#31092-a-PJD
2026 S.D. 51
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
BRIAN PYLE, Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA,
SOUTH DAKOTA DIVISION OF
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION,
MARTY JACKLEY, SOUTH DAKOTA
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STEVE
COTTON, CHARLES MIX COUNTY
STATE’S ATTORNEY, AMY BARTLING,
GREGORY COUNTY STATE’S
ATTORNEY, CHARLES MIX SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, AND GREGORY COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, Respondents and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
CHARLES MIX COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
THE HONORABLE BRUCE V. ANDERSON
Judge
MANUEL J. DE CASTRO, JR.
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for petitioner and
appellant.
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
NOLAN WELKER
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for respondents and
appellees.
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
AUGUST 25, 2026
OPINION FILED 09/30/26
#31092
DEVANEY, Justice
[¶1.] Brian Pyle filed an application for a writ of mandamus seeking an
order from the circuit court directing several law enforcement entities he named as
respondents to provide him with reports and records related to the investigation of
the death of his son, Ryan. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus
directing the law enforcement respondents to answer the application. The
respondents filed a motion to quash the peremptory writ along with a supporting
brief arguing that Pyle had not asserted sufficient grounds to request such relief.
Following a hearing, the court granted the State’s motion to quash the peremptory
writ and denied Pyle’s application. Pyle appeals, asserting the circuit court abused
its discretion when denying his application for a writ of mandamus. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
[¶2.] On September 20, 2024, Brian Pyle filed an application seeking a writ
of mandamus from the circuit court. He alleged that his son, Ryan, was reported
missing in August 2020 and his remains were found in November 2020 near the
Snake Creek Recreation Area near Platte, South Dakota. Pyle named, as
respondents, the State of South Dakota, the South Dakota Division of Criminal
Investigation (DCI), South Dakota Attorney General Marty Jackley, and the State’s
Attorneys and Sheriff’s Offices in Charles Mix and Gregory counties, and alleged
they were all involved in this missing person investigation. Pyle further alleged
that he had “filed numerous requests for medical records, police, and investigative
reports” related to his son’s disappearance and death, but the respondents ignored
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his requests.1 Pyle therefore sought a writ of mandamus from the circuit court
ordering the respondents to provide him the requested records and reports. He
cited South Dakota Constitution article VI, § 29(10) (Marsy’s Law) as a basis for
this relief.2
[¶3.] The circuit court issued a peremptory writ directing the respondents to
file a return or answer. An attorney for the State thereafter filed a notice of
appearance as counsel for all the respondents (collectively referred to hereafter as
the State), along with a motion to quash the peremptory writ and a supporting
brief.
[¶4.] In its brief to the circuit court, the State represented that law
enforcement investigated the circumstances surrounding Ryan’s disappearance and
death to determine whether foul play or criminal conduct was involved. As such,
the State maintained that the investigative reports contain confidential criminal
justice information that is statutorily exempt from disclosure. The State therefore
asserted Pyle could not show that he had a right to such reports or that the State
had a legal obligation to provide them. The State further asserted that Pyle had not
exhausted other remedies available under SDCL chapter 1-27, which governs public
access to records maintained by government entities. The State took issue with
Pyle’s claim that he had “filed numerous requests” for the records at issue.
1. Pyle’s allegations were not submitted via an affidavit, as required by SDCL
21-29-2.
2. Subsection 10 of Marsy’s Law refers to the right of a victim to confer with the
attorney for the government. S.D. Const. art. VI, § 29(10). However, Pyle’s
argument to the circuit court and to this Court on appeal refers only to
subsection (1), a different right enumerated in Marsy’s Law.
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According to the State, the Attorney General’s Office located only one prior request
from Pyle—a letter written by his attorney, dated January 4, 2024, requesting
medical records and investigative reports relating to Ryan’s death. The State
attached this letter to its brief as an exhibit and indicated that the requested
records were not provided to Pyle.
[¶5.] At a hearing on the State’s motion, neither party presented any
testimony or evidence. However, counsel for both parties provided additional
factual information during their oral arguments. Counsel for the State advised the
circuit court that he had reviewed the records related to this investigation and
understood that Pyle had been interviewed as part of the investigation and was
informed that law enforcement did not suspect foul play. The State further
represented that the investigation was complete and that there was no indication
that any crime had been committed.
[¶6.] In support of its motion to quash, the State argued that because of the
determination that no crime was committed, Pyle is not a “victim,” as the term is
defined under Marsy’s Law, and therefore Marsy’s Law is not applicable. The State
further asserted that even if Pyle could be deemed a victim, nothing in Marsy’s Law
gives a victim the right to compel disclosure of law enforcement reports. The State
maintained that because access to such reports is discretionary, mandamus relief is
not available. The State also reiterated the argument from its brief that Pyle had
not exhausted his administrative remedies when seeking access to the requested
reports.
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[¶7.] Pyle’s counsel agreed that either Pyle or his private investigator had
talked to DCI and the Gregory County Sheriff and were told that Ryan had died of
hypothermia. Pyle was not satisfied with this determination, and he hired private
investigators and a medical examiner to further investigate the circumstances of his
son’s death. Pyle and his private investigators suspected foul play may have led to
Ryan’s death. According to Pyle’s counsel, Ryan’s abandoned vehicle and his dog
were found in a cornfield on August 12 on the west side of the Missouri River in
Gregory County, but his remains were found east of the river three months later, in
a bog near Snake Creek Recreation Area in Charles Mix County, and his belongings
were scattered and found in a nearby cornfield. Counsel informed the circuit court
that Ryan was found in a fetal position with no clothes or shoes on, his knee was
hurt, and he had a broken nose.
[¶8.] Pyle argued that he is a victim under Marsy’s Law and is therefore
entitled to access the requested reports. When asked by the circuit court whether
there was a ministerial duty under Marsy’s Law to provide law enforcement records
to a victim, Pyle cited Article VI, § 29(1) of Marsy’s Law and asserted that the right
to “be treated with fairness and respect” includes access to these investigative
records regarding his son’s death. Pyle claimed that the State therefore has a legal
duty to provide this investigative information to him.
[¶9.] Following the hearing, the circuit court issued a memorandum decision
granting the State’s motion to quash the peremptory writ and denying Pyle’s
application for a writ of mandamus. The court determined that Pyle is not a
“victim” as defined in Marsy’s Law because the State had determined that no crime
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had been committed against Pyle’s son. The court also observed that Marsy’s Law
does not impose a mandatory duty on the State to allow Pyle access to the State’s
investigative records. As a further basis for its ruling, the court noted that SDCL
chapter 1-27 and SDCL 23-5-11 exempt such investigative records from public
disclosure requirements. Lastly, the court ruled that Pyle failed to exhaust all
potential administrative remedies available to those seeking access to public
records. For these reasons, the court determined that Pyle was not entitled to
mandamus relief.
[¶10.] Pyle appeals, asserting the circuit court abused its discretion when
denying his application for a writ of mandamus.
Standard of Review
[¶11.] We review a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a writ of
mandamus under an abuse of discretion standard. Puffy’s, LLC v. Dep’t of Health,
2025 S.D. 10, ¶ 26, 18 N.W.3d 134, 142 (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion
refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly
against reason and evidence.” Id. (quoting Krsnak v. S.D. Dep’t of Env’t & Nat.
Res., 2012 S.D. 89, ¶ 8, 824 N.W.2d 429, 433). “A [circuit] court abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). “Underlying questions of statutory interpretation and application in the
mandamus action ‘are questions of law that we review de novo.’” Id. (quoting Bohn
v. Bueno, 2024 S.D. 6, ¶ 12, 3 N.W.3d 441, 447).
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Analysis and Decision
[¶12.] Under South Dakota law, circuit courts may “issue a writ of
mandamus where no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists in the ordinary
course of law.” Krsnak, 2012 S.D. 89, ¶ 9, 824 N.W.2d at 433−34 (citation modified)
(citing SDCL 21-29-1 and -2). “A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
that will issue only when the duty to act is clear.” Bohn, 2024 S.D. 6, ¶ 13, 3
N.W.3d at 447 (citation omitted). Therefore, “[t]o prevail on a writ of mandamus or
prohibition, a petitioner must show a clear legal right to performance of the specific
duty sought to be compelled and the respondent must have a definite legal
obligation to perform that duty.” Id. (citation modified). “Mandamus may only be
used to compel ministerial duties, not discretionary duties.” Krsnak, 2012 S.D. 89,
¶ 10, 824 N.W.2d at 434.
[¶13.] Pyle’s assertion that he is entitled to mandamus relief is based solely
on his claim that, under Marsy’s Law, he is a victim to whom the State owes a clear
duty to provide investigative records regarding his son’s death. The term “victim” is
defined in Marsy’s Law as “a person against whom a crime or delinquent act is
committed.” S.D. Const. art. VI, § 29. The definition also includes certain close
relatives of the victim, including a parent, in cases involving “a victim who is killed
or incapacitated as a result of the crime or delinquent act.” Id. Thus, under the
plain language in Marsy’s Law, a crime must have occurred for one to invoke the
constitutional rights afforded to victims therein.
[¶14.] Here, the record before us contains only the representations from
counsel that law enforcement officials had determined that Ryan died from
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hypothermia and no crime was committed, and that Pyle disagrees with this
determination because he and his investigators believe Ryan’s death resulted from
foul play. However, no evidence was presented to the circuit court on which a
determination could be made as to whether a crime had been committed. Pyle
cannot, therefore, invoke the rights afforded to victims under Marsy’s Law as a
basis for his request for mandamus relief.
[¶15.] But even if Pyle had established that a crime had been committed
against his son, Marsy’s Law does not identify a “clear legal right” of victims to have
access to investigative information or a definite obligation of law enforcement to
provide it. Pyle cites subsection (1) of Marsy’s Law, which states that a victim has
“the right to due process and to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s
dignity.” S.D. Const. art. VI, § 29(1). But he fails to explain how the general
concepts of due process, fairness, and dignity equate to a “definite obligation” to
provide victims copies of law enforcement’s investigative records and reports.
Instead, these general concepts align with the overarching explanatory statement in
Marsy’s Law that the rights enumerated therein are granted to “ensure the victim
has a meaningful role throughout the criminal and juvenile justice systems[.]” S.D.
Const. art. VI, § 29. When reviewing this explanatory language, along with all the
rights enumerated in Marsy’s Law, we have determined that “the predominant
purpose of Marsy’s Law is to ensure that crime victims are kept informed and
allowed to meaningfully participate in the criminal justice system throughout the
time a crime is prosecuted and punished.” In re Essential Witness, 2018 S.D. 16,
¶ 15, 908 N.W.2d 160, 166 (emphasis added). No prosecution has occurred here,
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and the more specific rights set forth in Marsy’s Law primarily relate to events
occurring after a criminal proceeding has commenced.
[¶16.] Importantly, none of the nineteen enumerated rights in Marsy’s Law
direct or compel the State to disclose investigative reports or records. In fact, the
only subsection of Marsy’s Law that refers to the disclosure of reports or records is
subsection (12), which states that a victim has a “right, upon request, to receive a
copy of any pre-sentence report or plan of disposition, and any other report or record
relevant to the exercise of a victim’s right, except for those portions made
confidential by law[.]” S.D. Const. art. VI, § 29(12) (emphasis added). Even if the
reference in subsection (12) to other reports or records could be deemed applicable
here, which we do not hold, the qualification that follows demonstrates that a victim
has no right to obtain reports or records that are made “confidential by law.”
[¶17.] As noted by the circuit court, multiple statutes exempt investigative
reports from public disclosure. Relevant here, SDCL 1-27-1.5(5) sets forth one of
the categories of records that are not open to inspection or copying by the public.
This provision exempts “[r]ecords developed or received by law enforcement
agencies and other public bodies charged with duties of investigation or
examination of persons . . . if the records constitute a part of the examination,
investigation, intelligence information, citizen complaint or inquiry, [or] informant
identification[.]” Id. Moreover, under SDCL 23-5-11, “confidential criminal justice
information” is “specifically exempt from disclosure pursuant to §§ 1-27-1 to 1-27-1.15, inclusive, and may be withheld by the lawful custodian of the records.”
“Confidential criminal justice information” is defined in SDCL 23-5-10(1) to include
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“criminal investigative information” which is, in turn, defined in part as
“information associated with an individual, group, organization, or event compiled
by a law enforcement agency in the course of conducting an investigation of a crime
or crimes.” SDCL 23-5-10(4).3
[¶18.] This Court has previously noted that records of law enforcement’s
investigation of a death “to determine whether the death was the result of criminal
activity or foul play” constituted “confidential criminal justice information as
defined by statute.” Mercer v. S.D. Att’y Gen. Off., 2015 S.D. 31, ¶ 20, 864 N.W.2d
299, 304 (citing SDCL 1-27-1.5(5) and SDCL 23-5-11 when affirming the denial of a
media representative’s request for access to DCI’s investigative records regarding
the death of a public figure). Mercer did not involve a request for mandamus relief.
Instead, it involved our review of determinations made by the State Office of
Hearing Examiners in an administrative appeal of the Attorney General’s denial of
Mercer’s request for records. When addressing Mercer’s claim that the Attorney
General’s Office exceeded statutory authority by imposing conditions on the
disclosure of the requested records, we recognized that although the records sought
were exempt from public disclosure requirements, the Attorney General’s Office, as
3. Pyle contends the State’s claim that he cannot be deemed a victim because
there was no crime committed is inconsistent with the State’s reliance on
SDCL 23-5-11 and the definition in SDCL 23-5-10 which deems, as
confidential, information associated with an “investigation of a crime.”
However, this phrase logically includes investigations in which law
enforcement is attempting to determine whether a crime was committed.
Moreover, SDCL 1-27-1.5(5), which exempts law enforcement records from
public disclosure, includes investigations of a citizen complaint or inquiry.
This broader phrase would certainly encompass a missing person inquiry.
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custodian of the records, nevertheless has discretion under SDCL 1-27-37 to disclose
them. Id. ¶ 21, 864 N.W.2d at 305.
[¶19.] Based on the above analysis, it is clear that under Marsy’s Law and
the statutes governing access to public records and information that is deemed
confidential, the State had no duty to disclose criminal investigative information,
nor did Pyle have a clear right to access such information. Therefore, the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion when granting the State’s motion to quash the
peremptory writ and denying Pyle’s application for a writ of mandamus.4
[¶20.] Affirmed.
[¶21.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and SALTER, MYREN, and GUSINSKY,
Justices, concur.
4. For the reasons expressed above, we need not address the circuit court’s
additional determination that Pyle had other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedies that he could have pursued.
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