Judgment rendered September 30, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.
No. 57,075-CA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
JOSHUA D. PORTER AND Plaintiffs-Appellants YETTA LEE PORTER
versus
QUEST DIAGNOSTIC, INC AND Defendants-Appellees WILLIS KNIGHTON MEDICAL
CENTER D/B/A WILLIS
KNIGHTON HEALTH SYSTEM
D/B/A WORK KARE BOSSIER
*****
Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 165,631
Honorable Michael Nerren, Judge
*****
NELSON W. CAMERON Counsel for Appellants
WATSON, BLANCHE, Counsel for Appellees WILSON & POSNER
By: Robert W. Robison, Jr.
J. Scott Dorman, II
*****
Before COX, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.
COX, J.
This case originates in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court,
Bossier Parish, Louisiana. Joshua D. Porter and Yetta Lee Porter
(collectively referred to as “the Porters”) appeal the district court’s judgment
granting summary judgment in favor of Willis Knighton Medical Center
d/b/a Willis Knighton Health System d/b/a Work Kare Bossier (“Willis
Knighton”). For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s
judgment.
FACTS
On August 24, 2021, the Porters filed a petition for damages against
Quest Diagnostics, Inc. and Willis Knighton.1 The Porters alleged that when
Mr. Porter was an employee of Bossier City Fire Department, he was
required to undergo a drug test at Willis Knighton on August 26, 2020. Mr.
Porter stated that he did not use illicit drugs of any kind, but his urine sample
tested positive for amphetamines. The Porters alleged that this false test was
a result of Willis Knighton’s employees not following protocol and
mishandling his sample.
Mr. Porter was suspended with pay while the City of Bossier
conducted an internal investigation. During the investigation, Mr. Porter
was retested, and those test results were negative. Mr. Porter claimed
negligence and defamation and Mrs. Porter claimed loss of consortium, love,
society and affection, mental distress, anxiety, and inconvenience.
On September 5, 2025, Willis Knighton filed a motion for summary
judgment (“MSJ”), asserted that the Porters could not support their burden
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Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (“Quest”) was dismissed by the Porters. of proof, and attached the following exhibits: first amended and
supplemental petition for damages; excerpts of the transcript from Mr.
Porter’s deposition; excerpts of Mr. Porter’s certified medical records from
Willis Knighton; affidavit, expert report, and CV of Donna R. Smith, PhD;
and the Porters’ responses to request for admission, interrogatories, and
requests for production of documents. Willis Knighton argued that the
Porters cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact as to their
defamation claims because the record affirmatively shows that Willis
Knighton never made an unprivileged publication of Mr. Porter’s drug
screen results to a third party. It asserted that the Porters cannot show a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to three of the essential elements of
negligence: breach; cause in fact; and legal cause. It noted that because there
is no genuine issue of material fact as to Willis Knighton’s liability to Mr.
Porter, Mrs. Porter’s claims also fail.
Willis Knighton highlighted that Mr. Porter signed a release for his
test results to be sent to his employer. Regarding the element of breach,
Willis Knighton stated that the specimen ID number was the same on the
urine sample bottle and the control form, and Mr. Porter signed the custody
and control form which certified that the sample was properly labeled. Dr.
Smith found no evidence of a break in the chain of custody while handling
Mr. Porter’s sample, and the collection of Mr. Porter’s sample was
compliant with drug testing procedures and policies. Mr. Porter stated in his
deposition that his was the only sample in the collection area; therefore, it
could not have been mixed up with someone else’s sample. Dr. Smith also
found that the medical review officer followed all applicable regulations in
analyzing Mr. Porter’s results.
2
For the element of cause in fact, Willis Knighton argued that it did
nothing to cause Mr. Porter to “suffer ridicule and embarrassment” from his
coworkers. Mr. Porter stated in his deposition that the employees of Willis
Knighton did not communicate his result to anyone except his employer, but
he told two people about the test. Willis Knighton argued that Mr. Porter
could not claim breach during the collection process after signing the control
form that the container was sealed and the information on the label was
correct.
The Porters opposed Willis Knighton’s MSJ on October 8, 2025.
They argued that their expert, Dr. Aimee Nefcy, provided several material
opinions to dispute Willis Knighton’s arguments. Dr. Nefcy stated that the
“chain of custody was more likely that (sic) not insufficient at [Willis
Knighton], and therefore the validity of Mr. Porter’s initial urine test could
legitimately be questioned.” She also stated, “In addition to problems with
the chain of custody, the [urine] was borderline dilute because of a lack of
supervision, absence of instruction of water consumption, and failure to limit
donor’s water intake.” The Porters also highlighted Mr. Porter’s subsequent
negative drug tests.
The Porters argued that in collecting Mr. Porter’s urine sample, Willis
Knighton violated the applicable DOT guidelines to accurately maintain the
identity of the sample, and the procedures regarding the testing of a “water
log” donor were not followed. The Porters asserted that Willis Knighton
failed in properly collecting the sample in the following ways: the collector
did not split the sample between the two specimen bottles in Mr. Porter’s
presence; the collector did not instruct Mr. Porter to read the certification;
the collector failed to have Mr. Porter initial the labels after they were
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affixed to the specimen bottles and seal the bottles in Mr. Porter’s presence;
the collector failed to have Mr. Porter date the custody and control form; the
collection site was not secure, and other individuals walked through the area;
Willis Knighton’s employees did not observe Mr. Porter drinking water or
limit the amount he consumed; and his sample was sent to Pennsylvania
instead of Kansas, as stated on the form. The Porters asserted the evidence
created a genuine issue of material fact.
The Porters attached the following to their opposition: the deposition
transcript of Dr. Aaron Lirette, the medical review officer for this urine test;
an unsigned, unnotarized two-page affidavit of Mr. Porter; Dr. Nefcy’s
deposition transcript; deposition transcript of Rebecca Rigsby, an employee
at Willis Knighton; deposition transcript of Lynn Sherrer, an employee at
Willis Knighton; deposition transcript of Fire Chief Brad Zagone; deposition
transcript of Wendell Holmes, employee of the Bossier City Fire
Department; deposition transcript of Mr. Porter; Dr. Nefcy’s CV and expert
report; the custody and control form dated August 26, 2020; the August 26,
2020, positive urine test result; the September 14, 2020, hair test result; a
blank custody and control form; photographs of the split specimen; and
medical records.
Willis Knighton replied and argued that Mr. Porter’s affidavit should
be excluded as it was unsigned. It stated that there could be no genuine
issue of material fact as to breach because the only evidence cited in that
section was Mr. Porter’s unsigned affidavit. Willis Knighton asserted that
Dr. Nefcy’s opinion contradicts some of the Porters’ arguments. It argued
that the Porters did not address causation or defamation in their opposition to
the MSJ. Wills Knighton attached Dr. Nefcy’s deposition transcript.
4
On October 20, 2025, the Porters filed an opposed motion to
supplement the record and alternatively to continue the hearing. They
requested to file Mr. Porter’s signed and notarized affidavit, which they
alleged was available on October 8, 2025, but “through error it was not
included.” They attached the signed affidavit, which totaled four pages.
They also attached a combined affidavit of Bonnie Rains and Victoria
Adams, both employees of their counsel, who explained the technical
difficulties they experienced in filing the opposition, which led to them
overlooking the filing of the correct affidavit.
Willis Knighton opposed the motion to supplement. The MSJ hearing
was scheduled for and held on October 23, 2023. Following the hearing, the
trial court denied the Porters’ motion to supplement/continue and granted
Willis Knighton’s MSJ with prejudice. The Porters filed a motion for
devolutive appeal. Willis Knighton opposed the motion for appeal, arguing
that the denial of the motion to supplement/continue is an interlocutory
judgment and not subject to appeal. The trial court granted the appeal of the
MSJ. The Porters sought supervisory review of the denial of their motion to
supplement/continue. The writ was denied on the showing made. They now
appeal.
DISCUSSION
Motion to Appeal
The Porters argue that the trial court abused its discretion and erred by
not granting their appeal on the trial court’s failure to grant their motion to
continue or supplement their opposition to Willis Knighton’s MSJ. The
Porters argue that the issues of continuance, supplemental evidence, and
summary judgment are so intertwined as to require an appellate review
5
because an error in either reverses the final judgment and is not
interlocutory.
A judgment that does not determine the merits but determines only
preliminary matters in the course of the action is an interlocutory judgment.
La C.C.P. art. 1841(C). We note that normally when an appeal is taken from
a final judgment, the appellant is entitled to seek review of all adverse
interlocutory judgments prejudicial to him in addition to the review of the
final judgment. See Tubbs Rice Dryers, Inc. v. Martin, 44,800 (La. App. 2
Cir. 2/24/10), 33 So. 3d 926, writ not considered, 10-1105 (La. 9/3/10), 44
So. 3d 702.
Here, the Porters designated the record for appeal and clearly stated
their intent to appeal the granting of Willis Knighton’s MSJ and the denial of
their motion. Although the trial court did not grant their appeal as to the
denial of their motion, which was an interlocutory judgment, we will review
the denial of their motion, as it was briefed by the Porters.
Motion to Continue or Supplement
The Porters argue that the trial court abused its discretion and erred by
not granting their motion to continue or supplement their opposition to
Willis Knighton’s MSJ. They assert that the trial court should have granted
their motion for good cause because the filing of the unsigned affidavit was
a mistake.
Willis Knighton argues that the law does not permit a supplementary
opposition to a MSJ, and alternatively, the Porters’ supplementary
opposition and motion to continue were untimely filed.
La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2) states that any opposition to the MSJ and all
documents in support of the opposition shall be filed not less than 15 days
6
prior to the hearing on the motion. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2) provides, “For
good cause shown, the court may order a continuance of the hearing.” A
continuance under La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2) cannot serve as a pretext to
circumvent the deadlines set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2). Mahe v.
LCMC Health Holdings LLC, 23-00025 (La. 3/14/23), 357 So. 3d 322.
The Porters filed their motion to continue or supplement on October
20, 2025, three days before the scheduled MSJ hearing. The Porters did not
file a signed affidavit or request to supplement with a signed affidavit prior
to the deadline set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2). The Porters asked for a
continuance in order to supplement their opposition with the signed
affidavit. Good cause does not exist to circumvent the filing deadlines.
Based on the facts of this case, we do not find that the trial court erred
in denying the Porters’ motion to continue or supplement. As stated in
Mahe, compliance with the deadline was mandatory. This assignment of
error lacks merit. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the Porters’ motion to
continue or supplement.
Motion for Summary Judgment
The Porters argue that the trial court erred by granting Willis
Knighton’s MSJ when they presented sufficient summary judgment
evidence. The Porters assert that there is a genuine issue of material fact as
to the validity and integrity of the collection process.
Willis Knighton argues that the Porters did not have evidentiary
support of violations of the standard of care, and there were no genuine
issues of material fact regarding breach or causation.
A de novo standard of review is required when an appellate court
considers rulings on summary judgment motions. The appellate court must
7
use the same criteria that governed the trial court’s determination of whether
summary judgment was appropriate. Bank of New York Mellon v. Smith, 15-0530 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 1238; Jackson v. Minden Police Dep’t,
54,799 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/16/22), 351 So. 3d 880, writ denied, 22-01844
(La. 2/14/23), 355 So. 3d 616.
A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue
as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). Jackson v. Minden Police Dep’t,
supra.
A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery,
affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal
dispute. Green v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 53,066 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/25/19),
280 So. 3d 1256. A genuine issue of material fact is one as to which
reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only
one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary
judgment is appropriate. Jackson v. City of New Orleans, 12-2742 (La.
1/28/14), 144 So. 3d 876, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 869, 135 S. Ct. 197, 190 L.
Ed. 2d 130 (2014); Green v. Brookshire Grocery Co., supra. In determining
whether an issue is genuine, a court should not consider the merits, make
credibility determinations, evaluate testimony, or weigh evidence. Green v.
Brookshire Grocery Co., supra; Jackson v. Minden Police Dep’t, supra.
To prevail on a negligence claim under La. C.C. arts. 2315 and 2316,
a plaintiff must prove five separate elements: (1) the defendant had a duty to
conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (2) the
defendant failed to conform his conduct to the appropriate standard (the
8
breach of duty element); (3) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a
cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the
defendant’s substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries
(the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and (5) actual
damages (the damages element). A negative answer to any of the above
inquiries will result in the determination of no liability. Robert v. Turner
Specialty Servs., L.L.C., 50,245 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 182 So. 3d 1069.
The Porters rely heavily on Mr. Porter’s affidavit in their opposition
memo. Mr. Porter’s affidavit was unsigned; therefore, it cannot be
considered. The Porters’ expert, Dr. Nefcy, identified multiple violations in
the collection process based on Mr. Porter’s account and the dilution results,
which caused her to question the validity of the test. She also stated that the
dilution parameters were set to prevent false-negatives and tampering with
urine. Dr. Nefcy stated that she could not definitively say that the violation
of procedures caused the positive result, only that she considered the urine
sample to be invalid. She stated the following in her report:
Because of the delay in repeat testing and the general poor
reliability of hair testing with today’s technology, I cannot say
whether it is more or less likely that Mr. Porter truly had
amphetamine in his system, but the fact remains that the
original urine test in this case was not valid enough make a firm
determination against him.
We appreciate Mr. Porter’s commitment to a drug-free life. However,
the Porters failed to present evidence that the alleged violations of
procedures caused the positive test result. The Porters’ own expert stated the
procedures are in place to prevent a false-negative result. Based on the
evidence presented in the MSJ and opposition, we do not find the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Without the causation element, we
9
cannot connect the alleged violations with the alleged damages. Because
this element of negligence fails, there can be no liability. We affirm the trial
court’s judgment granting Willis Knighton’s MSJ.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the
Porters’ motion to supplement or continue and the granting of Willis
Knighton’s motion for summary judgment. Costs of this appeal are assessed
to the appellants, the Porters.
AFFIRMED.
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