UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HARRY DUNN, and DANIEL HODGES,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. 25-cv-1844 (DLF)
ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL, et al.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Harry Dunn and Daniel Hodges, officers who defended the U.S. Capitol from rioters on
January 6, 2021, bring this action against the Architect of the Capitol, seeking to compel
compliance with a law that directs the Architect to install a plaque honoring those who served on
January 6. See generally Compl., Dkt. 1; Consolidated Appropriations Act 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 214, 136 Stat. 49, 527 (2022). Before the Court is the Architect’s Motion to Dismiss under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 27.
Because the plaintiffs lack Article III standing, the Court will grant the defendant’s motion under
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. 1
I. BACKGROUND
On January 6, 2021, rioters attacked the United States Capitol to disrupt the certification
of the presidential election. Compl. ¶ 11. Officers from the Metropolitan Police Department and
Capitol Police, among others, confronted the mob as it breached barricades and forced its way into
the Capitol. Id. ¶ 12. The officers defended the building and the people inside it, even as hundreds
of officers were assaulted. Id. ¶ 20.
1
Because the Court will grant the defendant’s motion under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction, it does not address the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) arguments.
1
The plaintiffs, Harry Dunn and Daniel Hodges, were among the officers who defended the
Capitol on January 6. Dunn, a former officer of the U.S. Capitol Police, id. ¶ 4, alleges that on
that day, he “saw rioters attack police” and “protected injured officers” while enduring racial
epithets, id. ¶ 17. Hodges, a current officer of the Metropolitan Police Department, id. ¶ 4, alleges
that he was assaulted several times while defending the Capitol, id. ¶ 18.
Congress included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022, a declaration that “the
United States owes its deepest gratitude to those officers . . . who valiantly protected the United
States Capitol, Members of Congress, and staff on January 6, 2021.” Pub. L. No. 117-103,
§ 214(a). To give that gratitude a permanent expression, the Act directed the Architect to install,
within one year, an “honorific plaque listing the names of all of the officers” who responded to the
violence “at a permanent location on the western front of the United States Capitol.” Id. § 214(b).
That deadline came and went. More than three years later, the Architect installed a plaque
recognizing the January 6 first responders. See Pls.’ Resp. to March 7, 2026 Minute Order at 1.
But the plaque does not “list[] the names of all of the officers.” Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 214(b).
Instead, it lists law-enforcement agencies and organizations alongside a QR-code that visitors may
scan to access the officers’ names. See Pls.’ Resp. to March 7, 2026 Minute Order at 3. Nor is the
plaque installed “at a permanent location on the western front of the Capitol.” Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 214(b). Currently, it is displayed in the non-public Senate wing until the plaque can be
placed in its permanent location. See Pls.’ Resp. to March 7, 2026 Minute Order at 2–3 (citing
Megan Mineiro, Senate Agrees to Display a Jan. 6 Plaque Honoring Officers, N.Y. Times (Jan. 8,
2026)).
The plaintiff officers sue Austin, the Architect of the Capitol, in his official capacity,
alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Compl. ¶ 3–4. They
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seek mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, specifically, an order compelling the Architect to install
the memorial as mandated. Id. ¶¶ 38–43. The Architect has moved to dismiss this action for lack
of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Def. Mot. to Dismiss.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to dismiss
an action or claim when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A
motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) “presents a threshold challenge to the court’s
jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Federal district courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, “the plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Moran v. U.S. Capitol
Police Bd., 820 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
561 (1992)).
“When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court must treat the complaint’s factual
allegations as true and afford the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the
facts alleged.” Han v. Lynch, 223 F. Supp. 3d 95, 103 (D.D.C. 2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Those factual allegations, however, receive “closer scrutiny” than they would if the court
were considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Id. Unlike in the Rule 12(b)(6)
context, a court may consider documents outside the pleadings to evaluate whether it has
jurisdiction, but it still must “accept all of the factual allegations in [the] complaint as true.” See
Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If, at any point, the court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the claim or action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3).
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III. ANALYSIS
Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of federal courts to “cases” and
“controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. There is no “case or controversy unless the plaintiff
has standing.” West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Standing is jurisdictional;
if a plaintiff lacks standing, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the action.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3).
The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements”: (1) the
plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized and actual or
imminent; (2) there must be “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of”; and (3) it must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). “The burden
of establishing these elements falls on the party invoking federal jurisdiction, and at the pleading
stage, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating each element.” Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828
F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Standing is assessed from the time of the complaint. Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc. v. FAA,
211 F.3d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2000); cf. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397
(1980). Because the officers lacked standing when they commenced this action, this Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the case.
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A. Injury in Fact
For standing purposes, an injury in fact is an “invasion of a legally protected interest” that
is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). That requirement is not satisfied by an interest in seeing
the government comply with the law. See id. at 573–74. Nor does “offense, disagreement, or
distaste” with government action constitute a concrete injury without more. Nat’l Park Serv. v.
Nat’l Tr. for Historic Pres. in the U.S., 609 U.S. ___ (2026) (slip op. at 3).
Although the Architect has now installed the plaque, standing turns on whether the officer
plaintiffs had a cognizable injury when they filed the complaint. Advanced Mgmt. Tech., 211 F.3d
at 636. The relevant question, then, is whether the officers whom Congress meant to honor
suffered a cognizable injury from the Architect's failure to install the plaque. The officer plaintiffs
insist that they did, alleging several related injuries. See Compl. ¶ 31, 32. But none of the injuries
alleged in the complaint satisfies Article III's requirements.
First, the officers allege that by failing to offer the recognition Congress promised, the
Architect has exacerbated “psychic injuries” that the officers have experienced since January 6.
Compl. ¶ 31. According to the officers, the Architect’s failure to install the memorial plaque, as
Congress directed, “suggests that the officers are not worthy of being recognized.” Id. ¶ 29. As a
result, the Architect’s failure to act has compounded Officer Hodges’s anxiety and depression and
made it impossible for Officer Dunn to continue working to protect members of Congress. Id.
¶ 32.
Second, the officers allege that the Architect’s continued failure to recognize their service
has emboldened private parties to harass them and disparage their service. Id. In particular, the
officers have been accused “of being ‘crisis actors’ and . . . conspiracy agents” and regularly
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receive death threats. Id. Officer Dunn also has been targeted because of his race. Id. As a result,
both officers fear for their personal security. Id.
The first theory fails to present an injury in fact. Injury in fact requires something “other
than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which
one disagrees.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982). Distress resulting from what the officers perceive as
the government’s failure adequately to honor or recognize their service is precisely the kind of
psychological consequence arising from disagreement with government conduct that, standing
alone, does not constitute a concrete injury under Article III. See Nat’l Trust, 609 U.S. at ___
(slip op. at 3).
Nor does the officers’ unusually strong interest in the challenged government action
transform that interest into a concrete injury. To be sure, the officers have a far more personal
connection to the plaque than the public at large. They are not “just any person,” Nat’l Trust, 609
U.S. ___ (2026) (slip op. at 6) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); they are among the very officers
Congress sought to honor. That gives them an understandable and deeply personal interest in
whether the government recognizes their service in the manner Congress prescribed. But Article
III standing “is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at
486; accord Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563. It requires an injury in fact. Here, the asserted
injury is the psychological harm the officers attribute to what they view as inadequate
governmental recognition of their service. Their especially compelling personal stake in receiving
that recognition does not render the harm arising from their objection to government inaction
concrete for purposes of Article III.
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The officers’ generalized interest in having the Architect comply with Congress's mandate
likewise does not constitute an Article III injury. An asserted right to have the government act in
accordance with the law, without more, is not judicially cognizable. See Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. at 575–76. Vindicating “the public interest (including the public interest in Government
observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,” not
the federal courts. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576. And as the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held, and recently reinforced, “offense, disagreement, or distaste does not qualify as a
concrete and particularized injury under Article III.” Nat’l Trust, 609 U.S. ___ (2026) (slip op. at
3). Those limitations prevent the federal courts from becoming “continuing monitors of the
wisdom and soundness” of government action or forums for resolving disagreements over public
policy. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff
officers’ disagreement with the Architect’s failure to carry out Congress's mandate thus does not
supply the concrete and particularized injury that Article III requires.
The officers’ second theory of standing rests on actions by third parties. They allege that
they have been called “crisis actors” and “left-wing conspiracy agents,” subjected to racial epithets,
and received death threats. Compl. ¶ 32. And they fear for their physical safety as a result. Id.
Those allegations may describe concrete harms sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.
See TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 425 (explaining that concrete injuries can include certain
intangible harms).
But a concrete injury, standing alone, is not enough to establish Article III standing. Those
alleged injuries stem from the actions of third parties, which, in turn, caused the plaintiff officers
harm. Compl. ¶ 32. The officers still must, and cannot, show that those injuries are fairly traceable
to the Architect's failure to install the plaque or likely to be redressed by his doing so.
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Whether and how the officers who defended the Capitol on January 6, 2021 should be
honored is a matter on which Congress has spoken, and on which it remains free to act. But
Congress’s decision to require a particular form of recognition does not itself create the concrete
injury necessary for Article III standing. At least as alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff officers
have not carried their burden of establishing that they have suffered an injury in fact. 2
B. Causation and Redressability
Even assuming that the alleged mental-health issues and third-party harassment are
cognizable injuries, the officers have not traced those harms to the Architect's failure to install the
plaque as mandated. Article III requires the injury to be “fairly traceable” to the challenged
conduct and “likely to be redressed by a favorable decision” of the court. Valley Forge, 454 U.S.
at 471–72. Causation and redressability thus assure “that proper parties have brought their dispute
to the proper branch of federal government.” Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663
(D.C. Cir. 1996). Causation may be said to focus on whether a particular party is appropriate;
redressability, on whether the forum is. Id. at 664.
2
The officers appear to disclaim any distinct aesthetic injury, but they do rely by analogy on cases recognizing aesthetic injuries arising from contact with public displays. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 6 (arguing that their harms are “far more than aesthetic or generally offensive”). Even if the Court were to construe the complaint as alleging an aesthetic injury, that theory would also fail. The officers do not allege that the plaque’s location or design impairs their ability to “view[], appreciat[e], and study[]” the Capitol, Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562–63, or otherwise diminishes their use and enjoyment of it, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 180–183 (2000).
The officers also rely on some cases recognizing reputational injuries. See Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 8 (citing TransUnion, 594 U.S. 413 (2021)). But the complaint does not allege that the Architect made any false or defamatory statement about the officers or that the challenged conduct itself altered their reputation in a concrete way. See Transunion, 594 U.S. at 425, 435. Rather, it alleges psychological harm stemming from mistreatment by unidentified third parties in connection with the officers' service and advocacy. See Compl. ¶ 32. Even assuming those allegations could be characterized as reputational injury, the officers still must establish that the injury is fairly traceable to the Architect and redressable by an order of this Court. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471–72. And, as the Court will explain, the plaintiff officers cannot make that showing. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562.
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Start with the officers’ psychological injuries. Their theory is that the Architect’s failure
to provide the recognition Congress prescribed materially exacerbated the anxiety, depression, and
other psychological harms they suffered after January 6. Compl. ¶¶ 31–32. That theory is not
implausible merely because the attack and its aftermath are the more immediate causes of those
injuries. Article III “does not require that the defendant be the most immediate cause, or even a
proximate cause,” only that the injury be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct. Attias v.
Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The problem here is that the officers have not
alleged facts showing that the challenged conduct caused or materially exacerbated their mentalhealth conditions.
In the officers’ view, the government has attempted to “rewrite the history of January 6,
2021.” See Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4. And “because people take their cues . .
. from national political leaders,” id. at 5, the plaintiff officers contend that honoring their service
by installing the plaque as required by law is integral to alleviating the stress they experience from
the public's perception of that service. But that argument reveals the gap in the officers’ causal
theory. They do not argue that the Architect's failure to install the plaque itself worsened their
mental health conditions. See Compl. ¶ 32. Rather, their theory depends on what the Architect's
failure to install the plaque communicates to the public, how the public understands that message,
and how the resulting level of public recognition affects the officers. See Pl.’s Resp. to Court
Order at 2.
That theory requires several inferential steps between the challenged conduct and the
alleged injury, including the actions of independent third parties. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013); Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 70 (2024). Although the
complaint links the failure to install the plaque to public perceptions of January 6 and of the
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plaintiff officers, it does not allege that the Architect's failure to install the plaque worsened those
perceptions. At most, the complaint suggests that the uninstalled plaque failed to improve an
already unfavorable public perception. The asserted causal chain is therefore too attenuated to
fairly trace the officers’ mental-health injuries to the Architect's inaction.
The alleged third-party harassment injury presents an even more attenuated chain. The
officers have undoubtedly experienced mistreatment. But they attribute that behavior to the broad
governmental “whitewash” of January 6 that they allege, of which the plaque is only one
component. Pl.’s Resp. to March 7, 2026 Minute Order at 2. Again, their theory requires the
Court to infer that the Architect's failure to install the plaque conveys disrespect for the officers’
sacrifice; that members of the public recognize that disrespect; that this disrespect alters the
public’s perception of January 6 or its responding officers; and finally, that those altered
perceptions cause threats and harassment directed at the officers. If that sounds attenuated, it is.
Each causal theory attributes the plaintiff officers’ injuries not to the plaque itself, but to the
reactions of third parties to the plaque and the controversy surrounding it.
Courts are skeptical of causal theories that depend on “unfettered choices made by
independent actors not before the courts.” Cierco v. Mnuchin, 857 F.3d 407, 414–15 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562). Courts are also skeptical of causal theories
that depend on a “number of speculative links” in chain. Bentsen, 94 F.3d at 670. The officers’
harassment theory depends on both. Nothing alleged provides a basis to conclude installing the
plaque as mandated by law would itself change public opinion or alter the behavior of the
unidentified third parties threatening and harassing the officers. The officers’ theory of causation
is too attenuated to satisfy Article III.
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The same problem defeats redressability. Even if the Architect's failure to install the plaque
contributed to the officers’ injuries, the officers would need to show that mandating its installation
would be “likely” to alleviate those injuries. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561. Yet the
officers’ theory, again, depends on the response of third parties—that requiring the Architect to
install the plaque mandated by Congress would alter the public’s perception of the officers which
would ultimately alleviate the officers’ psychological injuries or reduce the harassment they
experience. Article III does not allow the Court to rely on such a speculative sequence of events.
See Bentsen, 94 F.3d at 663–64.
In their prayer for relief the officers request the plaque that Congress required. But the
officers must show that the relief they seek is likely to remedy the psychological and third-party
harms on which their standing depends. They have not.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action.
Accordingly, the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 27, is granted. A separate order consistent
with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
United States District Judge
September 30, 2026
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