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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 24-CO-0432
OMAR A. EUCEDA, APPELLANT,
V.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(2004-FEL-003044)
(Danya A. Dayson, Judge)
(Submitted May 5, 2026 Decided October 1, 2026)
Justin A. Okezie was on the brief for appellant.
Jeanine Ferris Pirro, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb and Anne Y. Park, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.
Before BECKWITH, EASTERLY, and SHANKER, Associate Judges.
SHANKER, Associate Judge: In 2014, appellant Omar A. Euceda was convicted
following a guilty plea of second-degree murder and attempted robbery in
connection with his 2003 failed robbery and fatal shooting of a drug dealer in
Washington, D.C., when he was twenty-three years old. The trial court sentenced
2
Mr. Euceda to twenty-four years of imprisonment to be followed by five years of
supervised release.
In 2022, Mr. Euceda moved for a sentence reduction under the Incarceration
Reduction Amendment Act, or IRAA. D.C. Code § 24-403.03. After a hearing and
a supplemental filing by Mr. Euceda, the trial court denied Mr. Euceda’s motion.
Mr. Euceda now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in three respects:
(1) failing to find that his “age at the time of the offense” weighed in his favor under
IRAA factor one; (2) failing to consider under factor three that few prison programs
were available to him because he speaks very little English; and (3) failing to
properly weigh his impending deportation when determining whether he would be a
danger if released. With respect to the first two claims, we discern no reversible
error, although we take this opportunity to set forth some clarifying guidance
regarding IRAA factors one and three. With respect to the third claim, Mr. Euceda
forfeited it in the trial court, and we see no plain error by the trial court. We therefore
affirm the denial of Mr. Euceda’s IRAA motion.
3
I. Background
A. The Attempted Robbery and Murder
The proffer of facts submitted in connection with the parties’ plea agreement
states:
On November 9, 2003, at approximately 9:21 p.m.,
Deandre Abbott, the surviving victim, and his cousin,
Walter Kirkland, the decedent, were walking in the 3200
block of 11th Street, NW, when they were approached by
defendant, Omar Euceda, and Ivan Gallo. Earlier that
evening, defendant Euceda and his friend, Ivan Gallo, had
left Gallo’s home and planned to rob drug dealers. When
they reached the 3200 block of 11th Street, NW, . . . they
engaged in conversation with Mr. Abbott and Mr.
Kirkland[ ] about the purchase of marijuana. Once Mr.
Kirkland showed the marijuana that they had, fearing that
they were going to be robbed, Mr. Abbott[ ] ran away.
However, Omar Euceda pulled a pistol and fired several
times, striking Mr. Kirkland once in the chest, and striking
his friend Gallo[ ] twice in the stomach.
After Mr. Kirkland collapsed to the sidewalk, both
defendant Euceda and Mr. Gallo ran from the scene. Mr.
Gallo flagged down an ambulance, and was taken to
Howard University Hospital. Paramedics transported
Walter Kirkland to George Washington University
Hospital, where he was pronounced dead. When
processing the crime scene, evidence technicians
recovered a .38 caliber pistol from the area through which
the defendant was seen running. On November 10, 2003,
after an autopsy was performed on Mr. Kirkland, Dr.
Gertrude Juste of the Chief Medical Examiner of the
District of Columbia[ ] concluded that the cause of death
4
was a gunshot wound to the torso which perforated his
lungs and aorta.
On November 10, 2003, Ivan Gallo, when shown a
confirmation photo, positively identified Omar Euceda as
the person who shot the decedent and Mr. Gallo. On
November 13, 2003, Deandre Abbott, once shown a photo
array, positively identified Omar Euceda as one of the two
men who approached him and the decedent on the night of
the murder. On May 4, 2004, the bullet recovered during
that autopsy[ ] was determined by Lyndon Watkins,
firearms and tool-mark specialist, to have been fired from
the pistol recovered by evidence technicians.
After pleading guilty to second-degree murder and attempted robbery, Mr.
Euceda was sentenced to twenty-four years of imprisonment to be followed by five
years of supervised release. 1
B. Mr. Euceda’s IRAA Motion, the Hearing, and
Mr. Euceda’s Supplemental Motion
After serving over seventeen years of his sentence, Mr. Euceda moved for a
sentence reduction under the IRAA. See D.C. Code § 24-403.03. An inmate is
1
Mr. Euceda was initially convicted in 2006 following a jury trial of multiple offenses, including first-degree felony murder while armed, in connection with the attempted robbery and fatal shooting. Euceda v. United States, 66 A.3d 994, 998 (D.C. 2013). In 2013, this court reversed all but one of the convictions and remanded for a new trial because during jury deliberations a courtroom clerk received and responded to a jury note without alerting anyone, including Mr. Euceda or his counsel. Id. at 997-98. On remand, Mr. Euceda pled guilty to second-degree murder and attempted robbery.
5
eligible for IRAA relief if they (1) committed the offense(s) underlying their
conviction(s) before their twenty-fifth birthday and (2) have served at least fifteen
years in prison. Id. § 24-403.03(a). The parties agreed that Mr. Euceda, who was
twenty-three years old at the time of the offenses and had served more than the
minimum time in prison when he filed his motion, is eligible for IRAA relief.
A court must reduce an eligible movant’s term of incarceration under the
IRAA if (1) they are “not a danger to the safety of any person or the community”
and (2) the “interests of justice warrant a sentence modification.” D.C. Code
§ 24-403.03(a)(2). To determine whether a movant has satisfied these conditions,
the IRAA requires courts to consider ten specific factors and an eleventh catch-all
factor:
(1) The defendant’s age at the time of the offense;
(2) The history and characteristics of the defendant;
(3) Whether the defendant has substantially complied with
the rules of the institution to which the defendant has been
confined, and whether the defendant has completed any
educational, vocational, or other program, where
available;
(4) Any report or recommendation received from the
United States Attorney;
(5) Whether the defendant has demonstrated maturity,
rehabilitation, and a fitness to reenter society sufficient to
justify a sentence reduction;
6
(6) Any statement, provided orally or in writing, provided
pursuant to § 23-1904 or 18 U.S.C. § 3771 by a victim of
the offense for which the defendant is imprisoned, or by a
family member of the victim if the victim is deceased;
(7) Any reports of physical, mental, or psychiatric
examinations of the defendant conducted by licensed
health care professionals;
(8) The defendant’s family and community circumstances
at the time of the offense, including any history of abuse,
trauma, or involvement in the child welfare system;
(9) The extent of the defendant’s role in the offense and
whether and to what extent another person was involved
in the offense;
(10) The diminished culpability of juveniles and persons
under age 25, as compared to that of older adults, and the
hallmark features of youth, including immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences, which counsel against sentencing them to
lengthy terms in prison, despite the brutality or
cold-blooded nature of any particular crime, and the
defendant’s personal circumstances that support an aging
out of crime; and
(11) Any other information the court deems relevant to its
decision.
Id. § 24-403.03(c).
1. The Initial Motion and Opposition
In his motion for IRAA relief, Mr. Euceda argued that most of the statutory
factors weighed in favor of a sentence modification, that he was no longer dangerous,
7
and that the interests of justice supported his immediate release based on a reduced
sentence of time served.
Under factor one, Mr. Euceda asserted that his brain had not fully developed
and was affected by trauma when he committed the offenses at age twenty-three.
With respect to the second and eighth factors, Mr. Euceda emphasized his
difficult upbringing in his native El Salvador, where his mother abused him, he
witnessed violence during the country’s civil war, and a gang kidnapped him. He
also referred to violence and instability he faced after moving to the United States.
Regarding the third and fifth factors, Mr. Euceda argued that his record
demonstrated substantial compliance with prison rules and his completion of
educational and developmental programs, as well as his maturity, rehabilitation, and
fitness to reenter society. Mr. Euceda stressed that none of his disciplinary
infractions while in custody involved violence or weapons. He also argued that he
had “voluntarily completed and participated in numerous educational and
developmental programs” but that he was “unable to participate in many educational
and other [Bureau of Prisons (BOP)] programs that were conducted solely in
English.” Mr. Euceda asserted that he was remorseful, empathetic, and mature, and
he emphasized that the BOP had determined that he posed a “low” risk of recidivism.
8
Under factor seven, Mr. Euceda pointed to a mitigation report prepared by an
attorney.
With respect to factors nine and ten, Mr. Euceda noted that he acted with Mr.
Gallo and that there was “some dispute” regarding whether the victims had weapons
and who started the altercation, but he asserted that nonetheless he “ultimately
accepted responsibility for shooting Mr. Kirkland.” Mr. Euceda also observed that
the offenses occurred when he was “still a young adult” and that he had matured, as
demonstrated by his lack of violent infractions while incarcerated.
Finally, in a discussion of his reentry plan, Mr. Euceda pointed out that, due
to a deportation order and detainer lodged by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), he will “almost certainly return directly to El Salvador upon
release from the BOP.” He added that it was his counsel’s understanding that he
would be “immediately transferred to the custody of ICE if released from the BOP,”
and, while “[i]t is unclear exactly how quickly immigration proceedings may occur,”
“it is almost guaranteed that Mr. Euceda would remain in ICE detention pending the
outcome of those proceedings.”
Overall, Mr. Euceda argued that, based on his development and maturity, his
lack of violent infractions in prison, BOP’s determination that he posed a low risk
of recidivism, and his demonstrated support network, he would not pose a danger to
9
the safety of any person or the community. He further asserted that the interests of
justice warrant a sentence modification because he accepted responsibility, he
suffered trauma growing up, his culpability at the time of the offenses was
diminished, and he had matured and been rehabilitated.
In opposing Mr. Euceda’s motion, the government argued, among other
things, that Mr. Euceda had committed sixteen disciplinary infractions while in
custody, including an infraction just weeks before he filed his motion. The
government noted that the offenses consisted of four 100-level infractions (one (the
recent infraction) for possessing a hazardous tool and three for use and possession
of drugs or alcohol); six 200-level infractions (one for stealing, one for “Phone
Abuse-Disrupt Monitoring,” and four for possessing intoxicants); and six 300-level
infractions (two for possessing an unauthorized item, two for refusing orders, and
two for being absent from an assignment). 2 The government also argued that Mr.
Euceda had participated in minimal educational programming.
In addition, the government noted that Mr. Kirkland’s mother opposed Mr.
Euceda’s release, that Mr. Euceda acted alone in shooting Mr. Kirkland and also shot
Mr. Gallo, and that Mr. Euceda had not demonstrated that he had aged out of crime.
2
The level of the offense refers to its severity; offenses range from the 100s level, the most severe, to the 400s level, the least severe. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3 (Table 1).
10
Finally, with respect to the immigration issue, the government observed that Mr.
Euceda’s deportation was only “possible” and that, because removal was uncertain,
“[t]he lack of firm prospects for long-term housing, employment, and detailed
community support weigh[ed] against immediate release.”
2. The Hearing
At a hearing, Mr. Euceda’s counsel largely argued the points made in his
IRAA motion and Mr. Euceda expressed remorse and said that he was ready to be
reintegrated into society. The government rested on its opposition and did not
present new evidence or argument.
The bulk of the hearing was devoted to Mr. Euceda’s immigration status. His
counsel observed that there was a “question as to whether he would even remain in
the United States if he were to be released” and that, as a result of an ICE detainer,
“if Mr. Euceda were to be released from BOP custody, he would at least initially be
transferred to ICE custody in order to have further [immigration] proceedings.”
Counsel stated that she did not know whether a final deportation order against Mr.
Euceda had been issued and therefore she could not say that deportation would be
“automatic,” but, in light of the nature his crimes, she had “no expectation that he
will not be deported, meaning that [she] believe[d] that he would return to El
Salvador.”
11
Counsel stated, however, that it was “not at all” Mr. Euceda’s position that
“just because . . . he may not reside in the country . . . he should just be released.”
Rather, Mr. Euceda was raising deportation because he was of the view that the
majority of the IRAA factors supported release and thus the court needed to think
about “what happens next” in terms of release conditions. Counsel reiterated that the
point was that “it’s a little bit more difficult to ask for specific conditions or specific
placements, just given this interim circumstance that he will have to work through
in the immigration system.” The trial court stated that it understood that Mr. Euceda
was not arguing that because he was likely to be deported, the court did not “have to
worry about dangerousness.”
The trial court noted that the case presented a “challenge” because it was
“difficult to assess the validity of a release plan in El Salvador.” The court made
clear that it was not suggesting that “placement out of a country” is a “per se bar” to
IRAA relief, but it observed that it did not “know how to do supervision out of state.”
Defense counsel noted that she did not think that the court would have jurisdiction
to impose any conditions of release if Mr. Euceda were released to another country,
and the court agreed that “there are issues.”
Defense counsel then offered to provide additional briefing on these questions
as well as additional information on Mr. Euceda’s immigration status.
12
3. The Supplemental Motion
In his supplemental filing, Mr. Euceda stated that upon his release he would
“be immediately transferred to the custody of ICE.” He added that he was not certain
but it was likely that he would be detained by ICE through his deportation
proceedings before a final determination and then deported within two weeks. He
was quite certain that he would not be permitted to remain in the United States, and
he stated that in El Salvador he would live with his wife, mother, and stepfather and
work in the fields and possibly do electrical, painting, and carpentry work. Mr.
Euceda noted that the trial court would not have jurisdiction to impose any
conditions of release on him if he were in El Salvador.
Mr. Euceda also set forth a brief reentry plan if he were “somehow” permitted
to remain in the United States, and he noted that if that were the case, the court could
impose release conditions. 3
3
In addition to these immigration issues, Mr. Euceda provided an explanation for the recent 100-level disciplinary infraction, relied upon by the government in its opposition to his IRAA motion, involving his possession of a hazardous tool. He stated that “multiple cell phones [were] found in a light fixture in a common area of his unit and that he never possessed or used them.”
13
C. The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court denied Mr. Euceda’s motion for a sentence reduction, first
setting forth at some length the scientific research and Supreme Court jurisprudence
related to the culpability of young individuals, then explaining its consideration of
each of the statutory factors, and finally concluding that Mr. Euceda had established
neither his nondangerousness nor that the interests of justice supported a sentence
reduction. We address only those factors relevant to the issues on appeal.
With respect to factor one, the court noted simply that Mr. Euceda was twentythree years old when he committed the offenses.
Under factor three, the court referred to Mr. Euceda’s sixteen disciplinary
infractions; it acknowledged that none involved violence or weapons, but it observed
that “the number and timing of the disciplinary actions remain probative of Mr.
Euceda’s ability to carry his burden under [the IRAA].” The court also
acknowledged Mr. Euceda’s BOP programming and work assignments and
expressly recognized that “that Mr. Euceda’s ability to participate in [educational or
vocational] programs has been limited, in part, by BOP’s lack of available
programming in Spanish.” It stated, however, that the government had identified a
need for programming in multiple areas which Mr. Euceda had failed to complete or
14
in which he had refused to participate. The court also recognized that BOP had
determined that Mr. Euceda posed a low risk of recidivism.
Under factor five, the court stated that “[w]hile Mr. Euceda has accepted
responsibility for his role in Mr. Kirkland’s death, the [c]ourt finds that his recent
disciplinary actions . . . are inconsistent with a finding of rehabilitation,” and that
“Mr. Euceda’s lack of any significant programming, including any formal vocational
training or finishing his GED, will make it difficult for Mr. Euceda to find
employment and otherwise successfully transition upon release.”
The trial court credited Mr. Euceda’s representations about the challenges of
his upbringing and weighed factor eight in his favor. It also recognized that factor
ten weighed in favor of relief.
With respect to the immigration issue, the trial court found that “it is extremely
unlikely” that Mr. Euceda will not be deported, but it stated that, “in assessing fitness
to reenter society,” it did not consider “the fact that Mr. Euceda will not be residing
in this jurisdiction to be particularly relevant to its analysis.”
The trial court concluded that, notwithstanding “Mr. Euceda’s extremely
difficult background, his acceptance of responsibility after remand, his BOP risk
assessment[,] and his lack of a criminal history,” all of which “militate in favor of
15
granting the [m]otion,” Mr. Euceda had “not carried his burden to prove that he
would no longer pose a danger to the community if released.” The court pointed
primarily to Mr. Euceda’s continuing disciplinary history, which “demonstrate[s]
that Mr. Euceda has not yet reached the level of maturity and rehabilitation which
would allow him to appropriately weigh the consequences of his actions and avoid
risky behavior in light of those risks and consequences.” In this regard, although the
court had stated that Mr. Euceda’s likely deportation was not particularly relevant to
its analysis, it noted that, “as a practical matter, the [c]ourt would have very little to
no ability to supervise Mr. Euceda’s release, if he were—as seems likely—
deported.” The trial court also referred to Mr. Euceda’s minimal “participation in
programs designed to address rehabilitation and re-entry” while in custody. The
court commented that it is “extremely unfortunate that the BOP does not offer
rehabilitative service in Spanish or at the very least extend opportunities that would
facilitate non-English speakers’ greater access to those services which would reduce
the likelihood of reoffending,” but it observed that “Mr. Euceda did not take
advantage of some of [the] limited opportunities which he did have” and that “Mr.
Euceda’s lack of programming, regardless of the cause of it, weighs against a finding
that he has carried his burden to demonstrate a lack of dangerousness.”
Finally, with respect to the interests of justice, the trial court stated:
“Notwithstanding the challenges that he faced, and his lack of violent disciplinary
16
history in BOP, Mr. Euceda’s lack of participation in programs to aid in
rehabilitation[;] his lack of judgment in weighing the risks, benefits[,] and
consequences of behaviors as demonstrated by his disciplinary record[;] and the lack
of this [c]ourt’s ability to ensure that he receives the services and supervision to
support his re-entry into whichever community to which he is released lead this
[c]ourt to conclude that [ ] Mr. Euceda’s release at this time will not serve the
interests of justice.”
This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
We review the denial of an IRAA motion for abuse of discretion. Davidson v.
United States, 349 A.3d 709, 714 (D.C. 2026). In doing so, we consider “whether
the decision maker failed to consider a relevant factor, whether the decision maker
relied upon an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support
the conclusion.” Id. at 714-15 (quoting Doe v. United States, 333 A.3d 893, 898
(D.C. 2025)) (citation modified). It is the movant’s burden to establish that he is “not
a danger to the safety of any person or the community and that the interests of justice
warrant a sentence modification.” Id. at 715 (quoting D.C. Code § 24-403.03(a)).
17
Mr. Euceda argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) failing to
expressly weigh in his favor his age at the time of the offenses under factor one;
(2) failing to adequately consider under factor three that a number of BOP programs
were not available to him due to his limited proficiency with English; and (3) failing
to weigh in his favor his likely deportation when determining whether he would be
a danger to the safety of any person or the community if released. As to the first two
claims, considering the trial court’s order in its entirety, we see no reversible error,
but we take this opportunity to clarify certain matters related to factors one and three.
Mr. Euceda waived his third claim of error so we do not address it.
A. Factor One: The Defendant’s Age at the Time of the Offense
The IRAA directs trial courts to “consider” “[t]he defendant’s age at the time
of the offense.” D.C. Code § 24-403.03(c)(1). In addressing this first factor, the trial
court said only that “Mr. Euceda was 23 years old at the time of the offense.” Mr.
Euceda argues that the court “made no finding regarding factor one and therefore
did not find that this factor weighed in [his] favor despite the overwhelming evidence
(including scientific evidence) that it did.” In response, the government points to the
trial court’s extensive discussion, outside of its specific reference to factor one, of
the diminished culpability of individuals under twenty-five, and, relying on Long v.
United States, 312 A.3d 1247, 1271 (D.C. 2024), it argues that, to the extent Mr.
18
Euceda’s argument is that the trial court should have given factor one more weight,
that is not a basis for reversal.
We agree with Mr. Euceda that IRAA factor one requires the trial court to
“consider” the defendant’s age at the time of the offense as part of the factors
informing a determination whether to reduce a term of imprisonment of an eligible
movant, D.C. Code § 24-403.03(c)(1), and a mere reference to that age in the
discussion of factor one is not sufficient. 4
In the context of the statute, with multiple factors informing an ultimate
determination, if “consideration” means anything, it must mean consideration of
how age supports relief. Moreover, the contrary view—that factor one is simply a
box to be checked—would render the factor redundant. An eligible defendant by
definition committed their offense before they were twenty-five. Id. § 24-403.03(a).
If a defendant was not under twenty-five when they committed the offense, the
IRAA analysis would not reach subsection (c). See Long, 312 A.3d at 1262 (“If a
4
We have seen a number of trial court IRAA orders that address factor one with only a reference to the defendant’s age at the time of the offense. See, e.g., Doe, 333 A.3d at 900 (“Pursuant to factor one, the court noted that Mr. Doe was sixteen years old when he committed the offenses.”); Long, 312 A.3d at 1267 (“As to the first Section 24-403.03(c) factor, the trial court found that Mr. Long was eighteen years old at the time of the offense.”); Bishop v. United States, 310 A.3d 629, 637 (D.C. 2024) (“As to the first factor—the defendant’s age at the time of the offense— the trial court noted that Mr. Bishop was nineteen when he committed the underlying offenses.”). Those cases did not involve a claim of error on that basis.
19
movant satisfies these eligibility criteria [in subsection (a)(1)], a court moves to the
merits criteria set forth in subsection (a)(2),” including consideration of the factors
in subsection (c).). It therefore makes little sense to read factor one as directing trial
courts to simply state (typically, restate) the defendant’s age at the time of the offense
without further “consider[ation]” of how that age bears on whether to grant relief.
Such a reading “would violate ‘one of the most basic interpretive canons that a
statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part
will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’” Ruffin v. United States,
76 A.3d 845, 855 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314
(2009)); see Williams v. United States, 345 A.3d 570, 581 (D.C. 2025).
The question, then, is what the consideration contemplated by the statute
entails. It is clear from the IRAA and its legislative history that the fact that a
defendant was under twenty-five at the time of the offense should always weigh in
favor of relief. We see no room in the statute, the policies underlying it, or the
legislative history for a trial court to determine that a defendant’s age at the time of
the offense—again, necessarily under twenty-five—should weigh against a movant.
See Bishop v. United States, 310 A.3d 629, 645 (D.C. 2024) (stating that “one of the
central purposes of the IRAA” is “to provide sentencing relief to a class of
incarcerated individuals who committed crimes at a time when, by definition, their
neurological development was incomplete”). There can be no eligible IRAA movant
20
whose age at the time of the offense does not demonstrate at least some level of
diminished culpability. Cf. Williams, 345 A.3d at 582 (“As a matter of statutory
construction, it would be odd to deem an individual eligible for [Youth
Rehabilitation Act (YRA)] treatment based on their age but then to weigh their age
negatively in conducting the Section 24-903(c)(2) analysis.”).
It does not follow, however, that the weight the trial court gives to the
defendant’s age at the time of the offense cannot vary. While the IRAA contemplates
that all individuals under twenty-five have underdeveloped frontal lobes and thus
diminished culpability, it does not suggest that trial courts must treat sixteen-yearolds and twenty-four-year-olds identically. To the contrary, the statute calls for
“consider[ation]” of the defendant’s age at the time of the offense as part of the
individualized determination of dangerousness and the interests of justice. See Rice
v. United States, 362 A.3d 471, 480 (D.C. 2026) (“We have clarified that a court
must make an individualized assessment of a movant’s application under the IRAA,
relying on the eleven factors for source material.” (citation modified)); Bishop, 310
A.3d at 636 (“Despite its broadly applicable scientific basis, the IRAA’s focus is
‘individualized’ and a court must take into account the idiosyncratic characteristics
of the movant, both at the time he or she committed the offense and at the time of
the motion.”).
21
The legislative history supports this view of age as a fluid concept. While the
Council certainly expressed its view that the culpability of all individuals under
twenty-five is diminished, it recognized that the age of a particular movant at the
time of the offense can matter. See Comm. on the Judiciary and Pub. Safety, Rep.
on B23-0127, the “Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Amendment Act of 2020”
(Nov. 23, 2020) (“2020 Committee Report”) at 15 (citing “[d]evelopmental
research” to explain its decision to make young adults as well as juveniles eligible
for IRAA relief, but not older adults: “[a]lthough young adults are more cognitively
developed than youth, compared to older adults, they are more impulsive, less
emotionally mature, and less cognizant of the consequences of their actions”
(quoting Emily Morgan and Katy Albis, Using What We Know About Young Adults
to Inform State Justice System Policies, Council of State Governments (Sept. 14,
2017)); id. (“Recent scientific work suggests that the human brain continues to
develop well into the 20s, particularly in the prefrontal cortex region, which
regulates impulse control and reasoning.”). In light of the Council’s recognition that
teenagers are different from individuals in their twenties and that they are both
different from older adults, trial courts conducting an individualized assessment
under the IRAA can, within their discretion, weigh factor one more heavily for a
movant depending on their age. Whether or how the court gives more weight to a
defendant’s age will, of course, turn on the evidence presented to the court and we
22
do not endeavor to prescribe any particular weight a court should give to factor one
under varying factual circumstances. See Williams, 345 A.3d at 580 (“This court
generally does not second-guess—meaning substitute its judgment for—a trial
court’s discretionary decision based on the weighing and balancing of factors.”
(citation modified)).
In Williams, we addressed this issue in the closely analogous context of the
District’s Youth Rehabilitation Act, “which includes factors similar to those” in the
IRAA. 345 A.3d at 580; see D.C. Code § 24-903(c)(2). We said that the YRA’s first
factor, “[t]he youth offender’s age at the time of the offense,” D.C. Code
§ 24-903(c)(2)(A), is not simply a redundant eligibility criterion but a “consideration
to weigh in the sentencing/set-aside calculus,” Williams, 345 A.3d at 581. Because
eligibility under the YRA already requires a defendant to be twenty-four or younger,
a conclusion that “the Council wanted courts simply to state on the record what
would necessarily be true under the terms of the factor effectively renders null factor
(A)’s express reference to the defined term ‘youth offender.’” Id. We added that the
YRA “is premised on the legislative judgment that youthful offenders lack the
reasoning and maturity to make wise decisions, and that that diminished capacity
gradually decreases (that is, reasoning and maturity increase) as one reaches their
mid-twenties”; “accordingly, the inclusion of age as a factor (in addition to an
eligibility criterion) reflects the Council’s judgment that the court must weigh the
23
offender’s development and maturity by focusing on the person’s age at the time of
the offense.” Id. at 581-82 (citation modified).
In Williams we also observed that, “because age under factor (A) is not simply
about eligibility, a trial court can determine in its discretion how much weight to
give this factor; it would be within the court’s discretion, for example, to view a
sixteen-year-old more leniently than a twenty-four-year-old.” Id. at 582 (citation
modified). We held, however, that “it would be a misapplication of the factor to
weigh age against a youth offender, as anyone twenty-four years old or younger is
entitled to the presumption of immaturity and diminished reasoning that undergirds
the statute.” Id. (emphasis in original). “Age under Section 24-903(c)(2)(A), then, is
a ‘one-way ratchet’ in favor of all youth offenders, but the extent of the ratchet can
vary depending on the age of the particular individual at the time they committed the
offense.” Id.
We now hold that under the IRAA, too, age is a “one-way ratchet” but the
extent of the ratchet can vary. 5 Accordingly, in addressing factor one, trial courts
5
This metaphor of a one-way ratchet should not be taken to mean that the trial court should simply “crank” the ratchet one level for each year under twenty-five the movant was when they committed the offense. We expect trial courts to engage in the “individualized assessment” the IRAA requires, Rice, 362 A.3d at 480, with respect to age just as much as to the other factors, with reference to whatever evidence is presented that sheds light on a defendant’s development and maturity,
24
should do more than just state the age of the defendant at the time of the offense;
they should set forth the weight they are giving to the factor and the reasons for that
weight.6
We now turn to this case. Although in addressing factor one the trial court
simply restated Mr. Euceda’s age at the time of the offenses, the court had explained
in detail the science and jurisprudence underlying the IRAA and had specifically
stated, among other things, that “[i]n passing the IRAA, the [D.C.] Council
considered . . . research on the development of the brain during adolescence”
showing that “the frontal lobes of the brain may not be fully developed until the mide.g., medical, psychological, or academic records. It might also be that age in a particular case must be considered in conjunction with another factor (such as factors two, seven, and eight), where, for example, trauma occurred or mental illness manifested in the defendant’s twenties.
6
Our treatment of IRAA factor ten in Bishop is not to the contrary. In Bishop, we said that the first part of factor ten—which instructs courts to consider “[t]he diminished culpability of juveniles and persons under age 25, as compared to that of older adults, and the hallmark features of youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, which counsel against sentencing them to lengthy terms in prison, despite the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime,” D.C. Code § 24-403.03(c)(10)—must both weigh categorically in favor of the movant and also apply without a case-by-case determination of degree. 310 A.3d at 645-47. Our conclusion that the extent of the one-way ratchet in the first clause of factor ten cannot vary was, however, driven by the “plain language” of the clause, which simply sets forth a blanket consideration related to the policies behind and purposes of the IRAA. Id. at 646 (“Unlike nearly all of the other statutory factors, the first clause of factor ten does not instruct the trial court to consider the reduced culpability of the individual movant. Rather, it applies broadly to the class of individuals under twenty-five.” (citation modified)). For the reasons set forth above, we read factor one differently.
25
twenties, meaning that adolescents possess impaired judgment and difficulty
grasping consequences.” The court also stated under factor ten that “Mr. Euceda was
twenty-three at the time of the instant offense and thus the [c]ourt shall consider the
‘mitigating qualities of youth’ . . . .”
The trial court’s order as a whole thus demonstrates that it weighed factor one
in Mr. Euceda’s favor. 7 It determined, however, that this factor, together with other
factors that weighed in Mr. Euceda’s favor (like his “extremely difficult background,
his acceptance of responsibility after remand, his BOP risk assessment[,] and his
lack of a criminal history”) was not enough to overcome the factors that in the court’s
view militated against relief. To conclude that the trial court failed to weigh Mr.
Euceda’s age in his favor because the court’s discussion of age came outside of,
rather than under, its heading for factor one would be to elevate form over substance.
See Bishop, 310 A.3d at 644 (“A trial court’s decision not to robustly discuss every
piece of evidence under each relevant factor might not, by itself, warrant reversal.”
(citation modified)); Jordan v. Jordan, 14 A.3d 1136, 1150 (D.C. 2011) (“Where the
record so plainly supports the conclusion that the required findings were actually
(though implicitly) made, reversing and remanding the case for an explicit finding
would be a waste of judicial resources and would elevate form over substance.”).
7
Mr. Euceda did not present the court with evidence such as that described in note five above.
26
Accordingly, whether considered under the rubric of harmless error or as a
recognition that we look at a trial court’s ruling in its entirety when determining
whether the court failed to consider a relevant factor, see Bishop, 310 A.3d at 641;
see also Jordan, 14 A.3d at 1149-50 (reading the trial court’s “order and the record
as a whole” in determining whether the court gave “full consideration and due
weight” to a factor), we agree with the government that the trial court did not commit
reversible error in considering Mr. Euceda’s age at the time of the offenses.
B. Factor Three and the Availability of Prison Programs
Factor three directs trial courts to consider, as relevant here, “whether the
defendant has completed any educational, vocational, or other program, where
available.” D.C. Code § 24-403.03(c)(3). In its discussion of the factor, the trial court
both recognized the programming that Mr. Euceda had completed and
“acknowledge[d] that Mr. Euceda’s ability to participate in such programs has been
limited, in part, by BOP’s lack of available programming in Spanish.” The court then
observed that the government had “identified a need for programming in multiple
areas which Mr. Euceda has failed to complete, and in some cases refused or
voluntarily withdrew from them, including anger/hostility, antisocial peers,
cognition[,] and obtaining his GED.”
27
Separately, in addressing factor five, the trial court noted that “Mr. Euceda’s
lack of any significant programming, including any formal vocational training or
finishing his GED, will make it difficult for Mr. Euceda to find employment and
otherwise successfully transition upon release.” And in its discussion of
dangerousness, the trial court stated that Mr. Euceda had shown minimal
“participation in programs designed to address rehabilitation and re-entry,” which
would be “particularly necessary to ensure that he does not pose an ongoing danger.”
While finding it “troubling” and “extremely unfortunate” that Mr. Euceda was
unable to participate in certain programming due to his limited proficiency in
English, the court nonetheless considered Mr. Euceda’s “lack of programming while
in the BOP”; stated that “there is some evidence that Mr. Euceda did not take
advantage of some of [the] limited opportunities which he did have”; and concluded
that the “lack of programming, regardless of the cause of it, weighs against a finding
that he has carried his burden to demonstrate a lack of dangerousness.” The court
also referred to “Mr. Euceda’s lack of participation in programs to aid in
rehabilitation” in concluding that a sentence reduction was not in the interests of
justice.
Mr. Euceda argues that the trial court’s finding that he failed to participate in
or complete certain programs that were available to him was unsupported because
there was no competent evidence that he refused to participate in or withdrew from
28
any programs that were in Spanish. He also asserts that the court legally erred
because its conclusion that his minimal programming supported a finding of
dangerousness regardless of its cause read the phrase “where available” out of factor
three. The government counters that BOP documents it attached to its opposition to
Mr. Euceda’s IRAA motion provided “some” evidence that Mr. Euceda voluntarily
withdrew or refused to participate in classes and Mr. Euceda presented no contrary
evidence. It also contends that the trial court did not ignore, and to the contrary
expressly acknowledged, the “where available” language in factor three and that the
court was permitted to consider Mr. Euceda’s failure to address “the underlying
issues that led to his criminality,” regardless of the reasons for that failure, in making
the dangerousness determination.
We think the government has the better argument. In explaining why, we
distinguish between factor three, on the one hand, and the overall dangerousness and
interests-of-justice determinations, on the other.
We agree with Mr. Euceda that, under factor three, a trial court must consider
a defendant’s completion of educational, vocational, or other programs relative to
the availability of such programs for the particular defendant. See Bishop, 310 A.3d
at 642 n.7 (noting “the possibility that there may be some circumstances in which a
lack of programming opportunities mandates a different calculus” about a
29
defendant’s program participation). The number of programs or hours of
programming completed by a defendant in a vacuum is not particularly revealing of
the defendant’s commitment to and efforts toward development and rehabilitation.
If, then, a defendant presents evidence of limited programming opportunities, the
trial court must grapple with that evidence and weigh factor three in light of it. 8 A
contrary interpretation would read the words “where available” out of factor three.
See Wilson v. United States, 362 A.3d 444, 450 (D.C. 2026) (“The primary and
general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found
in the language that he has used.” (quoting Duvall v. United States, 676 A.2d 448,
452 (D.C. 1996)); id. at 451. (In giving effect to a statute’s plain meaning, “effect
must be given every word of a statute, and interpretations that operate to render a
word inoperative should be avoided.”) (quoting MEPT St. Matthews, LLC v. District
of Columbia, 297 A.3d 1094, 1097 (D.C. 2023)).
8
In addition to Mr. Euceda’s argument about language barriers, we have seen arguments that District inmates are given low priority for programs in federal prisons, that program space is highly limited, and that the COVID-19 pandemic prevented program participation. See, e.g., Walls v. United States, 340 A.3d 22, 31 (D.C. 2025) (“Walls has attempted to partake in more prison programming but has at least once been denied or placed on a waitlist.” (citation modified)); Bishop, 310 A.3d at 642 (“Mr. Bishop asserted that it was not his fault that his programming participation was limited while in BOP custody because federal penitentiaries are less conducive to programming due to frequent lockdowns and limited program space.” (citation modified)).
30
We do not agree with Mr. Euceda, however, that the trial court failed to do
that here. After explicitly acknowledging that “Mr. Euceda’s ability to participate
in . . . programs has been limited, in part, by BOP’s lack of available programming
in Spanish,” the court described Mr. Euceda’s program participation largely
favorably. The court then noted the programming that would have benefited Mr.
Euceda but that he refused to participate in or withdrew from. The court thus
accepted Mr. Euceda’s argument that programming opportunities were limited, and
it evaluated Mr. Euceda’s programming participation relative to the opportunities
that were available to him. And as to Mr. Euceda’s argument that the trial court
lacked a factual foundation to find that he did not participate in programs that were
available to him (i.e., that were in Spanish), in light of the “Inmate Education Data”
document that the government attached to its opposition brief and the lack of
contrary evidence by Mr. Euceda, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly
erred.
With respect to the overall dangerousness and interests-of-justice analysis, we
conclude that a trial court can, within its discretion, determine that a defendant’s lack
of program participation, regardless of the reason, counsels against a sentence
reduction because the defendant is not sufficiently rehabilitated or remains a danger
to the safety of any person or the community. Ultimately, a trial court should not
grant a sentence reduction if it cannot find that the defendant is not dangerous, D.C.
31
Code § 24-403.03(a)(2), and if the reason the court cannot make such a finding is
that the defendant has not had the benefit of certain rehabilitative programs, it
matters little whether the reason is that the defendant chose not to participate or that
the programs were not available. 9 The point is that an IRAA determination is a
holistic endeavor; one factor requires the trial court to consider the defendant’s
completion of development programs that were made available to them, while the
overall analysis requires the court to determine whether it is safe and just to reduce
a defendant’s sentence. 10
9
Of course, a trial court could find that a defendant is not a danger to the safety of any person or the community and that the interests of justice warrant a sentence modification even if the defendant has not participated or has minimally participated in available educational, vocational, or other programs.
10
To be sure, the overall IRAA determination is made based on a
consideration of—not outside of—the enumerated factors. See D.C. Code § 24-403.03(a)(2); Doe, 333 A.3d at 910 (stating that the IRAA “limit[s] a trial court’s consideration of dangerousness and the interests of justice to its application of the eleven enumerated factors”). But we see no reason why a trial court cannot consider a defendant’s lack of necessary rehabilitative programming under factors five or eleven before then factoring it into the dangerousness and interests-of-justice analyses.
We also note that our decision in Walls is not to the contrary. There, we rejected the notion that a trial court could keep a defendant “incarcerated for some additional years simply because, through no fault of his own, the Bureau of Prisons has yet to enroll [him] in a program that he would seemingly benefit from and has sought to avail himself of.” Walls, 340 A.3d at 31. In Walls, however, the trial court had already determined that the defendant was no longer dangerous but denied IRAA relief on the grounds that further imprisonment was in the defendant’s own interests on the basis of the lack of programming. Id. at 27, 29. Here, we hold that a trial court
32
In sum, under factor three, a trial court must consider a defendant’s program
participation relative to the availability of programs for the defendant, and the court
did that here. Under the dangerousness and interests-of-justice analysis, a trial court
acts—and the trial court here acted—within its discretion in concluding that a
defendant’s lack of participation in beneficial programs, regardless of the cause,
weighs against a sentence reduction.
C. The Relevance of an Inmate’s Likely Deportation
Mr. Euceda argues that the trial court erred by failing “to consider how
profoundly Mr. Euceda’s pending deportation should have influenced its
dangerousness analysis because Mr. Euceda would not be a danger to the people and
communities in the United States if he were deported.” He points to a number of
federal trial court compassionate release decisions that, he says, support the notion
that the relevant “community” for dangerousness purposes is the United States and
asserts that his “pending deportation should have influenced [the trial court’s]
dangerousness analysis because [he] would not be a danger to the people and
communities in the United States if he were deported and likely would not reenter
can consider a defendant’s lack of certain programming, regardless of its cause, in determining whether the defendant is dangerous.
33
the United States afterwards where he could pose a danger to its people or
communities.”
At the IRAA hearing, Mr. Euceda explicitly disavowed an argument that “just
because . . . he may not reside in the country . . . he should just be released.” And
when the trial court stated that it “certainly” did not “understand [Mr. Euceda’s]
position to be” that because he is “likely to be deported” the court did not “have to
worry about dangerousness,” Mr. Euceda did not counter that that was in fact his
position. The government thus argues that Mr. Euceda waived his argument and that
we should not consider it. See Watkins v. United States, 362 A.3d 455, 466 (D.C.
2026); id. at 466 n.10 (“While we use ‘forfeiture’ to describe when a defendant
‘defaults’ or ‘fails to raise a claim before the trial court,’ we use ‘waiver’ to mean
an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’
Whereas forfeiture does not preclude review, waiver does. Here, we use ‘waiver’
because defense counsel explicitly agreed to the prosecution’s line of questioning.”
(citation modified)); see Brown v. United States, 627 A.2d 499, 508 (D.C. 1993)
(“We have repeatedly held that a defendant may not take one position at trial and a
contradictory position on appeal.”).
We do not believe waiver applies, because Mr. Euceda’s argument now is not
that he should have “just be[en] released” or that the court did not “have to worry
34
about dangerousness.” Rather, it is that the trial court should have considered his
deportation as a relevant factor in its dangerousness analysis. We agree, however,
that Mr. Euceda did not make—that is, he forfeited—the argument he is now
making. We therefore review his argument under the plain-error standard, under
which Mr. Euceda “must demonstrate (1) error[;] (2) that such error is plain,
meaning clear or obvious, by the time of appellate review; (3) that the error affected
[his] substantial rights; and (4) that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Lopez v. United States, 361 A.3d
140, 145 n.2 (D.C. 2026) (citation modified).
Mr. Euceda has failed to establish clear or obvious error by the trial court. As
he points out, there is a substantial question over what “the community” means under
the IRAA—does the term refer to the world community, the community of the
United States, the community of the District of Columbia, the community where the
defendant is living (whether in the United States or abroad), or something else
entirely? On the one hand, support for a narrower reading may be found in the
Council’s likely focus on protecting District residents in passing the statute, as well
as jurisdictional concerns that could arise if a defendant resides outside the District
or the United States. On the other hand, the statute’s expansive language and
individualized focus may support a broader reading, including one that reaches
communities outside the United States. Given the substantial arguments on both
35
sides, we cannot say that the trial court made a clear or obvious error. See Phillips v.
United States, 357 A.3d 764, 773 (D.C. 2026) (“[H]aving raised a close question
does not do [the defendant] any good on plain error review.”); Medhin v. United
States, 308 A.3d 1242, 1247 (D.C. 2024) (“An error is plain if it is ‘clear or obvious,
rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’” (quoting Williams v. United States, 210
A.3d 734, 743 (D.C. 2019))). And the few federal district court cases Mr. Euceda
cites do not persuade us otherwise: those cases involve a different statute, and at
most they assume—without directly interpreting that statute’s text—that “the
community” refers only to communities within the United States.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court denying Mr.
Euceda’s motion for a sentence reduction under the IRAA.
So ordered.