Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 441
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-25-642
Opinion Delivered September 30, 2026
CODY WOOLEMS
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 26CR-20-234]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE RALPH C. OHM,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Chief Judge
Cody Woolems appeals from the order of the Garland County Circuit Court denying
his petition for postconviction relief under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. On
appeal, Woolems argues that the circuit court erred in (1) finding that his trial counsel had
timely informed him of the State’s plea offer and (2) finding that his guilty plea was voluntary,
intelligent, and entered upon the advice of effective counsel. We affirm.
In June 2023, Woolems pleaded guilty to criminal attempt to commit first-degree
murder, first-degree criminal mischief, and first-degree domestic battering. The charges arose
from an incident that occurred in January 2020 in which Woolems was alleged to have shot
his ex-girlfriend. On the day that the case was set for trial, Woolems changed his plea and
pleaded guilty directly to the court. Sentencing was tried to a jury, and on the
recommendation of the jury, Woolems was sentenced to an aggregate of seventy-five years’ imprisonment for all three offenses and a $15,000 fine for attempted murder. Woolems
appealed and argued that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting improper
rebuttal testimony during his sentencing hearing. This court affirmed the sentence in an
opinion delivered in June 2024. See Woolems v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 380, 690 S.W.3d 893.
Thereafter, Woolems filed a timely petition for postconviction relief making several
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. An evidentiary hearing was held at which
Woolems testified along with his trial counsel, Brian Johnson; the prosecutor; and others.
The two sides disputed the number of pretrial meetings Woolems had with Johnson; which
man failed to respond to the other’s attempts to communicate; and whether Johnson had
adequately prepared for trial.
The case file included a written plea offer from the State dated July 31, 2020, for a
term of thirty years’ imprisonment. Johnson testified that he advised Woolems of this offer
more than once, and Woolems declined it every time. Woolems testified that the thirty-year
offer was never conveyed to him, that he learned about it six days before his June 12, 2023
trial date, and that the offer had expired by then. Woolems introduced the following text
messages between him and Johnson:
WOOLEMS: I don’t have any signal to call. What’s up
JOHNSON: You have trial next week and you’re not answering your phone
WOOLEMS: I don’t have any signal for calls. Why were you not at pretrial??
JOHNSON: Because I didn’t need to be at the pretrial. They made an offer and you
turned it down
WOOLEMS: I never got anything
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JOHNSON: We talked about the offer. It was 30 Years
The next message between the two is on the trial date six days later when Woolems texted
to say he was at the courthouse. Woolems testified that if he had known about the thirtyyear offer, he would have taken it.
The circuit court ruled from the bench that it was denying Woolems’s petition and
explained in detail its reasoning. The court subsequently entered its written order, which
Woolems now appeals.
We do not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the circuit court’s
findings are clearly erroneous. Scott v. State, 2012 Ark. 199, 406 S.W.3d 1. A finding is
clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after
reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Id. In making a determination on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
we consider the totality of the evidence. Id.
Where, as here, a defendant pleads guilty, the only claims cognizable in a proceeding
pursuant to Rule 37.1 are those that allege that the plea was not made voluntarily and
intelligently or that it was entered without effective assistance of counsel. Id. Our standard
of review requires that we assess the effectiveness of counsel under the two-prong standard
set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). Id. Under the Strickland test, a claimant must demonstrate both that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced his defense to such an extent that the petitioner was deprived of a
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fair trial. Jamett v. State, 2010 Ark. 28, 358 S.W.3d 874. An appellant who has pleaded
guilty normally will have considerable difficulty in proving any prejudice since his plea rests
upon his admission in open court that he did the act with which he was charged. Id. To
establish prejudice and prove that he was deprived of a fair trial due to ineffective assistance
of counsel, an appellant who has pleaded guilty must demonstrate a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, the petitioner would not have so pleaded and would have
insisted on going to trial. Id.
In his first point on appeal, Woolems argues that the circuit court erred in finding
that Johnson had informed him of the State’s plea offer. He points to the text messages
between him and Johnson and argues that there is a lack of evidence that the offer was ever
relayed. Woolems also points to allegations made at the hearing that Johnson had been
dishonest with the court regarding his efforts to obtain a report from an independent mental
evaluation and argues that this shows there is reason to doubt Johnson would be forthcoming
with his client.
In denying Woolems’s claim, the circuit court found that the text messages supported
Johnson’s testimony and showed that the parties had, in fact, discussed a thirty-year plea
offer. Woolems erroneously argues that his text to Johnson that he “never got anything” was
“in response” to Johnson’s message about the thirty-year offer. As the court noted from the
bench, however, Woolems had no response after Johnson stated that they had discussed a
thirty-year offer. Woolems did not express disagreement or surprise, nor did he question
whether the offer was still available. The court also noted that the offer likely would have
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been communicated to Woolems in 2020, three years before the text messages at issue. For
these reasons, the court found that the text messages supported Johnson’s testimony that the
offer was conveyed. We defer to the circuit court’s determination on matters of credibility
in a postconviction appeal. Muhammad v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 81, 640 S.W.3d 438. Thus,
we hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in denying relief on this claim.
In his remaining point on appeal, Woolems argues that the circuit court erred in
finding that his plea was voluntary, intelligent, and entered upon the advice of effective
counsel. Woolems argues that Johnson was ineffective because he failed to prepare for trial,
failed to meet with him to prepare for trial, and, according to two witnesses, appeared to be
under the influence of a narcotic. The circuit court found that Woolems failed to meet his
burden of providing sufficient evidence for these claims. The court further found that the
transcript of the plea as well as Johnson’s testimony supported its finding that the plea was
intelligently and voluntarily entered on the advice of competent counsel.
Woolems fails to explain how the evidence was sufficient to support his claims. He
points to the text messages quoted above to show that Johnson reached out to prepare for
trial only six days before, not three weeks or a month earlier, as Johnson had testified.
However, the only text messages Woolems introduced were those beginning six days before
trial. There was no evidence to support his claims regarding earlier communication efforts.
Furthermore, Woolems has failed to assert prejudice from any of these alleged errors. He
does not allege that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
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have insisted on going to trial. Because he has failed to demonstrate prejudice, the circuit
court did not clearly err in denying relief. See Scott, supra.
Affirmed.
ABRAMSON and VIRDEN, JJ., agree.
James Law Firm, by: William O. “Bill” James, Jr., and Drew Curtis, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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