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Brewer Home Center, LLC v. Sunshine Homes, Inc., Integrity Homes, LLC, Nathan Razer, Gary Dobbs, Bobby White, Bradley Witt, Billy Gene Barefield, Timothy Duplantis, Gulf South Homes, Inc., Jared Basset, Ian Rummings, Rummings Renovations, LLC, Justin Hancock, Trey Archer, Archer Services LLC, Justin S. Freeland, and Sierra Lynn McFarland

2026-09-30

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

Judgment rendered September 30, 2026.

Application for rehearing may be filed

within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,

La. C.C.P.

No. 57,009-CW

COURT OF APPEAL

SECOND CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

BREWER HOME CENTER, LLC Plaintiff-Respondent

versus

SUNSHINE HOMES, INC.,

INTEGRITY HOMES, LLC,

NATHAN RAZER, GARY

DOBBS, BOBBY WHITE,

BRADLEY WITT, BILLY

GENE BAREFIELD, TIMOTHY

DUPLANTIS, GULF SOUTH

HOMES, INC., JARED BASSET,

IAN RUMMINGS, RUMMINGS

RENOVATIONS, LLC, JUSTIN

HANCOCK, TREY ARCHER,

ARCHER SERVICES LLC,

JUSTIN S. FREELAND, AND

SIERRA LYNN MCFARLAND Defendants-Applicants

*****

On Application for Writs from the

Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the

Parish of Bossier, Louisiana

Trial Court No. 176,692

Honorable Michael O. Craig, Judge

*****

CARMOUCHE, BOKENFOHR, Counsel for DefendantsBUCKLE & DAY, PLLC Applicants, Justin S. By: Nicole M. Buckle Freeland, Sierra Lynn

McFarland, Integrity

Homes, LLC, Nathan

Razer, Gary Dobbs,

Bobby White, Bradley

Witt, Billy Gene

Barefield, and Timothy

Duplantis

SEABAUGH & SEPULVADO, LLC Counsel for PlaintiffBy: Michael C. Melerine Respondent, Brewer

Home Center, LLC

RON CHRISTOPHER STAMPS, LLC

By: Ron C. Stamps

DUKE LAW FIRM, LLC

By: Hannah D. Duke

E. CHARLES JACOBS

Attorney at Law

SHER GARNER CAHILL RICHTER Counsel for DefendantKLEIN & HILBERT, LLC Respondent, Sunshine

By: Thomas J. Madigan, II Homes, Inc.

CHRISTOPHER H. RIVIERE, APLC Counsel for DefendantBy: Evan M. Zizzi Respondent, Gulf South

Homes, Inc.

KEVIN W. HAMMOND, APLC Counsel for DefendantBy: Kevin W. Hammond Respondent, Jared Basset

*****

Before COX, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

COX, J.

This civil writ arises from the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court,

Parish of Bossier. Defendants, Integrity Homes, LLC, Nathan Razer, Gary

Dobbs, Bobby White, Bradley Witt, Billy Gene Barefield, Timothy

Duplantis, Justin S. Freeland, and Sierra Lynn McFarland (collectively, “the

Integrity Defendants”) seek review of the district court’s ruling denying their

peremptory exception of no cause of action, in favor of Brewer Home

Center, LLC (“Brewer”).

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 16, 2025, Brewer, a licensed retailer of factory-built homes,

filed a petition for damages against 17 named defendants: the Integrity

Defendants, Ian Rummings, Rummings Renovations, LLC, Justin Hancock,

Trey Archer, and Archer Services, LLC (collectively “the Contractor

Defendants”), Gulf South Homes, LLC (“Gulf South”), and Sunshine

Homes, Inc. (“Sunshine Homes”). Brewer alleged that the Integrity

Defendants conspired “in order to and/or attempt to steal from Brewer,” and

thereby violated the Louisiana Racketeering Act, La. R.S. 15:1351, et seq.

Specifically, Brewer provided:

9.

Thereafter, NATHAN RAZER, JARED BASSET, JUSTIN S.

FREELAND, and/or SIERRA LYNN MCFARLAND

conspired with INTEGRITY HOMES, LLC, GARY DOBBS,

BOBBY WHITE, BRADLEY WITT, BILLY GENE

BARFIELD, and/or TIMOTHY DUPLANTIS in order to

and/or attempt to steal from Brewer.

10.

The actions and/or attempted actions of NATHAN RAZER,

JARED BASSET, JUSTIN S. FREELAND, INTEGRITY

HOMES, LLC, GARY DOBBS, BOBBY WHITE, BRADLEY

WITT, BILLY GENE BARFIELD TIMOTHY DUPLANTIS,

and/or SUNSHINE HOMES, INC., violated the Louisiana

Racketeering Act, Louisiana Revised Statute 15:1351, et seq.

…

12.

Additionally, while acting in their course and scope and

purportedly on behalf of Brewer, NATHAN RAZER, JARED

BASSET, JUSTIN S. FREELAND, and/or SIERRA LYNN

MCFARLAND conspired with IAM RUMMINGS,

RUMMINGS RENOVATIONS, LLC, JUSTIN HANCOCK,

TREY ARCHER and ARCHER SERVICES, LLC, to defraud

Brewer.

The petition further alleged that while under contract, Razer, Basset,

Freeland, and McFarland conspired with Rummings, Rummings

Renovations, Hancock, Archer, and Archer Services to defraud Brewer.

Brewer further alleged that Rummings, Rummings Renovations, Hancock,

Archer, and Archer Services, submitted invoices to Brewer for work

allegedly performed, but the work was not performed or completed. On

September 16, 2025, the Integrity Defendants filed a “Peremptory Exception

of No Cause of Action” in response. The Integrity Defendants argued that

Brewer failed to state a cause of action for which relief could be granted

regarding its claims of civil conspiracy and racketeering because Brewer’s

claims were conclusory and lacked material facts.

In its opposition, Brewer argued it alleged sufficient facts to maintain

a cause of action for both claims. In support, Brewer cited Reynolds v.

Bordelon, 14-2362 (La. 6/20/15), 172 So. 3d 589, in which the Louisiana

Supreme Court provided in pertinent part:

The exception is triable on the face of the pleadings, and, for

purposes of resolving the issues raised by the exception, the

well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true. The

issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the

petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought.

Louisiana retains a system of fact pleading, and mere

conclusions of the plaintiff unsupported by facts will not set

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forth a cause or right of action. The burden of demonstrating

that a petition fails to state a cause of action is upon the mover.

Brewer asserted that not only did it provide well-pleaded facts sufficient to

establish a valid cause of action; therefore, the court should look at the facts

of the petition and assume they are true, viewing them in a light most

favorable to it, and resolve the matter in its favor.

A hearing on the matter was held on November 25, 2026. After

arguments, the district court found that Brewer stated a cause of action and

denied the exception. Specifically, the district court provided:

Well, the – the general issue of whether or not a petition states a

cause of action or has, uh, an individual has a right of action is

kind of the beginning phases of a – a pleading that starts a

lawsuit or a cause in general, kind of like a probable cause

hearing in a criminal case its – it’s a little lower threshold but –

and the term conspired while I agree if you have to prove that a

conspiracy took place you have to prove certain facts, but when

you use the term conspire it has a specific definition and that

definition contains within it certain elements that have to be

there. And – and so in the petition itself you’re looking at just

the four corners to see if there’s a cause of action that leads to

basically the – the discovery and – and other steps taken in the

– the prosecution of a civil case or the – the um, the defense of

a civil case and – and it is a minimal threshold and so based

upon the four corners of the petition I do believe that there is a

cause of action that has stated…but at this point to – to get the

ball rolling they meet the minimum requirements to state a

cause of action. Therefore, I’m going to deny the exception.

On March 17, 2026, Gulf South filed a peremptory exception of no cause of

action. Gulf South similarly argued that Brewer failed to allege sufficient

facts to establish a claim of civil conspiracy for fraud, and racketeering, and

instead, Brewer provided only conclusory statements. Gulf South further

noted that in addition to the lack of substance, it was only referenced once

throughout the entirety of Brewer’s petition, and there is no reference to its

conduct whatsoever.

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Brewer opposed the motion, again relying on Reynolds, supra.

Thereafter, Brewer filed an amended and supplemental petition, alleging in

part that:

8. As such, GULF SOUTH HOMES, INC.[,] exercised custody,

control, and/or authority over the operations conducted under

the name INTEGRITY HOMES, LLC, including the acts and

omissions of its members and agents.

10. GULF SOUTH HOMES, INC.[,] knew or should have

known that its license, authority, and insurance were being used

in furtherance of the wrongful and unlawful conduct described

in the original Petition, including but not limited to acts

constituting fraud, conversion, and violations of the Louisiana

Racketeering Act.

11. Despite such knowledge, GULF SOUTH HOMES, INC.

failed to take reasonable steps to prevent such conduct and

instead permitted, enabled, and/or facilitated the same.

12. The actions and inactions of GULF SOUTH HOMES, NC.

constitute fault under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315,

including but not limited to negligence, negligent supervision,

and negligent entrustment of its license and authority.

13. Additionally, GULF SOUTH HOMES, INC. is vicariously

liable for the acts of INTEGRITY HOMES, LLC and its

members and agents, who were acting within the course and

scope of authority granted by GULF SOUTH HOMES, NC.

14. Furthermore, GULF SOUTH HOMES, INC. is liable as a

co-conspirator in the unlawful scheme described in the original

Petition, and its conduct constitutes participation in and/or

facilitation of violations of the Louisiana Racketeering Act, La.

R.S. 15:1351, et seq.

The district court’s ruling on Gulf South’s exception was not included in the

record before this Court. However, in its brief, Brewer provided that the

exception was granted and the district court granted leave to amend and

supplement its petition. The Integrity Defendants applied for supervisory

review.

4

DISCUSSSION

Here, the Integrity Defendants present only one assignment of error

for this Court’s review: whether the district court erred in overruling their

peremptory exception of no cause of action regarding alleged violations of

the Louisiana Racketeering Act and civil conspiracy to commit fraud.

A peremptory exception of no cause of action is set forth in La. C.C.P.

art. 927(A)(5). The function of an exception of an exception of no cause of

action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether

the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. Sharp v.

Melton, 53,508 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1135; Pesnell v.

Sessions, 51,871 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d 686. The purpose of

the exception of no cause of action is not to determine whether the plaintiff

will prevail at trial but to ascertain if a cause of action exists. Sharp v.

Melton, supra.

A “cause of action,” when used in the context of the peremptory

exception of no cause of action, refers to the operative facts that give rise to

the plaintiff’s right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. Id.

The exception is triable on the face of the petition, and for the purpose of

determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the

petition must be accepted as true. Fink v. Bryant, 01-0987 (La. 11/28/01),

801 So. 2d 346; Sharp v. Melton, supra. No evidence may be introduced at

any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state

a cause of action. La. C.C.P. art. 931.

The burden of demonstrating that the petition states no cause of action

is upon the mover. Wright v. Louisiana Power & Light, 06-1181 (La.

3/9/07), 951 So. 2d 1058; Sharp v. Melton, supra. All reasonable inferences

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are made in favor of the nonmoving party in determining whether the law

affords any remedy to the plaintiff. Villareal v. 6494 Homes, LLC, 48,302

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/7/13), 121 So. 3d 1246. An exception of no cause of

action should be granted only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle him to

relief. If the petition states a cause of action on any ground or portion of the

demand, the exception should generally be overruled. Every reasonable

interpretation must be accorded the language used in the petition in favor of

maintaining its sufficiency and affording the plaintiff the opportunity of

presenting evidence at trial. Badeaux v. Southwest Computer Bureau, Inc.,

05-0612 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So. 2d 1211; Sharp v. Melton, supra.

An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling sustaining an

exception of no cause of action is de novo because the exception raises a

question of law, and the trial court’s decision is based only on the

sufficiency of the petition. Fink v. Bryant, supra. The essential question is

whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt

resolved in plaintiff’s favor, the petition states any valid cause of action for

relief. Wright v. Louisiana Power & Light, supra.

Racketeering

Regarding Brewer’s allegations regarding racketeering, the Integrity

Defendants maintain that Brewer failed to state a claim against them for a

violation of the Louisiana Racketeering Act.

The Integrity Defendants contend that for Brewer to establish a claim

of racketeering, it was required to show a “pattern of racketeering” through

well-pleaded facts. However, the Integrity Defendants maintain that Brewer

only presented the following claims:

6

9.

Thereafter, NATHAN RAZER, JARED BASSET, JUSTIN S.

FREELAND, and/or SIERRA LYNN MCFARLAND

conspired with INTEGRITY HOMES, LLC, GARY DOBBS,

BOBBY WHITE, BRADLEY WITT, BILLY GENE

BAREFIELD, and/or TIMOTHY DUPLANTIS in order to

and/or attempt to steal from Brewer.

10.

The actions and/or attempted actions of NATHAN RAZER,

JARED BASSET, JUSTIN S. FREELAND, SIERRA LYNN

MCFARLAND, INTEGRITY HOMES, LLC, GARY DOBBS,

BOBBY WHITE, BRADLEY WITT, BILLY GENE

BAREFIELD, TIMOTHY DUPLANTIS, and/or SUNSHINE

HOMES, INC. violated the Louisiana Racketeering Act,

Louisiana Revised Statute 15:1351[,] et seq.

Integrity Defendants urge that such allegations are nothing more than selfserving conclusory allegations that lack specific, well-pleaded facts, which

would demonstrate that the Integrity Defendants were guilty of engaging in

any form of racketeering. Specifically, the Integrity Defendants argue that

Brewer’s claims failed to present any facts to assert “when, where, or

how the Integrity Defendant conspired or engaged in a concerted action, or

what the concerted action was alleged to be” or to identify what the Integrity

Defendants “attempt[ed] to steal.”

Moreover, the Integrity Defendants argue that Brewer presented no

factual allegations that either the Integrity Defendants, as a whole or as

individuals, engaged in a single incident of racketeering or received any

proceeds from such activities. Notably, the Integrity Defendants assert that

no facts were alleged to demonstrate “when, where, or how” any of the

individually named defendants “conspired with any of the Contractor

Defendants to steal from Brewer,” or made any allegation that any of the

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named defendants “hired any of the Contractor Defendants or that any

business relationship existed between” them.

The Integrity Defendants argue that there are simply no facts set forth

in Brewer’s petition which demonstrate the Integrity Defendants “knew of

the alleged fraud by the Contractor Defendants, that the Integrity Defendants

assisted or encouraged the Contractor Defendants in committing any

fraudulent acts, that the Integrity Defendants received any proceeds or

derived any benefit from the Contractor Defendants’ alleged acts, or any

other acts or omissions that would extend a remedy to Plaintiff against the

Integrity Defendants.” As such, the Integrity Defendants assert Brewer’s

use of the term “conspiracy” serves as nothing more than a conclusion that

the trial court should have disregarded.

The provisions of the Louisiana Racketeering Act are set forth in La.

R.S. 15:1351, et seq. La. R.S. 15:1353 (A) provides that “[i]t is unlawful for

any person who has knowingly received any proceeds derived, directly or

indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity to use or invest, whether

directly or indirectly, any part of such proceeds, or the proceeds derived

from the investment or use thereof, in the acquisition of any title to, or any

right, interest, or equity in immovable property or in the establishment or

operation of any enterprise.” La. R.S. 15:1352 defines, in part, that

“racketeering activity” is the:

“[C]ommitting, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or

soliciting, coercing, or intimidating another person to commit

any crime that is punishable under the following provisions of

Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, the Uniform

Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, or the Louisiana

Securities Law:

(37) R.S. 14:67 (Theft)

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Theft is prohibited by La. R.S. 14:67, which provides, in pertinent part that

“[t]heft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs

to another, either without the consent of the other to the misappropriation or

taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations. An

intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the

misappropriation or taking is essential.”

Regarding racketeering, La. R.S. 15:1352(C) provides that a pattern of

racketeering means “engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering

activity that have the same or similar intents, results, principals, victims, or

methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing

characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such

incidents occurs after August 21, 1992 and that the last of such incidents

occurs within five years after a prior incident of racketeering activity.”

Although these statutes are part of the Louisiana Code of Criminal

Procedure, they provide for a civil cause of action. La. R.S. 15:1356

provides, in part:

E. Any person who is injured by reason of any violation of the

provisions of R.S. 15:1353 shall have a cause of action against

any person engaged in racketeering activity who violates a

provision of R.S. 15:1353. Such injured person shall be entitled

to recover three times the actual damages sustained or ten

thousand dollars, whichever is greater. Such person shall also

recover attorney fees in the trial and appellate courts and costs

of investigation and litigation reasonably incurred.

Based on this Court’s de novo review of the record, we find that

Brewer failed to state a cause of action against the Integrity Defendants for

racketeering.

In the present case, Brewer’s petition for damages is brief, and only

sparsely alleges that the Integrity Defendants, collectively and individually,

9

conspired to steal from Brewer, and violated the Louisiana Racketeering Act

as alleged in the following paragraphs:

9.

Thereafter, NATHAN RAZER, JARED BASSET, JUSTIN S.

FREELAND, and/or SIERRA LYNN MCFARLAND

conspired with INTEGRITY HOMES, LLC, GARY DOBBS,

BOBBY WHITE, BRADLEY WITT, BILLY GENE

BAREFIELD, and/or TIMOTHYDUPLANTIS in order to

and/or attempt to steal from Brewer.

10.

The actions and/or attempted actions of NATHAN RAZER,

JARED BASSET, JUSTIN S. FREELAND, SIERRA LYNN

MCFARLAND, INTEGRITY HOMES, LLC, GARY DOBBS,

BOBBY WHITE, BRADLEY WITT, BILLY GENE

BAREFIELD, TIMOTHY DUPLANTIS, and/or SUNSHINE

HOMES, INC. violated the Louisiana Racketeering Act,

Louisiana Revised Statute 15:1351[,] et seq.

As the Integrity Defendants argue, Brewer only made conclusory statements

that the Integrity Defendants conspired to attempt to steal or did steal from

Brewer, and in turn, violated the Louisiana Racketeering Act. Brewer’s

pleading is devoid of well-pleaded facts which would establish that the

Integrity Defendants operated with the common purpose of harming Brewer.

Further, Brewer’s allegations lack any substantial information as to when or

what the Integrity Defendants stole or attempted to steal from Brewer or the

monetary value of what was allegedly stolen, or even how the Integrity

Defendants allegedly stole or attempted to steal from Brewer.

A review of Brewer’s petition reflects that it is devoid of well-pleaded

facts which would sufficiently establish that a pattern of racketeering

occurred.

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Conspiracy to defraud

Likewise, with respect to Brewer’s allegations of civil conspiracy, the

Integrity Defendants argue that Brewer failed to provide sufficient facts to

demonstrate the elements of fraud.

Specifically, the Integrity Defendants assert that Brewer failed to

establish facts that “Nathan Razer, Justin Freeland, or Sierra McFarland

entered into an ‘agreement’ or had a meeting of the minds with the

Contractor Defendants, or that they in any way participated in, assisted, or

encouraged the alleged fraud committed by Contractor Defendants.” They

maintain that Brewer only provided self-serving conclusory allegations that

only claim the Contractor Defendants submitted invoices for work that was

alleged not performed or completed without pleading any facts to show “the

type of work performed or alleged to have been performed by the Contractor

Defendants, when or where such work was performed or alleged to have

been performed, the date or amount of any invoices submitted or to whom

they were submitted, or any other facts demonstrating the essential elements

of a fraud claim against any of the Integrity Defendants.”

An independent cause of action for civil conspiracy does not exist in

Louisiana; rather, the actionable element is the intentional tort that the

conspirators agreed to commit or committed, in whole or part, causing the

plaintiff’s injury. Coleman v. Querbes Co. No. 1, 51,159 (La. App. 2 Cir.

2/15/17), 218 So. 3d 665; Haygood v. Dies, 48,485 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/20/13), 127 So. 3d 1008, writ denied, 13-2955 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So. 3d

1177; Hardy v. Easterling, 47,950 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/13), 113 So. 3d

1178.

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The actionable element in a claim under La. C.C. art. 2324 is not the

conspiracy itself, but rather the tort which the conspirators agreed to

perpetrate and which they actually commit in whole or in part. Coleman v.

Querbes Co. No. 1, supra. To establish a conspiracy, a plaintiff is required

to provide evidence of the requisite agreement between the parties, i.e., the

plaintiff must establish a meeting of the minds or collusion between the

parties for the purpose of committing wrongdoing. Id.

Further, to establish conspiracy, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) an

agreement existed to commit an illegal or tortious act; (2) the act was

actually committed; (3) the act caused the plaintiff’s injury; and (4) there

was an agreement as to the intended outcome or result. Jeff Mercer, LLC v.

State through Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 51,371 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/7/17), 222

So. 3d 1017, writ denied, 17-1442 (La. 12/5/17), 231 So. 3d 625, cert.

denied, 504 U.S. 933, 138 S. Ct. 1566, 200 L. Ed. 2d 746 (2018). Moreover,

a plaintiff is required to provide evidence of the requisite agreement between

the parties, i.e., the plaintiff must establish a meeting of the minds or

collusion between the parties for the purposes of committing wrongdoing.

Id.

Fraud is a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with

the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a

loss or inconvenience to the other. La. C.C. art. 1953. Fraud may also result

from silence or inaction. Id. While fraud may result from a party’s silence

or inaction, mere silence or inaction without fraudulent intent does not

constitute fraud. Intent to defraud and loss or damage are two essential

elements to constitute legal fraud. Benton v. Clay, 48,245 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/7/13), 123 So. 3d 212.

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To succeed in a claim for intentional/fraudulent misrepresentations,

the petition must contain allegations of: (1) a misrepresentation of material

fact, (2) made with the intent to deceive, (3) causing justifiable reliance with

resulting injury. Id. In pleading fraud or mistake, the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake shall be alleged with particularity. Malice,

intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be alleged

generally. La. C.C.P. art. 856.

In the present case, Brewer presented the following allegations in their

petition regarding civil conspiracy for fraud:

12.

Additionally, while acting in their course and scope and

purportedly on behalf of Brewer, NATHAN RAZER, JARED

BASSET. JUSTIN S. FREELAND. and/or SIERRA LYNN

MCFARLAND conspired with IAN RUMMINGS,

RUMMINGS RENOVATIONS, LLC, JUSTIN HANCOCK,

TREY ARCHER, and ARCHER SERVICES, LLC, to defraud

Brewer.

13.

IAN RUMMINGS, RUMMINGS RENOVATIONS, LLC,

JUSTIN HANCOCK, TREYARCHER, and ARCHER

SERVICES, LLC., submitted invoices to Brewer for work

allegedly performed for Brewer.

14.

IAN RUMMINGS, RUMMINGS RENOVATIONS, LLC,

JUSTIN HANCOCK, TREYARCHER, and ARCHER

SERVICES, LLC., either did not perform said work or did not

complete work for which they were paid by Brewer.

We likewise find that Brewer’s allegations in this regard are conclusory and

are devoid of material fact which would support their allegation that the

Integrity defendants conspired to defraud Brewer. Here, there are no

material facts pled to assert the Integrity Defendants either misrepresented or

suppressed the truth with the intent to obtain an unjust advantage or cause a

loss or inconvenience to Brewer. Moreover, there are no allegations that

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Brewer relied on any of the work performed by any of the Integrity

Defendants, let alone any specificity of what work was contracted to be

performed or what was allegedly not completed.

Importantly, Brewer has not alleged that any of the Integrity

Defendants conspired with any other named defendant to engage in

fraudulent conduct with the intent to cause injury. The mere use of the term

“conspired,” without more, is insufficient to show that the Integrity

Defendants actually conspired to defraud Brewer. Therefore, we cannot say

that Brewer sufficiently pled enough material facts in their petition for fraud

or conspiracy to commit fraud against it by the Integrity Defendants.

However, while we disagree with the trial court’s denial of the

Integrity Defendant’s exception of no cause of action, we find that Brewer,

under La. C.C.P. art. 934,1 should be afforded an opportunity to amend its

petition to remove the grounds for the exception, if it can, by alleging

specific facts that would otherwise supports its claims against the Integrity

Defendants.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed herein, we respectfully reverse the trial

court judgment finding that Brewer stated a cause of action against the

Integrity Defendants for violations of the Louisiana Racketeering Act and

civil conspiracy to defraud, and remand to the trial court to allow Brewer to

1

La. C.C.P. art. 934 states that when the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court. However, if the grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be removed, the action, claim, demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed.

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amend its original petition. Costs are assessed equally to Brewer and the

Integrity Defendants.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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