Cite as 2026 Ark. 121
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-25-680
Opinion Delivered: October 1, 2026
DAVID FREEMAN
APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE
GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT
V. COURT
[NO. 26CR-83-14]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE RALPH C. OHM, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED.
CODY HILAND, Associate Justice
Appellant David Freeman was eighteen-years old when he committed capital murder
in furtherance of robbery, and he subsequently pleaded guilty to the murder in 1983.
Freeman was sentenced to life in prison without parole. Freeman now appeals from the
denial of his petition to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Arkansas Code
Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2016). Freeman contends the circuit court erred by not
considering scientific data that supports the Supreme Court of the United States’ ruling in
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)—and our subsequent ruling in Jackson v. Norris, 2013
Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906,1—to support a finding that there is no substantial difference in
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In Jackson, this court addressed the resentencing, pursuant to the holding in Miller, of a fourteen-year-old who had received a mandatory sentence of life without parole for the offense of capital murder. This court set out instructions for the circuit court that Jackson may present Miller evidence for consideration and that his sentence must fall within the the neurological brain development and maturity of young adults aged seventeen to twentyone. As a result of this data, Freeman argues his sentence of life imprisonment without
parole is illegal. The circuit court denied Freeman’s petition, and we affirm.
The circuit court’s decision to deny relief pursuant to section 16-90-111 will not be
overturned absent clear error. McGill v. State, 2025 Ark. 66, at 2. Under section 16-90-111,
a finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate
court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id. We are mindful that the plain text of section 16-90-111(a)
authorizes a circuit court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. Id. An illegal sentence is
one that is illegal on its face. Id. A sentence is illegal on its face when it is void because it is
beyond the circuit court’s authority to impose and gives rise to a question of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Id. The general rule is that a sentence imposed within the maximum term
prescribed by law is not illegal on its face. McGill, 2025 Ark. 66, at 2.
On appeal, Freeman claims that the circuit court erred (1) by not considering the
widely accepted scientific data that supports the rulings in Miller and Jackson, which note that
there is a substantial difference in young adults aged seventeen to twenty-one when it comes
to neurological brain development and maturity; (2) by failing to analyze “fellow sister
states[’]” decisions concerning the neurological brain development and maturity-level claims
he made; and (3) by failing to analyze federal court decisions concerning neurological brain
statutory discretionary range for a Class Y felony—not less than ten years and not more than forty years, or life. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997).
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development and maturity-level claims he made. The circuit court denied Freeman’s
petition, finding the sentence of life imprisonment without parole was not illegal,
particularly in light of Freeman’s claims “that he was a minor at the time of this crime[,] and
he was eighteen[,] [t]herefore, [he] was not entitled to the relief he seeks.”
Freeman referenced two cases, People v. Taylor, ___ N.W.3d ___ (Mich. Apr. 10,
2025),2 and United States v. Sepulveda, 762 F. Supp. 3d 153 (D.R.I. 2025), to support his claim
that a life sentence without parole for nineteen- and twenty-year-olds violates the benefit and
protections of the specialized procedures mandated in Miller and Jackson. Specifically, that
those in that age group are presumptively neurologically indistinguishable from either a
“teenage juvenile offender or an eighteen-year-old offender.”3 Although Freeman argues that
the clause prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment under article 2, section 9 of the Arkansas
Constitution mirrors Michigan’s clause, which served as the basis to support the Michigan
appellate court’s findings regarding its findings in Taylor, such a claim based on a
constitutional argument does not implicate the facial validity of the judgment. Although
this court has noted that the Supreme Court of the United States has not extended its
holdings to offenders who were eighteen or older when their crimes were committed, this
court has repeatedly held that assertions of constitutional error do not implicate the facial
2
Freeman also cited People v. Czarnecki, 27 N.W.3d 634 (Mich. Ct. App. 2023), which was reversed by the holding in Taylor sub nomine.
3
Freeman’s use of the term “teenage juvenile offender” to differentiate between teenagers categorized legally as juveniles and teenagers who are adults (i.e., eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds).
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validity of the judgment or the lack of jurisdiction of the circuit court and are not within the
purview of this statute. See Hogue v. State, 2026 Ark. 83, 732 S.W.3d 385; see also Mister v.
State, 2022 Ark. 35, 639 S.W.3d 331.
Freeman contends that there are developments indicating a major change in how the
law treats “emerging adults,” particularly when assessing the proportionality of punishment
to “contemporary standards of decency which mark the progress of society.’” Sepulveda, 762
F. Supp. 3d at 159 (citing Commonwealth v. Mattis, 224 N.E.3d 410 (2024) (internal citations
omitted). In Miller, the Court held that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a
juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment. Although the Court did not prohibit a juvenile
from being sentenced to life without parole, it required the sentencer to “take into account
how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to a lifetime in prison.” Segerstrom v. State, 2024 Ark. 130, at 6, 696 S.W.3d 799, 803
(quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480); see Grubbs v. State, 2020 Ark. 42, at 2, 592 S.W.3d 688,
690. This court has not extended its application of Miller to offenders who were eighteen or
older at the time of the homicide. See Gibbs v. Payne, 2023 Ark. 29, at 2, 660 S.W.3d 579,
582; see also Hogue, 2026 Ark. 83, at 2, 732 S.W.3d 385, 387. And precedent from other
jurisdictions do not persuade us to change course now.
A circuit court may correct an illegal sentence at any time because an illegal-sentence
claim is an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. McGill, 2025 Ark. 66, at 2; see Walden v. State,
2014 Ark. 193, at 3, 433 S.W.3d 864, 867. A sentence is illegal on its face when it exceeds
the statutory maximum for the offense for which the defendant was convicted. See Renshaw
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v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (1999). Freeman, who does not argue that the
sentence imposed on him exceeds the statutory maximum, was convicted of capital murder,
a Class Y felony under Arkansas Statutes Annotated section 41-1351 (Repl. 1977),
“punishable by death or life imprisonment without parole pursuant to chapter 13.”
Accordingly, Freeman’s sentence of life without parole is within the range permitted by
statute and is not facially illegal. See Bell v. State, 2017 Ark. 231, 522 S.W.3d 788. Because
Freeman failed to demonstrate that the circuit court’s denial of his petition to correct an
illegal sentence was erroneous, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Special Justice CORY COX joins.
WEBB, J., not participating.
David Freeman, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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