In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00108-CV
IN RE WILLIAM MICHAEL TALLEY
Original Mandamus Proceeding
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator, William Michael Talley, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed a writ of mandamus
requesting that this Court recuse the trial judge and reassign the case to another judge because
the trial judge has not ruled on Talley’s pending motions. In his underlying lawsuit against
family members over allegedly stolen land, Talley filed a motion to recuse the trial judge, a
motion to change venue, and other motions.
We deny the petition because Talley has (1) not complied with the procedural
requirements governing original proceedings for mandamus relief to establish his entitlement to
relief and (2) requested relief that cannot be granted in a mandamus petition.
I. Applicable Law
To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must show that (1) “he has no adequate
remedy at law for obtaining the relief he seeks” and (2) he seeks to compel a ministerial act
rather than a discretionary act. Powell v. Hocker, 516 S.W.3d 488, 494–95 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017) (orig. proceeding). To be entitled to mandamus relief in the form of ordering the trial
court to rule on a motion, Talley “must establish that the trial court (1) had a legal duty to rule on
the motion; (2) was asked to rule on the motion; and (3) failed or refused to rule on the motion
within a reasonable time.” In re Henry, 525 S.W.3d 381, 382 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2017, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
II. Talley Failed to Serve the Required Parties
A relator must serve the record with the petition on all parties at the same time. TEX. R.
APP. P. 52.7(c). In an original proceeding, the parties include the respondent and each real party
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in interest. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2. Here, Talley’s certificate of service identifies only the clerk of
this Court. He did not serve the respondent judge or the real parties in interest involved in the
underlying litigation. Therefore, the certificate of service is insufficient.
III. Unsworn Declarations Not Sufficient
Rule 52.3(k) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a relator “must
certify [in his or her petition] that he or she has reviewed the petition and concluded that every
factual statement in the petition is supported by competent evidence included in the appendix or
record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k). Here, Talley’s petition contains an unsworn affidavit that
states,
My name is William Michael Talley, my date of birth is March 12, 1960, and my
[Texas Department of Criminal Justice] state [identification number] is 2426137.
I am currently incarcerated at the Micheal [sic] Unit, 2664 [Farm-to-Market]
2054, Tennessee Colony, Texas 75886. I declare under the penalty of perjury that
the foregoing is true and correct.
This language mirrors the requirements of Statute 132.001(e) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 132.001(e). However, that is not
sufficient here because the unsworn declaration does not state that Talley “has reviewed the
petition and concluded that every factual statement in the petition is supported by competent
evidence included in the appendix or record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k).
Also, a relator must file with the petition “a certified or sworn copy of every document
that is material to the relator’s claim for relief and that was filed in any underlying proceeding[.]”
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a)(1); see TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(l)(1)(B) (“The appendix . . . must contain . . .
a certified or sworn copy of [any] order, or any other document showing the matter complained
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of[.]”). “Documents that are attached to a properly prepared affidavit are sworn copies,” while
documents attached to an improperly prepared affidavit are not. In re Henderson, No. 06-15-00034-CR, 2015 WL 13522812, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 10, 2015, orig. proceeding)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting In re Butler, 270 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding)). “The affidavit ‘must affirmatively show it is based on
the personal knowledge of the affiant’; the affidavit ‘is insufficient unless the statements in it are
direct and unequivocal and perjury can be assigned to them.’” Id. (quoting In re Butler, 270
S.W.3d at 759); see In re Garrett, No. 05-20-00462-CV, 2020 WL 2552892, at *1 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Dallas May 20, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (An affidavit complies when it states,
“under penalty of perjury, that the affiant has personal knowledge that the copies of the
documents in the appendix are true and correct copies of the originals.” (citing In re Butler, 270
S.W.3d at 759)).
The record also does not contain certified copies of any of the exhibits included or a
sworn declaration. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(l)(1)(B), 52.7(a)(1); see also In re Henderson, 2015
WL 13522812, at *1. Talley’s pro se or inmate status does not excuse compliance with these
rules. See Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); Barnes v. State,
832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam). “The
[Texas] Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized no exception for incarcerated persons seeking
mandamus relief.” In re Gomez, 602 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020,
orig. proceeding). “Nor has the high court prescribed a different legal standard for courts of
appeals considering the petitions of incarcerated persons for mandamus relief.” Id.; see In re
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Hall, No. 05-21-00641-CV, 2021 WL 4304569, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 22, 2021,
orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (stating that an inmate’s status “does not relieve him of the
obligation to file a sufficient record”).
“Because the record in a mandamus proceeding is assembled by the parties,” we must
“strictly enforce[] the authentication requirements of [R]ule 52 [of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure] to ensure the integrity of the mandamus record.” In re Smith, No. 05-19-00268-CV,
2019 WL 1305970, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 22, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)
(quoting In re McKinney, No. 05-14-01513-CV, 2014 WL 7399301, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Dec. 15, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)). “It is the relator’s burden to provide this Court
with a sufficient record to establish the right to mandamus relief.” In re Henderson, 2015 WL
13522812, at *2 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3, 52.7(a)(1)).
Therefore, the record is insufficient.
IV. We Cannot Order Recusal
Even if Talley had met the proper procedural requirements, his petition fails. “While we
have jurisdiction to direct the trial court to make a decision, we may not tell the court what that
decision should be.” In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008,
orig. proceeding); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j)(1)(A) (“An order denying a motion to recuse
may be reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judgment.”). Talley asks
this Court to order the recusal of the trial judge and to transfer the case to another trial judge.
Ordering recusal is not the type of mandamus relief we can grant. See In re Blakeney, 254
S.W.3d at 661.
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V. Conclusion
Therefore, Talley has not established that he is entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly,
we deny Talley’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
Charles van Cleef
Justice
Date Submitted: September 29, 2026
Date Decided: September 30, 2026
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