In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Z.R.

majority opinion

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Z.R.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0181

FILED 09-30-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS519752

The Honorable Sigmund G. Popko, Commissioner

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll Esq., Scottsdale

By Denise Lynn Carroll

Counsel for Appellant Child

Law Offices of Jason M. Leach, Higley

By Jason M. Leach

Guardian Ad Litem for Appellant Child

Tiffany & Bosco PA, Phoenix

By Alexander Poulos, Amy D. Sells

Counsel for Appellee Father

Rai Duer, P.C., Phoenix

By Peter B. Swann

Co-Counsel for Appellant Mother

Frost LLP, Phoenix

By Amy Wilkins Hoffman

Co-Counsel for Appellant Mother

IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Z.R.

Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 When parents fight, their children are often caught in the middle. When that fighting devolves, their children often suffer. Enter Z.R. (“Child”). Judge Robert Brooks described her situation like this:

[She] is a happy six-year-old who enjoys Karate, her new

school, and playing with her friends. [She] has two parents

who care for her and want to provide her [with] a life that

allows her to grow, be healthy, and flourish. Both parents are

fit . . . to parent her, care for her, and provide for her.

Unfortunately for [Child], her parents are amid an

extraordinary three-year legal saga that has negatively

affected her ability to know her father. That saga must now

end, and [she] must be allowed to exercise her rights to know

her father.

¶2 Starting in 2020, the relationship between Child’s parents frayed, then snapped. Since then, Angelica R. twice tried to terminate Jake V.’s parental rights. This appeal stems from her second attempt. That attempt produced what’s likely the longest termination hearing in state history. It lasted 44 days, during which the parties called 25 witnesses and submitted hundreds of exhibits. Doing Yeoman’s work, Commissioner Sigmund Popko issued a 143-page decision denying termination. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 Angelica R. (“Mother”) and Jake V. (“Father”) began dating in mid-2017; they never married. Child was born in 2018.

¶4 In October 2020, Mother petitioned the family division for legal decision-making and parenting time. She filed an acceptance of

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service and a stipulated order, claiming Father signed both. The stipulated order gave Father four hours of weekly supervised parenting time.

¶5 Two months later, Mother petitioned the juvenile court to terminate Father’s parental rights (“2020 Petition”). Mother claimed Father waived notice and consented to termination. At a hearing in February 2021, with Father absent, Mother testified Father relinquished his rights. Based on that testimony and Father’s purported consent, the juvenile court terminated Father’s rights (“2021 Order”).

¶6 But in September 2021, Father moved to set aside that Order, arguing he didn’t sign the documents, and Mother didn’t serve him—he said he only recently discovered them. In December 2021, over Mother’s objection, the juvenile court considered Father’s motion to set aside the 2021 Order. At that point, Mother sought special action relief, which we denied. See Angelica R. v. Popko, 253 Ariz. 84 (App. 2022).

¶7 In April 2022, Father sought summary judgment based on defective service. In September 2022, the juvenile court granted that motion, set aside the 2021 Order, and dismissed the 2020 Petition. Mother appealed; we affirmed. See In re Termination of Parental Rights as to Z.R., 2023 WL 2809239 (Ariz. App. Apr. 6, 2023) (mem. decision), review denied (Ariz. Aug. 22, 2023).

¶8 Still, Mother persisted. She again sought termination by amending her petition. Between April and December 2023, the juvenile court held a 44-day termination hearing. In October 2024, after considering the parties’ evidence, the juvenile court denied termination—the decision now on appeal.

II.

¶9 Between September 2022 and October 2024, the family division also conducted relevant proceedings. Right after the juvenile court set aside the 2021 Order, Father tried to modify the court’s decision-making and parenting time orders. The family division said no because no material change in circumstances occurred. But the court ordered that Father was entitled to four hours of weekly visitation, and those visits must commence.

¶10 In December 2022, Mother moved to stay the family law proceedings, including the parenting time orders. The family division refused. Mother again petitioned for special action relief; we again refused. See Rizik v. Jackson, 2023 WL 4948670 (Ariz. App. Aug. 3, 2023) (mem. decision). Also in December 2022, Father petitioned to hold Mother in

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contempt for denying his parenting time. Because of Mother’s stay motion, her special action petition, and other delays, the family division didn’t resolve Father’s petition until October 2024, mere days before the juvenile court issued the order now on appeal. In that October 2024 order, the family division found Mother in contempt for denying Father parenting time and “intentionally delaying the Therapeutic Intervention process.”

III.

¶11 Turning back to the juvenile court proceedings, Mother and Father testified during the termination hearing and called third-party and expert witnesses. They also introduced hundreds of exhibits, including photos, videos, text messages, and social media screenshots.

¶12 During the hearing, Mother testified as follows. Father, starting when Child was born, didn’t assist with childcare. Yes, Father stayed at her family’s home intermittently, but that was “more like couch surfing.” Despite Father producing photos showing his involvement with Child, they didn’t reflect reality.

¶13 In Child’s first ten months, Father changed Child’s diaper only five times, and he didn’t help with her teething or her medical appointments. By mid-July 2019, Father had little contact with Child.

¶14 Between October 2019 and October 2020, Father was uninterested in Child. Father still didn’t change diapers, buy toys, or connect with Child. Then, in early 2020, Father rented a condo, but he never asked Mother and Child to move in. During Covid, Father socialized with friends rather than isolating for Child’s safety, so he seldom visited Child.

¶15 In October 2020, Father agreed to terminate his parental rights by signing documents at Mother’s home. Although Father relinquished his rights, the family law order gave him weekly visitation for four hours, which he didn’t use. Between February 2021—when Father’s rights terminated—and August 2021, Father saw Child only five or six times. In August 2021, Mother severed contact.

¶16 For the next year, Father had no relationship with Child. After courts restored Father’s parental rights in September 2022, he still provided no financial support, and besides a few contacts in early 2023, he had no relationship with Child. As of January 2023, Father hadn’t given

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Child a birthday gift since 2020 or a Christmas gift since 2019, and he never paid child support.

¶17 For his part, Father testified as follows. He and Mother leased an apartment in mid-2018. But he spent only one night there because Mother wanted to stay with her family 24/7. So he, Mother, and Child lived with Mother’s family until February 2020. From birth, he fed, cared for, played with, and traveled with Child. And while traveling for work, he often called Mother and Child.

¶18 Between late 2019 and early 2020, Father and Mother sought their own place. He leased a condo in mid-February 2020. But when Mother didn’t bring Child there for a few days, he told Mother he knew his parental rights. He also told Mother and her family he was open to a formal co-parenting relationship rather than working things out with Mother.

¶19 After that, Mother visited Father’s condo with Child daily. He also visited Mother’s family home. But when Covid started, Father’s contact with Child waned because Mother and her family applied safety protocols more strictly to him than others who visited the family home.

¶20 In the first half of 2021, Father regularly played with Child. But Mother and Father’s relationship frayed. In the summer of 2021, Mother said she and Child had to travel to Michigan to visit Mother’s ailing grandparent. They actually visited the beach in California. During that time, Father had multiple calls with Child. When Mother returned to Arizona, Father confronted her about taking Child away. Although he tried to see Child, Mother wouldn’t respond.

¶21 The parents’ relationship then snapped. In August 2021, Mother blocked Father’s phone number, so he retained counsel. Counsel told Father about the family division’s visitation order and the juvenile court’s termination order. But Father claimed he hadn’t relinquished his rights or waived attendance at court hearings.

¶22 After Father learned about the 2021 Order terminating his rights, counsel advised Father not to contact Mother or her family because they might seek a protective order. Father still asked Mother’s counsel to see Child in late 2021, but Mother refused. Between September 2021 and September 2022, Father sought to set aside the termination order and made a settlement offer, which Mother refused.

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Opinion of the Court

¶23 Father testified that, after the court set aside the 2021 Order in September 2022, he tried exercising parenting time. Despite his requests and court orders giving him parenting time, Mother refused.

¶24 Father saw Child briefly in January 2023, but Child cried. He saw Child again in February 2023 with a mutually selected supervisor and that visit went well. He then wanted weekly visits, but Mother fired the supervisor—even though Mother had recommended her. That prevented Father from visiting Child. So Father asked the family division to appoint a therapist to help with reunification. Mother’s legal maneuvering also delayed that process. But for Mother’s interference, Father would have a relationship with Child.

IV.

¶25 When deciding termination, Commissioner Popko

considered the parties’ evidence regardless of date—he considered evidence when Father had full rights, after he lost his rights, after his rights were restored, and through the court’s order denying termination. In a thorough ruling, Commissioner Popko found Mother had “persistently and substantially restricted [Father’s] interaction with [Child].” So he found Father didn’t abandon Child, and he denied termination.

¶26 Let’s return now to the family division. There, Judge Brooks held more proceedings after Commissioner Popko denied termination. In February 2025—four months after the juvenile court denied termination— Judge Brooks decided a long-lingering request by Father to set aside the order giving him only four weekly hours of supervised visitation. In that ruling, he refused to set aside the stipulated order.

¶27 But Judge Brooks also considered temporary orders. Shortly after, he gave Father phased-in parenting time. While explaining his ruling, Judge Brooks “infer[red] from Mother’s desire to terminate Father’s parental rights that Mother is not likely to provide [Child] with any time with Father, absent a Court order.” Although Mother claimed she proposed “various parenting time arrangements,” Judge Brooks couldn’t “reconcile that . . . with Mother’s actions to have Father’s rights terminated, have this matter stayed during that action, and her other actions.”

¶28 Father appealed the order denying his set aside motion. But during appellate briefing, Mother moved to dismiss Father’s appeal. In her motion, Mother explained the parties agreed to “final orders, including

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legal decision making, parenting time, residence of the child, relocation, and child support[.]” To Mother, those orders made the appeal moot. A week later, the parties stipulated to dismiss the appeal; we obliged.

¶29 We know the content of the family division’s final orders— Mother attached them when moving to dismiss Father’s appeal. Through those orders, the parties “affirm that the[ir] agreement is practical and in the best interests of the parties’ minor child[.]” The parties acknowledge “that failure to have the child engaged in the therapeutically informed parenting time order would be . . . contrary to the child’s best interests.” And the court found “the proposed parenting plan, legal decision-making, and child support are in the child’s best interest[.]”

¶30 The parties attached a proposed parenting time and legal decision-making order, which the court entered. That order provides that “[t]he parties recognize that the child’s best interests are best served by having a meaningful, healthy, and safe connection to both parents.” The order confirms that the parenting plan “is in the best interests of the child” and not having Child participate “would be to the detriment of the child’s emotional development and contrary to the child’s best interests.” So the plan “give[s] each parent a voice in the child’s life . . . to maximize each parent’s time with the child, consistent with the child’s best interests.”

¶31 The parenting plan—like the court’s temporary orders— adopts a multi-stage plan to reintroduce Child to Father, starting with therapy, progressing to supervised parenting time, and ending with unsupervised parenting time. The plan says the “[t]he parties agree that [it] is in the child’s best interests that each parent has substantial, frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with the child and the ability to maximize their parenting time.” What’s more, the “plan has multiplestages and phases that are intended to maximize Father’s parenting time consistent with the child’s best interests.”

¶32 To help with all this, the parties appointed a case implementation supervisor. In the order doing so, the court concluded that “the failure to have the minor child fully participate in the parenting time plan . . . would be to the potential detriment of the minor child’s emotional development and contrary to the minor child’s best interests.” The court observed that Child “becomes emotionally dysregulated when with Father.” So although Father is “a fit and proper parent,” Child “is unable to presently exercise parenting time consistent with the Court’s order without ongoing supervision[.]”

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¶33 Lastly, the parties agreed to joint legal decision-making authority. While adopting that agreement, the court found it’s “in the child’s best interest that [Mother] and [Father] be awarded joint legal decision-making authority.”

VI.

¶34 Returning again to the matter before us, Mother and Child timely appealed the juvenile court’s order denying termination. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 603(a)(1)(A). And we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 8-235(A); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 601(b)(2)(F).

DISCUSSION

¶35 Mother says the juvenile court misapplied the “undisputed” facts by denying termination. Father responds that Mother didn’t meet her burden to achieve termination.

¶36 Before terminating a parent’s rights, the juvenile court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that there’s a statutory basis for termination. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); A.R.S. § 8-537(B); see also Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284-85 ¶ 25 (2005). If it does so, the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 288 ¶ 41.

¶37 We interpret statutes governing termination de novo. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 476 ¶ 17 (2023). On the other hand, we accept the juvenile court’s factual findings when supported by reasonable evidence and inferences. Id. at 478 ¶ 30. Unlike de novo review, this is a deferential standard: after all, “the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility.” Id. (quoting Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3 ¶ 9 (2016)). Unless clearly erroneous, we won’t disturb the juvenile court’s decision about whether a party has sufficiently established termination. Id. at 478-79 ¶ 31.

¶38 Arizona law lists several grounds for terminating parental rights—abandonment is one. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Abandonment occurs when a parent fails “to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, including providing normal supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). “Abandonment includes a judicial finding that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child.” Id. The statute also creates this presumption: failing “to maintain a normal

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parental relationship with the child without just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment.” Id.

¶39 Our supreme court recently explained how abandonment works when one parent seeks to terminate the other’s rights. See In re B.W., 260 Ariz. 123, 129–32 ¶¶ 17–26 (2025). A parent establishes the statutory presumption by producing evidence that “the other parent” didn’t “maintain a normal parental relationship for six months without just cause.” Id. at 130 ¶ 18. To do so, a parent seeking termination must show a “(1) failure to maintain a normal parental relationship; (2) for six months; and (3) without just cause.” Id. But a parent defending against termination can rebut the presumption. Id. To do so, he must show just cause or present “other evidence” disproving “the alleged failure to maintain a normal parental relationship.” Id. If he does so, the court must decide abandonment with no presumption. Id.

¶40 But no presumption doesn’t mean no termination. Id. ¶ 19. Termination can still occur. With no presumption, the parent seeking termination must prove the other “failed to ‘provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child . . .” for a sustained period.” Id. (quoting A.R.S. § 8-531(1)). Then again, “if a parent can show ‘just cause’” for lacking “a normal parental relationship,” abandonment fails. Id.

¶41 Although “just cause” is undefined, it exists when a parent “had a reasonable and fair justification for not maintaining a normal parental relationship with the child and relied on that justification in good faith.” Id. at 131 ¶ 24. To determine “just cause,” the court should “examine whether the parent is acting to maintain a normal parent-child relationship.” Id. ¶ 25. But that’s just one factor—there are others. Like these: whether the parent actively asserted his legal rights as necessary and any other factor impacting the “parent’s ability or belief as to his ability to assert his rights.” Id. at 132 ¶ 25.

¶42 Even before B.W., we identified one way for a parent to show “just cause” for not maintaining a normal parent-child relationship. We concluded “just cause” exists when a parent seeking termination “persistently and substantially restricted the other parent’s interaction with their child.” Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 293 ¶ 1 (App. 2013). Put differently, a parent seeking termination can’t prove abandonment by

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restricting the other parent’s involvement and then arguing he’s “had only limited involvement with the child.” Id. at 293-94 ¶ 1.

¶43 In Calvin B., Brittany tried to terminate Calvin’s rights based on abandonment. Id. at 295 ¶ 9. Brittany alleged “Calvin had only ‘limited and sporadic contact’ with their son and had “failed to have any meaningful contact with the child’” for over a year. Id. at 295 ¶ 9. But Brittany obtained an order of protection against Calvin and, when he tried to see their son, she had Calvin arrested. Id. at 294–95 ¶¶ 7–8. When Calvin sought temporary orders establishing parenting time, id. at 295 ¶ 9, Brittany argued visitation must await her termination request, id. ¶ 10. The juvenile court disagreed. Id. Calvin petitioned to enforce parenting time and for contempt, which the court granted. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. Still, the juvenile court terminated Calvin’s rights. Id. at 296 ¶ 15.

¶44 We reversed. Id. at 299 ¶ 33. We concluded that “throughout the child’s life, Calvin actively sought more involvement with their son than Brittany would allow.” Id. at 297 ¶ 22. Yes, Calvin was imperfect—he didn’t complete parenting classes or pay child support, id. ¶ 25—but his visitation requests, id. at 298 ¶ 27, and his litigation efforts, id. ¶¶ 28–29, defeated abandonment, id. at 299 ¶ 33. We distinguished Calvin’s conduct from that of the parents in Michael J.; unlike in that case, Calvin “vigorously asserted his legal rights.” Id. at 298 ¶ 29. We also differentiated Calvin’s conduct from that in S-114487 and S-1607. See Pima Cnty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 98 (1994) (a parent asserted legal rights only after a termination petition); Pima Cnty. Severance Action No. S-1607, 147 Ariz. 237, 239 (1985) (a parent petitioned once to enforce visitation but took no further action). Under Calvin B., “just cause” exists when a parent seeking termination behaves like Brittany. See 232 Ariz. at 297 ¶ 21.

II.

¶45 So we ask this: did the juvenile court err by applying Calvin B. to find “just cause”? We needn’t decide whether Mother established a presumption of abandonment or proved Father “failed to ‘provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with [Child] . . .’ for a sustained period.” In re B.W., 260 Ariz. at 130 ¶ 18 (quoting A.R.S. § 8-531(1)). Even if Mother proved either, her abandonment claim fails if Father had “just cause.” So we focus there.

¶46 The juvenile court concluded Mother behaved like Brittany. Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by applying Calvin B. to the facts the juvenile court found. Put differently, Mother doesn’t ask us to revisit

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Calvin B. or argue we there misinterpreted abandonment. So we’ll reverse the juvenile court only if no reasonable person could conclude Father had “just cause” under Calvin B. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 479 ¶ 31. But if a reasonable person could conclude Mother “persistently and substantially restricted” Father’s “interaction with” Child (like Brittany did), Mother’s abandonment claim fails. See Calvin B., 232 Ariz. at 293 ¶ 1.

¶47 During the termination hearing, the parties offered conflicting evidence about Father’s involvement in Child’s life before October 2020. It’s undisputed Father was present at Child’s birth. Mother alleged Father “consistently show[ed] little to no genuine interest” in Child and had “virtually no involvement in” Child’s life. But the court found otherwise, and there was sufficient evidence to do so. The court received evidence that Father and Mother were engaged to be married. Plus, Father lived with Mother and Child and he actively parented Child.

¶48 Mother also contested Father’s involvement with Child between October 2020 and September 2021—when Father knew not about legal proceedings against him. But the court found that, after Mother obtained the 2021 Order, she “strung [Father] along until August 2021 while he struggled to see [Child],” “after which she blocked his access[.]” The court found “no evidence of abandonment during this period.” To conclude as much, the court relied on photos and videos of Father with Child at his condo and Mother’s home, as well as testimony about Father’s attempts to communicate with Child. That evidence supports the court’s findings.

¶49 We turn next to the period between September 2021 and September 2022. During that time, Father initiated legal proceedings and had the 2021 Order set aside. The juvenile court found “no evidence of abandonment” during this time. Although Father didn’t see Child, that was because Mother obtained an order terminating his rights. Despite that order, Father “vigorously asserted his legal rights” by moving (successfully) to set aside the 2021 Order. Father requested to see Child; Mother rebuffed him. Mother admitted she did so based on the termination order.

¶50 Between September 2022 (when the court set aside the 2021 Order) and February 2023 (when Mother amended her termination petition), the court found Mother “persistently and substantially restricted [Father’s] interaction with [Child].” Father tried to see Child, but Mother’s

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counsel ignored him or responded that Mother wouldn’t allow visitation until a court found it would be in Child’s best interests. Father petitioned to enforce parenting time and for contempt. Father also petitioned to modify parenting time, which Mother moved to dismiss.

¶51 Father then visited Child twice in early 2023. In January 2023, Father had to cut his visit short because Child cried. In February, Father visited Child with a supervisor Mother agreed to hire. Father said that visit was productive, but Mother then terminated the supervisor. To the juvenile court, this proved Mother was uninterested in having Father engage with Child; the record adequately supports that finding.

¶52 The court also considered whether Father abandoned Child after Mother amended her termination petition. The court again found Father “vigorously pursu[ed] his rights in juvenile and family court and [Mother] persistently and substantially blocked [his] interaction with [Child].” Father asked the family division to appoint facilitators for parenting time, and he fought “to restore his rights which were taken from him by the now-void termination order.” Still, Mother argued against retaining therapists to facilitate reunification, delayed by seeking to stay the family law proceedings, and when those actions failed, petitioned for special action relief. Mother’s actions stopped Father from seeing Child.

¶53 The court found Father wanted to reunify with Child and have meaningful parenting time, but “[t]he great weight of the evidence” showed Mother “persistently and substantially restrict[ed] [Father’s] interactions with” Child. The record also adequately supports these findings.

¶54 In sum, a reasonable person could conclude that Father showed “just cause” for any lapse in his relationship with Child because Mother persistently and substantially restricted Father from interacting with Child. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 479 ¶ 31; In re B.W., 260 Ariz. at 131– 32 ¶¶ 24–25; Calvin B., 232 Ariz. at 293 ¶ 1. So the court didn’t err by denying termination.

¶55 Mother thinks Calvin B. is inapplicable. She compares Father’s conduct to that of the parents in the cases Calvin B. distinguished. To do so, Mother relies on her version of events. But the juvenile court didn’t find Mother’s version credible—it credited Father’s version. We ordinarily do not second guess the juvenile court’s credibility conclusions; there’s no reason to do so here. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3 ¶ 9.

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¶56 The court repeatedly found Mother persistently and substantially interfered with Father’s parental rights. Mother claims she “offered several different ways for Father to meet with his daughter,” but the court found she was “busy undermining it” by seeking to stay the family proceedings, repeatedly petitioning for special action relief, and ignoring Father’s requests to see Child. As we’ve explained, the record supports the court’s findings. See supra ¶¶ 47–54.

¶57 Legally speaking, Mother’s conduct is little different from Brittany’s. True, Mother didn’t obtain a protective order against Father. But just the same, Mother persistently and substantially restricted his access to Child. The court found Mother blocked Father with the 2021 Termination Order and continued to do so after the court set it aside. The court found Mother “blocked and delayed” a hearing on Father’s motion to modify his parenting time. And the court found that, even after “two direct court orders for parenting time,” Mother blocked Father from exercising it. Based on Mother’s persistent conduct (only some of which we’ve described), the juvenile court correctly applied Calvin B.

¶58 Mother argues S-114487 requires Father to do more than vigorously litigate his rights. She contends a parent must also “act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary.” See S-114487, 179 Ariz. at 97. But reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that Father sufficiently pressed his rights to establish a relationship with Child; the record evidence adequately supports the juvenile court’s legal conclusions. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 479 ¶ 31.

III.

¶59 Because Mother didn’t prove abandonment, the superior court didn’t decide Child’s best interests. See Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149 ¶ 8 (2018). Still, the court suggested Mother didn’t prove termination is in Child’s best interests. It considered that Mother’s husband wants to adopt Child, that Father has a stable career, home, and family and friends, both parents’ conduct, and their ability to solve parenting issues (they later did). Plus, Child’s guardian ad litem explained that, if he had “to make a best interest finding,” he would conclude “that mother has not proven that termination . . . is in the child’s best interest.”

¶60 While incorrectly characterizing the court’s best-interests finding as “half-baked,” Mother correctly notes the court inaccurately said Father “never sought to require a paternity test.”

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¶61 Still, after concluding Father didn’t abandon Child, normally we would stop. But we press on. Why? Because before oral argument in this appeal, Mother and Father agreed on legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support in the family division. So we address how that development impacts Mother’s quest to have us or the juvenile court conclude that termination is in Child’s best interests.

¶62 We judicially noticed the parties’ family law agreements. Neither party objected to us doing so nor sought to file supplemental briefs; they instead addressed the agreements at oral argument. Those agreements are reason enough not to force the juvenile court to determine whether termination is in Child’s best interests, even if abandonment occurred. As we explain, Mother agreed it’s in Child’s best interests for Child to have a relationship with Father—repeatedly and conclusively. And with those agreements, Mother’s best-interests argument flops.

¶63 We applaud the parties for overcoming their differences. See Garn v. Garn, 155 Ariz. 156, 160 (App. 1987) (“Stipulations are strongly favored by the law[.]”). Though laudable, the parties’ agreements are also binding. See Pulliam v. Pulliam, 139 Ariz. 343, 345 (App. 1984). They bind the parties like any contract would; after all, those agreements evidence a bargained-for exchange between them. See Bekins Van & Storage Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 4 Ariz. App. 569, 570 (1967).

¶64 Mother acknowledged during oral argument that we should honor her agreements. We do just that. See Pulliam, 139 Ariz. at 345. Those agreements—which the family division reduced to judgment—make it impossible to conclude termination is in Child’s best interests.

¶65 What were those agreements? Here’s a sample (there are others contradicting termination):

 “[I]t is in [Child’s] best interests that [Father] has substantial,

frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with [Child] and the

ability to maximize [his] parenting time.”

 The parties will have “joint legal decision-making, with neither

parent having final say” and that “agreement is practical and in the

best interests of [Child].”

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 “[F]ailure to have [Child] engage[] in the therapeutically informed

parenting time order would be to the potential detriment of [Child’s]

emotional development and contrary to the [Child’s] best interests.”

 Father is “fit to parent.”

 “[T]he proposed parenting plan, legal decision-making, and child

support are in [Child’s] best interest[.]”

 The parenting plan “will protect [Child’s] best interests into the

future.”

 And “[t]he parents can sustain an ongoing commitment to [Child].”

Based on these agreements, even if Mother proved abandonment, neither we nor the juvenile court could find that termination is in Child’s best interests.

¶66 Mother argues her agreements can’t stop us or the superior court from finding termination is in Child’s best interests. She argues that giving her agreements that effect would: (1) ignore the separate nature of family and juvenile court proceedings; (2) disregard fact issues that would exist on remand; and (3) punish her for entering into the agreements. We’re unconvinced.

¶67 The parties’ family and juvenile court proceedings aren’t truly separate; they all occurred in the superior court. Mother can’t agree that Father’s presence is in Child’s best interests in the family division while disputing that issue in juvenile court (including on appeal). There are at least two reasons why.

¶68 One, the family division and the juvenile court aren’t two courts, they’re one. See Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 13 (“The superior courts . . . shall constitute a single court.”); Rohan Mgmt., Inc. v. Jantzen, 246 Ariz. 168, 172 (App. 2019). In the family division, Mother answered the question she’d have us or the juvenile court answer—whether it’s in Child’s best interests for Father to have parental rights. And Mother did so in the same, unified superior court. See Rohan Mgmt., Inc., 246 Ariz. at 172 ¶ 11. We won’t order the superior court to resolve a question Mother already answered in the superior court.

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Opinion of the Court

¶69 Two, conceding parenting time is in “the best interests of the child” in family proceedings concedes the same in parallel termination proceedings. Both the parenting time and termination statutes use the phrase “best interests of the child.” Compare A.R.S. § 25-403 with A.R.S. § 8-533 (B). That phrase has the same meaning in both contexts—even if used for different purposes. It means this: will the action the court takes materially benefit the child? Stipulating to parenting time in the family law context means a parent can rarely continue to press for termination in the juvenile context.

¶70 Here’s what we mean: when one parent stipulates it’s in a child’s best interests for a parent to exercise parental rights in the family context, it’s equally in the child’s best interests for that parent to retain his rights in the juvenile context. After all, the legislature used the phrase “the best interests of the child” to determine legal decision-making and parenting time, and to determine whether parental rights should terminate. See A.R.S. § 25-403; A.R.S. § 8-533 (B); see also State Farm Auto. Ins. v. Orlando, 259 Ariz. 531, 534 ¶ 10 (2025). And if it would benefit a child for her father to exercise parenting time, it can’t also benefit her to terminate her father’s rights (thus eliminating parenting time).

¶71 This doesn’t mean the best-interests inquiry in the family context is identical to that in the juvenile context—for example, asking how much parenting time a parent gets differs from asking whether we should void a parent’s rights. We conclude only that a parent who agrees it’s in a child’s best interests for her father to exercise his rights can’t continue to maintain that it’s in the child’s best interests for him to have no rights. Think of it like this: it can’t simultaneously be in a daughter’s best interests for her father to have a relationship with her and for her father to have no chance to do so.

¶72 Mother can’t ignore her agreements on grounds they came after the termination hearing. We usually focus on facts developed during the termination hearing. Since that hearing though, Mother agreed it’s in Child’s best interests to have a meaningful relationship with Father. But Mother now asks us to decide that termination is in Child’s best interests and then direct the juvenile court to terminate Father’s rights. See In re C.E., 260 Ariz. 209, 213–14 ¶ 24–25 (App. 2025). To be sure, we seldom decide best interests on appeal. See id. ¶ 25. But we do so here—in Father’s favor— because Mother agreed that Father parenting Child is in Child’s best

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Opinion of the Court

interests, while arguing (paradoxically) that terminating Father’s rights is in Child’s best interests.

¶73 Mother’s argument is akin to a litigant resisting summary judgment after admitting a point defeating their claim. We don’t countenance such tactics. See Bishop v. State Dep’t of Corr., 172 Ariz. 472, 476 (App. 1992) (“A party cannot create a material issue of fact by contradicting her own prior testimony.”). And we don’t do so here. After seeking termination, Mother agreed—knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and repeatedly—that Father being in Child’s life is in Child’s best interests. We hold Mother to her agreements, which saves the parties (especially Child) from further (and futile) proceedings.

¶74 We also won’t ignore Mother’s agreements on grounds she wanted to avoid “scorched-earth litigation.” By agreeing that having Father involved is in Child’s best interests, Mother didn’t just avoid litigation. She resolved Father’s parenting time, legal decision-making, and child support, including any risk she’d lose on those issues. And narrowing or eliminating issues is why we favor stipulations. See Pulliam, 139 Ariz. at 345. Again, we merely apply Mother’s agreements.

¶75 Similarly, Mother’s agreements aren’t “subsequent remedial measure[s].” See Maricopa Cnty., Juv. Action No. JS-1363, 115 Ariz. 600, 601 (App. 1977). Truth be told, Mother mischaracterizes JS-1363. That opinion doesn’t discuss “subsequent remedial measures.” Id. It just says the juvenile court needn’t always consider post-petition conduct—a premise we don’t question. Id.

¶76 And consider this. Mother’s request to overlook her agreements contradicts her own position. Previously, Mother asked us to make the juvenile court consider Father’s post-amendment conduct. Pet. for Spec. Act. at 28, Angelica R. v. Jake V., No 1 CA-SA 24-0055 (Ariz. App. March 11, 2024). We stopped short of doing so. See Order Accepting & Declining in Part Spec. Act. Jurisdiction; Granting Partial Relief at 2–3, Angelica R. v. Jake V., No. 1 CA-SA 24-0055 (Ariz. App. May 9, 2024). But based partly on Mother’s arguments, the juvenile court then considered the parties’ post-amendment conduct (infra ¶ 82). Mother now has buyer’s remorse. She says her post-amendment agreements about Child’s bests interests are irrelevant. We reject her “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose” approach. Mother’s agreements—though arriving after her amended

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Opinion of the Court

petition—negate any basis for us or the juvenile court to conclude termination is in Child’s best interests.

¶77 But what if Father violates the parenting plan? Speculating he’ll do so is no reason to ignore Mother’s agreements. Mother agreed Father would “sustain an ongoing commitment to” Child, and that the parties’ plan “will protect [Child’s] best interests into the future.” These agreements bind Mother, until a court relieves her from them. See Pulliam, 139 Ariz. at 345. Plus, the family division predicted Father will perform and that his future performance is in Child’s best interests. See In re M.L., 261 Ariz. 189, 195 ¶ 20 (App. 2025) (courts “routinely make[] predictive judgments about future events”). So both Mother and the family division predicted Father will dutifully parent Child. If Father fails, Mother can seek relief. Until then, she can’t pursue termination in the off-chance Father falls short.

¶78 If we wanted to resolve this appeal most efficiently, we’d drop our pencil after affirming the court’s abandonment finding. But we have ventured further based on the unique nature of this litigation, marked by a 44-day termination hearing and multiple visits to this court. This litigation has burdened Child, and (as Judge Brooks expressed) the saga must end. Plus, the legislature prioritized the prompt resolution of juvenile matters. See A.R.S. § 8-235(C). We honor that instruction by deciding this matter as conclusively as possible. After all, Mother asks us to decide on appeal that termination is in Child’s best interests. Though we do so contrary to how Mother desires, we share her instinct that resolving all issues now is in Child’s best interests. Cf. In re C.E., 260 Ariz. at 214 ¶ 26 (“[W]e decline to further prolong [the proceedings] by remanding for additional proceedings merely because that is the conventional path.”). Neither we nor the superior court can now say that termination is in Child’s best interests. So even if abandonment occurred, termination can’t.

IV.

¶79 Mother makes other arguments. None prevail.

¶80 Mother argues the court erred by not considering postpetition evidence of abandonment. After the juvenile court said it wouldn’t

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consider post-petition evidence, Mother sought special action relief. We accepted jurisdiction and directed the juvenile court to consider evidence at least up to when Mother amended her petition. We left unresolved whether the court must consider post-amendment evidence.

¶81 The hole in Mother’s argument is this: the juvenile court then did what Mother would have us require it to do. True, the court initially said it wouldn’t consider post-amendment evidence. But the court later said it would consider such evidence; then it did so. After both parties presented evidence post-dating Mother’s amended petition, the court considered the parties’ evidence “through all periods.” For example, the court found insufficient evidence that Father abandoned Child between Mother’s amended petition and the end of the termination hearing. See supra ¶¶ 52-53. Because the court considered post-amendment evidence, we don’t decide whether the juvenile court must always do so.

¶82 Mother next argues the court erred by giving her only three hours to rebut Father’s testimony and by excluding her rebuttal witnesses. Father points out that Mother first disclosed seven rebuttal witnesses on day 42 of a 44-day hearing. During a conference, the court precluded all rebuttal witnesses other than Mother.

¶83 Because Mother didn’t obtain a transcript from that conference, we don’t know what was said. All we know is who appeared as counsel and how the court ruled. Father contends we therefore cannot decide this issue in Mother’s favor, but Mother contends “[i]t doesn’t take a transcript . . . to hold that [her] due process rights were violated” by a three-hour-to-fourteen-day discrepancy. We agree with Father.

¶84 Generally, “[w]hat constitutes proper rebuttal is within the trial court’s discretion and” without “an apparent abuse thereof” we will affirm. State v. Young, 116 Ariz. 385, 387 (1997). A “party that wants the record on appeal to include a transcript” must procure it. See ARCAP 11(b). Mother contends that, even without knowing what arguments the parties made, we can flip the juvenile court’s decision. Not so. Mother’s position conflicts with our rule that “[i]n the absence of the transcript, we presume it supports the court’s ruling.” Cruz v. City of Tucson, 243 Ariz. 69, 75 ¶ 25 (App. 2017). Without a transcript, we can’t say the court erred. See Blair v. Burgener, 226 Ariz. 213, 217 ¶ 9 (App. 2010).

¶85 Mother also invokes Volk to claim that limiting her rebuttal time violated due process. See Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462 (App. 2014). In

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Volk, the father could submit documents but not testify about them. Id. at 466 ¶ 11. We held that when assessing “credibility, the court must afford the parties an opportunity to present sworn oral testimony[.]” Id. at 464 ¶ 1. Here, as Volk instructs, Mother gave rebuttal testimony.

¶86 Volk also addressed adequate testimony time. Id. at 468 ¶ 21. We explained that time “limits become unreasonable if they prove insufficient to allow a substantive hearing.” Id. So a trial court “must allow reasonable additional time” when “the court lacks sufficient time to receive adequate testimony.” Id.

¶87 At no time did the court cut Mother’s rebuttal testimony short. And there’s no sign Mother couldn’t have given more rebuttal testimony if desired. Plus, Mother doesn’t identify any questions her counsel or any other party would’ve asked her with more time. Ultimately, the court’s limits on Mother’s rebuttal presentation did not “prove insufficient to allow a substantive hearing.” Id. The court didn’t err.

¶88 Mother argues the court erred by not sanctioning Father for disclosure violations by his handwriting expert. This issue arose from the contested validity of multiple documents, including Father’s purported consent to terminate his parental rights. Under the applicable rule, “the court may impose sanctions on a party who fails to disclose information in a timely manner.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 315(g). “Sanctions may include . . . any order the court deems appropriate.” Id. We won’t disturb the court’s sanction decision without an abuse of discretion. See State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 439 (1988).

¶89 During the hearing, Mother asked the court to give no weight to testimony from Father’s handwriting expert and to make Father disclose communications between his expert and Father’s counsel. Father responded, arguing Mother could’ve deposed his expert or conducted other discovery, but she didn’t do so. But the court ordered Father to “search his files . . . for records of conversations with” his expert. After Father provided those records and the court reviewed them in camera, the court ordered that Father must disclose some to Mother. But the court found nothing suggesting fraud on the court. Still, Mother argues Father’s disclosure failure was egregious and “showed demonstrable concealment of unfavorable opinions[.]”

¶90 Ultimately, the court allowed testimony from both handwriting experts. The court heard about what Father didn’t timely

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disclose, why it was disclosed late, and how to move forward. Father argued Mother wasn’t prejudiced and suggested ways to remedy his disclosure violation, including by allowing Mother to depose his expert. Mother argued that was insufficient because this is a credibility issue. But when Father’s expert testified, Mother attacked her credibility using the late-disclosed documents.

¶91 In her closing brief, Mother sought “an order that [the expert’s] testimony be given no weight.” The court instead gave “each expert’s testimony the weight it believes it is due[.]” As to Father’s expert testimony, the court said it gave it “very little weight[.]” And the court then didn’t rely on that testimony when denying termination.

¶92 True, the court didn’t explain why it let Father’s expert testify. But it allowed her testimony and then didn’t really rely on it. See City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 329 n.3 (1985). Even without reasoning, when reviewing that ruling, we will sustain it “unless undisputed facts and circumstances require a contrary ruling[.]” Id. at 330 (citation modified). Because the “undisputed facts and circumstances” don’t “require a contrary ruling” on Mother’s sanctions request, the court didn’t err by allowing Father’s handwriting expert to testify. See id.

¶93 Mother also says the court should’ve drawn an adverse inference against Father after a nonparty invoked the Fifth Amendment.

¶94 Father disclosed recordings of his interview with an author of a social study. Father’s girlfriend (“Wilburn”) recorded that interview; Father testified he didn’t know she did so. Wilburn testified Father asked her to leave during the meeting but, “being nosy,” she listened in. Mother argued Father and Wilburn conspired to record the interview.

¶95 When Wilburn testified, Mother’s counsel urged the court to admonish Wilburn about self-incrimination. After counsel made that request, Wilburn stopped testifying. A couple weeks later, Wilburn’s testimony continued. She invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked about her recording. Father’s counsel objected because Mother’s counsel was “purposefully asking questions that there’s no evidence to support them. Then . . . they will come in and argue . . . you need to take an adverse [inference][.]” That prediction was prescient—Mother later asked the court to take adverse inferences against Father.

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¶96 An adverse inference may be drawn against a party who refuses to testify. Montoya v. Super. Ct., 173 Ariz. 129, 131 (App. 1992). But we’ve never answered whether a trial court “may draw an adverse inference against a party” when a non-party invokes the Fifth Amendment. Ortiz v. Rambo, 2024 WL 188410, at *3 ¶¶ 16–17 (Ariz. App. Jan 18, 2024) (mem. decision). Other jurisdictions addressing that issue apply a nonexclusive list of factors from LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1997). See, e.g., Coquina Invs. v. TD Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 1300, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Mallory, 988 F.3d 730, 740 (4th Cir. 2021).

¶97 Mother asked for an adverse inference that Father “engaged in criminal conduct,” “has no regard for the truth or law,” and “signed [the] notary book[.]” Mother argued the LiButti factors required these inferences. The court “consider[ed] [Mother’s] arguments [and] her cited authorities” and “decline[d] to draw a permissive adverse inference against [Father.]” Mother argues the court’s explanation for not doing so was inadequate.

¶98 We needn’t decide whether a trial court may draw an adverse inference based on a non-party’s invocation, and we needn’t pin down the relevant factors for deciding whether to do so. As we’ve said, not explaining a discretionary decision isn’t necessarily an abuse of discretion. See supra ¶ 93. This is especially true when the record suggests valid reasons why the court declined an adverse inference. Given the parties’ competing perspectives on Willburn’s testimony (including its materiality), that Father didn’t invoke, and that the adverse inferences Mother sought were overly aggressive, the court again didn’t err.

CONCLUSION

¶99 The record adequately supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that Father didn’t abandon Child. Plus, after Mother agreed that Father being in Child’s life is in Child’s best interests, neither we nor the superior court can conclude otherwise. So we affirm the juvenile court’s decision denying termination. We also deny Mother’s Motion for a Procedural Order to Supplement the Record and to File Under Seal.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court

FILED: JR

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Z.R.

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain