In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00364-CV
ROEL GUERRA, APPELLANT
V.
MARIA FABIOLA GUERRA AND ELMA GUERRA CHAVEZ, APPELLEES
On Appeal from the 229th District Court
Starr County, Texas1
Trial Court No. DC-23-226, Honorable Baldemar Garza, Presiding
September 29, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
The matter before us is an interlocutory appeal stemming from a trust dispute
among siblings. Roel Guerra, Appellant, challenges the trial court’s rulings below through
three issues. We affirm.
1 This cause was originally filed in the Fourth Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court.
In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
BACKGROUND
In 1976, Nicasio and Benita Guerra created NB Guerra, LTD, a family limited
partnership. They transferred approximately 3,000 acres to the partnership. In 1982,
they created Guerra Cattle Company (GCC) with their son Roel. Nicasio died in 1997,
and his will was probated in Starr County Court at Law, Cause No. PR-97-023. His will
created a residuary trust with Benita as Trustee and Roel as Successor Trustee. Benita
died in August 2021, and her estate is currently pending in probate, Cause No. PR-22-015, in Starr County Court at Law. Multiple inventories filed in Benita’s probate include
interests in NB Guerra, LTD and interests in GCC.
On May 11, 2023, Roel’s sister, Maria, filed a Suit to Compel Trust Accounting
against Roel as Successor Trustee. On October 31, 2023, the trial court entered an Order
Granting Motion to Compel Trust Accounting requiring Roel to provide an accounting by
November 10, 2023. On December 19, 2023, the trial court entered an Order Awarding
Attorney’s Fees. On January 18, 2024, Roel appealed both orders but subsequently
dismissed that appeal. On June 25, 2024, Maria filed a First Amended Suit raising
additional issues and seeking appointment of a receiver, temporary injunction, and other
relief. On August 22, 2024, the trial court entered a Temporary Injunction Order and
Order Appointing Person to Carry Out Winding Up of NB Guerra, LTD Partnership. Roel
filed a Second Amended Notice of Appeal on April 14, 2025.
Roel argues that the October 31, 2023 and December 19, 2023 orders constituted
a final judgment disposing of all parties and claims, causing the trial court to lose plenary
power by April 2, 2024, at the latest. All subsequent orders, he posits, are therefore void.
2
Additionally, Roel contends the Starr County Court at Law has original, exclusive
jurisdiction over probate matters, including the Family LP and GCC interests listed in the
pending Benita Guerra estate, making the district court’s orders void for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
By this appeal, Roel requests the Court to order the trial court to vacate all orders
after April 2, 2025, as void for lack of plenary power and/or lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Maria and Elma ask the Court to affirm all trial court orders at issue (i.e., the
Accounting Order, Fee Order, Wind Up Order, and Temporary Injunction (TI) Order),
finding the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction.
ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, Maria and Elma point out that Roel failed to pay for the
reporter’s record. Email correspondence from the court reporter indicates the master and
exhibit volumes were pending payment. By letter dated February 25, 2025, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals directed Roel to provide proof of payment for the reporter’s
record or the court would only consider those issues or points that did not require a
reporter’s record for a decision. Maria and Elma argue this is Roel’s burden and the Court
should not review issues requiring the record. We agree. See Aguero v. Aguero, 225
S.W.3d 236, 237 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 2006, no pet.) (appellant has the burden to
properly request the completion of a record that is sufficient to illustrate reversible error;
if an appellant does not, and the issues raised involve matters omitted from the record
due to the failure to request or pay for same, those complaints are waived). We note also
that a reporter’s record is necessary to successfully challenge a motion for temporary
3
injunction. See Prappas v. Entexami, No. 04-05-00886-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2157,
at *3–4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 22, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Marriage of
Spiegel, 6 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.). See also See Webb
Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marshall, No. 24-0339, 2026 Tex. LEXIS 350, at *16 (Tex.
Apr. 24, 2026).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Subject matter jurisdiction “refers to a court’s authority to adjudicate a case.” Reiss
v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003) (citing Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d
71, 75 (Tex. 2000)). We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Tex.
Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex.
2024).
ISSUE ONE—FINAL JUDGMENT
Roel argues the two trial court orders compelling an accounting of a trust and
awarding fees constitutes a final judgment as a matter of law. Maria and Elma claim the
Accounting Order and Fee Order are not final appealable orders because they do not
dispose of all claims. We resolve the issue against Roel.
We find the Accounting Order and Fee Order are not final appealable orders
because they lack finality language and do not dispose of all claims. See Lehmann v.
Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001) (providing requirements for an order to
become a final judgment). Further, the Wind Up Order is not final because it does not
contain finality language, does not dispose of all claims, and contemplates further court
action. Id. See also In re Estate of Aguilar, No. 04-16-00503-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
4
1701, at *12 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“If the order
does not end a phase of the proceedings, but instead sets the stage for the resolution of
the proceedings, then the order is interlocutory.”). The order contemplated the
submission of a plan, and the assets of NB Guerra could not be liquidated or transferred
without additional court orders. This clearly is not a final order.
Trial courts retain plenary power over their judgments until they become final. In
re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Tex. 2020). Because the Accounting, Fee, and
Wind Up orders are not final, the trial court did not lose its plenary power in the underlying
matter. Id. Further, even if those orders had been final, the trial court retained its power
to enforce its judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 308; Ortiz v. Legal Concierge, Inc., 263
S.W.3d 385, 391 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
Only the TI Order is statutorily appealable, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(a)(4), but, as noted above, a reporter’s record is necessary to successfully
challenge that order, and none was presented here. See In re Marriage of Spiegel, 6
S.W.3d at 646. Without a reporter’s record, we presume the evidence presented was
sufficient to support the trial court’s order and findings.2 See Marshall, 2026 Tex. LEXIS
350, at *16.
2 The Temporary Injunction Order states an evidentiary hearing was held on July 16, 18, 24, and
August 5, 2024, and the trial court considered the pleadings, affidavits, exhibits, testimony, argument of counsel, and all things properly before the court in making its decision to issue the temporary injunction.
5
ISSUE TWO—STARR COUNTY COURT AT LAW JURISDICTION
Roel contends the Starr County Court at Law had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
over property listed as estate assets in the pending probate case. We disagree.
The County Court at Law has no jurisdiction over the Trust through Nicasio’s
Estate because it was closed in 2000, eliminating any pending probate proceeding. See
In re Estate of Aguilar, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1701, at *6 (the jurisdiction of a probate
court attaches at the time an application for the probate of a will is filed and continues
until the estate is closed). See also Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 223 n.8 (Tex.
2015). The Trust is non-testamentary as to Benita, making it a non-probate asset outside
her Estate’s interest. TEX. EST. CODE § 111.052(a)(1)(A); In re Estate of Perez-Muzza,
446 S.W.3d 415, 422 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. denied). Accordingly, we
overrule Roel’s second issue.
ISSUE THREE—DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION
Lastly, Roel contends the 229th District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider and
rule on Maria’s and Elma’s motions filed more than 105 days after the trial court granted
a trust accounting and attorney’s fees.
As noted above, the District Court retained plenary power over the proceedings
before it and the orders at issue were not final. Further, the District Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over trust proceedings, receivership, and partnership wind up matters. See
TEX. PROP. CODE § 115.001; Carroll v. Carroll, 304 S.W.3d 366, 368 (Tex. 2010). We
thus overrule the issue.
6
CONCLUSION
Having overruled the issues presented by this interlocutory appeal, we affirm the
orders of the trial court.
Alex Yarbrough
Justice
7