Cite as 2026 Ark. 122
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-25-822
Opinion Delivered: October 1, 2026
JAMES COOPER
APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE
CRITTENDEN COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT
V.
[NO. 18CR-95-145]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE TONYA M.
APPELLEE ALEXANDER, JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
CODY HILAND, Associate Justice
Appellant James Cooper appeals from the denial of his petition to correct an illegal
sentence filed pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2016).
Cooper, who was nineteen years old when he committed the offense of capital murder,
contends that the circuit court erred by not considering “widely-accepted” scientific data
that indicates there is no substantial difference in the neurological brain development and
maturity of young adults aged seventeen to twenty-one, and as a result of this data, his
sentence of life imprisonment without parole is illegal. The circuit court entered an order
denying relief, and we affirm.
Cooper was tried with Ulonzo Gordon and Jeremy Moten, and all three were
convicted of killing Otis Webster. Cooper’s liability for the crime was that of an accomplice,
and each were sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for capital murder. Cooper v.
State, 324 Ark. 135, 919 S.W.2d 505 (1996).
The circuit court’s decision to deny relief pursuant to section 16-90-111 will not be
overturned unless that decision is clearly erroneous. McGill v. State, 2025 Ark. 66. Under
section 16-90-111, a finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to
support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Millsap v. State, 2020 Ark. 38.
We are mindful that the plain text of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111(a)
provides authority to a circuit court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. Freeman v.
State, 2026 Ark. ___, at 2. An illegal sentence is one that is illegal on its face. Id. A sentence
is illegal on its face when it is void because it is beyond the circuit court’s authority to
impose and gives rise to a question of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. The general rule is
that a sentence imposed within the maximum term prescribed by law is not illegal on its
face. Id.
On appeal, Cooper contends that the circuit court erred by (1) not considering the
widely-accepted scientific data that supports the rulings in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012), and Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906,1 which note that there is a
substantial difference in young adults aged seventeen to twenty-one when it comes to
neurological brain development and maturity; (2) failing to analyze “fellow sister states[’]”
decisions concerning the neurological brain development and maturity level claims he made;
1
In Jackson, this court addressed the resentencing, pursuant to the holding in Miller, of a fourteen-year-old who had been mandatorily sentenced to life without parole for the offense of capital murder. This court set out instructions for the circuit court that Jackson may present Miller evidence for consideration and that his sentence must fall within the statutory discretionary range for a Class Y felony—not less than ten years and not more than forty years, or life. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997).
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(3) failing to analyze decisions of the federal courts concerning neurological brain
development and maturity-level claims he made; and (4) failing to grant relief under section
16-90-111 when the petition was filed in a timely manner and relief was authorized. The
circuit court denied Cooper’s petition, finding that the sentence of life imprisonment
without parole was not illegal.
Cooper addresses two cases, People v. Taylor, ___ N.W.3d ___, 2025 WL 1085247
(Mich. Apr. 10, 2025),2 and United States v. Sepulveda, 762 F. Supp. 3d 153 (D.R.I. 2025),
to support his claim that a life sentence without parole for nineteen- and twenty-year-olds
violates the benefits and protections of the specialized procedures mandated in Miller and
Jackson, which make those in that age group presumptively neurologically indistinguishable
from either a “teenage juvenile offender or an eighteen-year-old offender.”3 Although
Cooper argues that our state’s clause prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment under article
2 section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution mirrors Michigan’s clause, which served as the basis
to support the Michigan appellate court’s findings regarding its findings in Taylor, such a
claim based on a constitutional argument does not implicate the facial validity of the
judgment. Notwithstanding the fact that this court has noted that the Supreme Court of
the United States has not extended its holdings to offenders who were eighteen or older
when their crimes were committed, this court has repeatedly held that assertions of
2
Cooper also cited People v. Czarnecki, 27 N.W.3d 634 (Mich. Ct. App. 2023), which was reversed by the holding in Taylor sub nomine.
3
Use of the term “teenage juvenile offender” is likely in reference to teenagers that are categorized as “juveniles” or “youths” as opposed to teenagers that are categorized as adults (i.e., eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds).
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constitutional error do not implicate the facial validity of the judgment or the lack of
jurisdiction of the circuit court and are not within the purview of this statute. Freeman,
2026 Ark. ___, at 3 (citing Hogue v. State, 2026 Ark. 83, 732 S.W.3d 385; Mister v. State,
2022 Ark. 35, 639 S.W.3d 331).
Cooper contends that recent developments show a major change in how the law
treats “emerging adults,” particularly in light of an “assessment of a punishment’s
proportionality occurs ‘in light of contemporary standards of decency which mark the
progress of society.’” Sepulveda, 762 F. Supp. 3d at 159 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mattis,
224 N.E.3d 410 (Mass. 2024)) (internal citations omitted). Bearing in mind the Court’s
holding in Miller that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile violates the
Eighth Amendment, the Court did not prohibit a juvenile from being sentenced to life
without parole but required the sentencer to “take into account how children are different,
and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in
prison.” Segerstrom v. State, 2024 Ark. 130, at 6, 696 S.W.3d 799, 803 (quoting Miller, 567
U.S. at 480); see Grubbs v. State, 2020 Ark. 42, 592 S.W.3d 688. Again, this court has not
extended its application of Miller to offenders who were eighteen or older at the time of the
homicide. Freeman, 2026 Ark. ___, at 4. And, as we have stated before, precedent from
other jurisdictions do not persuade us to change course now on this matter. Id.
The circuit court determined that Cooper’s constitutional claims were not properly
before it and that, although Cooper deems his mandatory life sentence excessive, his
sentence is firmly within the statutory range for the offense of capital murder. A circuit
court may correct an illegal sentence at any time because a claim that a sentence is illegal is
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an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. A sentence is illegal on its face when it exceeds
the statutory maximum for the offense for which the defendant was convicted. Id. Cooper,
who does not contend that the sentence imposed on him exceeds the statutory maximum,
was convicted of capital felony murder, a Class Y felony under Arkansas Code Annotated
section 5-10-101 (Repl. 1993), punishable by death or life imprisonment without parole.
Accordingly, Cooper’s sentence of life without parole is within the range permitted by
statute and is not facially illegal. Id. at 5. In light of the foregoing, we affirm the circuit
court’s order because Cooper failed to demonstrate in the petition that the sentence in his
case was illegal.
Affirmed.
Special Justice COREY COX joins.
WEBB, J., not participating.
James Cooper, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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