In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00042-CV
IN THE MATTER OF T.R., A JUVENILE
On Appeal from the 474th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2024-151-J
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State filed a petition for determinate sentencing alleging that T.R., a juvenile,
engaged in delinquent conduct by committing two counts of aggravated assault. After the State
obtained grand jury approval for a determinate sentence, T.R. pled true to the delinquent
conduct. Pursuant to a plea bargain with the State, the juvenile court committed T.R. to the
Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) for a term of fifteen years, with the possibility of a
transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ). When T.R. turned eighteen, the
State requested a hearing to determine whether T.R. should be transferred to the TDCJ. After a
release or transfer hearing, the juvenile court transferred T.R. to the TDCJ to serve the remainder
of his sentence. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.11.
On appeal,1 T.R. does not argue that there was insufficient evidence to order his transfer
to the TDCJ. Rather, he argues that the transfer order was not specific enough to provide
meaningful review and seeks an abatement of his appeal to secure a more detailed order. T.R.
also argues that the order misclassified the offenses as “aggravated First Degree Felonies”
instead of second-degree felonies. Because we find that the order, combined with the appellate
record, provides for meaningful review, we overrule T.R.’s first point of error. We sustain
T.R.’s second point of error and modify the transfer order to reflect that the delinquent conduct
constituted aggravated second-degree felonies. As modified, we affirm the juvenile court’s order
of transfer to the TDCJ.
1
Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). We follow the precedent of the Tenth Court of Appeals in deciding the issues presented. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
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I. The Record Provides for Meaningful Review of the Transfer Order
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“We review the juvenile court’s decision to transfer a juvenile from TJJD to TDCJ for
abuse of discretion.” In re A.G., No. 10-16-00268-CV, 2017 WL 1452847, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Waco Apr. 19, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re J.J., 276 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied); In re F.D., 245 S.W.3d 110, 113 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no
pet.)). “In deciding whether the juvenile court abused its discretion, we review the entire record
to determine if the court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Id. (citing
In re J.J., 276 S.W.3d at 178). “If ‘some evidence’ exists to support the juvenile court’s
decision, there is no abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting In re J.J., 276 S.W.3d at 178); see In re
M.C., 502 S.W.3d 852, 858 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied).
In making a determination on whether to transfer T.R. to the TDCJ, the juvenile court
could consider the following:
[T]he experiences and character of the person before and after commitment to the
[TJJD] or post-adjudication secure correctional facility, the nature of the penal
offense that the person was found to have committed and the manner in which the
offense was committed, the abilities of the person to contribute to society, the
protection of the victim of the offense or any member of the victim’s family, the
recommendations of the [TJJD], county juvenile board, local juvenile probation
department, and prosecuting attorney, the best interests of the person, and any
other factor relevant to the issue to be decided.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.11(k).
B. The Evidence
At the release or transfer hearing, Tami Coy, who was familiar with T.R.’s behavior
while he was in the TJJD, testified that T.R. had violent altercations and “five major rule
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violations that ha[d] been confirmed through due process hearings, for fighting or assaulting
other youth.”2 Coy noted that although T.R. was eligible for programs while in the TJJD, T.R.
did not complete any. As an example, Coy testified that T.R. was placed in the Substance Use
Services program but was removed from it. Coy said that T.R. was “verbally aggressive” and
“often made threats to go off and disrupt, and just . . . tear up the dorm.” According to Coy,
T.R.’s “behavior [got him] moved . . . to the Phoenix program, which is the most restrictive
program [the TJJD] ha[d] for youth that are violently aggressive.” According to Coy, T.R.
would be a danger to the community if released. As a result, Coy testified that the TJJD’s
recommendation was to transfer T.R. to the TDCJ.
T.R. testified that he was aware of the “pretty big violations” that concerned the TJJD.
Even so, T.R. wished for another chance and asked the juvenile court to consider his release
instead of his transfer to the TDCJ. After hearing arguments from counsel, the juvenile court
determined that T.R.’s transfer to the TDCJ was appropriate.
C. Analysis
The juvenile court’s order expressly states that it considered the factors set forth in
Section 54.11(k) of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.11. “After careful
consideration of all the evidence presented,” which included “written reports from the [TJJD],
probation officers, and professional court employees, in addition to witness testimony,” the
juvenile court found, among other things:
2
The details of those violations are in a confidential social-history report, which was filed with the juvenile court. We have reviewed the details of T.R.’s social history, which the juvenile court considered in making its transfer determination. We also note that the social history lists T.R.’s prior adjudicated-delinquent conduct and resulting dispositions.
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• that T.R. “was found to have engaged in Delinquent Conduct, which occurred on
or about the 23rd day of April, 2024, the offense of TWO (2) COUNTS OF
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON (F2)”;
• that T.R. “[wa]s of sufficient intellectual abilities and sophistication to be
committed at the [TDCJ]”;
• that the nature of the penal offenses were “aggravated First Degree Felonies”; and
• that it was “in the best interest of [T.R.], and of society, that [T.R.] be placed in
the custody of the [TDCJ]. . . for the remainder of the FIFTEEN (15) YEAR
Determinate Sentence.”
Even so, T.R. complains that the order is not specific enough to provide for meaningful review.
The Waco Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument to the one made by T.R. in In re
A.G., 2017 WL 1452847, at *1. There, the Waco Court of Appeals overruled the juvenile’s
complaint that “the [juvenile] court did not provide sufficient reasoning as to why it ordered the
transfer” because the record supported the juvenile court’s Section 54.11(k) findings. Id.
Here, as in In re A.G., the juvenile court stated that it “considered the pleadings, the
evidence at the hearing, . . . the recommendations of the [TJJD], and other factors pursuant to
Section 54.11.” Id. at *2. Therefore, just as in In re A.G., we find here that “[t]he record and the
[juvenile] court’s findings and conclusions were sufficient to allow us to conduct our review and
reach the conclusion that the [juvenile] court did not abuse its discretion in rendering its
judgment.” In re M.C., 502 S.W.3d at 856. As a result, we overrule T.R.’s first issue on appeal.
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II. We Modify the Order of Transfer
The juvenile court’s order of transfer correctly reflects that T.R. was found to have
engaged in delinquent conduct of two counts of aggravated assault. Although the order properly
referred to those offenses as second-degree felonies, it also later mistakenly states that they were
“aggravated First Degree Felonies.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b).
We have the authority to reform a judgment to make the record speak the truth when we
have the necessary information before us to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); French v. State,
830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Ferguson v. State, 435 S.W.3d 291, 293–96 (Tex.
App.—Waco), pet. struck, No. PD-0457-14, 2014 WL 5374163, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 20,
2014) (per curiam) (order). Accordingly, we will modify the juvenile court’s order to correct
this clerical error.
III. Conclusion
We modify the juvenile court’s order to replace the phrase “aggravated First Degree
Felonies” with the phrase “aggravated Second Degree Felonies.” As modified, we affirm the
juvenile court’s order of T.R.’s transfer to the TDCJ.
Charles van Cleef
Justice
Date Submitted: September 24, 2026
Date Decided: September 29, 2026
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