Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 443
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-25-289
ROBERT ROWE, JR. Opinion Delivered September 30, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 26DR-24-661]
AMY ROWE HONORABLE CECILIA DYER, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Robert Rowe, Jr., appeals the Garland County Circuit Court’s February 11, 2025
divorce decree awarding appellee Amy Rowe permanent alimony. Robert argues on appeal
that there was no evidence to support the circuit court’s award of alimony. We affirm.
I. Background
On August 19, 2024, Amy filed a complaint for divorce in the Garland County
Circuit Court. In her complaint, Amy alleged that the parties separated on May 29, 2019,
after nearly seventeen years of marriage, and there were three children born of the marriage,
two of whom were still minors. Amy requested full custody of MC1 and MC2, child support,
and both temporary and permanent spousal support. Robert answered and requested that
the circuit court deny Amy’s requests for relief.
On January 22, 2025, the circuit court held a one-day hearing. Before the start of the
hearing, the parties entered a series of stipulations. Specifically, the parties stipulated that (1)
Robert would keep all personal property in his possession, including a 2015 Dodge Ram
2500, a side-by-side ATV, two four wheelers, two campers, and two boats; (2) Robert would
be responsible for the debt owed to Teddy Riddell and all other personal debt in his name;
(3) Amy would keep the personal property in her possession, including the Nissan
Pathfinder; (4) Amy would be responsible for all her personal debt, including the Discover
credit card debt and the debt owed to her mother, Linda Lord; (5) the parties would be
equally responsible for any medical debt owed for MC1 and MC2. The parties further
stipulated that they separated on May 29, 2019.
At the hearing, the testimony revealed that during their nearly seventeen-year
marriage, Amy was mainly a homemaker and stay-at-home mother. Amy never worked more
than part time during their marriage; however, she testified that she held a high school
diploma and certificates in computerized accounting and transcription. Amy stated that she
had considered taking college courses to work as an accountant but that she was not able to
do so currently. When asked why she was not working as an accountant with her
certification, she testified that she could not obtain a job without experience and that she
did not have experience in the field.
It is uncontested that Amy had a gross monthly income of $2,165.00 from her work
as an Uber driver and the sporadic Walmart deliveries. Her monthly expenses were
$3,544.38. She further testified that her mother had loaned her money to fix her car, pay
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bills, and purchase groceries for the family. Conversely, Robert’s gross monthly income was
$7,390.50, and his monthly expenses were $4,345.26, of which $2,830.54 were loan
payments. Additionally, Robert had roughly $360,000 in a profit-sharing account and about
$160,000 in an IRA.
Robert attested that he paid Amy $544 biweekly from 2019 until June 2024 when he
stopped paying her without notice. Amy stated that when he stopped the biweekly payments,
she was unable to afford her utilities and that they were shut off. Amy testified that she called
Robert and “begged” him for more money and that he told her that he would give her money
only if she did not request child support or spousal support in the divorce.
The circuit court entered a divorce decree on February 11, 2026, making the
following findings:
Pursuant to A.C.A.§ 9-12-312 [Amy] is awarded alimony in the amount of
$1,000.00 per month. [Robert]’s payment of alimony shall begin February 14,
2025, and shall be due and payable on or before the 14th day of each month
thereafter. Alimony payments shall be made through the Arkansas
Clearinghouse and [Robert] shall pay all fees associated with the collection and
distribution of said alimony payments. The court has considered the need of
[Amy] for alimony and the ability of [Robert] to pay. The court has also
considered the length of the marriage, the parties[’] age and station in life,
earning capacity of each party and work history during the marriage,
educational level and vocational level and skills of each party, employability of
each party, financial circumstances of the parties, and extent and nature of
resources and assets of both parties.
The circuit court also held that Robert was to pay $737 a month in child support for MC1
and MC2.
II. Standard of Review
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On appeal, divorce cases are reviewed de novo. Webb v. Webb, 2014 Ark. App. 697,
450 S.W.3d 265. An award of alimony is not mandatory but is solely within the circuit
court’s discretion. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 61 Ark. App. 88, 964 S.W.2d 411 (1998). We will not
reverse absent an abuse of that discretion. Cole v. Cole, 89 Ark. App. 134, 201 S.W.3d 21
(2005). An abuse of discretion means discretion improvidently exercised, i.e., exercised
thoughtlessly and without due consideration. Foster v. Foster, 2015 Ark. App. 530, 472
S.W.3d 151. The circuit court is in the best position to view the needs of the parties in
connection with an alimony award. Smithson v. Smithson, 2014 Ark. App. 340, at 2, 436
S.W.3d 491, 493. If alimony is awarded, it should be set at an amount that is reasonable
under the circumstances. Mitchell, supra.
The purpose of alimony is to rectify the economic imbalances in earning power and
standard of living in light of the particular facts of each case. Kuchmas v. Kuchmas, 368 Ark.
43, 243 S.W.3d 270 (2006). The primary factors that a court should consider in awarding
alimony are the financial need of one spouse and the other spouse’s ability to pay. Gilliam v.
Gilliam, 2010 Ark. App. 137, 374 S.W.3d 108. The circuit court may also consider other
factors, including the couple’s past standard of living, the earning capacity of each spouse,
the resources and assets of each party, and the duration of the marriage. Johnson v. CottonJohnson, 88 Ark. App. 67, 194 S.W.3d 806 (2004).
III. Financial Need
Notably, Robert does not allege that he is unable to pay the awarded alimony, nor
does he argue that the circuit court abused its discretion in the amount of alimony awarded;
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rather, Robert argues that Amy does not have a financial need for any alimony. Specifically,
Robert argues that Amy has no intent to rehabilitate herself given her testimony that she was
currently working full time and her job as an Uber driver “makes money.” This unwillingness
to rehabilitate herself, according to Robert, is evidence that Amy does not have a financial
need for alimony.
According to Amy’s testimony and the financial-means affidavit she submitted into
evidence, she earns $2,165.00 a month as an Uber driver. She listed monthly expenses of
$3,544.38. Subtracting her expenses from her income, Amy’s income falls $1,379.38 short
of her needs. Moreover, Amy testified that once Robert stopped paying $544 biweekly, she
fell behind on her bills and had her utilities shut off. In the meantime, Amy was working six
to eight hours a day and relying on her mother to help with groceries and car repairs. We
adhere to no mathematical formula or bright-line rule in awarding alimony. Valetutti v.
Valetutti, 95 Ark. App. 83, 234 S.W.3d 338 (2006). The need for flexibility outweighs the
need for relative certainty. Id.
Furthermore, Robert’s argument that Amy could earn more than she currently was
earning is unsupported by the record. An award of permanent alimony is authorized under
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-312(a)(1) (Repl. 2020), which provides that when a divorce decree is
entered, the circuit court may enter an order concerning alimony as is “reasonable from the
circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case.” Medlen v. Medlen, 2020 Ark. App.
159, at 6. The testimony at trial was that Amy was fifty years old and had never worked more
than part time throughout the entirety of the parties’ nearly seventeen-year marriage. Amy
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does not have a college degree, nor does she have the experience necessary to obtain a job in
the accounting field. Amy’s earning potential is limited in this instance. We have held that
permanent alimony in such a situation is not an abuse of discretion. See Vigneault v. Vigneault,
2010 Ark. App. 716, at 8, 379 S.W.3d 566, 571 (affirming an award of permanent alimony
where the parties “are in their mid-fifties and are divorcing after a long-term marriage”).
Moreover, Amy testified that she has considered taking additional courses to do more
accounting work, but she is currently unable to do so. “We give due deference to the circuit
court’s superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony.” Oliver v. Oliver, 2026 Ark. App. 112, at 8–9. Accordingly, we find that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Amy had a financial need for
alimony.
Finally, Robert’s argument that there was an inequitable distribution of marital
property that unfairly benefited Amy also fails. The division of property is a secondary factor
that the circuit court may consider when determining the necessity of alimony. See Boyles v.
Boyles, 268 Ark. 120, 594 S.W.2d 17 (1980). The court in Boyles did not mandate that circuit
courts consider the enumerated factors, and other cases have held that these are secondary
factors a court may consider in determining whether to award alimony. See Butler v. Butler,
2014 Ark. App. 507, 443 S.W.3d 585; Mitchell v. Bass, 2009 Ark. App. 640; Mearns v. Mearns,
58 Ark. App. 42, 946 S.W.2d 188 (1997).
In this case, however, the property division was equitable. Amy was awarded 50
percent of Robert’s retirement accounts that were funded during their marriage. Robert,
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likewise, was awarded 50 percent of Amy’s retirement account. Robert’s argument that he
was awarded “nearly all, if not all,” of the marital debt is belied by the record. The parties
stipulated that each would assume responsibility for the marital debt that was in his or her
name.1 Outside of the stipulation, Robert was required to pay the remaining balance for
MC1’s braces. All other medical expenses for MC1 and MC2 were to be split equally by the
parties. Accordingly, the marital debt was divided equitably between the parties, and this
factor does not support a finding that the circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded
Amy alimony.
IV. Conclusion
It is the appellant’s burden to show that the circuit court abused its discretion by
making a decision that was arbitrary or groundless. Becker v. Becker, 2019 Ark. App. 230, at
6, 575 S.W.3d 608, 611. Here, the circuit court clearly considered the evidence and
testimony and conducted the required analysis. Accordingly, we are not left with a definite
and firm conviction that the circuit court has made a mistake. Nauman v. Nauman, 2023 Ark.
App. 41, at 14–15, 660 S.W.3d 598, 607.
Affirmed.
KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and VIRDEN, J., agree.
Hurst Law Group, by: Justin B. Hurst, for appellant.
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Moreover, part of the “marital debt” Robert discusses is the myriad of purchases he made postseparation: $6,500 for a new bass boat; $14,000 for a new Dodge truck; $4,200 for a new four-wheeler; $14,000 for a Polaris side-by-side after the motor in the four-wheeler “blew up”; $26,000 in dental work; and $28,000 for a party barge.
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Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson; and Sherry Burnett, for
appellee.
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