Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 458
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-25-531
Opinion Delivered September 30, 2026
STEVEN CHERNEY
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
V. SEVENTEENTH DIVISION
[NO. 60DR-24-2774]
DANIELLE CHERNEY
APPELLEE HONORABLE BRENT EUBANKS,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
MIKE MURPHY, Judge
Appellant Steven Cherney appeals from the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s May 7,
2025 decree granting him a divorce from appellee Danielle Cherney. On appeal, Steven
contends that the circuit court erred in classifying certain stock units as nonmarital property.
We affirm.
Steven and Danielle were married in June 2016. Danielle filed for divorce in August
2024. The parties had no children together. By the final hearing, the parties had agreed to
the division of most of their property, and on appeal, the only issue concerns the
classification of certain restricted stock units awarded to Danielle as part of her employment
with a financial services company.
At trial, Danielle testified that she had some restricted stock units (RSUs) awarded to
her by her company. She said they were “vested,” but she was still unable to access them because the company would first have to experience a liquidity event (such as the company’s
purchase or going public) that was also approved by the board. The RSUs expire after seven
years. She cannot access them or sell them; if she left her employment, the stocks would
disappear. She agreed she had earned them during the marriage and had to pay taxes on
them, but they presently “have no cash value.” That said, her 2023 and 2024 W-2s from her
employer showed that she received RSUs as compensation valued at $66,320.46 in 2024 and
$34,157.25 in 2023. No documents concerning the terms and conditions of the stock units
were introduced—the only evidence we have concerning them is Danielle’s testimony and
her W-2s. The value was calculated at its current value before a public offering.
From the bench the court stated,
There is the issue of RSUs, which are some form of deferred compensation which
may be realized by plaintiff in the future. I think ultimately that is the problem. I
don’t have any expert testimony about what an RSU necessarily is. I did hear
[Danielle]’s testimony about it. I heard argument of Counsel on both sides about what
Defendants exhibit 1, 2, and 3 may indicate an RSU does. I find that because the
RSU cannot be -- well, may never truly vest, and I think that is probably the correct
terms of art. The testimony was that there are multiple qualifying conditions, and
those were itemized in the testimony. It comes from some sort of financial event
through [Danielle]’s employer and in discretion of that board.
But should [Danielle] be terminated tomorrow or any other disqualifying event, she
would not see the proceeds of that potential income. And so I find it’s not vested as
of the time of this ruling and of the decree. And therefore, there is no division of the
RSUs. To the extent they are ever realized, they will be the property of [Danielle].
Similarly, in the decree for divorce, the court found that
the restricted stock units RSUs are not currently vested and [Danielle]’s testimony
verified multiple qualifying conditions that keep them from being vested at this time.
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Further, the Court finds that if [Danielle] were terminated tomorrow, or any
other disqualifying event, she would not receive any of the proceeds from the RSUs.
Steven appealed, arguing that the RSUs were earned during the marriage and
therefore subject to division pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315 (Repl.
2020).
This court reviews division-of-marital-property cases de novo. Nauman v. Nauman,
2018 Ark. App. 114, at 14, 542 S.W.3d 212, 220. With respect to the division of property
in a divorce case, we review the circuit court’s findings of fact and affirm them unless they
are clearly erroneous or against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. A finding is clearly
erroneous when the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. In order to demonstrate that the circuit
court’s ruling was erroneous, an appellant must show that the circuit court abused its
discretion by making a decision that was arbitrary or groundless. Id.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315 provides that, with some exceptions, all
property acquired during a marriage is marital property, meaning that at divorce, it is subject
to an equal division between the parties. We have held that restricted stock units may be
marital property—or partially marital property—depending on the extent of the right the
earning partner has to the property, when that right was acquired, and when it may be
exercised. Nauman, 2018 Ark. App. 114, 542 S.W.3d 212.
The interests at issue in Nauman were complicated, and a forensics accounting expert
was required at trial to explain the nature and scope of the interests. The expert testified
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about the vesting schedule and that for the stocks to vest, the husband simply had to
continue employment, but he would also become fully vested if he died, became disabled, or
was terminated without cause; or if there is a change in control of the company, a merger,
or a dissolution.1 The RSU agreement, nonqualified stock option, and omnibus incentive
plan were also introduced.
Considering this evidence, the circuit court found—and this court agreed—that the
interests at issue were vested for marital-property purposes because some rights to the awards
could not be diminished by Nauman’s employer; not all of Nauman’s interest was
dependent on his continued employment. The question is how speculative the nature of the
interest is. An interest that is contingent only on continued employment is too speculative
to be vested and subject to division. Nauman, 2018 Ark. App. 114, at 18, 542 S.W.3d at 222
(citing Pelts v. Pelts, 2017 Ark. 98, at 3, 514 S.W.3d 455, 456). Similarly, if a benefit can be
unilaterally terminated by an employer without terminating the employment relationship,
the interest is too speculative. Id. (citing Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984)).
In Pelts, the supreme court concluded that the husband’s potential interest in activeduty retirement benefits was too speculative to divide at divorce because he would receive no
benefits if he left military service immediately. Pelts, 2017 Ark. 98, 514 S.W.3d 455. Nauman,
1
We note that “vested” sometimes carries a slightly different meaning in an employeecompensation setting than in a marital-property setting. In division-of-property cases, it means a sufficiently definable property right subject to division. Even if a party testifies that something is vested or will vest, that does not mean it is automatically divisible at divorce. Nauman demonstrates this.
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however, distinguished Pelts because the awards in Nauman could also fully vest upon some
alternative events—including death, disability, or a change in corporate control—so the
husband’s interest was not contingent solely on continued employment.
The record before us today is significantly less developed than the one in Nauman.
Here, no award agreements or plan documents were introduced. The entirety of the evidence
consisted of Danielle’s testimony and her 2023 and 2024 W-2s. Although Danielle described
the RSUs as vested, she also testified that she could neither access them nor sell them, and
she would receive nothing if her employment terminated. Her testimony further established
that she could realize the value of the RSUs only if her employer experienced a qualifying
liquidity event approved by its board and that the RSUs would expire after seven years.
Nothing in this record establishes an alternative event that would preserve or accelerate
Danielle’s right to the awards notwithstanding the end of her employment, as was the case
in Nauman. On this record, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in concluding
that Danielle’s interest remained too contingent to constitute a vested property right subject
to division. We affirm.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and THYER, JJ., agree.
Wallace, Martin, Duke & Russell, PLLC, by: Britnie Byers, for appellant.
Dodds, Kidd & Ryan, by: Catherine A. Ryan, for appellee.
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