Judgment rendered September 30, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,878-KW
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Respondent
versus
GREG MAX LAWSON Applicant
*****
On Application for Writs from the
Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Claiborne, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 16838
Honorable William R. “Rick” Warren, Judge
*****
LOUISIANA LEGAL ETHICS, LLC Counsel for Applicant By: Dane S. Ciolino
Meghan Harwell Bitoun
LIZ MURRILL Counsel for Respondent Attorney General
IRENA ZAJICKOVA
J. TAYLOR GRAY
Assistant Attorneys General
*****
Before PITMAN, STONE, and STEPHENS, JJ.
STEPHENS, J.,
This appeal arises out of the Second Judicial District Court, Parish of
Claiborne, State of Louisiana, the Honorable Warren “Rick” Warren, Judge,
presiding. The defendant, Gregory M. Lawson, filed a supervisory writ
seeking review of the trial court’s denial of his post-conviction relief
(“PCR”) application seeking an out-of-time appeal. Lawson’s writ was
granted to docket by this Court on April 16, 2026. For the reasons set forth
below, we grant the writ, reverse the ruling of the trial court denying
Lawson’s PCR application, and remand the matter for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 2, 1990, a Bienville Parish grand jury charged Lawson with
attempted second degree murder in connection with the shooting of Seth
Garlington which occurred on April 24, 1990. A motion for change of venue
filed by Lawson was granted, and the trial was moved from Bienville to
Claiborne Parish. On February 4, 1991, the Bienville Parish District
Attorney recused himself from the case due to a conflict of interest, and the
Attorney General’s Office assumed prosecution of the case. Trial began on
May 13, 1991. Lawson, who remained free on bond, left the courthouse
during jury deliberations on May 16, 1991, and the jury found him guilty as
charged in absentia.
The trial court granted a request by the State to issue a bench warrant
for Lawson’s arrest and ordered that, if arrested, Lawson be held without
bond. The trial court then scheduled a hearing for Lawson’s sentencing, as
well as hearings for the State’s firearm enhancement penalty motion,
motions for bond forfeiture, and a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal filed on behalf of Lawson. The defendant failed to appear at these
hearings, and the trial court signed a judgment forfeiting Lawson’s bond.
Because of Lawson’s flight from trial and failure to appear for sentencing,
the trial court determined it was unable to move forward with the case and
continued all pending issues without date. Lawson’s counsel sought
supervisory writs with this Court from the trial court’s decision not to rule on
the motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Writs were denied by this
Court and the Supreme Court. See, State v. Lawson, 584 So. 2d 684 (La.
1991).
In September 2023, more than 32 years later, Lawson was found in
Mexico which, according to the defendant, is where he absconded to when
he fled the courtroom. He was arrested, extradited to the United States, and
returned to Claiborne Parish for sentencing. New counsel enrolled on behalf
of Lawson and moved for a new trial. The State responded by opposing
Lawson’s motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and new trial. Both
motions were denied by the trial court in July 2024.
On July 18, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The
victim’s written impact statement was read aloud by the State’s victim’s
assistance coordinator, and Lawson and his brother made statements as well.
The trial court sentenced Lawson to 45 years at hard labor without the
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The sentencing
transcript shows that the trial court did not advise Lawson of his right to file
a motion to reconsider sentence or a motion to appeal his conviction and
sentence within 30 days of his sentence. The trial court did, however, advise
Lawson at the sentencing hearing that he had two years after his conviction
and sentence had become final within which to file an application for PCR.
2
No motion for reconsideration of sentence was filed, and Lawson’s attorney
did not file a motion for appeal or designation of record following
sentencing.
Lawson’s right to appeal his conviction and sentence expired on
August 18, 2024, and his conviction and sentence became final. La. C. Cr. P.
art. 914. Six months later, on January 21, 2025, Lawson filed an application
for PCR seeking an out-of-time appeal, alleging that his attorney failed to
timely file a motion for appeal on his behalf and he filed the PCR
application to “exercise his right to appeal after the appropriate time has
expired.” The State was ordered by the trial court to file a response pursuant
to La. C. Cr. P. art. 927 by February 28, 2025. However, because of a
“ministerial oversight,” on July 17, 2025, the Attorney General’s office
requested the first of several extensions within which to file its response.
On November 17, 2025, the State filed a “Motion for Preliminary
Review of Application for Post-Conviction Relief Seeking Out-of-Time
Review” wherein the State asserted that Lawson’s claims are subject to
dismissal because they do not survive the list of preliminary criteria found in
the newly amended version of La. C. Cr. P. art. 927; they are time-barred
under La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8; and the factual and legal grounds asserted in
the claims are inadequate, not meritorious, and, as such, do not entitle
Lawson to relief. Specifically, the State argued that Lawson’s absence from
the state for more than 30 years following his conviction has prejudiced the
State’s ability to respond to any future appeal under La. C. Cr. P. art.
930.8(C). The State also claimed the applicability of the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine and urged that Lawson should be barred from
seeking appellate review due to his 30-year absence.
3
Lawson filed a response on November 21, 2025, in which he claimed
that his PCR application was timely because the two-year period under La.
C. Cr. P. art. 930.8(A) began to run from the date of sentencing, which was
July 18, 2024, not from the date of conviction in 1991. Lawson also argued
that La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8(C) was inapplicable because that provision
addresses delays in pursuing PCR proceedings once they have been initiated,
not delays in sentencing, and the State has failed to demonstrate any
prejudice in its ability to respond to Lawson’s “simple” request for an outof-time appeal. Lastly, Lawson asserted that his right to judicial review is
guaranteed by the Louisiana Constitution and, as such, cannot be abrogated
by judicial doctrine.
On December 4, 2025, without holding a hearing, the trial court
granted the State’s motion and dismissed Lawson’s PCR application seeking
an out-of-time appeal. Lawson filed an application for supervisory writs that
was opposed by the State. In the writ application, Lawson’s counsel
assigned as error that “[t]he trial court erred in denying Mr. Lawson’s state
constitutional right to direct appeal by dismissing [his] timely-filed
application for post-conviction relief seeking an out-of-time appeal.” In its
opposition, the State urged that the trial court’s ruling was not erroneous.
According to the State, Lawson forfeited his rights to seek an appeal, based
on untimeliness of his application for PCR. Alternatively, if the PCR
application was timely, then Lawson’s “decades of delay while on the run in
Mexico have prejudiced the State.” Finally, the State asserted that by
escaping to Mexico for 30 years, Lawson forfeited his right to appeal under
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Lawson’s writ was granted to docket by
this Court, the matter was briefed by both parties, and attorneys for Lawson
4
and the State argued their positions before the assigned panel at oral
argument. The matter was then submitted for decision.
DISCUSSION
Failure of defense counsel to properly brief issue(s) before the
Court
We must first address what was a serious misunderstanding on the part
of defense counsel. After the defendant’s writ to docket was granted, in
preparing Lawson’s brief, rather than addressing the issue upon which the
trial court ruled and the writ application was based, i.e., whether the trial
court erred in dismissing Lawson’s PCR seeking an out-of-time appeal, the
defendant’s attorney apparently assumed that, by granting the writ to docket,
this Court had granted Lawson an out-of-time appeal. Appellate counsel
thus briefed and discussed six assignments of error attacking Lawson’s 1991
conviction and 2023 sentence.
Even after this misunderstanding was specifically pointed out and
expounded upon by the State in its appellee brief, Lawson’s appellate
attorney doubled down, dug in her heels, and asserted in a reply brief that
once this Court granted the writ to docket, the procedural issues were
foreclosed, and this Court was going to consider the merits of Lawson’s
claims. Counsel should have instead taken the opportunity to correctly
assign as error and brief the actual issue before this Court as framed in
Lawson’s writ application.
Uniform Rules Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4) provides that “the
court may consider as abandoned any assignment of error or issue which has
not been briefed.” (Emphasis added.) The general rule is that an assignment
of error lodged in the trial court which is not briefed or orally argued is
5
considered abandoned. State v. Blanton, 325 So. 2d 586 (La. 1976); State v.
Carlisle, 315 So. 2d 675 (La. 1975). See Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal,
Rule 2–12.4; State v. Becnel, 441 So. 2d 339 (La. App. 5 Cir.1983).
In State v. Smith, 452 So. 2d 251, 252-54 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1984), the
appellate court noted that the sole assignment of error designated in the trial
court record in that case was not consistent with defense counsel’s briefed
assignment of error. Additionally, the assignment of error specified in the
brief was not responsive to the offense for which defendant was charged.
Nonetheless, in spite of the discrepancies, the Fifth Circuit decided to review
the defendant’s sentence for excessiveness because, under the facts of that
case, the obvious substance of these two assignments of error was a claim
that the defendant’s sentence was excessive in violation of Article I, § 20, of
the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. Id. at 253.
La. C.C.P. art. 2164 provides in part that the appellate court shall
render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on
appeal. Considering the totality of the circumstances, including that the trial
judge did not advise the defendant of his right to direct appellate review or
of the deadline for exercising that right, and that Lawson’s appellate brief,
had it been properly prepared would have simply restated the issue,
assignment of error, and argument set forth in his writ application, we will
not consider as abandoned the defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s
ruling on his PCR application.
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Lawson’s application
for PCR seeking an out-of-time appeal
Lawson first asserts that his PCR application was timely filed under
La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8. Although he was convicted in 1991, he was not
6
sentenced until July 18, 2024. A judgment is not final in a criminal case
until the defendant has been sentenced, urges the defendant. His PCR
application seeking an out-of-time appeal, filed on January 21, 2025, was
well within the two-year limitation period established by art. 930.8(A).
Lawson, who was not advised by the trial court at sentencing of his right to
appeal or the 30-day time limitation for filing such an appeal, can only seek
review of his conviction and sentence via an application for PCR. As noted
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Counterman, 475 So. 2d 336,
339 (La. 1985), “[t]he appropriate procedural vehicle for a defendant to seek
exercise of his right to appeal, after the delay provided in Article 914 has
expired, is an application for post-conviction relief pursuant to Articles 924-930.7” filed in the district court.1
According to the State, the trial court did not err in dismissing
Lawson’s application for PCR pursuant to its preliminary review under La.
C. Cr. P. art. 927 because it was time-barred under La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8.
The State contends that Lawson’s two-year time period for seeking PCR has
lapsed because he filed it on January 21, 2025, decades after (a) he was
convicted on May 16, 1991, and (b) his deadline for moving to appeal lapsed
30 days later. La. C. Cr. P. art. 914(B)(1).
A plain reading of the applicable code articles and jurisprudence
establishes that Lawson’s application for PCR was timely filed. Because
Lawson’s application was filed six months after his sentencing, there is no
procedural bar to his request for PCR.
1
Louisiana’s PCR statutes have been amended by the legislature since Counterman was rendered and are currently set forth in La. C. Cr. P. arts. 924-930.11.
7
Lawson next urges that the State’s reliance on La. C. Cr. P. art.
930.8(C) as support for the trial court’s dismissal of his PCR application is
misplaced. According to the defendant, art. 930.8(C) requires the State to
make a showing of prejudice to its ability to respond to, negate, or rebut the
allegations of the petition for PCR, not to “speculative allegations that might
be raised in a future appeal.” Lawson notes that all he sought in his
application was the reinstatement of his right to an out-of-time appeal. In
fact, urges the defendant, the State responded to his petition for PCR by way
of a detailed motion/memo in opposition. The State did not and could not
show any prejudice in its ability to respond to his request for an out-of-time
appeal, contends the defendant. If the trial court applied La. C. Cr. P. art.
938.8(C) to deny his PCR application, asserts Lawson, it committed error.
The State claims that even if Lawson’s PCR application were timely,
his escape to Mexico has prejudiced the State’s ability to respond to his
allegations. According to the State, the defendant’s “three decade” failure to
timely seek PCR since the date of his original conviction has prejudiced the
State’s “ability to respond to, negate, or rebut the allegations of [his]
petition.”
We agree with Lawson that the State has not been prejudiced by its
ability to respond to his PCR application, as it in fact did file a detailed
opposition. The State raises valid issues regarding the effect Lawson’s long
absence will have on the defense of his appeal, but these are not pertinent to
the issue of whether the State can respond to the defendant’s PCR
application.
The last argument made by Lawson is that the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine raised by the State cannot override his constitutional right to appeal.
8
The defendant points out that he lost his right to appeal through no fault of
his own, but because the trial court did not advise him of his right to appeal
his conviction and sentence within 30 days as noted previously. Lawson
cites State v. Clark, 19-1077 (La. 5/1/20), 295 So. 3d 935; and State v.
Counterman, supra. He further claims that the trial court had the authority
to grant his timely request for an out-of-time appeal and that courts have
recognized that a defense attorney’s failure to timely file a motion for appeal
constitutes a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel and thus a denial of his constitutional right to due
process. State v. Clark, supra.
The State asks this Court to affirm the trial court’s denial of Lawson’s
PCR application on the basis of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, as he
was a “fugitive from justice” who “has demonstrated such disrespect for the
legal processes that he has no right to call upon the court to adjudicate his
claim.” State v. Gonzales, 95-0860, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/18/96), 680 So.
2d 1253, 1257, writ denied, 96-2490 (La. 3/14/97), 690 So. 2d 35 (citations
omitted).2
According to the State, Lawson’s 35-year escape to Mexico should
constitute cause disentitling him from the ability “to call upon the resources
of the Court for determination of his claims.” Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396
U.S. 365, 366, 90 S. Ct. 498, 499, 24 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970).3
2
Ms. Gonzales escaped from custody after sentencing but before her appeal had been lodged. She was on the run for eight years, and upon her apprehension, her appeal ensued. Ms. Gonzales’s complaint did not cause her to lose her right to appeal, but instead the loss of records and transcripts necessary to that appeal during her time on the run.
3
The defendant in Molinaro disappeared after his appeal was final at the state level and was pending with the U.S. Supreme Court.
9
The State complains, rightfully so, that Lawson’s conviction is 30
years old, and its ability to retry him (should an out-of-time appeal succeed)
has been unduly prejudiced. For example, notes the State, three law
enforcement witnesses are deceased, another officer is in his mid-80’s, and
none of the litigators (including the defense attorney) or the judge is still
living. Why should the defendant be allowed to benefit from his escape
from justice, questions the State?4
Appeal is the exercise of the right of the State or a defendant to have a
judgment or ruling reviewed by the proper appellate court. La. Const. art. V,
§ 10(A); La. C. Cr. P. art. 911. A defendant may appeal to the proper court
of appeal from a judgment in a criminal case triable by jury. La. Const. art.
V, § 10(A); La. C. Cr. P. art. 912.1(B)(1). A defendant generally may appeal
only from a judgment which imposes sentence. La. C. Cr. P. art. 912(C)(1);
State v. Means, 09-1716 (La. 4/9/10), 32 So. 3d 805. A defendant’s right to
appeal a serious criminal conviction is of constitutional dimensions and can
only be waived by the defendant himself in a knowing and intelligent
manner. La. Const. art. I, § 19; State v. Simmons, 390 So. 2d 504 (La. 1980).
La. C. Cr. P. art. 914 provides that a motion for appeal, which can be
made orally in open court or by filing a written motion with the clerk, must
be made no later than “[t]hirty days after the rendition of the judgment or
ruling from with the appeal is taken,” or “[t]hirty days from the ruling on a
4
Most of the authority cited by the State in support of application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine is from other jurisdictions. Louisiana had a statutory provision that provided for the dismissal of appeals by fugitives. See, former La. R.S. 15:548 (“[I]f an appellant be a fugitive from justice on the return day or the day fixed for the hearing of his appeal, the appeal will be dismissed.”). However, this statute was repealed when Louisiana’s Code of Criminal Procedure went into effect in 1967.
10
motion to reconsider sentence filed pursuant to Article 881.1, should such a
motion be filed.”
If a defendant fails to timely move for an appeal, his conviction and
sentence become final, and the defendant loses his right to obtain an appeal
by simply filing a motion for appeal in the trial court. Instead, a defendant
whose time for appealing has run must seek reinstatement of his appeal
rights by filing an application for PCR requesting an out-of-time appeal.
This is not because the trial court has been divested of jurisdiction, but
because the conviction and sentence became final when the time for
appealing elapsed. La. C. Cr. P. art. 914; State v. Counterman, supra.
In the instant case, as noted above, the trial court did not inform the
defendant of his 30-day period within which to appeal his conviction and
sentence, and his attorney did not file a motion for appeal or designation of
record. Therefore, his sole remedy for seeking review of his conviction
and/or sentence is through an application for PCR seeking an out-of-time
appeal. Unlike the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the State in its
brief, this defendant was not at fault for the loss of his right to appeal.
Lawson is entitled to appellate review of his conviction and sentence
pursuant to Louisiana’s Constitution.
The fact that Lawson has the right to appeal despite a 30-plus years’
absence from the State of Louisiana is not a hall pass from justice, however,
despite the prosecution’s argument to the contrary. Time will have taken its
toll on the defendant’s ability to effectively appeal this more-than-three
decades old conviction. As noted by the court in State v. Gonzales, 95-0860,
p. 7, 680 So. 2d at 1256, “the loss of records and transcripts, over time must
fall on [his] shoulders.”
11
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the writ application filed by the
defendant, Gregory M. Lawson, is granted. The order of the trial court
granting the State’s motion for review and dismissal of the post-conviction
relief application denying the defendant an out-of-time appeal is reversed.
This matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant the
defendant an out-of-time appeal.
WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED; REMANDED.
12