Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not
take any action in reliance upon this opinion until it is certified.
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
A.T.,
FILED
Appellant-Respondent Oct 02 2026, 10:29 am
CLERK
v. Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
J.T.,
Appellee-Petitioner
October 2, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-PO-1428
Appeal from the White Circuit Court
The Honorable Jason A. Thompson, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
91C01-2405-PO-74
Opinion by Judge Bradford
Judges Bailey and Altice concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PO-1428 October 2, 2026 Page 1 of 8
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] In 2024, the trial court issued a protective order against A.T. prohibiting him
from contacting his brother, J.T. In February of 2026, J.T. petitioned the trial
court to extend the protective order, which was granted. A.T. argues that the
trial court erred in extending the protective order through May 8, 2028, without
evidence of a continuing threat to J.T. Because we agree, we reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] A.T. and J.T. are brothers. The parties’ mother passed away in November of
2022. Managing her estate and the family business primarily contributed to the
brothers’ deteriorating relationship. On May 8, 2024, J.T. petitioned the trial
court for a protective order against A.T. The trial court entered an ex parte
temporary restraining order that day.
[3] The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on July 12, 2024. J.T.
presented evidence of ongoing litigation between him and A.T.’s son regarding
management of the family business, A.T. wandering around J.T.’s property and
taking photos, and several threatening communications to J.T. from A.T. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered that the protective order
against A.T. would stay “in full force and effect” until May 8, 2026. Tr. Vol. II
p. 47.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PO-1428 October 2, 2026 Page 2 of 8 [4] On February 23, 2026, J.T. petitioned the trial court to extend the protective
order. On April 17, 2026, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing, and
on April 29, 2026, ordered the protective order to be extended until May 8,
2028. Although the parties’ mother’s estate had been closed, the trial court
determined that ongoing litigation between J.T. and A.T.’s son, as well as
“perpetual threats” from A.T. (evidence of which had been presented at the
hearing for the initial protective order), justified extending the protective order.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 10. The trial court considered the following to be
perpetual threats:
a) “Now the game will begin, see you in court”
b) “I will see you in person and we will settle your childish
foolish actions”
c) “See you in federal court”
d) “I will come to office and straighten you out”
e) [A.T] was visible on videos at late hours of the evening on the
business/farm property
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 10–11 (internal record citations omitted).
Discussion and Decision
[5] A.T. argues that the trial court erred in extending the protective order. “When,
as here, a party appeals a trial court’s judgment entering a protective order, we
apply a two-tiered standard of review—we consider whether the evidence
supports the court’s findings and, if so, whether those findings support the
judgment.” S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 497 (Ind. 2023). “In making these
determinations, we neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PO-1428 October 2, 2026 Page 3 of 8
of witnesses, and we consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s
decision.” Id.
[6] The Indiana Civil Protective Order Act (“CPOA”) “shall be construed to
promote the: (1) protection and safety of all victims of domestic or family
violence in a fair, prompt, and effective manner; (2) protection and safety of all
victims of harassment in a fair, prompt, and effective manner; and (3)
prevention of future domestic violence, family violence, and harassment.” Ind.
Code § 34-26-5-1.
A finding that domestic or family violence or harassment has
occurred sufficient to justify the issuance of an order under this
section means that a respondent represents a credible threat to
the safety of a petitioner or a member of a petitioner’s household.
Upon a showing of domestic or family violence or harassment by
a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall grant relief
necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat
of violence.
Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(h). Generally, a protective order “is effective for two (2)
years after the date of issuance.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(f). “[B]ecause an
extension is necessarily derived from the original protective order, the trial
court’s determination must be viewed in light of the continuing harm or the
threat of continuing harm that necessitated the issuance of the protective order
in the first instance.” A.N. v. K.G., 10 N.E.3d 1270, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
The petitioner who seeks an extension of a protective order “bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a new protective order or
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PO-1428 October 2, 2026 Page 4 of 8
extension of an existing order is required.” J.K. v. T.C., 25 N.E.3d 179, 182
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
[7] “[E]xtension must be based upon evidence that a protective order currently is
necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat of violence
because of a continuing threat of harm.” Id. (internal quotation omitted;
emphasis in original). Evidence of new threatening behavior is not necessarily
needed to demonstrate a continuing threat.
An example of a one-time threat that would justify reissuing,
renewing, or extending an order for protection is where a
respondent—even just once—issues what amounts to a perpetual
threat: “You’ll never be safe. You’ll never know when I’ll show
up. You’d better always be looking over your shoulder. Because
one day—next week, next month, next year—I’ll get you. I
promise you that.”
S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 220 (Ind. 2020). However, the Indiana Supreme
Court has held that “a single episode of physical violence with no follow-up act,
no threat that the violence will recur, and no other reasonable grounds to
believe that” a present intent to harm exists does not justify extending a
protective order. Id.
[8] A.T. argues that the trial court erred in extending the protective order based
only on the same circumstances that had led to the issuance of the initial order.
We agree. At the hearing on J.T.’s petition to extend the protective order,
neither party presented evidence of new threatening communications or
problems that had not already been considered by the trial court when it had
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PO-1428 October 2, 2026 Page 5 of 8
initially issued the protective order. “[T]he circumstances leading to entry of a
prior order generally cannot be the sole basis for entering a new order or
renewing or extending the previous one.” S.H., 139 N.E.3d at 220. Instead,
J.T. sought to keep the protective order in place “until the remainder of the bad
blood … of the family resolves[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 52. Although the litigation
between J.T. and A.T.’s son was still pending, the parties’ mother’s estate, the
primary point of contention between the parties, had been closed since the
protective order was initially issued. J.T. had also conceded that “since the
order was issued we have not had a violation of it, and so to be fair about it, it
seems to have worked and has been respected and all of the issues that were
coming up on a rather frequent basis have been completely [re]solved.” Tr.
Vol. II p. 51. “[W]hen, as here, the respondent did not violate the prior order,
we would put the respondent in an impossible, no-win situation ‘if full
compliance with a protective order can be a basis for extending the order or
issuing a new one.’” S.H., 139 N.E.3d at 221 (quoting J.K., 25 N.E.3d at 183)
(bracketed text omitted).
[9] In support of the extension, J.T. contends that the trial court properly
determined that A.T. had made perpetual threats against him. The trial court
concluded that “Now the game will begin see you court,” “I will see you in
person and we will settle your childish foolish actions,” “See you in federal
court,” and “I will come to office and straighten you out,” together with A.T.
walking J.T.’s property late at night, constituted perpetual threats. We are
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PO-1428 October 2, 2026 Page 6 of 8
unpersuaded that any of these actions rise to the level of a perpetual threat,
especially in light of the fact that none of them have reoccurred.
[10] During the 2024 evidentiary hearing, J.T. could only speculate as to what “the
game” meant. Tr. Vol. II p. 11. In the earlier part of this message, A.T. had
stated that he would “insist on a supervised estate” and seek to recover J.T.’s
alleged underpayment of rent. Ex. 1. Because the parties’ mother’s estate has
since closed, the threat of A.T.’s hypothetical game has also likely ended. J.T.
testified that A.T.’s statements about settling his “childish foolish actions” and
A.T. coming to J.T.’s office to “straighten [him] out” came after J.T. had hung
up the phone on A.T. Tr. Vol. II pp. 13, 17. When A.T. had told J.T. that he
would arrive at his office in thirty minutes, A.T. had never come. These
statements are not like the examples provided by the Indiana Supreme Court in
S.H., in which the threats were explicitly perpetual. 139 N.E.3d at 220.
Therefore, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the
extension of the protective order. Id. at 221 (“[A] trial court may issue a
protective order only if presented with enough evidence that the respondent
represents a present, credible threat to the petitioner’s safety.”).
[11] The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Timothy P. Broden
Lafayette, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PO-1428 October 2, 2026 Page 7 of 8 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Michael D. Dean
Withered Burns, LLP
Lafayette, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-PO-1428 October 2, 2026 Page 8 of 8