Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 454
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-26-252
BRITTANY SCHULTZ Opinion Delivered September 30, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
V. SMITH DISTRICT
[NO. 66FJV-23-558]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR HONORABLE DIANNA HEWITT
CHILDREN LADD, JUDGE
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge
Appellant Brittany Schultz appeals from the Sebastian County Circuit Court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her three children, Minor Child 1 (MC1) (DOB 05-15-14), Minor Child 2 (MC2) (DOB 07-21-21), and Minor Child 3 (MC3) (DOB 10-12-23).1
On appeal, Schultz argues that the circuit court (1) lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter
the termination order; (2) clearly erred in finding that statutory grounds existed to support
the termination; and (3) clearly erred in finding that termination was in the children’s best
interest. We affirm.
1
The parental rights of MC1’s legal father, Christopher Hutton, were not terminated. The legal father of MC2, Jason Hollan, never appeared in the case and was found to have abandoned MC2. Hollan’s parental rights were terminated in the same order as Schultz’s, and he did not appeal. The once-putative father of MC3, Micah Collum, failed to establish paternity and was dismissed from the case.
I. Relevant Facts
On December 18, 2023, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a
petition for dependency-neglect and emergency custody of MC1, MC2, and MC3. 2 In the
affidavit attached to the petition, a family-service worker (FSW) stated that DHS had received
a report concerning Schultz’s mental stability while in the hospital with MC3 on December
14, 2023. Schultz had been arguing with Micah Collum, was screaming and yelling, and
appeared to be very anxious. Schultz reportedly made comments that she wanted to die and
that she had ideas in her head to drive her car into a tree. Schultz refused a recommended
assessment at the hospital, and hospital staff contacted law enforcement due to Schultz’s
erratic behavior. The next day, December 15, the FSW conducted a home visit; Schultz
submitted to a drug screen and tested positive for cocaine and THC. Schultz told the FSW
that she was not seeing her therapist, that she was not on her medication, and that Collum
had stolen her medication. Schultz reported that Collum was using drugs when MC3 was
born and had been staying with her and caring for MC3 while she was working and that
Collum had relapsed. DHS exercised a seventy-two-hour hold based on concerns that both
substance abuse and mental instability, developmental status, or cognitive deficiency
seriously impaired the caregiver’s ability to supervise, protect, or care for the children.
2
The record reflects that when the petition was filed, there was a pending protectiveservices case that had been opened by DHS in November 2023 on the basis of Garrett’s Law after Schultz and MC3 tested positive for THC at MC3’s birth in October 2023, and a cordblood-test result later came back positive for cocaine and THC.
2
The circuit court granted the petition for emergency custody on December 19,
finding that there was probable cause to believe the children were dependent-neglected and
that it was contrary to their welfare to remain in Schultz’s custody. A probable-cause hearing
was held on December 20, and an order was filed on December 29. The court found that
probable cause existed and continued to exist requiring that the children remain in DHS
custody. The court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of
the children and granted DHS discretion to begin a trial home placement if Schultz could
provide documentation that her medications had been filled and a negative drug screen.
An adjudication hearing was held on January 23, 2024, and an order was filed January
30. The circuit court found that the allegations in the petition and accompanying affidavit
were substantiated by the proof and that the children were dependent-neglected based on
Garrett’s Law. The court further found that, at the time of the hearing, Schultz had
appropriate housing and a stable job and, since the removal, had resumed taking her
medication and was seeing a therapist regularly. According to the written order,
“[p]ermanent custody” of the children was returned to Schultz, but because of concerns
about Schultz’s drug use, the court was “keeping this case open, in a court-involved
[protective-services] case.” The court ordered Schultz to cooperate with DHS.
On April 2, the circuit court held a review hearing. The court was concerned with
Schultz’s lack of cooperation and noted that two FSWs had testified that Schultz was difficult
to work with and that Schultz “appeared to be smiling during serious testimony and she
interrupted testimony and was defensive at times.” The court allowed the children to remain
3
with Schultz and ordered Schultz to comply with an updated case plan. The court ordered
Schultz to submit to a psychological evaluation, hair-follicle testing, and random drug
screens; continue with counseling; complete parenting classes; provide DHS with MC1’s
homeschool curriculum; and permit DHS to see the children in the home.
A second review hearing was held on June 4. The court found that Schultz was “doing
much better this review.” Schultz had stable housing and transportation, was managing her
mental health, had completed the psychological evaluation, and her hair-follicle test came
back negative. The court found that Schultz was not currently working and that she still
needed to finish parenting classes. Additionally, the court was concerned that Schultz had
not provided an accredited curriculum regarding MC1’s education. The court allowed
custody of the children to remain with Schultz and ordered that the case be left “open at this
time to address the concern regarding [MC1’s] education and for [Schultz] to finish
parenting.”
A third review hearing was held on August 6. Schultz tested positive for THC at the
hearing. The circuit court ordered DHS to hold a staffing to discuss the results of Schultz’s
psychological evaluation and the recommendations made therein. The court found that
Schultz had not complied with the court’s previous orders to provide the curriculum for
MC1 and to finish parenting classes and ordered her to do so. The court also noted that
Schultz had testified she was moving out of state but would not say where she was moving.
The court was concerned with Schultz’s lack of compliance and positive drug test. The court
4
found that Schultz was “making the case difficult” and “failing to cooperate” and that
progress was “backsliding.”
The court found that MC1’s father, Christopher Hutton, had complied with the case
plan and orders of the court, and the court was impressed with Hutton’s progress. Hutton
had been residing in Kansas and, nevertheless, had been present at every hearing. The court
found that it was in MC1’s best interest to be placed in Hutton’s temporary custody, and it
so ordered. As to MC2 and MC3, who were currently with MC1 on an extended visit with
Hutton, the court ordered that custody be placed with DHS because “the parents are unfit
for custody or placement” but that MC2 and MC3 could remain in Hutton’s care on an
extended visit.
The court ordered supervised visitation between the children and Schultz. Schultz
was ordered to maintain contact with DHS, including providing her current address. The
court noted that the testimony and evidence indicated Schultz still had a home,
transportation, and employment in Fort Smith and ordered that “[s]ervices shall continue to
be offered in Fort Smith, AR, and [Schultz] shall comply with services.”
A fourth review hearing was held on October 15. The court found that Hutton’s
testimony was credible and that Schultz’s testimony was not credible. The court remained
concerned about Schultz’s lack of cooperation and hostility during the case. The court found
that Schultz had not yet benefited from the services in the case. Schultz was ordered to obtain
and maintain appropriate housing, transportation, and income; provide proof of vehicle
insurance; resolve her criminal issues; continue with therapy; complete anger-management
5
classes; and maintain regular visitation/family time. DHS was ordered to look at Schultz’s
psychological evaluation “closely and confirm the history she gave is accurate and in full
disclosure” so that all diagnoses and recommendations are accurate.
The court ordered that MC1 “is hereby placed in the full permanent custody of the
parent, Christopher Hutton.” Hutton and MC1 were “dismissed from the case, as
permanency has been achieved for [MC1] with custody of him being placed with [his father].”
As to MC2 and MC3, the court set the case goal as reunification with a concurrent goal of
guardianship. The court ordered that MC2 and MC3 shall remain on extended visit with
Hutton and noted that there was currently an “ongoing ICPC [3] [home study] request in
Kansas.” The court ordered supervised visitation between the children and Schultz to occur
at an appropriate facility in Kansas. A permanency-planning hearing was scheduled for
January 7, 2025.
On November 15, 2024, DHS filed a motion for emergency change of custody of
MC1. DHS had learned that less than two weeks after the circuit court issued its order
awarding “full permanent custody” of MC1 to Hutton, Schultz petitioned a Kansas court for
an order of protection from stalking, sexual assault, or human trafficking against Hutton.
The Kansas court had entered a temporary order of protection listing as protected persons
Schultz and all three children. DHS was concerned that the Kansas court would potentially
enter a permanent order of protection and give Schultz custody of MC1, when the court in
3
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.
6
this case had found Schultz unfit for custody or placement and ordered her restricted to
supervised visitation with the children. The circuit court granted an emergency change of
custody, placed custody of MC1 with DHS, and added Hutton and MC1 as parties to the
case again. All three children were removed from Hutton and placed in foster care in
Arkansas.
On November 26, the circuit court held a probable-cause hearing on the emergency
change of custody as to MC1, and an order was filed on December 4. The court found that
Schultz’s testimony at the hearing was not credible. The court had concerns about Schultz’s
instability, her actions in Kansas, and the serious and negative impact of her actions on the
children. The court found that Schultz “was attempting to usurp the Court’s authority with
her pleadings filed in Kansas.” The court ordered that there shall be no visitation between
the children and Schultz without further order of the court. The court further found that it
had “exclusive jurisdiction regarding custody and placement of the juveniles.” The court
ordered that if any other court, including an out-of-state court, awarded Schultz custody of
the children, “Schultz shall not exercise any custody towards [the children] and shall
immediately return [the children] to [DHS].”
A permanency-planning hearing was held on January 7, 2025, and an order was filed
on January 17. The court remained very concerned about returning custody of the children
to Schultz. The court found that Schultz had not been honest in her testimony and was “not
credible at all.” The court found that Schultz was pursuing a Kansas case “while coming into
this court and essentially denying that stance.” Schultz had been inconsistent with counseling
7
and had not completed Triple P parenting classes. The court found that visitation had not
been beneficial to the children, “and especially with respect to [MC1], who has been severely
affected by the last visit.” The court did not believe that continued services offered to Schultz
would result in a successful reunification. The court had “grave concerns” about contact
between the children and Schultz and ordered that it was not in the best interest of the
children to have any form of visitation with Schultz.
The court further found that DHS had complied with the case plan and orders of the
court and had made reasonable efforts to provide family services and finalize a permanency
plan for the children. The court found that DHS had offered numerous services, including
parenting classes, hair-follicle testing, random drug tests, home visits, case-manager services,
and facilitating the pending ICPC home study in Kansas. The court found that Schultz,
nevertheless, had not made significant, measurable progress. The goal of the case was
changed to adoption following termination of parental rights with respect to Schultz. The
court noted that it had consistently found that Hutton had followed the case plan and
“continues to find that there is nothing left other than clean up the mess caused by this
mother in Kansas.” The court ordered that the children remain in DHS custody because
Schultz was unfit, and custody could not be placed with Hutton until the legal matter in
Kansas was resolved.
On January 23, 2025, DHS filed a petition for termination of Schultz’s parental rights
alleging subsequent factors and aggravated circumstances as grounds for termination. A
termination hearing was held on March 4, June 10, and September 16. Schultz admitted that
8
the case had been going on for over a year and that, as of March 4, when the termination
hearing began, she still had not completed anger-management or Triple P parenting classes
and needed to find stable housing. By the time of the final hearing date on September 16,
she testified that she had housing, transportation, and employment and that she had
completed the following services: two hair-follicle tests, two psychological evaluations, three
different parenting classes, anger-management classes, and a drug-and-alcohol assessment.
She testified that she had recently moved but was unable to provide an address for her new
home and was “not exactly sure” how many bedrooms there were. She also testified that she
currently had two jobs but admitted that she had not provided any proof of employment to
DHS.
She testified that she was not aware of the recommendations made in her second
psychological evaluation, which was completed in February 2025, until a week or two before
the September 16 hearing date. She testified that while she did not reach out to her FSW
about those referrals, she would be willing to complete the recommended services if the court
would allow her more time to work on her case plan.
DHS caseworker Elyse Turner testified that, throughout the case, Schultz was “always
combative” and difficult to work with. Turner said that Schultz never provided an accredited
homeschool curriculum for MC1. She said that Schultz did not complete the Triple P
parenting classes because she did not want anyone in the home. She testified that after the
children were placed with Schultz at the adjudication hearing, Schultz left and moved to
Kansas and did not finish her case plan, causing the children to be placed in DHS custody
9
once again. According to Turner, Schultz refused to provide DHS an address in Kansas and
would not allow DHS access to records concerning her progress. Turner testified that DHS
had not been able to verify Schultz’s housing or employment. She said that, by the time of
the termination hearing, DHS still had the same concerns regarding Schultz; nothing had
changed. As to Schultz’s compliance with the case plan and orders of the court, Turner said:
“She doesn’t like to do them and very rarely does she, unless . . . her back is to the wall, will
she do them.” She said that Schultz picks and chooses what it is she wants to do or not do.
According to Turner, it was not until the termination petition was filed that Schultz finally
decided to start some of the services.
Turner testified that the last visitation between the children and Schultz occurred
nearly a year prior. Turner did not believe that any visitation would be appropriate; it would
be too traumatic for the children. She noted the suffering inflicted on the children in
connection with Schultz’s court filings in Kansas. Turner testified that Schultz had not
benefited from any of the services that she had completed. She further testified that there
were no services DHS could offer to help achieve successful reunification. Turner did not
believe that continuing services would result in a successful reunification because of Schultz’s
“history of trying to do services,” her resistance, and her lack of communication.
Additionally, Turner testified to the children’s adoptability. She said that Hutton was
interested in adopting MC2 and MC3 so that all three children could be together and
continue their tight bond. She said that it was necessary to terminate Schultz’s rights as to
10
MC1 for MC1 to achieve permanency, especially because of Schultz’s mental instability and
refusal to take responsibility for her actions.
DHS caseworker supervisor Kristen Hill testified that the referral for Triple P
parenting class was made before Schultz moved to Kansas. Hill said that Schultz knew that
Triple P wanted to be in her home and attempted to get services started, but Schultz chose
to go to Kansas. Hill testified that there are not any services DHS could continue to offer for
successful reunification in light of Schultz’s lack of compliance throughout the entire case.
She said that Schultz did not want to comply with anything the court ordered or that DHS
had ordered. She testified that even in the beginning, when it was a protective-services case
and the children were in her home, Schultz still did not want to comply with DHS. She said
that Schultz was “very defiant and argumentative.” Hill did not believe that Schultz would
benefit from any services for which DHS had not made referrals because, based on Schultz’s
history, she would not comply.
Hill testified that when Schultz found out the circuit court had awarded Hutton full
permanent custody of MC1 in October 2024, she immediately went to a court in Kansas and
filed an order of protection against Hutton. Hill said that because of the order of protection
in Kansas, DHS had to remove the children from Hutton. The children were brought back
to Arkansas and placed in foster care. According to Hill, Hutton had done nothing wrong,
and the order of protection was based on the lies that Schultz was perpetuating on the Kansas
court. Nevertheless, until the order of protection in Kansas was resolved, the children could
not go back to Hutton.
11
Hill had been present at the hearings before the circuit court and had attended four
of the hearings before the court in Kansas. Hill recalled the circuit court ordering Schultz,
and Schultz agreeing, to do everything possible to get the children removed from the Kansas
order of protection. Hill testified that Schultz did not comply with the court’s order. Instead,
Schultz went to the court in Kansas and argued vigorously that the Kansas court had
jurisdiction over the issue of the children’s custody. Schultz told the Kansas court that she
was doing everything she was supposed to do and never mentioned any of the Arkansas
court’s orders or asked to have the children removed from the order of protection.
According to Hill, Schultz’s lack of cooperation with DHS paled in comparison to
Schultz’s contemptuous behavior relating to the Kansas order of protection. Hill had never
seen this blatant disregard of a court order by a parent. Hill testified that because of Schultz’s
actions, MC1 was not with his father from October 2024 to March 2025. And Schultz’s
failure to follow the circuit court’s order to get the children removed from the order of
protection tacked on an additional three months. Hill said that if Schultz had complied with
the court’s order, the children could have gone back to Hutton and, especially MC1, would
not have endured months of foster-care placement with a “stranger” instead of being with
his father. She testified that ultimately Hutton had to hire an attorney in Kansas to resolve
the order of protection so that MC1 could come home.
Hill stated that nothing changed after the order of protection was resolved and the
children went back to Kansas with Hutton; Schultz had “stayed away” from the children
since October 2024. Hill testified that the case had been open for nearly two years, and it
12
would not be safe for the children to return to Schultz. She testified that the children are
adoptable and that there were no barriers to Hutton’s adopting MC2 and MC3 as a single
parent so that the three children could stay together. She said that even if Hutton did not
adopt, the children would benefit from having an emotionally stable parent and not Schultz.
The circuit court entered an order terminating Schultz’s parental rights on January
16, 2026. The court found that DHS had provided family services to Schultz since November
2023. At the time of the termination hearing, which began on March 4, 2025, Schultz had
only recently paid for anger-management classes that she was ordered to complete on
October 15, 2024. Additionally, Schultz was “evasive in revealing where she was living,” and
“it was evident to the Court that she did not have stable housing.” She provided incomplete
information as to her employment. She never provided the homeschool curriculum to DHS
despite her testimony that she did so in May 2024. The court found that Schultz’s testimony
throughout the pendency of the case showed her lack of truthfulness, lack of cooperation,
and continuous attempts to manipulate and disregard the case plan and orders of the court.
The court noted that Schultz reported in her psychological evaluation that this case
began after she was falsely accused of substance abuse. The court further noted that while
Schultz originally tested positive for cocaine, she was ultimately able to produce a drug test
negative for cocaine, but she continued to test positive for THC, and the children were
adjudicated dependent-neglected pursuant to Garrett’s Law. The court found that Schultz’s
testimony regarding cocaine usage “has been inconsistent and has been all over the place[,]”
but “[t]he evidence is absolute that she has consistently used marijuana before, during, and
13
after this case opened[.]” By the beginning of the termination hearing, Schultz had still not
completed anger-management classes; she never provided the homeschool curriculum; she
did not have appropriate housing; and she had not completed Triple P parenting classes.
Among other things, the court found Schultz’s filing a protective-family-services case
against Hutton in Kansas “incredible” in light of the fact that before the children were placed
with Hutton on an extended visit, Schultz had characterized Hutton as her best friend. As a
result of Schultz’s actions, which caused a Kansas court to enter an ordering prohibiting
Hutton from having contact with MC1, the circuit court had no choice but to remove MC1
from the custody of Hutton and place MC1 back in the custody of DHS, disrupting MC1’s
previously achieved permanency. The court found that Schultz’s actions causing all three
children to be separated from Hutton were “extremely harmful” to the children and caused
them “significant trauma.”
The court found that, by the time of the termination hearing, Schultz “continued to
fail to cooperate and her credibility continued to be lacking” and that the record shows that
Schultz “has continuing instability, repeated positive drug screens, has failed to provide proof
of compliance with services, has moved across state lines without notice, and has interfered
with Court-ordered placements.” The court found that, despite nearly fifteen months of
intensive services, Schultz “has not achieved or maintained the stability necessary to safely
parent her children, and the juveniles would be at risk of harm if returned to [her].”
After considering the evidence, the circuit court found by clear and convincing
evidence that both grounds alleged in the petition supported termination and that it was in
14
the children’s best interest to terminate Schultz’s parental rights. First, the court found that
Schultz had subjected the children to aggravated circumstances: specifically, that “a
determination has been or is made by a judge that there is little likelihood that services to
the family will result in successful reunification[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A)–(B)(i) (Supp. 2025). The court stated the following with respect to
the aggravated-circumstances ground:
The Court found at the hearing on January 7, 2025, that continuing to work
services is not likely to result in a successful reunification. [Schultz’s] actions
in this case have been detrimental to the health, safety, and welfare of the
juveniles, and she has failed to work or benefit from any services, despite the
intense services offered by [DHS]. The Court has found for her to have contact
with the juveniles to be harmful and against the juveniles’ best interest. She
has taken action to circumvent the Court’s orders and then lied to the Court
about doing so. The Court does find there is little likelihood services to the
family which would result in a successful reunification.
Next, the court found that “other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of
the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of [the
children] in the custody of [Schultz] is contrary to [the children’s] health, safety, or welfare
and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, [Schultz] has manifested the
incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate [her]
circumstances that prevent the placement of [the children] in [her] custody[.]” Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a). The court found the following with respect to the othersubsequent-factors ground:
Schultz has failed to comply with the orders of the Court, or work services
towards reunification. [She] has taken actions that have been harmful and
traumatizing to the juvenile[s’] health, safety, and welfare. She has failed to
15
obtain or maintain stability in housing, income, or transportation. She has
continually been untruthful to the Court. The Court has found for her to have
contact with the juveniles to be harmful and against the juveniles’ best interest.
She has taken action to circumvent the Court’s orders and then lied to the
Court about doing so. [She] has manifested the incapacity or indifference to
remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the circumstances that
prevent placement of the juvenile[s] in [her] custody.
Finally, the circuit court found that termination of Schultz’s parental rights was in
the children’s best interest. The court noted that DHS had identified potential adoptive
placements for the children and that Schultz “continues to have instability, repeated positive
drug screens, failed to comply with services, and despite the length of time this case has been
open, she has not achieved or maintained the stability necessary to safely parent the
children.” Specifically, the court made the following findings:
As to [MC2’s and MC3’s] adoptability, the Court finds that the juveniles are
adoptable. As to the adoptability of [MC1], the Court finds that adoptability
as to him is legally irrelevant as Christopher Hutton’s parental rights are not
being terminated and as such [MC1] could not be free for adoption after the
termination. However, the Court does find that it is in [MC1’s] best interest
that Brittany Schultz’s parental rights be terminated as to [MC1] as well,
despite the parental rights of Christopher Hutton not being terminated as
well.
As to potential harm, the Court finds that the juveniles would be subjected to
potential harm if parental rights are not terminated, specifically, potential
psychological and physical harm to the juvenile[s]. As stated above, and in
paragraph 9 of this order, the facts show Brittany Schultz has subjected the
juveniles to trauma from her actions and the juveniles would be subjected to
potential harm if the rights were not terminated.
Schultz obtained an order of indigency for appeal and filed a timely notice of appeal
on February 3, 2026.
II. Standard of Review
16
A circuit court’s order terminating parental rights must be based upon findings
proved by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3). A circuit court
must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the
child, taking into consideration (1) the likelihood that the child will be adopted if the
termination petition is granted; and (2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect
on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the
parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(A). The order terminating parental rights must also
be based on a showing of clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds
for termination listed in section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B). Jurls v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark.
App. 443, at 10, 676 S.W.3d 316, 324.
Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural
rights of parents, but parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of
the health and well-being of the child. Perry v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 193,
at 7, 625 S.W.3d 374, 379. In deciding whether to terminate the parental rights of a parent,
the circuit court has a duty to look at the entire picture of how that parent has discharged
his or her duties as a parent. Id., 625 S.W.3d at 379. The intent behind the termination-ofparental-rights statute is to provide permanency in a child’s life when it is not possible to
return the child to the family home because it is contrary to the child’s health, safety, or
welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of
time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(a)(3). Even full
17
compliance with the case plan is not determinative; the issue is whether the parent has
become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her child. Jurls, 2023 Ark. App. 443, at
10, 676 S.W.3d at 324.
This court’s review of termination proceedings is de novo, and we will not reverse the
circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 324. A
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 324. In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous,
we give due deference to the opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of
witnesses. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 324.
III. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
In her first point on appeal, Schultz purports to raise an issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Relying on Young v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2012 Ark. 334,
Schultz argues that the circuit court lost jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights when
the court adjudicated the children dependent-neglected and then simultaneously ordered
the children placed back in her “permanent” custody. Schultz contends that this effectively
terminated the dependent-neglected status of the children and closed the dependencyneglect proceeding. In a similar vein, Schultz also contends that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to “reopen” the case as to MC1 and order an emergency change of custody when
the court had previously awarded full permanent custody to Hutton and dismissed MC1 and
18
Hutton from the case. Schultz further argues that the commission of statutory and
procedural errors throughout the case divested the circuit court of jurisdiction to enter the
termination order. We disagree.
Schultz’s reliance on Young is misplaced, and her argument does not implicate the
circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. In Young, an earlier dependency-neglect action had
been closed in 2009 when the juvenile court placed the child in the permanent custody of
the Sextons with visitation to the mother. 2012 Ark. 334, at 2. Two years later, the Sextons
filed, in the same case name and number from the closed dependency-neglect action, an
emergency petition to modify the mother’s visitation. Id. at 2–3 n.1. The mother
counterclaimed, seeking custody of the child. The juvenile court reopened the case and
decided the custody issue in a “permanency-planning” format, although it was not a
dependency-neglect matter. Our supreme court held in the Young appeal that the circuit
court erred in applying the Juvenile Code because the dependency-neglect case had been
resolved, the action had been terminated, and the case could not be reopened. Id. at 3.
However, because the juvenile division is a circuit court—and therefore a court of general
jurisdiction—with authority to hear a general child-custody case, the supreme court
nevertheless decided the merits of the appeal. Id. at 3–4.
We discussed the Young holding in Abram v. Arkansas Department of Human Services,
2016 Ark. App. 437, 502 S.W.3d 563. In Abram, a dependency-neglect case was opened and
subsequently closed after the children successfully achieved reunification with their mother.
Less than a month after the case had been closed, the mother was arrested on drug-related
19
charges, and DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect under the
same docket number of the case that the court had closed the month before. Eventually, a
termination hearing was held, and at the close of the hearing, the mother orally moved to
dismiss the termination proceeding on the basis that DHS had erroneously filed the case
under the same docket number as the closed dependency-neglect action. The circuit court
denied the motion and terminated the mother’s parental rights.
We rejected the mother’s argument in the Abram appeal as follows:
Appellant’s reliance on Young is misplaced. The facts in this case are
very different from the facts before the court in Young. Here, the dependencyneglect action had been closed for less than a month when the new petition
for emergency custody and dependency neglect was filed, not two years later
as in Young. Second, the new petition in this case was not a general-custody
matter but a dependency-neglect petition, exactly the type of case heard in
juvenile court. Appellant admits that the circuit court in this case had
jurisdiction over the matter. Appellant argues, relying on Young, that the court
improperly exercised its jurisdiction and thus that the [circuit] court erred in
not dismissing the case.
We recognize that the supreme court held in Young that the circuit
court erred in reopening the two-year-closed dependency-neglect case to
entertain a petition for modification of visitation. We do not interpret the
court’s opinion, however, as forbidding the reopening of a closed dependencyneglect case in all circumstances, nor do we discern that the court offered a
remedy for any alleged error in doing so. Indeed, in Young, where the court
specifically held that the circuit court erred in reopening the case, the court
then decided the merits of the appeal.
Accordingly, in this dependency-neglect case—decided on its own
merits, occurring less than a month after the initial dependency-neglect case
had been closed, and over which the juvenile court clearly had subject-matter
jurisdiction—we hold that the court did not err in denying appellant’s motion
to dismiss.
Id. at 4–5, 502 S.W.3d at 566–67 (footnote omitted).
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Notably, in the present case, the circuit court did not close the initial dependencyneglect case. Rather, while the adjudication order states that the children were placed back
in the “permanent” custody of Schultz, the court expressly ordered that the case be left open
and that DHS continue to offer services due to concerns about Schultz’s drug usage. We
note that the course of action taken by the circuit court here does not come within the
meaning of “permanent custody” as contemplated in the Juvenile Code. See Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-35-102(44) (Supp. 2025) (“Permanent custody” means “custody that is transferred to a
person as a permanency disposition in a juvenile case and the case is closed.”); cf. Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-35-102(59) (“Temporary custody” means “custody that is transferred to a person
during the pendency of the juvenile division of circuit court case when services are being
provided to achieve the goal of the case plan.”); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-102(60) (“Trial
placement” means that custody of the juvenile remains with DHS, but the juvenile is
returned to the home of a parent or the person from whom custody was removed for a period
not to exceed sixty days.); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-102(48) (“Protection plan” means
a written plan developed by DHS in conjunction with the family and support network to
protect the juvenile from harm and that allows the juvenile to remain safely in the home.).
We also note that, from our review of the record, the reference in the adjudication order
appears to be the only time that the placement of the children back with Schultz following
removal was described as “permanent” custody. In fact, the termination order states:
As part of the disposition hearing, which was held concurrent with the
Adjudication, the Court found Brittany Schultz had made sufficient
21
improvements that temporary custody of the juveniles could be returned to
Brittany Schultz, however there were still concerns sufficient for the case to
remain open for a Court involved protective services cases . . . due to drug
usage.
(Emphasis added.)
In any case, we rejected a similar argument in Jurls, 2023 Ark. App. 443, 676 S.W.3d
316. The mother in Jurls argued that the circuit court lost jurisdiction to enter an order
terminating her parental rights because it had entered an order awarding Hamilton
permanent custody of MC2 eleven days earlier. Id. at 13, 676 S.W.3d at 326. The circuit
court’s permanent-custody order in that case stated that the court “hereby closes its case as
to [MC2] and no further reviews shall be conducted in this matter as to [MC2]” and that the
“Order of Permanent Custody shall remain in effect until the entry of further orders of this
Court or a court of competent jurisdiction and this matter is subject to being reopened for
enforcement or modification.” Id. at 7, 676 S.W.3d at 322. This court said: “We cannot read
the circuit court’s order to mean that it was no longer finding that appellant’s parental rights
should be terminated and that it was instead closing the case completely.” Id. at 14, 676
S.W.3d at 326. We noted, among other things, that the original dependency-neglect case
remained open; therefore, it was unnecessary for additional pleadings to be filed to “reopen”
the case. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 326. Accordingly, we held that the circuit court “clearly had
subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the termination order as both Young and Abram make
clear.” Id., 676 S.W.3d at 326.
22
We have also rejected a “jurisdictional” challenge to termination that, like Schultz’s,
asserted failures by the circuit court to follow statutory and procedural requirements. In
Parnell v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, we held:
The parents characterize this as subject-matter jurisdiction, but it is not.
Jurisdiction of the subject matter is power lawfully conferred on a court to
adjudge matters concerning the general question in controversy. Banning v.
State, 22 Ark. App. 144, 737 S.W.2d 167 (1987). If the court errs in its decision
or proceeds irregularly within its assigned jurisdiction, the remedy is by appeal
or direct action in the erring court. Id. The parents could have complained
directly to the [circuit] court or appealed from the adjudication order, but they
did neither.
2018 Ark. App. 108, at 13, 538 S.W.3d 264, 273; see also Ward v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
2015 Ark. App. 106, at 4 (“A court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction if it cannot hear a matter
under any circumstances and is wholly incompetent to grant the relief sought. On the other
hand, a court’s failure to follow the statutory procedure in the exercise of its power may
constitute reversible error, but it does not oust the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”)
(internal citations omitted); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-302(a)(1)(A), (B), & (C) (Supp.
2025) (circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction over dependency-neglect cases;
proceedings in which emergency custody, protective custody, or cases in which a seventy-twohour hold has been taken on a juvenile; and proceedings for termination of parental rights).
Schultz, moreover, did not raise any argument below challenging the circuit court’s
authority to order termination based on procedural and statutory errors; therefore, her
argument is not preserved for review. See Russell v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2014 Ark. App.
734, at 4–5 (holding that while the question of subject-matter jurisdiction is always open for
23
review, appellant failed to raise any argument concerning the reopening of the closed case to
the circuit court; therefore, the argument is not preserved for review on appeal); see also Welsh
v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2026 Ark. App. 258, at 9–10, 738 S.W.3d 649, 655 (rejecting
appellant’s argument that the circuit court lacked authority to hear the termination petition
because she failed to preserve her argument for appeal). Nor did she raise any objection to
the manner in which the case proceeded. See Abram, 2016 Ark. App. 437, at 5, 502 S.W.3d
at 567. Accordingly, to the extent Schultz contends the circuit court made procedural or
statutory errors, we cannot reach the merits of her argument on appeal.
B. Statutory Grounds
For her second point, Schultz argues that the circuit court erred in finding that
statutory grounds existed to support the termination. The circuit court granted the
termination petition as to Schultz on the bases of the aggravated-circumstances and the othersubsequent-factors grounds. Here, the evidence clearly supported the aggravatedcircumstances ground, and only one ground is necessary to support the termination. See
McCullar v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 15, at 7, 683 S.W.3d 202, 208.
A court of competent jurisdiction may terminate parental rights when the parent is
found to have subjected any juvenile to aggravated circumstances. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3). The circuit court found that Schultz had subjected the children to
aggravated circumstances: specifically, that the court determined that there was little
likelihood that services would result in successful reunification. Id.
24
Schultz contends that DHS failed to demonstrate that it offered her enough services
during the case, pointing to a DHS caseworker’s testimony that referrals were not made for
certain services recommended in Schultz’s second psychological evaluation in February 2025,
including a comprehensive substance-abuse evaluation and domestic-violence classes.
Throughout the case, the circuit court made findings that DHS made reasonable efforts to
provide reunification services to Schultz. Schultz did not appeal those prior findings and is
barred from challenging them now. See Rivera v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App.
405, at 15, 558 S.W.3d 876, 885.
The aggravated-circumstances ground, moreover, does not require that DHS prove
that meaningful services toward reunification were provided. Lloyd v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
2022 Ark. App. 461, at 10, 655 S.W.3d 534, 541. Nevertheless, Schultz was offered
numerous services, but she did not take advantage of these services. The children were
removed from Schultz due to Garrett’s Law, and Schultz continued to test positive for THC
throughout the case. See McCullar, 2024 Ark. App. 15, at 8, 683 S.W.3d at 208 (noting that
aggravated circumstances have been found to exist when a parent continues to test positive
for drugs). The circuit court ordered Schultz to continue attending counseling, allow DHS
access to her home for home visits, obtain and maintain stable and appropriate housing,
complete parenting classes, and maintain contact with DHS. Schultz, however, did not
consistently attend counseling; she failed to complete the Triple P parenting classes; she
failed to maintain contact with DHS; she denied DHS access for home visits; and she
abruptly moved out of state and refused to provide further details regarding housing,
25
including a physical address and number of bedrooms in the home. See Mayer v. Ark. Dep’t
of Hum. Servs., 2025 Ark. App. 51, at 19 (aggravated circumstances existed where parents
failed to complete court-ordered family therapy and instead “moved out of state, making it
even more difficult for them to take advantage of the services DHS offered”). Further, Schultz
filed an order of protection in Kansas to thwart the circuit court’s custody orders and
engaged in litigation there that disrupted the children’s placement with Hutton. Schultz
refused to take accountability for her actions, her visitation was suspended, and DHS
caseworkers testified that there were no further services DHS could offer her to achieve
reunification. See Mayer, 2025 Ark. App. 51, at 19–20 (aggravated circumstances existed
when visitation ultimately had to be suspended due to parents’ behavior and caseworker
testified there were no additional services that could be offered that would result in successful
reunification). As for the services for which referrals were not made, Schultz’s caseworker
testified that, considering Schultz’s history, even if referrals were made, “[she didn’t] believe
[Schultz] would do it. And even if she did, she would not follow the recommendations.”
While Schultz may have completed some or even most of the services offered, even
full compliance with the case plan and court orders is not determinative; the issue is whether
the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her child. Holland v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 548, at 12, 680 S.W.3d 52, 60. This court has held that
a parent’s continued inability to protect and care for his or her child and failure to benefit
from the services provided are sufficient to demonstrate little likelihood that further services
will result in a successful reunification. See Jones v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App.
26
299, at 7, 578 S.W.3d 312, 317 (upholding termination on aggravated-circumstances ground
when parent, after being provided services for over a year, “had not demonstrated sufficient
parenting skills to regain custody . . . or to be trusted with a trial placement or unsupervised
visitation”). A parent can create this type of aggravated circumstance by not following
through with offers of assistance, by not completing basic goals of the case plan, and by
failing to make significant progress. McCullar, 2024 Ark. App. 15, at 7, 683 S.W.3d at 208.
Moreover, a child’s need for permanency and stability may override a parent’s request for
additional time to improve the parent’s circumstances. Jurls, 2023 Ark. App. 443, at 10, 676
S.W.3d at 324. And a parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future behavior.
Id., 676 S.W.3d at 324.
Given the evidence presented in this case, we hold that the circuit court’s finding that
there was little likelihood that services would result in successful reunification was not clearly
erroneous. Because we conclude that DHS adequately proved the aggravated-circumstances
ground, we need not discuss the remaining ground found by the circuit court. See Kohlman
v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 164, at 9, 544 S.W.3d 595, 600.
C. Best Interest
For her third and final point, Schultz argues that the circuit court erred in finding
that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Specifically, she
contends that there was no evidence that she posed a risk of harm to the children. In
considering potential harm caused by returning the child to the parent, the circuit court is
27
not required to find that actual harm would result or affirmatively identify a potential harm.
Perry, 2021 Ark. App. 193, at 10, 625 S.W.3d at 380–81. Potential-harm evidence must be
viewed in a forward-looking manner and considered in broad terms. Mayer, 2025 Ark. App.
51, at 20. Past actions of a parent over a meaningful period of time are good indicators of
what the future may hold. Id.
The same evidence that supports the aggravated-circumstances ground of little
likelihood of successful reunification is sufficient to support the circuit court’s potentialharm finding. Perry, 2021 Ark. App. 193, at 10, 625 S.W.3d at 381. Despite nearly fifteen
months of services, Schultz continued to test positive for THC.4 She failed to provide proof
of compliance with services. By the time of the termination hearing in March 2025, she had
only recently paid for anger-management classes that she had been ordered to complete
several months before. Additionally, there was evidence showing that she moved across state
lines without notice and that she took action to interfere with court-ordered placements of
the children. This court has held that a parent’s continued illegal drug use and instability are
sufficient to demonstrate a risk of potential harm to the children. Jurls, 2023 Ark. App. 443,
at 20, 676 S.W.3d at 329.
Schultz acknowledged at the termination hearing that she had caused significant
trauma to her children. She said that she was willing to be more forthcoming with DHS
4
Even at the termination hearing, Schultz continued to deny having used cocaine when she was pregnant with MC3 and was “not sure how that was in the umbilical cord.” But she admitted that she smoked marijuana during the pregnancy because she “just had a really horrific neck and back pain.”
28
going forward and that, if given more time, she would continue to work on her case plan.
Clearly, the circuit did not believe her, and we defer to the circuit court’s credibility
determinations. Perry, 2021 Ark. App. 193, at 10, 625 S.W.3d at 381. Moreover, a child’s
need for permanency and stability may override a parent’s request for additional time. Id. at
11, 625 S.W.3d at 381. We cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that
termination of Schultz’s parental rights was in her children’s best interest.
Affirmed.
TUCKER and HIXSON, JJ., agree.
Streit Law Firm, PLLC, by: Jonathan R. Streit, for appellant.
Ellen K. Howard, Arkansas Department of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel,
for appellee.
Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children.
29