In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00012-CV
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF BRYAN WAGNER AND SABRINA WAGNER
On Appeal from the 43rd District Court
Parker County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV24-1620
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sabrina Wagner, appearing pro se, appeals a final decree of divorce from Bryan Wagner. 1
On appeal, Sabrina argues that (1) the trial court’s award to Bryan of a disproportionate share of
community property due to Sabrina’s fault in the breakup of the marriage was neither just nor
right, (2) there was structural error because the trial judge that presided over the divorce was also
presiding over a criminal proceeding against her, (3) the trial court erred by excluding her
evidence at trial, (4) admission of her criminal records violated Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of
Evidence, (5) Bryan’s counsel should not have been allowed to testify about attorney fees,
(6) she was silenced by judicial warning, (7) the denial of discovery rendered the trial unfair,
(8) the trial court erred by failing to consider spousal maintenance, (9) the permanent injunction
protecting Bryan was inequitable, (10) the “tax liability shift” was inequitable, and (11) the final
decree of divorce mistakenly referenced an agreement where there was none and contained the
wrong address for the marital home.2
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s property division. We also conclude
that Sabrina failed to preserve her second through fifth points of error and that her sixth through
eighth points of error are meritless. We further find that Sabrina has failed to adequately brief
her ninth and tenth points of error. Even so, we sustain Sabrina’s complaint regarding references
1
Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). We follow the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals in deciding the issues presented. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2
We have renumbered Sabrina’s issues and will address them as renumbered.
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to an agreement in the final divorce decree, modify the decree to remove those references, and
affirm the judgment, as modified.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Sabrina and Bryan were married on May 12, 2012. The record shows a history of
assaults by Sabrina against Bryan, including an assault in the marital residence on or about the
last of September 2024, in which Sabrina held a handgun to Bryan’s head while threatening to
kill him. That assault led to Sabrina’s October 5 arrest for aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon and Bryan’s October 11 petition for divorce, in which he sought a disproportionate share
of community property due to Sabrina’s fault in the breakup of the marriage.
On October 15, after she had bonded out of jail, Sabrina had Bryan’s car towed from his
place of employment. After hearing evidence of Sabrina’s numerous assaults and continued
pattern of harassment against Bryan, the trial court issued a final protective order against Sabrina
on November 22, 2024. Among other things, the protective order prohibited Sabrina from going
to the marital residence. Bryan amended his petition to seek a permanent injunction against
Sabrina for his safety.
Through hired counsel, Sabrina served requests for disclosure and requests for production
on Bryan on November 26, 2024, but the trial court granted Sabrina’s counsel’s motion to
withdraw from her representation on December 19, 2024. Because Sabrina became a pro se
respondent, the trial court reminded her of deadlines for responding to Bryan’s discovery and
notified her that she had already missed a deadline to turn over the parties’ tax returns. Sabrina
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did not respond to Bryan’s discovery requests, did not provide any financial documentation, and
failed to file an inventory.
At trial, Bryan argued that Sabrina had failed to respond to his request for admissions,
which were sent to Sabrina at a time when she was represented by counsel, and introduced the
deemed admissions into evidence. The deemed admissions show that Sabrina started assaulting
Bryan in the spring of 2023, had attempted to kill Bryan on numerous occasions, and had told
her marriage counselor “that she wanted to kill herself or cut [Bryan’s] head off with a knife.”
The deemed admissions show that, on separate occasions, Sabrina had slapped and punched
Bryan, kicked him in the ribs, beat him in the back of the head with a foreign object, and hit him
in the face repeatedly while he was asleep.
Bryan also testified about the physical abuse and threats that had led to the final
protective order. The deemed admissions and Bryan’s trial testimony also show that Sabrina had
destroyed Bryan’s property and had assaulted Bryan with multiple objects, including belts with
metal ends, a machete, an extension cord, fireplace tools, coat hangers, plates, glasses, a TV
stand, vases, and a wooden holiday nutcracker. The deemed admissions and Bryan’s testimony
show that, at the end of September 2024, Sabrina threatened Bryan with a metal object after
assaulting him, stuck a Glock 38 handgun in Bryan’s mouth while threatening to blow his head
off, aimed the handgun at his penis, and held the handgun to Bryan’s temple while hitting him.
Bryan testified and introduced documents that show Sabrina was arrested for assaulting him with
a firearm.
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Bryan introduced photographs of the late September 2024 assault from an “internal
camera” that was recording inside the marital residence. The photographs clearly depict Sabrina
holding a handgun to Bryan’s head on multiple occasions on the same night. Bryan also
introduced numerous photographs of the injuries he had sustained from Sabrina’s assaults from
March 2023 to July 2023, as well as photographs of his property that Sabrina had destroyed.
Bryan testified that he was afraid of Sabrina and asked the trial court for a permanent
injunction to protect him. Bryan, who left the marital residence and slept at his place of
employment and friends’ residences out of fear until he had obtained the November 22 protective
order, testified that Sabrina returned to the marital home after bonding out of jail, removed
property, threw trash and Bryan’s clothes throughout the house, took Bryan’s weapons, and had
kicked and stabbed holes in the walls and doors. Bryan introduced photographs of the damage
caused by Sabrina to the marital home and testified that he spent $5,802.88 to repair it. He
introduced receipts for the repairs and had prepared the marital home for sale but said that
Sabrina was not cooperating to sell the house and had refused to sign a listing contract.
At trial, Sabrina did not object to Bryan’s sworn inventory and property appraisal. Bryan
testified that Sabrina already had the personal-property items she had requested in her
possession. Bryan prayed for reimbursement of the home repairs from the proceeds of the future
sale of the marital home and sought sixty percent of the proceeds as a just and right property
division. He also specifically requested that all of his retirement benefits acquired during the
marriage be awarded to him for the emotional and physical damage that he had endured.
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As for Sabrina’s request for spousal maintenance, Bryan testified that Sabrina was a
regional-sales director for Alert 360, with a potential of earning over $100,000.00, and had her
own bank account containing $60,000.00. He introduced copies of Sabrina’s paychecks into
evidence. Bryan testified that Sabrina had not turned over any of her financial information and
had changed many passwords on various joint-credit cards. Bryan also testified that he had paid
around $20,000.00 in legal fees for the divorce.
In its final decree of divorce, the trial court awarded Bryan (1) all furniture, fixtures,
clothing, jewelry, and personal effects in his possession or subject to his sole control that were
located in the marital residence; (2) all cash in his possession or subject to his sole control; (3) all
sums and proceeds from his retirement plans and accounts, except that “5 years” of “his 401K
Plan with Deluxe Corporation,” which was already his separate property acquired before
marriage, and (4) two Ford motor vehicles. Sabrina received (1) all furniture, fixtures, clothing,
jewelry, and personal effects in her possession or subject to her sole control; (2) all sums of cash
in her control; (3) all policies of life insurance (including cash values) insuring her life; (4) all of
her retirement plans and accounts; (5) a Hyundai motor vehicle; and (6) her two dogs.
As for the marital residence, the trial court ordered it to be sold, “with Bryan Wagner
having the right to choose the realtor and sales price,” provided that (1) Bryan would first be
reimbursed $5,802.88 for sums he “expended to bring the residence up to sale condition,” and
(2) the proceeds would be split with sixty percent going to Bryan and forty percent going to
Sabrina. The trial court also decreed that Bryan was responsible for debts related to nine credit
cards and that Sabrina was responsible for debt on sixteen credit cards. Further, the trial court
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imposed a permanent injunction against Sabrina, prohibiting her from, among other things,
threatening or injuring Bryan, communicating with Bryan with intent to annoy or alarm him,
coming within 500 yards of Bryan, his place of employment, or the marital residence, or harming
or reducing the value of Bryan’s property. Lastly, the trial court awarded Bryan $7,500.00 in
attorney fees.3
II. There Was No Abuse of Discretion in the Trial Court’s Property Division
In her first point of error, Sabrina argues that the trial court erred by its property division
because (1) reimbursement of $5,802.88 was not supported by the evidence, (2) the “unilateral
realtor and pricing authority” to Bryan for the sale of the marital home is not equitable, (3) the
furniture award was based on “fraud in the property listing,” (4) the decree awarded Bryan all of
his community retirement “[w]ithout [j]ustification,” and (5) the “60/40 [s]plit” of the marital
home lacked evidentiary support.
A. Standard of Review
A trial court is charged with dividing the community estate in a “just and right” manner.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001; Watson v. Watson, 286 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
“Because the standards for dividing a community estate involve the exercise of sound
judgment, a trial court must be accorded much discretion in its decision.” Krueger v. Krueger,
No. 02-25-00156-CV, 2026 WL 2130237, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 23, 2026, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (quoting Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2018)). “The division
3
Sabrina filed motions for new trial, which were not heard because the motions were not sworn to and did not request a hearing.
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‘should be corrected on appeal only where an abuse of discretion is shown in that the disposition
made of some property is manifestly unjust and unfair.’” Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d at
543) (quoting Hedtke v. Hedtke, 248 S.W. 21, 23 (Tex. 1923))). “The appellate court cannot
merely reweigh the evidence.” Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d at 543). “Rather, ‘we view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the court’s decision and indulge every legal
presumption in favor of its judgment.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Ford, 435 S.W.3d 347,
350 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.)).
As a result, “while ‘legal and factual sufficiency are relevant factors in assessing whether
the trial court abused its discretion, . . . they are not independent grounds of error.”’ Id. (quoting
In re Marriage of Williams, No. 06-18-00041-CV, 2018 WL 6424245, at *4 n.7 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana Dec. 7, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citation omitted)). “A trial court does not
abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative nature to support the
property division.” Id.
“When, as here, a party appeals from a judgment following a bench trial and no findings
of fact or conclusions of law have been filed, the trial court’s judgment implies all fact findings
necessary to support it.” Oliva v. Oliva, No. 02-25-00264-CV, 2026 WL 628160, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry,
526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017)). “We must affirm the judgment if we can uphold it on any
legal theory supported by the record.” Id. (citing Rosemond v. Al-Lahiq, 331 S.W.3d 764, 766–
67 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam)).
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B. Analysis
In reviewing the evidence recited above, we find that the award of $5,802.88 in
reimbursement was supported by Bryan’s testimony and receipts showing that the sums were
expended to repair the marital home in preparation for its sale. We also find that the trial court’s
decision to allow Bryan to choose the realtor and sales price for the home was based on Bryan’s
testimony that Sabrina refused to cooperate in the sale of the marital home or sign a listing
contract. As for Sabrina’s claim of “fraud in the property listing,” we overrule this complaint
because the record shows that Sabrina did not object to Bryan’s sworn inventory and appraisal at
trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
Moreover, we find that Bryan’s testimony and evidence regarding Sabrina’s assaults on
him supplied the basis for the trial court’s disproportionate award of community property to him.
See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981). On appeal, Sabrina does not acknowledge the
effect of her conduct on the community property division and suggests that it should have been
equal. However, “a property division need not be equal to satisfy the just-and-right standard.”
Krueger, 2026 WL 2130237, at *4 (citing In re Marriage of Mozley, No. 06-16-00004-CV, 2016
WL 4256926, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Murff,
615 S.W.2d at 699))).
We find that there was ample evidence to support the disproportionate award of
community property to Bryan. As a result, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
property award.
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III. Sabrina Failed to Preserve Her Second Through Fifth Points of Error
In her second point of error, Sabrina complains about the fact that the trial judge who
presided over the divorce was also presiding over a criminal proceeding against her. However,
Sabrina did not raise this issue before trial. To preserve error on this issue, Sabrina was required
to file a motion to recuse the trial judge. See Vasudevan v. Vasudevan, No. 14-14-00765-CV,
2015 WL 4774569, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(“To the extent [appellant] contends the trial judge should have recused himself, by failing to file
a motion to recuse, [appellant] did not preserve [her] complaint for appellate review.”); Barkley
v. Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass’n, No. 14-11-00941-CV, 2013 WL 5434171, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 26, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The record contains no motion to
recuse [the trial judge]. Accordingly, appellant has failed to preserve any error for review.”).
Because Sabrina did not file a motion to recuse, we overrule this point of error as unpreserved.
In her third point of error, Sabrina argues that the trial court erred by excluding her
evidence at trial, which denied her a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The record shows that
Sabrina wished to introduce the testimony of her marriage counselor via Zoom, but the trial court
noted that “the [c]ourt does not allow Zoom testimony that is not prearranged so [the counselor]
would need to be [t]here in person.” Sabrina had not subpoenaed the counselor. “If evidence is
excluded at a bench trial, to preserve error, the party must make an offer of proof, see TEX. R.
EVID. 103(a)(2), or a bill of exception, see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.2.” Stephens v. Stephens, No. 02-23-00081-CV, 2024 WL 4233118, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 19, 2024, pet. denied)
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(mem. op.). Because Sabrina did not make an offer, of proof or a bill of exception regarding the
substance of the marriage counselor’s testimony, we overrule this issue as unpreserved.
In her fourth point of error, Sabrina argues that the admission of her criminal records
violated Rule 403. See TEX. R. EVID. 403. “To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a
party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the
specific grounds for the desired ruling, if they are not apparent from the context of the request,
objection, or motion.” Est. of Boylan, No. 02-14-00170-CV, 2015 WL 598531, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Feb. 12, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)). “If a party
fails to do this, error is not preserved, and the complaint is waived.” Id. (citing Bushell v. Dean,
803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam)). Here, the reporter’s record shows that Sabrina
made no objection to exclude the evidence of her criminal records at trial. As a result, we
overrule this issue as unpreserved.
Next, “[i]n a divorce proceeding, the trial court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and
expenses.” Krueger, 2026 WL 2130237, at *7 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.708(c)). In her
fifth point of error, Sabrina argues that Bryan’s counsel violated the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct by acting as an advocate and a witness on the issue of attorney fees and
believes that his testimony should have been excluded on that basis. Yet, the reporter’s record
shows that Bryan’s counsel testified about the issue of attorney fees without objection. As a
result, we overrule Sabrina’s fifth issue as unpreserved.
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IV. Sabrina Raises Meritless Points of Error
In her sixth through eighth points of error, Sabrina raises points of error that we find
meritless. First, Sabrina argues that she was silenced by “judicial warnings.” After Bryan had
testified that Sabrina was under indictment for abusing him, he introduced records of her pending
criminal case without objection. The trial court noted that Sabrina had a criminal case pending
in the same court and “caution[ed her] to be very careful about what [she was] going to say
during the course of th[e] trial” “[b]ecause the things that [she said] could potentially be used
against [her] in [her] criminal trial.” When the trial court invited Sabrina to present her case, it
warned her that, if she chose to testify, Bryan’s cross-examination could be used against her in a
criminal case. Sabrina decided not to testify instead of simply choosing not to answer Bryan’s
cross-examination questions by invoking the Fifth Amendment.4 She called no witnesses and
introduced no evidence in her favor by her own choice, not because the trial court prevented her
an opportunity to present her case. As a result, we overrule Sabrina’s sixth point of error.
In her seventh point of error, Sabrina argues that the denial of discovery rendered the trial
unfair. However, the trial court did not deny Sabrina the opportunity for discovery and noted, on
the record, that Sabrina had not filed any motions to compel discovery. Simply put, Sabrina’s
seventh point is meritless.
In her eighth point, Sabrina argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider spousal
maintenance. However, the trial court heard evidence on the issue from Bryan, which
established that Sabrina was capable of working and earning a six-figure salary. As noted above,
4
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Sabrina did not introduce any evidence in favor of her request for spousal maintenance. Because
nothing established that the trial court failed to consider the issue of spousal maintenance, we
overrule Sabrina’s eighth point of error.5
V. Sabrina’s Next Points of Error Are Inadequately Briefed
“Rule 38.1(g) [of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure] requires the appellant’s brief
to ‘state concisely and without argument the facts pertinent to the issues or points presented.’”
NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. United Dev. Funding IV, 674 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2023, pets. denied) (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g)). “Rule 38.1(i) requires that the
appellant’s brief must ‘contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.’” Id. (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)). “In
the absence of appropriate record citations or a substantive analysis, a brief does not present an
adequate appellate issue.” Id. (citing Hornbuckle v. Cadillac, No. 02-15-00267-CV, 2016 WL
3157569, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 2, 2016, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.)). “The
appellate court has no duty to brief issues for an appellant.” Id. As a result, “[f]ailure to provide
citation to the record or citations for legal references constitutes inadequate briefing and waiver.”
Id. at 446–47 (citing Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 283–84
(Tex. 1994); Hornbuckle, 2016 WL 3157569, at *2).
Here, Sabrina raises several complaints by cursory and conclusory statements. In her
ninth point of error, Sabrina argues that the permanent injunction protecting Bryan is inequitable.
5
To the extent that Sabrina argues that the trial court erred by failing to award spousal maintenance, we overrule this point of error since Sabrina did not introduce evidence to support her claim for spousal maintenance. Also, Sabrina mentions in her pro se brief that she was owed reimbursement for community contributions for caring for the marital home and Bryan while he had stage four cancer. However, Sabrina filed no pleading seeking such reimbursement.
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In her tenth point of error, Sabrina contends that the “tax liability shift” is inequitable. Neither of
these points is supported by any citation to authorities, and neither point contains substantive
legal analysis. As a result, we overrule these points as inadequately briefed.
Next, although not a separate point, Sabrina also includes several other complaints in her
pro se brief. For example, Sabrina asserts, without any citation to the record, that there was “[e]x
[p]arte [c]ommunication, [district attorney] [c]ollusion, and [a] [c]ompromised [a]ttorney
[c]hain.” “Since we have no independent duty to review the record to determine whether there
was error” and since our review of the brief shows “no meaningful analysis of error allegedly
committed by the trial court,” we overrule this complaint as inadequately briefed. Id. at 447.
VI. We Sustain Sabrina’s Last Issue and Modify the Judgment
Sabrina argues that the decree’s label as an “Agreed Final Decree of Divorce” is
inaccurate because there was no agreement. First, contrary to Sabrina’s argument, the judgment
was not labeled as an agreed decree but was instead titled as a “Final Decree of Divorce,”
without any mention of an agreement in its title. That said, under a section called “Jurisdiction,”
the trial court stated that it found that it had jurisdiction over the case “after examining the record
and the agreement of the parties.” Under a different section called “Clarifying Orders,” the trial
court reserved the right to clarify and enforce “this Agreed Final Decree of Divorce.” No other
mention of an agreement is referenced by the judgment.
Next, Sabrina correctly points out that the permanent injunction prevents her from going
within 500 yards of “102 Woodlot Lane,” even though the marital residence is located at “105
Woodlot Lane.”
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“[W]e modify the judgment to correct clerical errors that were discovered when
reviewing the final order.” In re S.B., No. 02-23-00017-CV, 2023 WL 6475637, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Oct. 5, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). Because there was no agreement in this
case, we modify the trial court’s final divorce decree by removing references to any agreement.
Specifically, we modify (1) the section called “Jurisdiction,” by deleting the words “and the
agreement of parties,” and (2) the section called “Clarifying Orders,” by removing the word
“Agreed” from the phrase “this Agreed Final Decree of Divorce.” We further modify the
permanent injunction section of the trial court’s judgment to reflect that Sabrina is prevented
from going within 500 yards of “105 Woodlot Lane.”
VII. Conclusion
We modify the trial court’s judgment by deleting references to an agreement in the
manner specified above and by specifying that Sabrina is not to go within 500 yards of “105
Woodlot Lane.” As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: July 7, 2026
Date Decided: September 30, 2026
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