[Cite as State v. Williams, 2026-Ohio-3840.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SCIOTO COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
: Case No. 25CA4122
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
:
v. :
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
JACQUAVIUS WILLIAMS, : ENTRY
:
Defendant-Appellant. :
: RELEASED: 09/23/2026
APPEARANCES:
Karyn Justice, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellant.
Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney and Jay Willis, Scioto County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal of a Scioto County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry
of conviction in which Jacquavius Williams (“Williams”) was convicted after a jury trial of
illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse. On appeal, Williams contends: 1) that the
conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of
the evidence; 2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion in limine; and 3) the trial
court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial. After reviewing the parties’
arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we find no merit to the assignments of
error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} On October 30, 2023, Williams was an inmate in the custody of the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, where he was serving a sentence for Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 2
aggravated robbery and felonious assault, as well as a sentence for attempted illegal
conveyance onto the grounds of a detention facility. He had been in prison since 2011.
On October 30, Williams was transferred with his property from the Ohio State
Penitentiary to Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (“SOCF”).
{¶3} During a routine search of Williams’ personal belongings, a corrections
officer found a bottle of lotion concealing a package containing nine Suboxone
(buprenorphine) strips, a Schedule III controlled substance; 13 pieces of paper that later
tested positive for Schedule I controlled substances (ADB-Butinaca and ADB-4enPinaca); and xylazine, a Schedule III substance. In the course of the investigation, Ohio
State Highway Patrol (“OSHP”) Investigator Wells spoke with Williams at SOCF
regarding the incident. Williams indicated he did not want to give an official statement,
but spontaneously uttered incriminating remarks concerning the contraband.
{¶4} On June 13, 2024 a Scioto County grand jury returned an indictment
charging Williams with four counts of illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto grounds
of a specified government facility (Counts 1-4), in violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2) and
(G)(2), third-degree felonies; two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs (Counts 5-6),
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(c), third-degree felonies; trafficking in drugs
(Counts 7-8), in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(2)(c), fourth-degree felonies;
two counts of aggravated possession of drugs (Counts 9-10), in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(b), third-degree felonies; and two counts of possession of drugs
(Counts 11-12), in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(2)(b), fourth-degree felonies.
{¶5} The case proceeded to jury trial. At the conclusion of the State’s case, the
defense made a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, and the State agreed it had not shown Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 3
the presence of the bulk amount for Buprenorphine and therefore requested a jury
instruction as to a lesser-included offense for Counts 8 and 12. The trial court denied
the motion for acquittal and instructed the jury regarding a lesser-included offense
concerning the Buprenorphine counts. The jury found Williams guilty of three counts of
illegal conveyance of drugs (Counts 1-3), two counts of aggravated possession of drugs
(Counts 9-10); and one count of possession of drugs (Count 11). The jury found
Williams not guilty of the remaining counts.
{¶6} The trial court proceeded to sentencing and found that Counts 1, 2, and 3
merged for sentencing purposes. The State elected to proceed with sentencing on
Count 1. The trial court also found that Counts 9, 10, and 11 merged for sentencing
purposes. The State elected to proceed with sentencing on Count 10. The trial court
then found that Counts 1 and 10 merged, and the State elected to sentence on Count 1.
Thus, Williams was convicted of one count of illegal conveyance that involved ADBButinaca, a Schedule I controlled substance.
{¶7} The trial court sentenced Williams to 36 months in prison, including an
optional term of up to 2 years of post-release control. The trial court further ordered
Williams to serve the 36-month term consecutively to the sentence Williams was
already serving at the time of the offense. Williams subsequently submitted this appeal,
assigning three errors for our review.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION IN
LIMINE.
Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 4
III. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR
MISTRIAL.
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Williams appears to challenge both the
sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Williams asserts that the State failed to meet its
burden to prove every essential element of the case against him, but in particular, the
element that he knew there were controlled substances in his property when he arrived
at SOCF. He argues the State relied primarily on the testimony of corrections and law
enforcement personnel who testified about the chain of custody of his property. As it
relates to whether he had knowledge of the substance, he argues the only evidence the
State presented about knowledge was through the testimony of the OSHP investigator,
Trooper Wells. He acknowledges that Trooper Wells testified that Williams volunteered
a statement that he committed the crimes. Williams states, however, he denied
volunteering that statement, believing instead that he was answering a hypothetical
question. Williams further alleges that even though the State showed the contraband
was found in his property, the State did not prove that Williams knew it was in his
property.
{¶9} The State submits that it presented sufficient competent, credible evidence,
most of which was uncontroverted, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams
was guilty consistent with the jury’s verdict.
A. Law.
{¶10} “ ‘ Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the weight of the
evidence involve distinct legal concepts and different standards of review.... While both
challenge the strength of the evidence, “[a] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 5
attacks its adequacy ... while a challenge to the weight of the evidence attacks its
persuasiveness.” ’ ” (Bracketed text and second ellipsis in original.). State v. Reillo,
2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 15, quoting
Disciplinary Counsel v. Smith, 2017-Ohio-9087, ¶ 23. “Put differently, while a review of
the sufficiency of the evidence asks whether the State met its burden of production, a
manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge looks to whether the State met its burden of
persuasion.” Id., citing State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26.
{¶11} “In general, a claim of insufficient evidence invokes a due process concern
and raises the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the
verdict as a matter of law.” State v. King, 2022-Ohio-4616, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing State
v. Schroeder, 2019-Ohio-4136, ¶ 59 (4th Dist.); State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
386 (1997). Thus, “[w]hether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction is
a question of law that this court reviews de novo.” State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-2804,
¶ 16, citing State v. Groce, 2020-Ohio-6671, ¶ 7. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution the court asks whether “ ‘ “any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”
Id., quoting State v. Dean, 2015-Ohio-4347, ¶ 150, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. Accordingly, “[t]he appropriate
standard of review for a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge is ‘whether, if believed,
the evidence can sustain the verdict as a matter of law.’ ” Id. at ¶ 17, quoting State v.
Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, ¶ 13.
{¶12} However, in a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, “a court
‘ “ ‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 6
witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” ’ ” Reillo, 2026-Ohio-2701 at ¶ 26, quoting
Brown, 2025-Ohio-2804, at ¶ 30, Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,, quoting State v.
Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172 (1st Dist. 1983), paragraph three of the syllabus.
Therefore, an appellate court will vacate a jury's verdict and order a new trial “ ‘only in
the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction,’ ” Id.
at ¶ 27, quoting Brown at ¶ 31, quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. Courts,
therefore, “review the record to determine whether the ‘jury clearly lost its way.’ ” Id. at
¶ 26, quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.
{¶13} Even so, we observe it is the role of the jury to determine the weight and
credibility of evidence. State v. Schluep, 2025-Ohio-5866, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.) “ ‘ “A jury,
sitting as the trier of fact, is free to believe all, part or none of the testimony of any
witness who appears before it.” ’ ”” Id., quoting State v. Reyes-Rosales, 2016-Ohio3338, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. West, 2014-Ohio-1941, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.). The trier
of fact should be accorded deference in evidentiary weight and credibility issues
because it is in the best position to gauge the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice
inflections, and to use these observations to weigh their credibility. Schluep at ¶ 22.
{¶14} We further observe that “ ‘[a]lthough sufficiency and manifest weight are
different legal concepts, manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the
analysis; that is, a finding that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the
evidence necessarily includes a finding of sufficiency.’ ” State v. Neff, 2025-Ohio-1171,
¶ 46 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Gravely, 2010-Ohio-3379, ¶ 46 (10th Dist.), citing State Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 7
v. Braxton, 2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Roberts, 1997 WL 600669
(9th Dist. Sept. 17, 1997). Hence, “ ‘a determination that a conviction is supported by
the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.’ ” Id.,
quoting Gravely at ¶ 46; State v. Wickersham, 2015-Ohio-2756, ¶ 27, (4th Dist.); State
v. Pollitt, 2010-Ohio-2556, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.). We, therefore, “ “first examine whether
appellant's convictions are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” Id.
quoting Gravely at ¶ 46, citing State v. Sowell, 2008-Ohio-3285, ¶ 89 (10th Dist.).
B. Analysis
{¶15} At the outset, we note that Williams states his convictions are not
supported by the manifest weight or sufficient evidence. We observe that although the
trial court found Williams guilty of three counts of illegal conveyance of drugs (Counts 1-3), two counts of aggravated possession of drugs (Counts 9-10), and one count of
possession of drugs (Count 11), the trial court merged several offenses such that the
illegal conveyance of drugs was the only remaining offense. Thus, if sufficient evidence
supports Williams’s illegal conveyance conviction, an erroneous verdict on the merged
count would be harmless. See State v. Foster, 2023-Ohio-746, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.); State v.
Whitehead, 2022-Ohio-479, ¶ 78 (4th Dist.); State v. Worley, 2021-Ohio-2207, ¶ 73;
State v. Campbell, 2021-Ohio-2482, ¶ 46 (4th Dist.); see also State v. Williams, 2012-Ohio-4693, ¶ 54 (4th Dist.)(because a court does not impose a sentence for merged
offenses, the defendant is not “convicted” of those merged offenses, and there is
therefore no “conviction” for appellate court to vacate). Consequently, if we determine
that the manifest weight of the evidence supports Williams’s illegal conveyance Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 8
conviction, we need not address the other offenses. Further, Williams’s argument does
primarily address the illegal conveyance count.
{¶16} Williams was convicted of a sole count of illegal conveyance of drugs of
abuse onto the grounds of a specified governmental facility, in violation of
R.C. 2921.36(A)(2) and (G)(2), a third-degree felony. R.C. 2921.36 provides, in
pertinent part:
(A) No person shall knowingly convey, or attempt to convey, onto the
grounds of a detention facility or of an institution, office building, or other
place that is under the control of the department of mental health and
addiction services, the department of developmental disabilities, the
department of youth services, or the department of rehabilitation and
correction any of the following items:
***
(2) Any drug of abuse, as defined in section 3719.011 of the Revised Code[.]
***
(G)(2) Whoever violates division (A)(2) of this section or commits a violation
of division (C) of this section involving any drug of abuse is guilty of illegal
conveyance of drugs of abuse onto the grounds of a specified governmental
facility, a felony of the third degree.
Count 1 involved ADB-Butinaca, a Schedule I controlled substance, though Williams
does not specifically challenge the identity or amount of drugs involved here.
{¶17} In the case sub judice, Williams argues the State failed to prove that he
“knew there were controlled substances in his property when he arrived at SOCF.” R.C.
2901.22(B) provides:
(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is
aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will
probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances
when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is
a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 9
{¶18} At trial, the evidence showed that when officers transport inmates from
prison to prison (including SOCF), the officers stow the inmates’ belongings in a
compartment beneath the transport vehicle. Upon arrival at SOCF, each inmate’s box
is placed in the receiving property cage, which is secured with a padlock and kept in the
property room behind a locked door. The transfer inmate’s belongings arrive in a taped,
sealed box labeled with the inmate’s name and tag showing the inmate’s picture and
number. Even if multiple inmates arrive at SOCF at the same time, a corrections officer
searches each box individually, one at a time. When contraband is discovered, it is
secured in a vault for review by criminal investigators.
{¶19} The State presented testimony from a corrections officer assigned to the
security threat group (STG), who had specialized training in identifying drugs that may
be conveyed into the facility. On October 30, 2023, during a routine search of transfer
inmate Williams’ property, this corrections officer found a lotion bottle that had a
package inside of it. The lotion bottle attracted the corrections officer’s attention
because it was wrapped in plastic. Inside were 9 Suboxone strips and 13 pieces of
paper soaked in what appeared to be controlled substances approximately the size of
an inmate ID. The State also presented testimony describing how inmates use the
drugs in question and the monetary value of the drugs, as well as drug identification
testimony from an expert witness/drug analyst.
{¶20} In addition to this testimony, OSHP Trooper Wells detailed the extent of her
investigation. She testified that, several months after a corrections officer discovered
contraband in Williams’s property, Williams was brought to an interview room to discuss
the incident. Trooper Wells stated that she asked Williams to sit in a chair in the middle Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 10
of the room, across from her, and then introduced herself, explaining that her role was
to advise him of his rights and obtain his side of the story. She told Williams he had
been brought in because drugs were found in his property and that she understood he
had likely already appeared before the rules infraction board. Trooper Wells testified
that, after she finished this introduction, Williams stated: “I don’t want to give you an
official statement. It’s obviously [sic] that I brought it to use some and sell some.” At
that point, Williams said that he wasn’t going to tell Trooper Wells how he got it there or
anything beyond that.
{¶21} Then Trooper Wells said, “I need to read you your rights and let you –
record what you’re saying.” Williams then said, “That’s not necessary to read my rights.
I am not going to give you an official statement.” According to Trooper Wells, Williams
immediately spoke out and made this statement after she had introduced herself to him
and then told him the reason she was there. Trooper Wells explained that she had not
asked him one single question when Williams made this statement. In fact, according to
Trooper Wells, Williams had made the statement before she had had a chance to ask
him a question or read him his rights.
{¶22} During the defense’s case, Williams testified on his own behalf. He
acknowledged he had been incarcerated and transferred from the Ohio State
Penitentiary to SOCF in October 2023. Williams stated that his property was searched
before he was transferred from one facility to another.
{¶23} According to Williams, he was asleep around midnight on October 31 when
the SOCF staff came to his cell and told him to “cuff up,” he was being taken to a Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 11
segregation cell, and the staff did not tell him why. Williams claimed that it wasn’t until a
few days later, or the following week that someone talked to him about the incident.
{¶24} Williams further testified that about five months later, SOCF staff told him
he had a visitor. Williams assumed one of his family members came to see him, but
instead of being taken to the visitation room, he was escorted to a different room.
Williams stated that he saw a couple of men exit the room before he was brought inside,
where a chair was positioned in the middle. After he sat down, Trooper Wells began
questioning him.
{¶25} According to Williams, when Trooper Wells began questioning him, he
immediately said he didn’t want to talk. Williams claimed Trooper Wells asked him four
or five times if he wanted to “give information.” Williams further testified that Trooper
Wells specifically asked him “what would one do with drugs like that,” and that he
specifically responded, “take care of their family, sell them[,] or do them.”
{¶26} According to Williams, Trooper Wells “twisted” his whole statement--he
never said “my possession,” and he never said “my drugs.” He never said, “this [is]
what I would do.” He claims that Trooper Wells asked him “what would one do with
those type of drugs?” Thus, Williams took Trooper Wells’s question as a “hypothetical
question.” Williams testified that, if he had admitted the drugs were his, he would have
done so either at the rules infraction board or when another investigator questioned him.
He further testified that he didn’t “remember any rights being read.” At trial, Williams
also testified that he has a “lot of property,” and disputed that it was even “his stuff,” and
further, that he didn’t put anything into this bottle the State is talking about. Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 12
{¶27} On appeal, Williams claims that “the only evidence presented by the State
that Mr. Williams had knowledge of this incident was the testimony of the OSHP
investigator. She testified Mr. Williams voluntarily admitted to her that he committed
these crimes.” Williams points out that at trial he denied volunteering the statement,
and that any remarks he made to Trooper Wells were based on a hypothetical. In so
doing, on appeal, he concedes that the evidence shows the contraband was found in
his property, but asserts that there is no evidence that he knew it was there.
{¶28} The State responds that the jury was free to believe all of the evidence for
themselves. We agree with the State. We acknowledge that “[o]ne witness, if believed,
may provide the trier of fact with competent, credible evidence to support its
determination.” State v. Lewis, 2018-Ohio-3784, ¶ 38 (4th Dist.).
{¶29} Further, even if the only evidence of Williams’s knowledge of the substance
was Trooper Well’s testimony regarding his statement, it is the jury’s purvey to assess
credibility. The Supreme Court of Ohio recently addressed the issue of manifest weight.
The Court observed, when discussing manifest weight, that an appellate court sits as a
“thirteenth juror,” and may disagree with “the fact-finder's resolution of the conflicting
evidence.” State v. Reillo, 2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 27, quoting State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio4175, ¶ 26. However, “ ‘[i]n weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be
mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.’ ” Id. at ¶ 28, quoting Eastley v.
Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21. Thus, “ ‘ “[i]f the evidence is susceptible of more than
one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is
consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 13
judgment.” ’ ” Id., quoting In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 14, quoting Seasons Coal Co.,
10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, fn. 3.
{¶30} We are further mindful that in the instant case, the jury acquitted Williams
on some of the indicted counts. Those acquittals indicate the jury carefully weighed the
evidence and did not clearly lose its way in finding him guilty on the remaining counts.
See State v. Steele, 2025-Ohio-5730, ¶ 37 (4th Dist.) (The fact that the jury acquitted
the defendant of one count shows it carefully reviewed the evidence before it); State v.
Brown, 2007-Ohio-287, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.) (Even when there were discrepancies between
the victim’s account and the defendant’s account of what transpired, this was a matter
of credibility and the fact-finder did not clearly lose its way when it convicted defendant
on some counts, but acquitted him on others).
{¶31} Therefore, we overrule Williams’s first assignment of error as it has no
merit.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶32} In his second assignment of error, Williams avers that the trial court erred
in denying his motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Trooper Wells regarding his
statement that he had brought the controlled substances with him to use and sell within
the prison. The State responds that the trial court properly denied Williams’s motion in
limine because Miranda was not implicated when Williams made the statement. The
State contends that Williams “volunteered” the statement at a time when he was not “in
custody,” such that the statement was not a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda. Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 14
A. Law.
{¶33} Crim.R. 12(C), “pretrial motions,” provides that “[p]rior to trial, any party
may raise by motion any defense, objection, evidentiary issue, or request that is
capable of determination without the trial of the general issue. The following must be
raised before trial: * * * (3) [m]otions to suppress evidence, including but not limited to
statements and identification testimony, on the ground that it was illegally obtained.
Such motions shall be filed in the trial court only.” Crim.R. 12(D) further provides that
such pretrial motions “shall be made within thirty-five days after arraignment or seven
days before trial, whichever is earlier. The court in the interest of justice may extend the
time for making pretrial motions.”
{¶34} “ ‘A “motion to suppress” is defined as a “[d]evice used to eliminate from
the trial of a criminal case evidence which has been secured illegally, generally in
violation of the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure), the Fifth Amendment (privilege
against self-incrimination), or the Sixth Amendment (right to assistance of counsel, right
of confrontation etc.), of U.S. Constitution.” ’ ” State v. Woltz, 2017-Ohio-9042, ¶ 10 (4th
Dist.) quoting State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449, (1995). “ ‘[A] motion to suppress
is the proper vehicle for raising constitutional challenges based on the exclusionary
rule[.]’ ” State v. Robinson, 2025-Ohio-1539, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. French, 72
Ohio St.3d at 449.
{¶35} In contrast, a motion in limine “is a pretrial request asking the court to
prohibit opposing counsel from referring to or offering evidence on matters so highly
prejudicial to the moving party that curative instructions would be ineffective in
preventing a predispositional effect on the jury.” State v. Foster, 2025-Ohio-2942, ¶ 41 Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 15
(3d Dist.); State v. Wild, 2010-Ohio-4751, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.); French, 72 Ohio St.3d at 449,
citing Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990). Thus, “[a] motion in limine is directed to the
trial court's discretion on an evidentiary issue that might arise at trial but that has not yet
been presented in full context.” State v. Vulgamore, 2021-Ohio-3147, ¶ 38 (4th Dist.),
citing State v. Shalash, 2015-Ohio-3836, ¶ 30 (12th Dist.).
{¶36} However, “[a] motion in limine can serve as the functional equivalent of a
motion to suppress, which determines the admissibility of evidence with finality.” State
v. Jones, 2021-Ohio-3050, ¶ 61 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Johnston, 2015-Ohio-450, ¶ 16
(2d Dist.). “A motion in limine is treated like a suppression motion when an evidentiary
hearing is held at which testimony regarding the topic of the motion is fully presented
with cross-examination.” Id., citing Johnston at ¶ 22.
{¶37} “Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed
question of law and fact.” State v. Farrow, 2023-Ohio-682, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.), quoting
State v. Turner, 2020-Ohio-6773, ¶ 14. “An appellate court must accept the trial court's
findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. But the appellate
court must decide the legal questions de novo.” Id. quoting Turner at ¶ 14.
B. Analysis
{¶38} In the instant case, Williams filed a “motion in limine” on February 14, 2025,
prior to trial but more than 35 days after arraignment, which took place August 7, 2024.
The motion requested that the statements Williams made to Trooper Wells be excluded
from evidence because “[d]efendant was not mirandized prior to making any
statements,” therefore, “[t]he statements were taken in violation of defendant’s rights Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 16
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth[,] and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.”
{¶39} On the morning of the jury trial held February 18, 2025, the trial court
addressed the issue with counsel. The trial court generally inquired about the factual
circumstances of the motion, and counsel for the State and defense recited the
circumstances surrounding Williams’s statement to Trooper Wells. However, the trial
court did not hear sworn testimony. The trial court noted that the pleading was styled as
a “motion in limine.” However, the trial court found that the motion was actually a
constitutional challenge as to why the statements should not be admitted, and as such,
the trial court found the motion was untimely.
{¶40} Even though the trial court found the motion to be untimely, the trial court
accepted the proffered facts by the State and defense, and found that legally, the
statement did not involve a custodial interrogation because (1) Williams was not “in
custody” for the purposes of Miranda and (2) that it appeared the statement was not
elicited by questioning, even though it was probably the trooper’s intent to interview
Williams at the time. The trial court indicated that it sounded from the proffer like
Trooper Wells never had the chance to mirandize Williams. The trial court
acknowledged it had not “heard the statement” at that point in time.
{¶41} Based on the record, we find no error. Initially, we would turn to Crim.R.
12(C) and (D) and determine that the trial court properly held the motion in limine, which
was actually a motion to suppress, to be untimely.
Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 17
{¶42} We also find no error on the part of the trial court in denying the motion in
limine/suppress on the merits. When the issue was addressed by the trial court, the
parties offered the following facts:
1. Williams was in an inmate at SOCF and was restrained at the time he
made the statement;
2. In an interview room at the prison, Trooper Wells advised Williams that
drugs had been found in his property, and that she observed that he
probably already had a rules infraction hearing on the issue.
3. At that point, Williams said he didn’t want to give an official statement,
and then Williams went on to say, he obviously “brought it to use and sell
some,” and further, that he didn’t want to say anything else.
4. Trooper Wells advised him at that point she would need to advise him of
his rights and that the statement would be recorded, and Williams then
stated that there was no need because he was not going to give a
statement.
5. Williams terminated the interview before it began in that Trooper Wells
did not have time to ask a single question of Williams; Williams offered this
statement before Trooper Wells could begin asking questions.
6. The exchange occurred in an interview room at the prison and Williams’s
exchange with Trooper Wells lasted “less than two minutes,” [p]robably less
than one minute.”
7. When Williams terminated the attempted interview, he was immediately
taken back to his cell.
Trooper Wells’s and Williams’s testimony given during the trial regarding the
circumstances surrounding the statement are essentially consistent with the proffer of
evidence the attorneys submitted to the trial court. The primary differences were that, at
trial, Williams testified that different words were spoken. Further, Williams claimed the
exchange lasted longer than the State represented, and described Trooper Wells as
“questioning” him.
Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 18
{¶43} “If a suspect provides responses while in custody without having first been
informed of his or her Miranda rights, the responses may not be admitted at trial as
evidence of guilt.” Cleveland v. Oles, 2017-Ohio-5834, ¶ 9, citing Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). “Imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial
situation within the meaning of Miranda.” State v. Barker, 2017-Ohio-596, ¶ 11 (5th
Dist.), citing Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 510-511 (2012); State v. Jewell, 2025-Ohio2496, ¶ 56 (1st Dist.). “Rather, the inquiry into whether an incarcerated person is
subject to a custodial interrogation focuses on all the features of the interview, not
merely the fact that the interviewee is in prison.” Jewell at ¶ 56, citing Howes v. Fields,
565 U.S. 499, 514 (2012). These include “(1) the location of the questioning, (2) its
duration, (3) statements made during the interview, (4) the presence or absence of
physical restraints during the questioning, and (5) the release of the interviewee at the
end of the questioning.” Jewell at ¶ 56, quoting State v. Nelson, 2016-Ohio-7115, ¶ 24
(6th Dist.). “ ‘In determining whether a person is in custody in this sense, the initial step
is to ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a
reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave.’ ” Nelson at ¶ 22, quoting Howes, 565 U.S. at 509.
{¶44} The record reflects that, although Williams made the statements in a prison
interview room while restrained, the encounter was brief. Trooper Wells’s remarks were
introductory, and the circumstances surrounding Williams’s statement were not
coercive. After Williams stated that he did not want to give a statement, he was
immediately returned to his cell.
Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 19
{¶45} In addition, there is no indication from the facts proffered at the time the
trial court considered the motion that Williams’s statements were made in response to
an interrogation. “[T]he requirement that police officers administer Miranda warnings
applies only when a suspect is subjected to both custody and interrogation.” (Emphasis
added.). State v. Neyland, 2014-Ohio-1914, ¶ 119, citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. An
unsolicited and spontaneous statement that does not result as product of interrogation
also does not implicate Miranda. See Neyland at ¶ 119, citing Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) and State v. Dunn, 2012-Ohio-1008, ¶ 24. The parties’
proffer at the time the trial court considered the motion supports the conclusion that
Williams’s statement was not made in response to questioning, but was instead a
spontaneous remark made after Trooper Wells explained the purpose of the interview.
{¶46} We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding the motion in limine,
which was actually a motion to suppress, was untimely. Further, the trial court did not
err in admitting Williams’s statements. Thus, we overrule the second assignment of
error.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
A. Law.
{¶47} In his third assignment of error, Williams asserts that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial. Williams objected and then asked for a
mistrial when the corrections officer testified, after being asked if he could “recognize
[Williams] on sight,” that “[w]e had to look him up last week for having drugs.” Williams
argues on appeal that the testimony is not admissible to show that the defendant has a
disposition or propensity toward the commission of a crime, pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B). Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 20
He acknowledges that a trial court sustaining an objection and giving a curative
instruction has been held to be enough to “cure the taint” from an improper statement.
However, he asserts that the “inflammatory nature” of the error was prejudicial because
the jury had already heard the statement and it implied that Williams persisted in
unindicted criminal acts.
{¶48} The State responds that the statement was offered to identify Williams and
not offered to prove character or that Williams acted in conformity therewith. In addition,
the State asserts that the jury is presumed to have followed a curative instruction.
A. Law.
{¶49} “ ‘A trial court must declare a mistrial only “when the ends of justice so
require and a fair trial is no longer possible.” ’ ” State v. Holsinger, 2022-Ohio-4092,
¶ 14 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 198, quoting State v.
Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59 (1995). “ ‘A mistrial should not be ordered in a cause
simply because some error has intervened. The error must prejudicially affect the
merits of the case and the substantial rights of one or both of the parties.’ ” State v.
Thacker, 2020-Ohio-4620, ¶ 48 (4th Dist.), quoting Tingue v. State, 90 Ohio St. 368
(1914), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶50} “ ‘An appellate court reviews an order denying a motion for a mistrial for
abuse of discretion.’ ” Holsinger at ¶ 14, citing Adams at ¶ 198. “An abuse of discretion
is ‘an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, or ... a view or action
that no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.’ ” State v. Wagner, 2026-Ohio2488, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Brady, 2008-Ohio-4493, ¶ 23. “A trial court's decision is Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 21
unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support it.” Id. citing
Scioto Land Co., LLC v. Knauff, 2023-Ohio-4821, ¶ 50 (4th Dist.).
{¶51} “When the defendant seeks a mistrial based on impermissible testimony
about other acts, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the motion if the
references were brief and isolated, the remarks were followed by a curative instruction,
and the likelihood of prejudice is low.” State v. Haskins, 2024-Ohio-5908, ¶ 32 (8th
Dist.), citing State v. Friess, 2023-Ohio-3409, ¶ 116 (6th Dist.) citing State v. Durst,
2020-Ohio-607, ¶ 47 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Trimble, 2009-Ohio-2961, ¶ 174-175, and
State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59, (1995).
B. Analysis.
{¶52} At trial the State asked a corrections officer witness whether he had seen
Williams before. The State asked the following questions:
State: As he – you – you had never seen this man before?
Corrections officer: I’ve seen [Williams] before.
State: You have?
Corrections officer: Yes.
State: Okay. Okay. So, you do know him personally?
Corrections officer: Yes.
State: You can recognize him on sight, at least?
Corrections officer: Yes. We had to look him up last week for having drugs.
At that point, defense counsel objected, and the trial court immediately sustained the
objection. The trial court further stated, “[t]he jury should disregard that statement.” Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 22
{¶53} Then, defense counsel requested a bench conference, wherein he asked
for a mistrial. The State responded that the issue could be remedied with a curative
instruction, and explained that the State was simply attempting to have the corrections
officer identify Williams, not discuss the prior act. During the bench conference,
defense counsel conceded that the State did not “elicit” the statement, but further
stated, “it was blurted out and you can’t unring those bells.” The trial court overruled the
motion and then once again instructed the jury that the statement made by the witness
was irrelevant and should not be considered for any purpose at trial. The trial court also
asked each juror whether he could follow that instruction, and each juror responded
affirmatively.
{¶54} We note on appeal that the State argues that “other acts” evidence may be
admissible for another purpose than proof that the defendant “acted in conformity
therewith.” However, at trial, the State argued that it did not intend to elicit the other
acts evidence at all – rather, its question was designed to elicit the simple statement
that the corrections officer could identify Williams, and the corrections officer offered the
additional information spontaneously. In so doing, the State argues that the admission
of the evidence was not error. However, at trial, the trial court sustained defense
counsel’s objection and immediately issued a curative instruction. The trial court then
reiterated the instruction and ensured that the jury knew not to consider the statement
for any purpose.
{¶55} “[A] curative instruction is an appropriate remedy, rather than a mistrial, for
inadvertent answers given by a witness to an otherwise innocent question.” State v.
Howard, 2005-Ohio-3702, ¶ 43 (2d Dist.) (when, in an aggravated robbery and felonious Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 23
assault trial, State witness inadvertently testified he met the defendant when they went
to prison over a felonious assault, counsel was not ineffective for failing to ask for a
mistrial when a curative instruction would suffice). “Further, a jury is presumed to follow
curative instructions given by the trial court and therefore a trial court sustaining an
objection and giving a curative instruction has been held to be enough to cure the taint
from an improper statement.” Id., citing State v. Mobley, 2002-Ohio-1792 at *2 (2d
Dist.).
{¶56} It is well-settled that “ ‘[a] jury is presumed to follow the instructions,
including curative instructions, given it by a trial judge.’ ” State v. Meddock, 2017-Ohio4414, ¶ 48 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, ¶ 122 (3d Dist.), quoting
State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59 (1995). Thus, “we presume that the jury will
follow the court's curative instructions concerning improper witness comments.” State v.
Wharton, 2010-Ohio-4775, ¶ 44 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Ahmed, 2004-Ohio-4190, ¶
93; State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 254 (2002). “However, we … recognize that
‘occasionally curative instructions may not sufficiently eliminate the prejudicial impact of
highly inflammatory evidence.’ ” Id., citing State v. Martin, 2005-Ohio-1732, ¶ 46 (4th
Dist.). “ ‘A party can rebut the presumption that curative instructions remedy a mistake
by showing that the jury could not have ignored the evidence and that serious prejudice
likely occurred.’ ” Id. quoting Martin at ¶ 46.
{¶57} Based on the record before us, we cannot find error. The trial court
immediately sustained the objection, such that the impact of the offending evidence on
the verdict is unlikely as the statement here was isolated and not specifically elicited by
the State. See State v. Ellison, 2017-Ohio-284, ¶ 30 (4th Dist.) (trial court did not error Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 24
by failing to grant mistrial when witness referred to fact defendant had been to prison as
the statement was isolated and not elicited by the State). Thus, the limiting instruction
prevented any danger that the jury would unfairly consider the other acts evidence as
proof of Williams’s bad character or that he had acted in conformity therewith. See
State v. Cobb, 2025-Ohio-1274, ¶ 35 (2d Dist.) (in trial for murder and having a weapon
under disability, other acts evidence tending to show defendant was “drug addict” was
not grounds for mistrial when trial court provided a curative instruction). Williams has
not demonstrated from the record how the jury must not have followed the instruction.
Additionally, the evidence at trial considered without the offending remark is substantial.
{¶58} Accordingly, we overrule Williams’s third assignment of error.
CONCLUSION
{¶59} For the reasons set forth above, we overrule all three assignments of error
and affirm the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Scioto App. No. 25CA4122 25
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ____________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.