J-S29021-26 2026 PA Super 223
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOSE SANCHEZ-RODRIGUEZ :
:
Appellant : No. 593 EDA 2026
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 3, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-CR-0001347-2021
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 2, 2026
Jose Sanchez-Rodriguez (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his
first petition timely filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). 1
After careful consideration, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for
further proceedings.
The PCRA court summarized the relevant factual history underlying this
appeal:
On or about August 27, 2019, emergency medical services (EMS)
arrived at 710 Meixsell Valley Road, Saylorsburg, Monroe County,
Pennsylvania, in response to a report of a thirty-eight (38) year
old male experiencing cardiac arrest. (N.T. 8/25/2022, at 48, 56).
Shortly after the arrival of EMS, the victim, [Edward Blew (Blew),]
was declared dead due to a suspected drug overdose. (N.T.
8/25/2022, at 66-67). A later autopsy confirmed that [Blew] had
fatal levels of heroin, fentanyl and methamphetamine in his
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S29021-26
bloodstream. (N.T. 8/25/2022, at 89, 94-97; 8/29/2022, at 58-60).
[Appellant] was charged[,] in Monroe County[,] with drug delivery
resulting in death, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2506(a), a felony of the first
degree, two counts; conspiracy to commit drug delivery resulting
in death, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, a felony of the first degree;
possession with intent to deliver, three (3) counts, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); conspiracy to deliver, three (3) counts, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 903; criminal use of communication facility, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
7512(a), a felony of the third degree; and involuntary
manslaughter, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2506….
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/3/26, at 2-3 (capitalization, punctuation, and citation
format modified).
Significant to this appeal,
[a]pproximately six (6) weeks after the incident giving rise to the
charges in Monroe County, on October 15, 2019, the Salisbury
Township Police, in Lehigh County, … observed a vehicle with an
expired registration exit a parking lot without signaling. See
Commonwealth v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, No. 239-CR-2019
(Lehigh Cnty., 10/16/2019). Salisbury Township police initiated
a traffic stop of the vehicle, which was being driven by [Appellant].
(N.T. 8/26/2022, at 53-56). Officers removed [Appellant] from
the vehicle and observed a jar of marijuana and two (2) yellow
bags in plain view. (N.T. 8/26/2022, at 56-57). A more thorough
scan of the vehicle revealed additional yellow bags, three
thousand dollars ($3,000.00) in cash, multiple digital scales and
multiple cell phones. (N.T. 8/26/2022, at 57-58).
Based upon the Salisbury officers’ wingspan search, officers were
granted a search warrant for the vehicle. During the search,
officers found methamphetamine in pouches, a white powdery
substance, a lunchbox containing suboxone pills and sublingual
strips, and approximately two hundred twelve (212) yellow
glassine bags. (N.T. 8/26/2022, at 63-64, 68-70). As a result,
[Appellant] was charged[,] in Lehigh County[,] … with felony
possession with intent to distribute charges for
methamphetamine, heroin/fentanyl, marijuana and cocaine;
misdemeanor possession for the same; [and other related
offenses]. On August 13, 2020, [Appellant] pleaded … nolo
-2-J-S29021-26
contendere to a single charge of felony possession of marijuana
with intent to deliver. (N.T. 8/13/2020, Lehigh Cnty.).
[Appellant] was sentenced, in Lehigh County, to one (1) year of
probation.
While litigating the Lehigh County charges, [Appellant’s]
Lehigh County attorney moved to suppress the fruits of the
stop [(the Lehigh County evidence),] having learned that the
arresting officer improperly logged the dashcam footage
where the traffic infraction occurred. More specifically,
[Appellant’s] attorney moved to suppress the evidence pursuant
to the Fourth Amendment to the United State Constitution and
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. A hearing
was held on [Appellant’s] suppression motion before the
Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County …. Before [a
ruling on the Lehigh County suppression motion] was
rendered …, [Appellant] pled guilty in that case to a single
marijuana charge with the remaining felony drug charges
dropped.
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/3/26, at 3-4 (emphasis added; citations’ format and
punctuation modified).
In the Monroe County case underlying this appeal,
the Commonwealth filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence
of other bad acts, including … the Lehigh County [evidence]. In
response [to] the Commonwealth’s notice, [Appellant’s] trial
counsel opposed [admission of the Lehigh County evidence] and
filed a motion in limine, arguing that under Rules 403 and 404 of
the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, the evidence was irrelevant
and more prejudicial than probative. 2 [The trial court] disagreed
and allowed the evidence to be admitted at trial. See[] Order,
8/23/2022.
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/3/26, at 4 (footnote added).
2 Appellant’s trial counsel did not challenge the constitutionality of the seizure
of evidence resulting from the Lehigh County traffic stop.
-3-J-S29021-26
A jury ultimately convicted Appellant of, inter alia, drug delivery
resulting in death, multiple counts of conspiracy, and possession with intent
to deliver controlled substances.3 On November 29, 2022, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to 37-74 years in prison. This Court affirmed Appellant’s
judgment of sentence on April 1, 2024. Commonwealth v. SanchezRodriguez, 319 A.3d 1, 26 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. filed Apr. 1, 2024)
(unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not petition for allowance of
appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
On April 30, 2025, Appellant timely filed the instant PCRA petition
claiming ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. The PCRA court conducted
an evidentiary hearing on June 9, 2025.
Following the hearing, the parties agreed to leave the matter open
for receipt of the transcript of the Lehigh County suppression
hearing at issue, to provide post-hearing briefs, and for the
Commonwealth to present witnesses. The matter resumed on
November 14, 2025….
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/3/26, at 1. On February 3, 2026, the PCRA court
denied Appellant’s petition, after which Appellant timely filed the instant
appeal. Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate the facts
and circumstances related to a car stop and subsequent search
and seizure occurring in [Lehigh] County, and upon such
investigation[,] for not moving to suppress the evidence seized as
3 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2506, 903(a); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
-4-J-S29021-26
the product of an illegal stop, and as a violation of discovery rules,
when the motions would have succeeded?
2. Was trial counsel ineffective at sentencing for failing to object
to the court’s consideration of uncharged bad acts that were
neither contained in the pre-sentence investigation [(PSI) report]
nor developed during trial?
3. Was trial counsel ineffective at sentencing for failing to object
to the court’s consideration of Appellant’s alleged “lack of
remorse” when Appellant remained silent at trial, during the
preparation of the [PSI] report, and during sentencing, and there
existed no other basis to support the court’s conclusion that
Appellant lacked remorse?
4. Was Appellant prejudiced by the cumulative impact of counsel’s
ineffectiveness at sentencing?
Appellant’s Brief at 1-2 (capitalization modified).
Appellate review of a PCRA court’s denial of relief “is limited to the
examination of whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the
record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739,
744 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
“[W]e review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Each of Appellant’s issues argue the ineffective assistance of his prior
counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the petitioner must plead and prove that the underlying claim is
of arguable merit; that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis
for the disputed action or inaction; and that there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different but for counsel’s error. Failure to satisfy any one of these
prongs is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance. The PCRA
court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports them,
and we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.
-5-J-S29021-26
Commonwealth v. Prater, 256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations
omitted).
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court improperly
denied relief on his ineffectiveness claim, which is based on trial counsel’s
failure to seek suppression of the Lehigh County evidence. Appellant’s Brief
at 19. According to Appellant, his trial counsel should have moved to suppress
the Lehigh County evidence “based on the same grounds” that were advanced
in Lehigh County, i.e., as a violation of Appellant’s constitutional rights. Id.
at 20. Appellant directs our attention to his trial counsel’s PCRA hearing
testimony admitting that counsel never obtained the Lehigh County court file,
and counsel’s statement that he was not “familiar with [the Lehigh County]
suppression motion until I read [Appellant’s] petition.” Id. (citation omitted).
Regarding the underlying Lehigh County suppression issue, Appellant
further argues that the Lehigh County traffic stop was illegal, as the officer
who conducted the traffic stop left his jurisdiction without authorization. Id.
at 21-22. Appellant claims that the officer was not in “hot pursuit” of his
vehicle or involved in a police chase. Id. at 23. Appellant points out that the
PCRA court did not address the arguable merit of this ineffectiveness claim.
Id. at 25. According to Appellant, the PCRA court erroneously concluded it
was precluded from reviewing the substantive underlying issue. Id.
Appellant additionally claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by not seeking suppression of the Lehigh County evidence, based
-6-J-S29021-26
on the Lehigh County prosecutor’s violation of mandatory discovery rules. Id.
at 27. According to Appellant, his Lehigh County counsel moved for
suppression based on the Commonwealth’s failure to produce the dashcam
and surveillance videos, but his Monroe County trial counsel failed to do so.
Id. at 28. Appellant argues that his Monroe County “trial counsel could and
should have attempted to keep the evidence derived from the traffic stop out
of evidence[,] based on the Commonwealth’s discovery violations in that
case.” Id. (footnote omitted). Appellant asserts that without the dashcam
and surveillance videos, his counsel could not challenge the validity of that
traffic stop, and the subsequent search warrant issued in Lehigh County. Id.
at 29.
Appellant argues that he suffered prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s
failure to investigate and seek suppression of the Lehigh County evidence. Id.
at 32. Appellant states that the Lehigh County traffic stop resulted in the
seizure of about 200 glassine bags that were unique, and matched the bags
found in the home of the Monroe County victim, Blew. Id. Appellant argues
that the uniqueness of the bags, and their similarity to the bags found in
Blew’s home, constituted “the lynchpin of the Commonwealth’s presentation
inculpating Appellant.” Id.
In particular, Appellant challenges the legal basis for the PCRA court’s
refusal to review the merits of his ineffectiveness claim, i.e., that Appellant
waived any challenge to the Lehigh County evidence by pleading guilty to the
-7-J-S29021-26
Lehigh County charges. Id. Appellant disputes this conclusion, arguing that
because the Lehigh County court never ruled on the suppression issue, the
PCRA court could review the merit of his ineffectiveness claim. Id.
In its opinion, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s claim, stating that
[the court does] not get to the merits of [Appellant’s] PCRA
petition because [Appellant] has waived the very issues raised in
his petition when he pleaded guilty in the Lehigh County matter.
PCRA Court Opinion, 2/3/26, at 5-6. The PCRA court cited the coordinate
jurisdiction rule as precluding its review of the Lehigh County evidence. Id.
at 6. The PCRA court concluded that as part of Appellant’s Lehigh County
plea, Appellant waived the right to litigate any pretrial motions or claims raised
in that matter. Id. However, the PCRA court recognized that Appellant pled
guilty prior to the Lehigh County suppression court ruling on his motion. Id.
Appellant’s first issue implicates the coordinate jurisdiction rule. The
coordinate jurisdiction rule
states that judges of coordinate jurisdiction should not overrule
each other’s decisions. The rule, applicable in both civil and
criminal cases, falls within the ambit of the law of the case
doctrine. … [T]he law of the case doctrine refers to a family of
rules which embody the concept that a court involved in the later
phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided
by another judge of that same court or by a higher court in the
earlier phases of the matter. Among the related but distinct
rules which make up the law of the case doctrine is the rule
that upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of
coordinate jurisdiction, the transferee trial court may not
alter the resolution of a legal question previously decided
by the transferor trial court.
-8-J-S29021-26
Commonwealth v. King, 999 A.2d 598, 600 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations and
quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). As this Court has explained,
[w]here a motion has been presented and decided[,] and where
no new facts are presented in the motion which is seeking the
same relief, the first order should be followed based on
considerations of judicial economy and efficiency. This rule
prevents forum shopping because without this rule, the same
issue could be raised repeatedly before different judges of the
same court until a litigant finds a judge sympathetic to his or her
position. Additionally, our Supreme Court has stated that absent
the most compelling circumstances, a judge should follow the
decision of a colleague on the same court when based on the
same set of facts.
Drapeau v. Joy Techs., 670 A.2d 165, 167-68 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citations
and quotation marks omitted; capitalization modified; emphasis added). 4
Instantly, our review discloses that the Lehigh County suppression court
never “decided” Appellant’s suppression motion. Rather, Appellant chose to
plead nolo contendere prior to the disposition of his motion. Because the
Lehigh County suppression court never decided Appellant’s suppression
motion, the PCRA court erred in concluding that the coordinate jurisdiction
4 In Musumeci v. Penn’s Landing Corp., 640 A.2d 416 (Pa. Super. 1994),
this Court recognized that
there is an exception to the [coordinate jurisdiction] rule which
provides that the second judge is authorized to overrule the first
if new evidence or newly decided legal authorities compel him or
her to do so….
Id. at 419 (citations omitted).
-9-J-S29021-26
barred its consideration of Appellant’s instant ineffectiveness claim. See
Drapeau, 670 A.2d at 167-68.
The PCRA court’s decision also appears to invoke the collateral estoppel
doctrine, albeit not by name.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a part of the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy, which was
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The phrase “collateral estoppel,” also known as
“issue preclusion,” simply means that when an issue of law,
evidentiary fact, or ultimate fact has been determined by a valid
and final judgment, that issue cannot be litigated again between
the same parties in any future lawsuit. Collateral estoppel does
not automatically bar a subsequent prosecution, but rather, it bars
redetermination in a second prosecution of those issues
necessarily determined between the parties in a first proceeding
that has become a final judgment.
Traditionally, Pennsylvania courts have applied the collateral
estoppel doctrine only if the following threshold requirements are
met: 1) the issues in the two actions are sufficiently similar and
sufficiently material to justify invoking the doctrine; 2) the issue
was actually litigated in the first action; and 3) a final
judgment on the specific issue in question was issued in the first
action. An issue is actually litigated when it is properly
raised, submitted for determination, and then actually
determined. For collateral estoppel purposes, a final judgment
includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that
is sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.
Commonwealth v. Holder, 805 A.2d 499, 502-03 (Pa. 2002) (plurality)
(citations and footnotes omitted; original emphasis omitted; emphasis
added).
In Commonwealth v. Lagana, 509 A.2d 863 (Pa. 1986), our Supreme
Court considered whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to pre- 10 -J-S29021-26
trial suppression rulings, where separate prosecutions arose from a single
arrest. Id. at 864. The Supreme Court opined that,
in those instances where two prosecutions arise out of a single
search and/or seizure, a decision by a suppression judge
during the first prosecution can, upon the motion of the
previous prevailing party, become part of the second
prosecution. The party against whom this decision is being
offered may offer any new evidence which was previously
unavailable. See generally Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(j). Absent such
new evidence the suppression judge in the second prosecution
must adopt the findings and conclusions of the first judge, and
incorporate them into the record. Thereupon, the party against
whom the first decision is offered may have the validity of the
decision reviewed on appeal.
Id. at 866 (original footnote omitted; footnote added). “Although Lagana
involved separate actions before different judges of the same court, its
teaching is equally applicable to separate cases before courts of equal
jurisdiction in different counties of this Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v.
Camperson, 650 A.2d 65, 69 (Pa. Super. 1994).
In Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 317 A.3d 615, 405 EDA 2023 (Pa.
Super. filed Mar. 25, 2024) (unpublished memorandum), 5 this Court
addressed a situation similar to the instant case, wherein the defendant
sought suppression of evidence that resulted in charges in two counties: Bucks
and Northampton. After the defendant argued a suppression motion in
Northampton County, but before a ruling by the Northampton County
5 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating this Court may rely on unpublished decisions
of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, for their persuasive value).
- 11 -J-S29021-26
suppression court, Appellant sought suppression of the same evidence in
Bucks County. This Court stated that,
[u]nder these circumstances, [the defendant] was not precluded
from raising the motion to suppress [in the Bucks County case]
simply because he had already argued for suppression of the
evidence in the Northampton County case. Further, because
there was no ruling on the suppression motion in the
Northampton County case at the time [the defendant]
moved for suppression of the evidence in this case, the trial
court in this case was not required to adopt any findings or
conclusions from the Northampton County case.
Id. (unpublished memorandum at 5 n.3) (emphasis added). This Court’s
reasoning in Maldonado is persuasive.
Here, the Lehigh County suppression court issued no findings,
conclusions, or decision that could have been adopted by the Monroe County
suppression court. Because there was no decision on Appellant’s Lehigh
County suppression motion, the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar
Appellant from seeking suppression of the Lehigh County evidence in the
Monroe County prosecution. See Lagana, 509 A.2d at 866. For this reason,
the PCRA court erred in concluding that it was barred from considering the
Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim. Because the PCRA court did not address any
of the elements of Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim based on trial counsel’s
failure to seek suppression of the Lehigh County evidence, we are constrained
to vacate the order of the PCRA court, and remand for further proceedings.
On remand, the PCRA court is directed to address Appellant’s ineffectiveness
- 12 -J-S29021-26
claim, and is authorized to conduct additional evidentiary hearings, if
necessary, to resolve Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the sentencing court’s
consideration of uncharged bad-acts evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 36.
Appellant claims that at sentencing, the Commonwealth alleged that officers
found ammunition during his Lehigh County traffic stop, and showed a
photograph of this evidence at the sentencing hearing. Id. According to
Appellant, “[t]he Commonwealth argued [at the hearing] that due to
Appellant’s status as a person not to possess a firearm, Appellant could have
been charged for possessing the ammunition, although he was not.” Id.
Appellant claims that the Commonwealth additionally and improperly referred
to evidence that Appellant had committed an illegal act by taking a photograph
of the courtroom during his bail modification hearing. Id.
Appellant points out that neither act was referenced in his PSI report.
Id. at 37. Further, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth’s photograph of
the ammunition was not presented or admitted at his trial. Id. Appellant thus
claims that the trial court relied upon these impermissible factors as the basis
for sentencing Appellant in excess of the aggravated range of the sentencing
guidelines. Id.
In assessing Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim, we are cognizant that,
when it is clear that the petitioner has failed to meet the prejudice prong, the
- 13 -J-S29021-26
court may dispose of the claim on that basis alone, without a determination
of whether the first two prongs of an ineffectiveness claim were met.
Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 357 (Pa. 1995).
Prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for
counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance. A reasonable
probability is less than more likely than not[.] It is a probability
that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
proceeding.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 353 A.3d 609, 665-66 (Pa. 2026) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
In its Opinion, the PCRA court6 addressed this issue and, inter alia,
concluded that Appellant failed to establish the arguable merit of his claim, or
prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance:
[Appellant’s] issue relates to references made at the time of
sentencing to nine-millimeter shells and a photo from an
unspecified courtroom that were made by counsel for the
Commonwealth prior to sentencing. (N.T. 11/29/2022, at 36-38).
[Appellant] asserts that these references were neither presented
at trial nor contained in the [PSI r]eport. These references came
from text messages and a photo on [Appellant’s] cell phone that
were made part of the record as an exhibit at the time of trial. As
such, [the PCPRA court] find[s] no merit in [Appellant’s]
argument.
Additionally, the nine-millimeter shells and the photo were not a
basis for [the trial court’s] sentence that was imposed upon
[Appellant]. Although [the trial court] addressed the photo of the
unspecified courtroom at the time of sentencing, it was to
illustrate that [the court was] acknowledging the plethora of
evidence presented at trial regarding [Appellant’s] proud
6 The Honorable Jennifer Harlacher Sibum presided over both Appellant’s trial
and his PCRA proceedings.
- 14 -J-S29021-26
membership of an active gang. (N.T. 11/29/2022, at 44, 60). The
photo itself and the reference to the nine-millimeter shells had no
bearing on the sentence [the court] imposed. Rather, the
sentence imposed was based upon an extensive [PSI] report and
the circumstances surrounding [Appellant’s] conviction. (N.T.
11/29/2022, at 45).
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/23/26, at 3 (citations’ format modified).
The PCRA court’s findings are supported in the record, and we discern
no legal error in its conclusion. Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue merits
no relief. See Travaglia, 661 A.2d at 357.
In his third issue, Appellant argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court’s “use of Appellant’s
silence in the formulation of [its] sentence.” Appellant’s Brief at 45. Appellant
asserts that he exercised his constitutional right to remain silent at trial and
at sentencing. Id. According to Appellant, the sentencing court stated,
among its reasons for the sentences imposed, the fact that Appellant “sat
through the entire trial stone cold as he is here today, not an ounce of
remorse.” Id. at 45-46 (quoting N.T., 11/29/22, at 42). Appellant claims
that the trial court then imposed a sentence greatly exceeding the maximum
aggravated guidelines range. Id. at 46.
Appellant claims that, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bowen, 975
A.2d 1120 (Pa. Super. 2009), when a defendant exercises his right to remain
silent in order to preserve his appeal issues, the court may not cite the
defendant’s “failure to take responsibility for crimes they never admitted to
committing at sentencing.” Appellant’s Brief at 46 (quoting Bowen, 975 A.2d
- 15 -J-S29021-26
at 1127). Appellant argues “there can be no serious question that the court
relied, at least in part[,] on Appellant’s silence.” Id. at 47.
Appellant acknowledges his trial counsel’s explanation for not objecting
to the trial court’s statement. Id. Specifically, Appellant acknowledges the
following testimony by his trial counsel at the PCRA hearing: “I took that
specific passage to mean [Appellant’s] demeanor and appearance throughout
the proceedings, not necessarily relevant to him taking the stand and
testifying. But no, I didn’t make any objection in that regard.” Appellant’s
Brief at 47 (citation omitted). Appellant further points out his trial counsel’s
testimony that Appellant was “just staring[,] focused on what was being said
throughout the entire time, as far as I can recall.” Id. (citation omitted).
Appellant argues that his focus on the trial “does not constitute a lack of
remorse—it is what every criminal defendant has a right to do, and is expected
to do.” Id. at 48. Appellant argues that trial counsel’s failure to object
resulted in the waiver of this issue, and caused him prejudice. Id.
The PCRA court offered the following explanation for rejecting
Appellant’s ineffectiveness issue:
[The sentencing court] placed [its] reasons for the sentence
imposed upon [Appellant] on the record at the time of sentencing
on November 29, 2022. (N.T. 11/29/2022, pp. 41-51). There are
numerous legitimate factors that were placed upon the record at
the time of sentencing illustrating [its] imposition of sentence. Id.
[The court] stand[s] by those reasons.
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/23/26, at 4.
- 16 -J-S29021-26
The PCRA court did not address (1) the arguable merit of Appellant’s
underlying issue; (2) whether counsel had a reasonable basis for not objecting
to the sentencing court’s stated reasons for its sentence; or (3) whether
Appellant suffered prejudice resulting from counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.
See Prater, 256 A.3d at 1282. As such, we are constrained to vacate the
PCRA court’s order as to this issue. We remand for the PCRA court to consider
Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim under the appropriate standard. 7 See id.
The PCRA court is authorized to conduct additional evidentiary hearings, if
necessary, to resolve Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim.
In his fourth and final issue, Appellant argues that the “cumulative
prejudicial effect” of the sentencing errors warrants relief. Appellant’s Brief at
50. However, as we conclude Appellant’s second issue challenging the
sentencing court’s consideration of “uncharged” bad acts evidence warrants
7 We note that
a sentence based in part on an impermissible consideration is not
made proper simply because the sentencing judge considers other
permissible factors as well. In deciding whether a trial judge
considered only permissible factors in sentencing a defendant, an
appellate court must, of necessity, review all of the judge’s
comments. Moreover, in making this determination it is not
necessary that an appellate court be convinced that the trial judge
in fact relied upon an erroneous consideration; it is sufficient to
render a sentence invalid if it reasonably appears from the record
that the trial court relied in whole or in part upon such a factor….
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 309 A.3d 754, 784 (Pa. 2024) (citation omitted).
- 17 -J-S29021-26
no relief, Appellant’s “cumulative prejudicial effect” argument fails. No relief
is due on this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s denial of relief on
Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims premised on the sentencing court’s
consideration of uncharged bad acts evidence, and the “cumulative effect” of
counsel’s ineffectiveness at the sentencing hearing. However, we are
constrained to vacate the PCRA court’s order denying relief on Appellant’s
ineffectiveness claims premised on trial counsel’s failure to (a) seek
suppression of the Lehigh County evidence, and (b) object to the sentencing
court’s consideration of Appellant’s demeanor/silence. We remand these
issues to the PCRA court for further proceedings, in accordance with this
Opinion.
Order affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further
proceedings in accordance with this Opinion. Superior Court jurisdiction
relinquished.
P.J. Lazarus joins the opinion.
P.J.E. Ford Elliott concurs in the result.
Date: 10/2/2026
- 18 -