7.1-5-7 concerning minors and alcoholic beverages.”); I.C. §
7.1-5-7-7 (making it a Class C misdemeanor for a minor to possess or consume
alcohol). Alexander admits that, when he was at least eighteen years of age, he
knowingly gave alcohol to S.C., E.B., and E.H. He also admits that the girls
were under eighteen years of age at the time, i.e., that they were “child[ren.]”
I.C. § 31-37-2-6; see also I.C. § 31-37-1-1 (defining “delinquent child” as a child
“under eighteen (18) years of age” who commits a delinquent act).
[11] However, Alexander contends there was no evidence that he knew the three girls
were under age eighteen when he gave them alcohol, and he maintains that
such knowledge was required to convict him of the Class A misdemeanors. We
disagree and conclude that knowledge of a child’s age is not required to prove a
Class A misdemeanor. See I.C. § 35-46-1-8(a).
[12] “A statute that is clear and unambiguous must be read to mean what it plainly
expresses, and its plain and obvious meaning may not be enlarged or
restricted.” McNeil v. Anon. Hosp., 219 N.E.3d 789, 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)
(citation modified), trans. denied. And “we must assume that the legislature
means what it says and that the legislature chose the language it did for a
reason.” Id. (citation modified); see also, e.g., D.W. v. State, 263 N.E.3d 151, 157
(Ind. 2025) (citation modified) (“[W]e consider both what the statute does—and
does not—say, because we cannot add words or restrictions.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 6 of 33 [13] Furthermore, we must consider “the structure of the statute in its entirety to
promulgate a harmonious reading.” D.W., 263 N.E.3d at 157. That is, each
section of a statute must be construed with reference to all other sections, and,
“[i]f possible, every word must be given effect and meaning, and no part should
be held to be meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest of the [statute].”
Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ind. 2011). Indiana
courts have adopted a “surplusage canon” under which we “give effect to every
word and eschew those interpretations that treat some words as duplicative or
meaningless.” Ind. Off. of Util. Consumer Couns. v. Duke Energy Ind., LLC, 248
N.E.3d 1205, 1213 (Ind. 2024) (citation modified).
[14] Subsection (a) of Indiana Code Section 35-46-1-8, which is the subsection
applicable to Class A misdemeanors, states in full:
A person at least eighteen (18) years of age who knowingly or
intentionally encourages, aids, induces, or causes a child to
commit an act of delinquency (as defined by IC 31-37-1 or IC 31-37-2) commits contributing to delinquency, a Class A
misdemeanor, except as provided in subsections (b) through (e).
The defendant’s knowledge of the minor’s age under this subsection is not
required, and we may not add words to the statute. See, e.g., D.W., 263 N.E.3d
at 157. Rather, the statute requires a defendant’s knowledge or intent to engage
in the prohibited conduct of encouraging, aiding, inducing, or causing a child to
commit the delinquent act of possessing or consuming alcohol. Of course, the
State also must prove that the “child” to which the statute refers was under age
eighteen, as that is an element of the offense, just not an element requiring a
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 7 of 33
defendant’s knowledge. 2 I.C. § 35-46-1-8; see also I.C. § 31-37-1-1 (defining
delinquent child). Alexander admits the evidence showed the three girls were
under age eighteen at the time he provided them with alcohol; he only claims
he had no knowledge of that fact.
[15] In contrast, subsection (c) of the statute, which applies to Level 5 felonies, does
clearly require the defendant’s knowledge of the child’s age:
(c) The offense described in subsection (a) is a Level 5 felony if:
(1) the person committing the offense is at least twenty-one (21)
years of age and knowingly or intentionally furnishes:
(A) an alcoholic beverage to a child in violation of IC 7.1-5-7-8 when the person committing the offense knew or reasonably
should have known that the person furnished the alcoholic
beverage was a child[…] and
(2) the consumption, ingestion, or use of the alcoholic beverage
… is the proximate cause of the death of any person.
I.C. § 35-46-1-8(c) (emphasis added).
[16] If subsection (a), which is subsumed within subsection (c), 3 required knowledge
of the child’s age, there would be no need to repeat that specification in
2
Thus, the dissent’s contention that “[o]ne cannot knowingly induce a ‘child’ to do anything without some
awareness that the person induced is a child” is simply inaccurate. Dissent, Op. at 24.
3
As is common in criminal statutes, the first subsection—(a)—is the prohibited criminal conduct and the
following subsections discuss elements that are aggravating circumstances that increase the penalty for the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 8 of 33
subsection (c)(1)(A); that is, the specific mens rea language in subsection
(c)(1)(A) would be superfluous. 4 But we may not presume the legislature
intended to create duplicative and superfluous language in a statute. See Duke
Energy, 248 N.E.3d at 1213. Moreover, subsection (c) makes it clear that the
legislature knows how to specify that knowledge of age is required when that is
what it intends.
[17] Construing subsections (a) and (c) harmoniously, as we must, it is clear that the
legislature intended that contributing to delinquency as a Class A misdemeanor
does not require the defendant’s knowledge of the child’s age, but the greater
offense of contributing to delinquency as a Level 5 felony does require such
knowledge. 5 That is, the statute requires proof of the defendant’s knowledge of
base crime. See D.H. v. State, 932 N.E.2d 236, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted) (“We have held that
‘prohibited conduct’ and ‘element’ are not synonymous; thus, the culpability requirement applies only to the
conduct of the statute…. In contrast, aggravating circumstances that increase the penalty for the crime must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but do not require proof of culpability.”).
4
The dissent attempts to skirt the obvious surplusage issue only by ignoring the words “knew or” in
subsection (c) of the statute. That is, the dissent asserts that subsection (c) is not duplicative of an alleged
knowledge of age requirement in subsection (a) because it involves “an easier-to-prove constructive
knowledge standard for the felony offense.” Dissent, Op. at 29. But that is not a complete reading; subsection
(c) plainly requires a showing that the defendant “knew or” should have known the child’s age. I.C. § 35-46-1-8(c) (emphasis added). And if subsection (a) contained a knowledge of age requirement, the word “knew”
in subsection (c) would be mere surplusage. To avoid such surplusage, instead of using the words “knew
or[,]” subsection (c) would have to say, “when the person committing the offense did not know but reasonably
should have known that the person furnished the alcoholic beverage was a child….” We may not read such
additional language into a statute. See D.W., 263 N.E.3d at 157.
5
Cf. Davidson v. State, 233 N.E.2d 173, 175 (Ind. 1968), and Cornes v. State, 467 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984), each of which involved much older and significantly different versions of the contributing to
delinquency statute. Specifically, the statute did not create the Level 5 felony as currently stated in subsection
(c) until July 1, 2004. See P.L.46-2004, § 2. That is, until 2004, the statutory language specifically requiring
knowledge of a child’s age as an element of a greater offense did not exist, so the Court in Davidson and
Cornes was not confronted with the obvious surplusage issue with which we are confronted today. Thus,
neither of those cases is “precedent” that interpreted “identical operative language” to the current version of
the contributing to delinquency statute, as the dissent argues. Dissent, Op. at 27.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 9 of 33
the child’s age only when the charge of contributing to delinquency is brought
as a Level 5 felony. I.C. § 35-46-1-8(c)(1)(A).
[18] The mens rea requirement of Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-2(d) (or, “the
Culpability Statute”), cited by Alexander and the dissent, is inapposite. That
subsection states: “Unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if
a kind of culpability is required for commission of an offense, it is required with
respect to every material element of the prohibited conduct.” Id. Our Supreme
Court has held “[t]here is nothing in Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(d) … to suggest that
the Legislature intended that if a kind of culpability is required for one (but only
one) material element of the prohibited conduct, it is required for commission
of the offense and every material element of it.” Louallen v. State, 778 N.E.2d
794, 798 (Ind. 2002). Rather, our Supreme Court has stated, “‘prohibited
conduct’ and ‘element’ within Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(d) are not synonymous
and if the legislature had intended culpability to apply to every material
element, the phrase ‘of the prohibited conduct’ would be superfluous.” Leonard
v. State, 73 N.E.3d 155, 162 (Ind. 2017) (citation modified) (holding, “under the
plain language of subsection (d) the State is required to prove culpability …
with respect to every material element of the prohibited conduct[, and] though
Moreover, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, while each of those cases concluded that the State had provided
evidence that the defendant knew the child was under age eighteen, neither case addressed whether the State
was required to prove that knowledge, only whether knowledge had been charged and proved. The specific
question of whether knowledge of the child’s age is statutorily required to prove the misdemeanor crime was
not before the Court in those cases.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 10 of 33
the victims’ identities were material elements of the offense, the identities are
not part of the prohibited conduct”); see also D.H., 932 N.E.2d at 238.
[19] Thus, the Indiana Supreme Court has squarely rejected the dissent’s reading of
the statute in the past. See Louallen, 778 N.E.2d at 798. As we are, of course,
bound by that precedent, today we decline to embrace the interpretation
advanced by Alexander and the dissent; namely, that Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-2(d) means that, if a statute provides for culpability regarding one element,
it must be read as applying that same culpability to every other element. 6 Id.
[20] Furthermore, this Court has recognized that the statutory language “unless the
statute defining the offense provides otherwise,” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(d), evinces a
legislative intent to create some strict liability crimes “in which the State need
not prove a mental element,” McCaffrey v. State, 523 N.E.2d 435, 436 n.4 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1988), and some crimes where “a kind of culpability is required for
one (but only one) material element of the prohibited conduct[,]” McKinley v.
State, 45 N.E.3d 25, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Louallen, 778 N.E.2d at
798), trans. denied. In this case, Indiana Code Section 35-46-1-8 “provides
otherwise” by explicitly and specifically requiring a defendant’s knowledge of
the child’s age only when a Level 5 felony is charged.
6
We note that the dissent does not address this principle for which we cite Louallen but merely tries to
distinguish that case as involving a different kind of statute. Dissent, Op. at 25. We do not cite Louallen as an
example of a similar criminal statute but for its interpretation of the Culpability Statute, I.C. § 35-41-2-2(d).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 11 of 33 [21] Factors that show a legislative intent to impose strict liability include “the
severity of punishment (greater penalties favor culpable mental state
requirement);… the danger to the public of prohibited conduct (greater danger
disfavors need for culpable mental state requirement);… [and] the defendant’s
opportunity to ascertain the operative facts and avoid the prohibited conduct.”
State v. Shelton, 692 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Here, the culpable
mental state is required only for the greater penalty of a Level 5 felony, which
addresses the greater danger of the child's alcohol use proximately causing
death.
[22] We are not stating anything new today about culpability requirements in
criminal law; this Court has consistently distinguished between elements of a
criminal offense that are prohibited conduct, for which culpability is generally
required, and elements of a criminal offense that are aggravating circumstances
that increase the penalty for the crime but do not require a showing of
culpability. See, e.g., D.H., 932 N.E.2d at 238-39 (noting that the element of a
battery victim being a school employee is an aggravating circumstance that
increased the penalty for battery to a Class C felony but did not have a separate
culpability requirement); see also Maldonado-Morales v. State, 985 N.E.2d 25, 28
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting the mens rea requirement applied to the domestic
battery element of touching a household member in a rude, insolent, or angry
manner, but not to the multiple additional elements listed in subsequent
subsections, which were aggravating circumstances that could increase the
penalties for domestic battery from a misdemeanor to a felony). Here, the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 12 of 33
“knew or reasonably should have known” element of subsection (c) is an
aggravating circumstance 7 that, when combined with the additional elements
under subsection (c), increases the penalty for contributing to the delinquency
of a minor to a Level 5 felony.
[23] In short, the statute as a whole shows a legislative intent to impose strict
liability on those who provide alcohol to minors (i.e., subsection (a)) and to
impose an even greater penalty on those who are aware of the age of the minor
(subsection (c)), furnish the alcohol anyway, and the minor’s alcohol use
proximately causes the death of any person. That is, taken together, subsections
(a) and (c) of the statute evince a legislative determination that providing
alcohol to minors is a harm so great that it must be punished regardless of the
defendant’s knowledge of the minor’s age and that providing alcohol to one
who the defendant knows is a minor is an even greater harm that should be
punished even more severely when it results in someone’s death.
[24] The crime of contributing to delinquency as a Class A misdemeanor does not
require a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age. The State presented
7
Subsection (c) contains other aggravating circumstances as well, i.e., the defendant was at least age twentyone and the minor’s use of the alcohol was the proximate cause of the death of any person. I.C. § 35-46-1-8(c)(1), (2). We note that all the aggravating circumstances of subsection (c) must be met for a Level 5 felony
conviction; thus, even a person over twenty-one years of age who knew the person to whom he provided
alcohol was a minor cannot be convicted of a Level 5 felony unless the provision of the alcohol was the
proximate cause of someone’s death.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 13 of 33
sufficient evidence to support Alexander’s three challenged Class A
misdemeanor convictions.
Sentencing
[25] Sentencing decisions, including the imposition of consecutive sentences, lie
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219,
1222 (Ind. 2008); Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
(citation omitted), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is
“clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom.” Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869 (citation omitted). A trial court abuses its
discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:
(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a
sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a
sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating
factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3)
enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly
supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4)
considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”
Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind.), clarified on reh’g,
875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 14 of 33 [26] So long as a sentence is within the statutory range, 8 the trial court may impose
it without regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 489. If the trial court does find the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors, it must give a statement of its reasons for
selecting the sentence it imposes. Id. at 490. However, the relative weight or
value assignable to reasons properly found, or those which should have been
found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869.
[27] Moreover, we note that “a trial court is required to state its reasons for
imposing consecutive sentences,” and “must find at least one aggravating
circumstance” to do so. McBride v. State, 992 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013), trans. denied. “[A] trial court may rely on the same reasons to impose a
maximum sentence and also [to] impose consecutive sentences.” Gilliam v.
State, 901 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The existence of even one valid
aggravating factor is enough to support the imposition of consecutive sentences.
See, e.g., Walden v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1165, 1177-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans.
denied. 9
8
There is no advisory sentence for misdemeanors. The term of imprisonment for a Class A misdemeanor is
“not more than one (1) year”—that is, the statutory range is up to one year. I.C. § 35-50-3-2. Here, the trial
court chose to impose the maximum sentence for each of the three challenged Class A misdemeanor
convictions. Alexander does not challenge the sentence for the false informing conviction.
9
We further note “[i]t is a well-established principle that the existence of multiple crimes or victims
constitutes a valid aggravating circumstance that a trial court may consider in imposing consecutive
sentences.” McBride, 992 N.E.2d 919-20. Here, there were multiple victims.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 15 of 33 [28] Here, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence (i.e., one year) for each of
the three contributing to delinquency convictions and ordered the sentences to
run consecutively. In so doing, the trial court considered specific aggravating
factors. Alexander first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
finding the existence of an aggravator for which there is no support in the
record. Specifically, Alexander contends that there is no record evidence to
support the aggravator of a lack of remorse. He is incorrect. The trial court
noted that Alexander had not shown remorse for his crimes, and lack of
remorse is a permissible aggravator. See, e.g., Veal v. State, 784 N.E.2d 490, 494
(Ind. 2003). As evidence of Alexander’s lack of remorse, the trial court pointed
to the fact that Alexander had been charged with additional criminal charges
“just a short time after” the trial in this case. Tr. v. 5 at 201. A pending criminal
charge is also a proper consideration as an aggravator in sentencing. See, e.g.,
Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
[29] Alexander further contends that the trial court abused its discretion by relying
upon an aggravator that is allegedly improper as a matter of law. However, we
need not address that contention because, “[w]hen we can identify sufficient
aggravating circumstances to persuade us that the trial court would have
entered the same sentence even without the impermissible factor, we will affirm
the trial court’s decision.” Carter v. State, 271 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. Ct. App.
2025) (citation modified), trans. denied; accord Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.
Such is the case here; Alexander’s lack of remorse, alone, supports maximum
and consecutive sentences, not to mention his pending criminal charges. See
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 16 of 33
Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869. Therefore, we are confident that the trial court would
have imposed the same sentence regardless of any allegedly improper
aggravator. See Carter, 271 N.E.3d at 570. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it imposed maximum and consecutive sentences.
Appellate Rule 7(B) Review
[30] Alexander also asks that we revise his sentence because it is allegedly
inappropriate. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution
“authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed
by the trial court.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. This appellate authority is
implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). 10 Id. As our Supreme Court
recently explained,
Appellate Rule 7(B) serves “to leaven the outliers, rather than to
achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence,” McCallister v. State, 91
N.E.3d 554, 566 (Ind. 2018), allowing revision of a sentence if
the court finds the trial court’s decision to be inappropriate in
consideration of the nature of the offense and the offender’s
character, Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting
App. R. 7(B)). “Ultimately, our constitutional authority to review
and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is
appropriate,” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017)
(cleaned up), an act that is reserved for “exceptional” cases,
Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015). It is up to the
defendant to “persuade the appellate court that his or her
sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.”
10
Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, in full: “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 17 of 33
Childress [v. State], 848 N.E.2d [1073,] 1080 [(Ind. 2006)]. The
trial court’s sentence is afforded considerable deference and will
stand unless [overcome by] “compelling evidence portraying in a
positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by
restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s
character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent
examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111,
122 (Ind. 2015).
Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).
[31] The evidence discloses that Alexander did not just buy some alcohol for minors
but bought “a lot” of alcohol for the three minor girls: specifically, an entire
bottle of vodka and multiple shot-sized bottles of Fireball whiskey. Tr. v. 5 at
82. That is evidence of an act that “clearly exceeds the elements necessary” to
prove the offense of contributing to delinquency. Anderson v. State, 989 N.E.2d
823, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Alexander has not pointed to any
evidence that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses.
[32] Nor does Alexander’s character warrant a revision of his sentence. “Our
analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a
defendant’s qualities, including: the defendant’s age, criminal history,
background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Wilson v. State, 221
N.E.3d 667, 680 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100
(Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)). Here, there is no
evidence of remorse on Alexander’s part; in fact, there is evidence that he
bragged about his offenses after committing them. Furthermore, it is
appropriate for us to consider evidence of other pending criminal charges
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 18 of 33
against Alexander, as that casts “a poor reflection on the defendant’s character,
because it may reveal that he or she has not been deterred after having been
subjected to the police authority of the State.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068,
1094 (Ind. 2025) (citation modified).
[33] In short, Alexander has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate
in light of the offenses and his character.
Conclusion
[34] There was sufficient evidence to support Alexander’s convictions, and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him. In addition, Alexander has
failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his offenses and his
character. Therefore, we affirm his convictions and sentence.
[35] Affirmed.
Brown, J., concurs.
Weissmann, J., dissents with separate opinion.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Matthew J. McGovern
Fishers, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
John R. Oosterhoff
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 19 of 33
Weissmann, Judge, dissenting.
[36] Alexander gave alcohol to three teenage girls—S.C., E.B., and E.H.—all of
whom were, in fact, under 18. The State proved that much, and on that point I
agree with the majority. But the State never proved the one fact that actually
makes this a crime: that Alexander knew the girls were minors. Because that
proof is lacking, I would reverse his three convictions for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor (CDM).
[37] Indiana law already answers whether that knowledge was required. Ind. Code §
35-41-2-2(d) (Culpability Statute) specifies that “[u]nless the statute defining the
offense provides otherwise, if a kind of culpability is required for commission of
an offense, it is required with respect to every material element of the prohibited
conduct” (emphasis added). This rule requires proof that Alexander acted
knowingly or intentionally as to every material element of contributing to the
delinquency of a child because nothing in the statute defining the offense
“provides otherwise.” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2022) (CDM Statute); Ind.
Code § 35-41-2-2(d).
[38] The majority does not dispute that subsection (a) of the CDM Statute requires
Alexander to have acted “knowingly or intentionally” in encouraging, aiding,
inducing, or causing the prohibited conduct. The majority simply carves the
word “child” out of that requirement, reasoning that a child’s status is an
“aggravating circumstance” outside the “prohibited conduct” to which the
mens rea attaches. But the majority relies on cases that do not support that
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 20 of 33
conclusion. Those cases involve different types of statutes: ones that contain no
express mens rea, ones that attach a mental state only to a discrete element, or
ones that add an aggravating circumstance to an already complete crime. The
logic underlying those statutes—that ignorance of a fact can be excused when
that fact is not what makes the conduct a crime—does not apply to the CDM
statute, where the child’s age is what makes the defendant’s act a crime. And
these differences mean that the CDM Statute falls within the Culpability
Statute’s default rule, but the statutes in the cases on which the majority builds
its opinion do not.
[39] In essence, the majority is placing a square peg in a round hole and
pronouncing that it fits. I would reverse Alexander’s convictions because the
State failed in its burden of proving that he knew the child was a minor, leaving
insufficient evidence for conviction.
I. Knowledge of the Child’s Age Is an Essential Element of
CDM
[40] The CDM Statute provides in relevant part:
(a) A person at least eighteen (18) years of age who knowingly
or intentionally encourages, aids, induces, or causes a child to
commit an act of delinquency (as defined by IC 31-37-1 or IC 31-37-2) commits contributing to delinquency, a Class A
misdemeanor, except as provided in subsections (b) through (e).
(b) If the delinquent act described in subsection (a) would be a
felony if committed by an adult, the offense described in
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 21 of 33
subsection (a) is a felony of the same level as the delinquent act
would be if committed by an adult.
(c) The offense described in subsection (a) is a Level 5 felony
if:
(1) the person committing the offense is at least twentyone (21) years of age and knowingly or intentionally
furnishes:
(A) an alcoholic beverage to a child in violation
of IC 7.1-5-7-8 when the person committing the
offense knew or reasonably should have known that
the person furnished the alcoholic beverage was a
child; or
(B) a controlled substance (as defined in IC 35-48-1-9) or a drug (as defined in IC 9-13-2-49.1) in
violation of Indiana law; and
(2) the consumption, ingestion, or use of the alcoholic
beverage, controlled substance, or drug is the proximate
cause of the death of any person.
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8 (2022).
A. The Statute’s Placement of “Knowingly or
Intentionally” Before Every Element Triggers, Rather
Than Displaces, the Default Culpability Rule
[41] The Culpability Statute essentially divides criminal statutes into two categories:
(1) those in which the Legislature placed the mens rea at the outset of the
offense description and (2) those that “provide[] otherwise.” Ind. Code § 35-41-Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 22 of 33
2-2(d). This first group falls within the Culpability Statute’s default rule, which
applies the culpability required for commission of the offense to every material
element of the prohibited conduct. Id. The second group of criminal statutes
falls within the Culpability Statute’s express exception because these statutes
“provide[] otherwise” and therefore require a different mens rea application
than the default rule supplies.
[42] The CDM Statute falls within the first category of statutes: those governed by
the Culpability Statute’s default rule. Subsection (a) of the CDM Statute opens
with “knowingly or intentionally.” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2022). That phrase
sits before every element that follows in the single sentence in subsection (a),
including the element requiring that the target of the encouragement be “a
child.” Id.
[43] Where “knowingly or intentionally” is placed ahead of the prohibited act in a
statute, the Culpability Statute’s default rule requires that the mens rea be
applied to each and every element of the offense that follows it. See, e.g.,
Chappell v. State, 966 N.E.2d 124, 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that to
convict the defendant of Class A felony burglary under a theory of accomplice
liability, the State was required to prove the defendant’s awareness of a high
probability both that he was engaging in the actus reus of the crime—namely,
aiding, inducing, or causing burglary—and that his behavior would facilitate
the commission of a breaking and entering with the intent to commit one of the
specifically named felonies).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 23 of 33 [44] The majority agrees, at least implicitly, that “knowingly or intentionally”
governs the verbs “encourage[s], aid[s], induc[es], or caus[es]” in the CDM
Statute. Op. at ¶ 14. The majority’s position is that this mens rea requirement
silently stops short of the object of those verbs—“a child”—although nothing in
the sentence marks that boundary. See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2022).
[45] But “knowingly or intentionally encourages, aids, induces, or causes a child to
commit an act of delinquency” is a single verb phrase with a single direct
object. Id. One cannot knowingly induce “a child” to do anything without some
awareness that the person induced is a child. The object of the verb therefore is
part of the conduct that must be done knowingly. The Legislature’s placement
of “knowingly or intentionally” at the very outset of that CDM clause is exactly
what triggers the Culpability Statute’s default rule and not its exception. Ind.
Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2022).
B. The Majority’s Authority Falls Within the Culpability
Statute’s Exception
[46] In concluding that the mens rea requirement does not extend to knowledge that
the person is a child, the majority draws support from precedent involving
statutes falling within the Culpability Statute’s exception, not its default rule.
These statutes, unlike the CDM Statute, do not have one express mens rea
stated before “every material element of the prohibited conduct,” as is required
for application of the Culpability Statute’s default rule. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(d).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 24 of 33 [47] For instance, some of these statutes—those in State v. Shelton, 692 N.E.2d 947
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998) and McCaffrey v. State, 523 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988)—contain no mens rea requirement. At least two other statutes within the
majority’s precedent involve a mens rea that is expressly limited to a single,
isolated element. Louallen v. State, 778 N.E.2d 794, 796-98 (Ind. 2002) (given
the Legislature’s position of intent language in the midst of the child molesting
statute, “intentional” mental state is required as to only one element of child
molesting); McKinley v. State, 45 N.E.3d 25, 29-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (specific
intent applies to only one element of drug dealing offense listed in midst of
governing statute).
[48] The remainder of the statutes within the majority’s precedent supply a mental
state for a base offense but do not require the same mental state with respect to
proof of a separate, additional fact establishing a different felony class or
charge. Leonard v. State, 73 N.E.3d 155 (Ind. 2017) (identity of murder victim);
McKinley, 45 N.E.3d at 29 (weight-based felony enhancement) 11; MaldonadoMorales v. State, 985 N.E.2d 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (enhancement based on
proof of domestic relationship with victim or presence of child); D.H. v. State,
932 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (enhancement based on victim’s school
employment).
11
McKinley is cited twice in this section because it involved two different culpability issues: one arising from
the challenged statute’s statement of a mens rea limited to a single element of the base offense and another
involving the statute’s felony enhancement based on proof of drug weight. 45 N.E.3d 25, 29-30 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 25 of 33 [49] Each of the majority’s cited decisions reached its result because of a specific
textual feature—an absent mens rea, a limited mens rea, or an already-complete
crime. As a result, each of these decisions involves statutes falling within the
Culpability Statute’s exception because the statutes provide a path different
than the Culpability Statute’s default rule dictates. See Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(d)
(“[u]nless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if a kind of
culpability is required for commission of an offense, it is required with respect
to every material element of the prohibited conduct”). Although the Culpability
Statute’s exception authorizes inconsistent application of a mens rea
requirement to material elements within a statute, as the majority’s precedent
establishes, the Culpability Statute’s default rule does not. See id.
[50] The majority’s precedent involving statutes falling within the Culpability
Statute’s exception does not govern a case involving subsection (a) of the CDM
Statute, which falls squarely within the Culpability Statute’s default rule. 12
C. Our Own Precedent Already Treats Knowledge of Age as
an Element of This Offense
[51] Long before today, our Supreme Court rejected the identical argument the
majority now accepts: that an offense charged under subsection (a) of the CDM
12
The majority also cites Leonard v. State, 73 N.E.3d 155, 162 (Ind. 2017), for the proposition that "prohibited
conduct" and "element" are not synonymous under Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(d) and that culpability therefore
need not reach every element simply because it governs one. That principle may be true in the abstract, but it
does not resolve this case. It only restates the question of whether "child" is part of the "prohibited conduct"
in subsection (a). That question turns on the statute’s own structure, addressed above, not on a general rule
borrowed from a different statute construing a different crime.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 26 of 33
Statute imposes strict liability as to the child’s age. Davidson v. State, 233 N.E.2d
173, 174-75 (Ind. 1968). The Court held that whether the defendant “knew or
ought to have known that the girl in question was under age” is a question of
fact for the jury and that this follows directly from the word “knowingly” in the
statute. Id. at 175.
[52] This Court has said the same thing. In Cornes v. State, 467 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984), this Court treated the defendant’s knowledge that the victim
was under 18 as one of the elements of proof that the State was required to
establish for a CDM conviction.
[53] The majority discounts these decisions on two grounds: that they predate the
2004 amendment creating the Level 5 felony in subsection (c) of the CDM
Statute and that neither Davidson nor Cornes squarely held that knowledge was
required, as opposed to merely charged and proved. Op. at n.4. Neither ground
withstands scrutiny.
[54] As to the first, the 2004 amendment added a new felony tier to the CDM
Statute; it did not touch the mens rea structure of subsection (a), which has
required a defendant to act “knowingly” since long before Davidson was
decided. Davidson, 233 N.E.2d at 175 (construing predecessor statute’s
requirement that a person act “knowingly” to encourage a child’s delinquency).
A holding interpreting identical operative language does not lose its force
merely because the Legislature later adds an unrelated felony provision
elsewhere in the same statute. In fact, under some such circumstances, the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 27 of 33
Legislature may be deemed to have acquiesced and agreed to that judicial
interpretation by its failure to change the statutory language. See generally Fraley
v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Ind. 2005) (“[I]t is well established that a
judicial interpretation of a statute . . . accompanied by substantial legislative
inaction for a considerable time, may be understood to signify the General
Assembly’s acquiescence and agreement with the judicial interpretation”).
[55] Moreover, the majority’s second reason for rejecting Davidson and Cornes—that
they did not hold that knowledge is required, Op. at n.5—fares no better. The
Davidson Court expressly ruled that the defendant’s knowledge of age “is a
question of fact for the jury” precisely because the statute required the
defendant to act “knowingly.” 233 N.E.2d at 175. That is a holding about the
State’s burden of proof, not a passing observation about the State’s actual proof.
[56] Cornes is equally direct. Faced with the defendant’s claim that the State failed to
prove his knowledge of the child’s age, this Court did not say such proof was
unnecessary. It instead affirmed the conviction because the jury viewed the
child and heard testimony about her apparent age. The Court, in essence,
treated the defendant’s knowledge as an element the State was required to, and
did, prove. Cornes, 467 N.E.2d at 427.
D. The Surplusage Argument Does Not Hold Up
[57] The majority’s textual argument reduces to this: if subsection (a) of the CDM
Statute already required knowledge of age, subsection (c)(1)(A)’s “knew or
reasonably should have known” language would be redundant. Op. at ¶¶ 13-18.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 28 of 33
“Under our surplusage canon, courts should give effect to every word and
‘eschew those [interpretations] that treat some words as duplicative or
meaningless.’” Cutchin v. Beard, 171 N.E.3d 991, 997 (Ind. 2021) (quoting
Estabrook v. Mazak Corp., 140 N.E.3d 830, 836 (Ind. 2020)). The majority’s
finding of surplusage does not survive examination for three reasons.
[58] First, subsection (c) of the CDM Statute is not simply subsection (a) plus a
knowledge requirement. Rather, subsection (c) applies only to offenders 21 or
older, requires proximate causation of a death, and uses a “knew or reasonably
should have known” standard rather than just the actual-knowledge standard
that “knowingly” ordinarily requires. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a), (c) (2022); see
also Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) (defining “knowingly” as awareness of a “high
probability”). “Reasonably should have known” is an objective, constructiveknowledge standard nowhere else recognized as a culpability level in Indiana’s
criminal code. See Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a)-(c) (defining only intentionally,
knowingly, and recklessly). In addition, “reasonably should have known” is a
lower bar than actual knowledge.
[59] The Legislature did not repeat subsection (a)’s knowledge requirement in
subsection (c). Instead, it included only in subsection (c) an easier-to-prove
constructive-knowledge standard for the felony offense. The State need not
prove under subsection (c) that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware
of the child’s age so long as the defendant reasonably should have known it.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 29 of 33 [60] That substitution is not surplusage. It tells courts what showing suffices for the
felony (constructive knowledge, plus proof the alcohol proximately caused a
death) as distinguished from what the default rule already requires for the
misdemeanor (actual knowledge, without more). Far from being redundant of
subsection (a), subsection (c)(1)(A)’s language does independent work: it
lowers, not repeats, the mental-state bar for the more serious offense involving
death.
[61] Second, the majority’s own reasoning proves too much. The majority holds that
the phrase “[u]nless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise” in
Indiana Code § 35-41-2-2(d) is satisfied whenever a later subsection in a
criminal statute separately specifies a mental state. If that is the case, logic
dictates that the drug-furnishing clause of subsection (c) of the CDM Statute
itself should be a strict liability offense as to age, given that subsection (c)
contains no age-knowledge language of any kind. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(c)(1)(B)
(2022). Yet no party suggests, and the majority does not hold, that a defendant
may be convicted of furnishing drugs to a minor under subsection (c) without
any showing that he knew or should have known the recipient was a minor.
The omission of “knew or reasonably should have known” from one clause is
not, by itself, proof of a deliberate choice to eliminate a knowledge requirement
from another. If it were, the drug-furnishing clause could not survive the
majority’s own logic.
[62] Third, even less persuasive is the majority’s suggestion that subsection (a) is
simply “subsumed” within subsection (c) so that any knowledge language in (c)
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 30 of 33
necessarily duplicates (a). Op. at ¶ 16, n.3. That framing assumes the very point
in dispute. If subsection (a) already requires knowledge of the child’s age by
default under Indiana Code § 35-41-2-2(d), as I believe it does, subsection
(c)(1)(A)’s language does not duplicate subsection (a). It recalibrates the
standard of proof for that same fact when the State seeks the far greater felony
penalty, exactly as explained above. The surplusage canon has no work to do
here because there is no genuine redundancy to eliminate—only two different
standards of proof for two different levels of an offense.
E. Indiana Law Presumes a Culpable Mental State, and the
Cases the Majority Invokes to Overcome That
Presumption Confirm Rather Than Rebut It
[63] Our Supreme Court has held that Indiana “strictly construes penal statutes
against the state,” and ambiguity is resolved in favor of “the presumption that a
culpable mental state is an intended element in criminal offenses for which the
culpability is not specified by statute.” State v. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d 963, 965, 967
(Ind. 1989). Overcoming that presumption takes “‘far more than the simple
omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition.’” Id. at 966
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1978)).
[64] Subsection (a) does not even omit the culpability phrase. It expressly specifies
“knowingly or intentionally” as the mens rea. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2022).
A statute that supplies a mens rea for the offense it defines cannot, without
more, be read to impose strict liability as to the object that mens rea modifies.
See Tracy v. Morell, 948 N.E.2d 855, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Ind. Code §
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 31 of 33
35-41-2-2 when ruling that Class A misdemeanor dealing in altered property “is
not a strict liability statute, and proof of mens rea, or culpability, is required”).
[65] The majority separately invokes several factors that the Shelton Court
considered when determining whether the Legislature intended to impose strict
liability through a statute barring sale of guns to minors. Op. at ¶ 21 (citing
Shelton, 692 N.E.2d at 949). But as explained above, that statute lacked any
mens rea language at all. That is why the Shelton Court had to resort to a multifactor balancing test in the first place to determine legislative intent. Shelton, 692
N.E.2d at 949. Subsection (a) of the CDM Statute already answers the
culpability question by its own text, which specifies a mens rea as to all
elements. Therefore, the balancing in Shelton is unnecessary here.
[66] In any event, applying Shelton’s considerations to subsection (a) of the CDM
Statute does not support the majority’s reading. Of the seven factors, Shelton
found that the severity of punishment and the low expected number of
prosecutions favored a mens rea requirement even for a handgun sale carrying a
minimum two-year felony sentence. Id. at 950-51. Shelton determined the
remaining five factors—chiefly, the great public danger of handguns and the
ease with which a seller can verify a buyer’s age through the statutory transfer
procedures set out in Indiana Code §§ 35-47-2-8 through -12—overcame that
presumption. Id.
[67] No comparable verification procedure exists for a private citizen who provides
alcohol to acquaintances. Unlike Shelton’s licensed handgun transfer, there is no
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 32 of 33
statutory mechanism by which Alexander was required, or even able, to
confirm the ages of S.C., E.B., and E.H. before bringing them alcohol. And the
Class A misdemeanor at issue here still exposes a defendant to a full year in jail
on each count.
[68] Both factors that Shelton itself identified as weighing against strict liability—the
severity of the punishment and the difficulty of finding a large volume of
prosecutions to justify dispensing with a mens rea—are present here. In
addition, none of the offsetting considerations that carried the day in Shelton—
an established age-verification process, or the exceptional public danger from
the immediate or uncontrollable use of a lethal weapon—is present here. The
presumption Shelton establishes remains unrebutted.
II. Conclusion
[69] The child’s age is not a footnote to this offense; it is the reason the offense
exists. Giving vodka to an adult is not a crime. Giving that same vodka to a
child is a crime. The only thing separating innocent conduct from a crime is
what the defendant knew about who was accepting the alcohol. A statute that
says “knowingly or intentionally” at the start means knowingly or intentionally
as to all material elements of the prohibited conduct. Our own precedent has
said so for nearly 60 years, and nothing in the felony subsection of the CDM
Statute suggests otherwise. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would
reverse Alexander’s convictions for contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-2705 September 30, 2026 Page 33 of 33