State v. Moorer

[Cite as State v. Moorer, 2026-Ohio-3877.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 116017

v. :

TALLIS C. MOORER, JR., :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 1, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-25-700845-B

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting

Attorney, and Eric Collins, Assistant Prosecuting

Attorney, for appellee.

Elizabeth Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Lauren

Hammersmith, Assistant State Public Defender, for

appellant.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

Tallis C. Moorer, Jr. (“Moorer”) was charged in an 11-count

complaint in juvenile court stemming from events in January 2024, relating to the homicide of Tyrone Hipps, who was fatally shot while seated in the driver’s seat of

a Nissan Sentra at a gas station on East 93rd Street in Cleveland.

The State pursued a mandatory bindover or, in the alternative, a

discretionary bindover. The court held a probable-cause hearing at which the State

introduced a theory that Moorer and two codefendants planned to rob Hipps and

the incident turned fatal.

Andrew Hayduk, a homicide detective for the Cleveland police

department testified that when he arrived at the crime scene, it was “cordoned off

with crime scene tape” and he observed “numerous 9 millimeter shell casings in

the parking lot.” (Tr. 13.) Det. Hayduk successfully retrieved surveillance footage

that was played during the probable-cause hearing. He described the video:

One of the suspects — there’s multiple people running and the victim’s

vehicle kind of coasts forward and hits the front of the gas station. It’s

gonna bounce back close to where it started. . . . There’s two

individuals that run — it’s difficult to see, but it’s in the back left. You

can see a muzzle flash from the suspect in all black that I believe is

[codefendant M.S.] fire into the rear of the victim’s vehicle. . . . So

those two individuals, they run off screen to the left, which I believe is

east, down Marah Avenue as the victim’s vehicle coasts back next to

that gas pump . . . . After striking the building, the victim’s vehicle

moves back in reverse.

(Tr. 16-17.)

Det. Hayduk detailed the process he utilized in identifying Moorer

and his codefendants. In the surveillance footage, Det. Hayduk identified Moorer

as the individual “with [a] black sweatshirt with the yellow lettering on it.” (Tr.

18.) He took still shots from the surveillance footage and sent them to other units within the Cleveland Police Department. Det. Hayduk stated that a detective from

the Gang Impact Unit contacted him because the detective recognized the two

codefendants from a prior arrest in a different matter. Since Det. Hayduk had no

leads on the individual in the black sweatshirt with yellow lettering, he sent still

images of the individual to various media sources, including the police

department’s Facebook page, Channel 19 News, and the Instagram account called

the “Cleveland Remembrance Page.” Det. Hayduk noted that he received

numerous tips “many of them from the Indian River Juvenile Facility,” identifying

Moorer as the individual in the photos. Moorer had been incarcerated at Indian

River for over four years and was released in January 2024, about two to three

weeks prior to the shooting.

Det. Hayduk was questioned about the vehicle that took the suspects

to the gas station. He identified the vehicle as a Chevrolet Equinox registered to

Wakiha Fayne, believed to be Moorer’s aunt and a parent of one of the

codefendants. A search warrant was obtained to search Fayne’s residence for the

vehicle, but Fayne told Det. Hayduk that “she was on her way to the house” and he

suspected that she “deliberately drove a different car to the house in order to hide

the Chevy Equinox.” (Tr. 34.) Fayne and another individual were eventually pulled

over in the Equinox and taken to the homicide unit for questioning. Det. Hayduk

described Fayne as “very evasive” and unforthcoming with any information. (Tr.

35.) A search warrant obtained for Fayne’s phone revealed a text message

indicating that she was in an Uber about an hour prior to the shooting and that she sent a text to one of the codefendants, “I need my f***ing car.” (Tr. 37.) Fayne sent

another message the day after the incident, asking for one of the codefendant’s

phone numbers “because if any got pulled over and because KJ was on live talking

about y’all run up Marah [Avenue] and y’all was in a car at first.” Id. Det. Hayduk

believed that this message was “a reference to them fleeing down Marah [Avenue]

and being in a car earlier, [Fayne’s] car.” Id. According to the detective, when the

vehicle was eventually recovered, Fayne admitted that she had cleaned the interior

of the vehicle after the incident. Consistent with Fayne, Det. Hayduk described

evidence in Fayne’s phone suggesting that the vehicle had been cleaned between

the incident and the police taking custody of the vehicle.

Det. Hayduk also discussed the processing of the other vehicle in this

matter — the Nissan Sentra in which the victim was shot. Photos introduced into

evidence showed the vehicle with numerous bullet defects in various areas of the

vehicle, two of which were in the rear of the front driver’s seat, where Hipps had

been shot and corresponded to wounds on Hipps’s body on his right chest and right

wrist. A black bag of marijuana was retrieved from the front passenger seat.

Also recovered was the victim’s cellphone, revealing that Hipps was

communicating through FaceTime with Moorer approximately five minutes before

the shooting. Det. Hayduk was able to take a screenshot of that conversation. He

compared the background of the screenshot to a photo of the interior of the

Chevrolet Equinox and felt that it was “very likely” that Moorer was in that vehicle

when he spoke to Hipps. (Tr. 54.) The two side-by-side photos were introduced into evidence. Det. Hayduk stated that the iCloud account used to FaceTime Hipps

belonged to Moorer’s older brother who had been incarcerated at the time of the

shooting.

Det. Hayduk also discussed his use of the codefendants’ social media

accounts to identify Moorer. He also saw on Fayne’s Instagram account that she

responded to a post about the Northern Ohio Violent Fugitive Task Force arresting

a 16-year-old for the fatal shooting of Hipps and a post about an active standoff on

“130th and Forest.” Det. Hayduk noticed that an Instagram account associated

with Fayne commented “Tallis” on these posts.

While in custody, Moorer voluntarily submitted to a DNA swab. The

sample was compared against DNA from a firearm that was discovered in a crawl

space next to the room where Moorer was arrested. Det. Hayduk believed the

recovered firearm could be the murder weapon. DNA from the recovered firearm

matched Tallis’s DNA, but Det. Hayduk had not received any ballistic results from

the evidence collected. On cross-examination, Det. Hayduk admitted that the two

codefendants and Moorer ran in opposite directions, with Moorer running in the

opposite direction just prior to two muzzle flashes near the codefendants.

At the close of the State’s case, the court found probable cause to

believe that Moorer committed the offenses charged and bound the matter over to

the general division.

In December 2025, Moorer agreed to plead guilty to one count of

involuntary manslaughter and felonious assault, each with a three-year firearm specification. The parties offered a jointly recommended sentencing range of 15 to

20 years, agreeing that consecutive sentences would be imposed to achieve this

range. On amended Count 1, the trial court ordered Moorer to serve the three-year

firearm specification prior to and consecutive to six years on the base offense of

involuntary manslaughter, for a total of nine years. On Count 10, the trial court

ordered Moorer to serve the three-year firearm specification prior to and

consecutive to six years on the base offense of felonious assault, for a total of nine

years. The trial court ordered the two counts to be served consecutively for an

aggregate total of 18 years, and after applying the Reagan Tokes Law, the

maximum term was a potential 21 years.

Moorer appeals and assigns the following errors for our review:

I. The juvenile court erred when it transferred Moorer’s case to

the adult court when its probable cause finding lacked sufficient

evidentiary support.

II. The trial court erred when it failed to merge for sentencing

offenses that had a similar import, arose from the same

conduct, and were not committed separate or with a separate

animus.

III. Moorer was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

I. Juvenile Court Probable-Cause Determination

In his first assignment of error, Moorer contests the sufficiency of

the State’s probable-cause evidence that led to his case being bound over to the

general division. The State generally argues that by pleading guilty, Moorer has

waived “all nonjurisdictional defects in prior stages of the proceedings,” including

his ability to contest the bindover proceeding. This court has repeatedly rejected the State’s broad and bright-line conclusion. See State v. Pickens, 2024-Ohio-951,

¶ 14 (8th Dist.), and In re T.S., 2024-Ohio-4898, ¶ 69 (8th Dist.) (both recognizing

precedent from this court that found a defendant could challenge the amenability

determination on appeal despite pleading guilty).1

At the outset, we note that whether a defendant has waived their

probable-cause challenge by pleading guilty has not been addressed by the Ohio

Supreme Court. In State v. Turner, 2026-Ohio-1996, ¶ 12, the Court accepted the

case under three propositions of law, including whether “[i]n juvenile bindover

cases, guilty pleas in criminal court waive claims arising out of the underlying

bindover hearing because a grand jury determination superseded the juvenile

court’s probable cause finding.” Because the Turner Court found merit to the

State’s first proposition of law regarding subject-matter jurisdiction, it did not

decide whether a defendant waives the “right to challenge the adult court’s

jurisdiction over [the] case by entering guilty pleas in that court.” Turner at ¶ 38.

The Ohio Supreme Court also had the opportunity to address this

issue when it accepted for review the Seventh District’s decision, State v. Zarlengo,

2021-Ohio-4631 (7th Dist.). See 04/27/2022 Case Announcements, 2022-Ohio1284, State v. Zarlengo, No. 2022-0106. In Zarlengo, the Seventh District held

1At the time of release of this opinion, the issue of whether a defendant by pleading

guilty waives any challenge to the amenability determination in a bindover proceeding is currently pending in the Ohio Supreme Court. See 10/24/2024 Case Announcements #3, 2024-Ohio-4777, State v. D.T., No. 2024-1276, and 01/28/2025 Case Announcements, 2025-Ohio-481, State v. T.S., No. 2024-1647.

that “a defendant who pleads guilty in the general division of the common pleas

court waives the ability to contest the sufficiency and weight of the evidence

presented at the probable cause hearing in the juvenile court.” Id. at ¶ 46.

The Ohio Supreme Court accepted the discretionary appeal on three

propositions of law, with the first proposition of law stating: “In juvenile bindover

cases, guilty pleas in criminal court do not waive on direct appeal constitutional

claims arising out of the underlying bindover hearings in the juvenile court.”

Zarlengo, No. 2022-0106. The appeal, however, was voluntarily dismissed before

the Ohio Supreme Court could render a decision on this issue. Id.

This court, however, has recently held that a guilty plea waives a

defendant’s right to challenge the probable-cause determination made in a

bindover proceeding. Pickens, 2024-Ohio-951 (8th Dist.); T.S., 2024-Ohio-4898

(8th Dist.); State v. Griffin, 2026-Ohio-925 (8th Dist.). But see State v. Mays,

2014-Ohio-3815 (8th Dist.) (addressing a probable-cause challenge following a

guilty plea). Accordingly, based on this court’s recent precedent Moorer has

arguably waived his challenge on appeal.

Even if Moorer did not waive his ability to challenge the probablecause determination by pleading guilty, we would not find any merit to Moorer’s

assignment of error.

R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i) provides the framework for determining

whether a case is subject to a mandatory bindover.

After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent

child for committing an act that would be aggravated murder . . . if

committed by an adult, the juvenile court at a hearing shall transfer

the case if . . . [t]he child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the

time of the act charged and there is probable cause to believe that the

child committed the act charged.

To establish probable cause in a bindover proceeding, the State must

present credible evidence supporting each element of the alleged offenses. State

v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 93 (2001). To find probable cause, the court must

find “credible evidence that ‘raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt’” but does

not require evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re D.M., 2014-Ohio3628, ¶ 18, quoting Iacona at id. In mandatory-bindover proceedings, the court is

considered a gatekeeper rather than an ultimate trier of fact because it is “charged

with evaluating whether sufficient credible evidence exists to warrant going

forward with a prosecution on a charge that the legislature has determined triggers

a mandatory transfer of jurisdiction to adult court.” In re A.J.S., 2008-Ohio-5307,

¶ 46. We must defer to the juvenile court’s “determinations regarding witness

credibility, but review de novo the legal conclusion whether the [S]tate presented

sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the juvenile

committed the acts charged.” Id. at ¶ 51.

Here, the State was required to present sufficient evidence that

Moorer caused “the death of another as a proximate result of the offender’s

committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the

first or second degree . . . .” R.C. 2903.02(B). In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence review, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond” a mere suspicion of guilt. State v.

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 274 (1991).

Moorer specifically contests the State’s theory that he and his

codefendants had planned to rob Hipps and asks us to consider other evidence in

the record suggesting that he was not privy to a plan to rob or shoot Hipps. Moorer

argues that evidence demonstrating that he spoke to the victim on FaceTime

approximately five minutes before the murder does not demonstrate that he and

his codefendants were planning a robbery. He also argues that there is no evidence

suggesting that the meetup with Hipps was for a marijuana purchase, and no

evidence suggesting that anything was stolen from the victim prior to the shooting.

We disagree.

As the State argued in its responsive brief, evidence required to

establish probable cause for bindover purposes need not rise to the level of “beyond

a reasonable doubt” as is required to sustain an actual conviction. The State

presented video evidence demonstrating that Moorer was in the vehicle with the

alleged suspects. The video then shows all three suspects, including Moorer,

entering the store and leaving quickly without making a purchase. Surveillance

footage from the gas station shows Moorer running away from the passenger side

of Hipps’s vehicle. When the victim’s vehicle was searched, shell casings were

recovered from the passenger side of the vehicle. The State also introduced cell phone records indicating that Moorer had been speaking to Hipps via FaceTime

just moments before the murder, and Det. Hayduk identified an item in Moorer’s

hands as he is running from the scene as a cell phone. The State also presented

physical evidence suggesting that the 14 shell casings collected from the parking

lot were from two different guns, and a gun was found near Moorer at the time of

his arrest.

The aforementioned evidence, especially when considered together

and viewed in the totality of the circumstances, raises more than a mere suspicion

of guilt that Moorer committed the acts charged that were considered during the

bindover proceeding. Accordingly, we find that the State presented sufficient

evidence to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the

acts charged. Regardless of whether the issue was waived or is reviewed on its

merits, the trial court did not err, and Moorer’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

II. Allied Offenses

In his second assignment of error, Moorer argues that the trial court

should have merged his involuntary-manslaughter and felonious-assault charges

for sentencing because they are allied offenses of similar import. The State

contends that Moorer’s sentence is not reviewable because it was a jointly

recommended sentence, imposed by the court, and authorized by law. According

to the State, the agreed-upon sentence included consecutive sentences, which implicitly included an agreement that the multiple offenses were separate under

R.C. 2941.25.

R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) precludes appellate review of a sentence that is

jointly recommended by the parties, imposed by the court, and authorized by law.

In State v. Underwood, 2010-Ohio-1, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a

sentence is imposed for multiple convictions on offenses that are allied offenses of

similar import in violation of R.C. 2941.25(A), R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) does not bar

appellate review of that sentence even though it was jointly recommended by the

parties and imposed by the court.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.

In this case, it is undisputed that the parties jointly recommended a

sentencing range of 15 to 20 years. The agreement, however, was silent on whether

the offenses were allied, and thus subject to merger at sentencing. Despite this

silence, Moorer agreed to consecutive sentences on a two-count guilty plea, both

of which included a three-year firearm specification.

In State v. Word, 2019-Ohio-795 (8th Dist.), this court held that “a

defendant cannot agree to consecutively serve sentences without agreeing that the

court has the authority to impose individual sentences on each count.” Id. at ¶ 9,

citing State v. Lee, 2018-Ohio-1839, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). “When an offender agrees to

consecutively serve separate sentences on multiple offenses, such an agreement

constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge the sentences under R.C. 2941.25.” Id.,

citing Lee at ¶ 9.

Based on the sentencing range Moorer agreed to, the sentence was

an impossibility unless the counts were run consecutively, and thus, it is

reasonable to say that Moorer’s agreement implicitly conceded that these were not

allied offenses of similar import. At no point during the plea colloquy did Moorer

or his counsel express any misunderstanding about consecutive sentences or the

sentencing range. In fact, Moorer, through counsel, agreed with this

interpretation, acknowledging at multiple points that he was not only agreeing to

consecutive sentences, but agreeing to a specific range of prison time.

THE COURT: Just so the record is clear, that it is your desire, in order

to accomplish the plea here today, that consecutive sentences are

going to be required?

[MOORER’S COUNSEL]: That’s our understanding. That’s correct.

(Tr. 41.)

By agreeing to consecutive sentences, Moorer implicitly agreed that

the offenses were not allied. Accordingly, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), we lack

jurisdiction to review Moorer’s sentence on appeal because Moorer’s sentence was

jointly recommended, imposed by the court, and authorized by law.2 His second

assignment of error is overruled and that portion of the appeal is dismissed.

2 Even if we concluded that appellate review was permitted, we would nonetheless

find that Moorer waived his right to challenge whether the offenses were allied. See In re T.B., 2021-Ohio-2104 (8th Dist.) (finding the jointly recommended sentence reviewable, but the allied-offense issue waived because the parties agreed that none of the offenses were allied).

III. Effective Assistance of Counsel

Moorer’s final assignment of error suggests that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel “failed to object to several errors

in both the juvenile and the adult court — failures which prejudiced [him].”

Specifically, he claims that his counsel’s failure to object to the alleged errors in his

first and second assignments of error “prejudiced him because he is now serving a

sentence for both offenses instead of just one.”

For us to conclude that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance,

the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the failure to object may

constitute sound trial strategy. State v. Mohamed, 2017-Ohio-7468, ¶ 18. The

defendant first must show that counsel’s performance was deficient or falls below

an objective standard of reasonable representation. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). Next, the defendant must prove prejudice, that is,

show that there is a reasonable probability that counsel’s deficient performance

affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id. at 694.

Based on our disposition of the first two assignments of error, we

cannot say that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness or that Moorer demonstrated prejudice. Notwithstanding any

determination regarding waiver of the probable-cause determination, we found

that the State presented sufficient evidence upon which the trial court based its

decision to bind the matter over to the general division. Accordingly, an objection

would not have changed the outcome.

In resolving the second assigned error, we found that the assigned

error was unreviewable because Moorer’s plea agreement included a jointly

recommended sentence that was imposed by the court and authorized by law.

Moorer’s agreement to consecutive sentences was an implicit agreement that the

offenses did not merge for sentencing. Accordingly, Moorer cannot demonstrate

prejudice. His third assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed in part; dismissed in part.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

convictions having been affirmed in part, and dismissed in part, any bail pending

appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and

DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR