Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not
take any action in reliance upon this opinion until it is certified.
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
De’Mario Streeter, FILED
Oct 02 2026, 9:49 am
Appellant-Defendant
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
v. and Tax Court
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 2, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-509
Appeal from the Porter Superior Court
The Honorable Michael A. Fish, Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
64D01-2309-F5-8182
64D01-2402-F6-1823
64D01-2410-F5-10769
Opinion by Judge Bradford
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 1 of 23
Judge Felix concurs. Chief Judge Tavitas concurs in part and dissents
in part with opinion.
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] De’Mario Streeter pled guilty to Level 5 felony domestic battery, Level 5 felony
stalking, and Level 6 felony intimidation. The trial court accepted Streeter’s
guilty plea and sentenced him to an aggregate thirteen-and-one-half-year
executed sentence. The trial court also ordered Streeter to pay court costs and
$80.00 in fees. Streeter contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing him and in ordering him to pay court costs and fees. We conclude
that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing Streeter and in
ordering him to pay court costs. However, because we conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $80.00 in fees, we affirm in
part and reverse in part.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 28, 2023, Streeter committed a domestic battery against his
girlfriend, S.D. During this battery, Streeter fractured S.D.’s jaw and caused
bruising and swelling to her face, neck, arms, and torso. As a result of the
battery, S.D. had to have her jaw wired shut and required reconstructive
surgery. On September 8, 2023, the State charged Streeter with Level 5 felony
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 2 of 23
domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury in Cause No. 64D01-2309-F5-8182 (“Cause No. F5-8182”). The State later amended the charging
information to include a charge of Level 5 felony attempted obstruction of
justice.
[3] In February of 2024, Streeter communicated threats to Portage Police Detective
N.H. “because of her occupation as a law enforcement officer” with the intent
that she “be placed in fear that the threat would be carried out[.]” Tr. Vol. II p.
15. On February 7, 2024, Streeter sent a message to Detective N.H. that said
You a smart pretty b[***]h lol I wonder if u gone look even more
cute in a … lmao u think its a game too. See, its pretty easy for
me to get what I want. Especially someone’s whole life, address,
cell phone number, location, car they drive. U name it,
anything. Literally anything! And you my friend have earned yo
self a spot....and your little friend you was with. This was fun
too you. Its gunna be even more fun to me, because its all gunna
all be unexpected surprises. Dead people are more fun[.]
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 147 (bracketed material added). Streeter sent a
second message that said “[n]o expiration date on revenge <3333 NONE! And
I don’t forget s[**]t.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 147. On February 8, 2024,
Streeter sent two more messages. In the first of these messages, Streeter
referenced a handgun and stated that it “[h]as your name written all over it
;)[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 146. In the second, Streeter said “[y]our little
friend, he’s not that smart. He’ll be dead before the new year is here. Lmao
Being dead sounds like it sucks. But these are the decisions we make when we
deal with people and play games. Goodmorning Tho ;) I love how pretty you
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 3 of 23
are <3333[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 146. On February 23, 2024, the State
charged Streeter with three counts of Level 6 felony intimidation in Cause No.
64D01-2402-F6-1823 (“Cause No. F6-1823”).
[4] Streeter also stalked Detective N.H. “[a]nd made explicit or implicit threats
with the intent to place her in unreasonable fear of sexual battery, serious bodily
injury, or death[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. On August 5, 2024, in violation of a no
contact order, Streeter sent a letter to Detective N.H. He also sent messages
referencing Detective N.H. on October 7, and October 8, 2024. On October 10,
2024, Streeter sent additional messages referencing Detective N.H., in which he
threatened to sexually batter her or cause her serious bodily harm or death. On
October 17, 2024, the State charged Streeter with two counts of Level 5 felony
stalking, five counts of Level 6 felony intimidation, and Class A misdemeanor
invasion of privacy in Cause No. 64D01-2410-F5-10769 (“Cause No. F5-10769”).
[5] On December 1, 2025, Streeter and the State entered into a stipulated plea
agreement, by the terms of which Streeter agreed to plead guilty to Level 5
felony domestic battery in Cause No. F5-8182; Level 6 felony intimidation in
Cause No. F6-1823; and Level 5 felony stalking in Cause No. F5-10769. In
exchange for Streeter’s guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss “the remaining
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 4 of 23
counts and charges captioned.”1 Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 90. The trial court
accepted Streeter’s guilty plea.
[6] After Streeter requested that the trial court appoint counsel for the sentencing
hearing, the trial court conducted an indigency hearing. Streeter affirmed that
his financial situation had not changed, he had not sold any property or
inherited property, he had not come into possession of any lottery winnings,
and he did not have any money saved. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
trial court found Streeter “indigent” and that he qualified “for the services of the
public defender.” Tr. Vol. II p. 18.
[7] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on January 30, 2026. In the
presentence investigation report (“PSI”), Streeter indicated that, due to his
incarceration, he had no current source of income but that prior to his
incarceration, he had earned approximately $6000.00 per month. Streeter’s
monthly expenses did not exceed his monthly income, and he indicated that his
financial situation had been “good[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 120. Streeter
further indicated that he would return to work once released from incarceration.
[8] Detective N.H. testified that she had initially been assigned to investigate
Streeter’s domestic battery against S.D. but she eventually became involved in
approximately ten cases against Streeter. As part of her law-enforcement
1
In addition to Cause Nos. F5-8182, F6-1823, and F5-10769, the caption included numerous charges that
had been brought under ten other cause numbers.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 5 of 23
duties, Detective N.H. had monitored Streeter’s communications while he was
incarcerated. She noted that Streeter had violated a no-contact order protecting
S.D. “[h]undreds and hundreds of times.” Tr. Vol. II p. 28. Streeter had also
telephoned Detective N.H., sent her letters, sent her messages through the jail
communication system, and given her messages indirectly through his
conversations and messages with other associates because he knew that she was
listening to and reading his jail communications. Detective N.H. gave a
lengthy victim-impact statement in which she detailed Streeter’s actions and
indicated that she had experienced “on-going fear, stress, and emotional strain”
as a result of Streeter’s actions. Tr. Vol. II p. 36.
[9] In sentencing Streeter, the trial court found the following aggravating factors:
1. The Defendant has a prolific history of criminal or
delinquent behavior as set forth in the pre-sentence report.
2. Defendant has violated no-contact order(s) issued against
him.
3. The Defendant has recently violated the conditions of
probation, parole, and/or pre-trial release.
4. The harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the victim
was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove
the commission of the offense.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 130. The trial court “reject[ed] all mitigating
factors.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 130. The trial court then sentenced
Streeter to the following consecutive sentences: (1) five years for domestic
battery; (2) two and one-half years for intimidation; and (3) six years for
stalking, for an aggregate sentence of thirteen and one-half years. The trial
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 6 of 23
court also dismissed “all remaining counts in all causes” pursuant to the plea
agreement. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 131. The trial court also imposed
“judgment liens entered for three (3) sets of court costs [2] and the $80.00 jail
booking and death benefit fee.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 131.
[10] When Streeter indicated that he would like to have counsel appointed for the
purpose of appeal, the trial court engaged him in the following exchange:
[Trial Court]: You’ve been incarcerated for some time, I’m
aware of your financial situation. I had previously appointed
pauper counsel for you and had made a finding that you’re an
indigent person. Have any circumstances changed that would
allow you to hire an attorney with your own funds at this time?
[Streeter]: No.
[Trial Court]: Does anybody owe you money that you
know of?
[Streeter]: No.
[Trial Court]: Are you an heir in anybody’s estate?
Anybody passed away and you would get money from their
estate, anything of that nature?
[Streeter]: No, your Honor.
[Trial Court]: Okay. Anybody sold any property or
anything of yours where they owe you the money from that
property sale?
[Streeter]: No.
[Trial Court]: Do you have any personal property that is
worth anything significant? I heard some folks say that you may
have played some instruments or something of that nature?
[Streeter]: No.
[Trial Court]: Anything value that could be sold?
[Streeter]: No.
2
The record indicates that the court costs imposed in each of the three actions were $189.00.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 7 of 23
[Trial Court]: Okay.
[Trial Court]: Sir, I’ll find you’re indigent and you qualify
for the services of the public defender. I’ll maintain the
appointment of the public defender service for the appeal
period[.]
Tr. Vol. II pp. 54–56.
Discussion and Decision
[11] Streeter contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him, in
ordering him to pay court costs, and in ordering him to pay $80.00 in fines.
I. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in
Sentencing Streeter.
[12] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are
reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868
N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218
(Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the
reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
We review for an abuse of discretion the court’s finding of
aggravators and mitigators to justify a sentence, but we cannot
review the relative weight assigned to those factors. When
reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
identified by the trial court in its sentencing statement, we will
remand only if the record does not support the reasons, or the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 8 of 23
sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by
the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given
are improper as a matter of law.
Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citation and
quotation omitted), trans. denied.
[13] The trial court sentenced Streeter to five years for Level 5 felony domestic
battery resulting in serious bodily injury, six years for Level 5 felony stalking,
and two and one-half years for Level 6 felony intimidation. “A person who
commits a Level 5 felony … shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between
one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3) years.” Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-6(b). “A person who commits a Level 6 felony … shall be
imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half
(2½) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Thus, the trial court imposed an enhanced sentence for the domesticbattery count and maximum sentences for the stalking and intimidation counts.
A. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Failing to
Find Streeter’s Guilty Plea to be a Mitigating
Circumstance
[14] Streeter argues the trial court improperly failed to consider his guilty plea as a
mitigating circumstance. The trial court “is not obligated to accept the
defendant’s contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance or to
give the proffered mitigating circumstances the same weight the defendant
does.” Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 9 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 9 of 23
“An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor
requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both
significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.
Streeter has failed to do so.
[15] “A guilty plea is not necessarily a mitigating factor where the defendant
receives substantial benefit from the plea or where evidence against the
defendant is so strong that the decision to plead guilty is merely pragmatic.”
Norris v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1245, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation
omitted), trans. denied. Streeter received a significant benefit from his guilty
plea. With regards to the three cause numbers at issue in the instant appeal, the
State dismissed nine felony charges and one misdemeanor charge in exchange
for Streeter’s guilty plea. In addition to these charges, numerous other cases
were also dismissed as part of the plea agreement. Our review of the record
indicates that, in total, nineteen felony charges and nine misdemeanor charges
were dismissed. Given the significant benefit Streeter received, he has failed to
demonstrate that his guilty plea was a significant mitigating circumstance.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found no
mitigating circumstances.
B. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Finding
the Significant Harm Suffered by the Victims to be an
Aggravating Circumstance
[16] Initially, we note that the trial court found three unchallenged aggravating
circumstances: (1) Streeter’s “prolific” history of criminal or delinquent
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 10 of 23
behavior; (2) Streeter violated the no-contact orders issued against him; and (3)
Streeter recently violated the conditions of probation, parole, and/or pre-trial
release. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 130.
A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to enhance a
sentence. When a trial court improperly applies an aggravator
but other valid aggravating circumstances exist, a sentence
enhancement may still be upheld. The question we must decide
is whether we are confident the trial court would have imposed
the same sentence even if it had not found the improper
aggravator.
Baumholser, 62 N.E.3d at 417 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
[17] Streeter argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found the
significant harm suffered by the victims to be an aggravating circumstance.
Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(a), however, provides that “[i]n determining
what sentence to impose for a crime, the court may consider the following
aggravating circumstances: (1) The harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by
the victim of an offense was: (A) significant; and (B) greater than the elements
necessary to prove the commission of the offense.” We have held that “in order
for this factor to be a valid aggravator, the trial court must explain why the
impact suffered by the victims exceeded that which is normally associated with
the crime.” Walden v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1165, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans.
denied. The trial court did so here.
[18] The State argues that “the harm was greater than just stalking or just placing the
victim in reasonable fear as the endless contacts and threats led to a state of
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 11 of 23
constant hyper-vigilance and fear for her life, as well as her family’s safety,
wholly disrupting Detective [N.H.’s] life[.]” Appellee’s Br. p. 15. Given the
severity of Streeter’s conduct and numerous threats to Detective N.H., we
agree. However, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in finding this
aggravating circumstance, under these circumstances of this case, we can say
with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even
without consideration of the harm to Detective N.H.
II. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in
Ordering Streeter to Pay Court Costs
[19] An abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to a trial
court’s sentencing decisions and to the imposition of costs and
fees. This standard allows reversal only when a decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law. But a
statute’s meaning and scope are legal questions we review de
novo.
Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind. 2024) (internal citation and quotations
omitted).
[20] Streeter contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay
court costs, given its finding that he was indigent with regard to appointment of
counsel. Initially, we note that while Streeter argues that the trial court did not
conduct an indigency hearing with regard to court costs, the trial court
conducted an indigency hearing with regard to appointment of counsel and
entered court costs as a civil judgment, meaning that Streeter could not be
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 12 of 23
imprisoned for non-payment. The indigency hearing conducted by the court
was sufficient to cover both appointment of counsel and the imposition of costs
and fees. See generally Wooden v. State, 757 N.E.2d 212, 218–19 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (providing that a trial court does not need to conduct a separate indigency
hearing if the trial court’s order imposing fines and/or court costs includes
language indicating that the defendant cannot be imprisonment for
nonpayment), trans. denied.
[21] We have previously concluded that “[a] defendant’s indigency does not shield
him from all costs or fees related to his conviction. An indigency determination
merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay.”
Meunier-Short v. State, 52 N.E.3d 927, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation
and quotation omitted). The Indiana Supreme Court appeared to recognize this
in Spells, stating, “a defendant may be deemed unable to pay one cost, yet able
to pay another.” 225 N.E.3d at 778. Furthermore, the Indiana General
Assembly has codified the fact that “[i]f the court finds that the person is able to
pay some of the fines, fees, and court costs, the court may prorate the person’s
fine, fee, and court costs, and require the person to pay an amount that the
person can reasonably afford.” Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5(e).
[22] In this case, the trial court questioned Streeter about his financial situation
during the guilty-plea hearing. The trial court found Streeter to be “indigent”
and that he qualified “for the services of the public defender” at the sentencing
hearing. Tr. Vol. II p. 18. At sentencing, the trial court questioned Streeter
about whether his financial situation had changed. The trial court again found
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 13 of 23
Streeter to be “indigent” and that he qualified “for the services of the public
defender” on appeal. Tr. Vol. II p. 55. In sentencing Streeter, the trial court
“order[ed] judgment liens entered for three (3) sets of court costs and the $80.00
jail booking and death benefit fee. There is no restitution.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 131. The trial court’s order did not include a specific indigency
finding as it relates to costs or fees.
[23] The PSI includes additional information relating to Streeter’s financial
situation, indicating that while Streeter did not have a source of income while
incarcerated, prior to his incarceration, he had earned approximately $6000.00
per month. Streeter’s monthly expenses had not exceeded his monthly income,
and he indicated that his financial situation had been “good[.]” Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 120. Streeter further indicated that he would return to work
once released from incarceration.
[24] Indiana Code section 33-37-2-3(a)(2) provides that if a trial court finds that a
person is not indigent with regard to payment of court costs, it can order “the
person [to] pay … the entire amount of the costs at some later date[.]” In this
case, the trial court effectively ordered Streeter to pay the court costs at some
later date. Given Streeter’s admitted earning potential post-incarceration, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.
[25] It is clear from the record that the trial court considered Streeter’s indigency but
nonetheless ordered him to pay court costs. Streeter did not face the possibility
of imprisonment as the trial court entered a civil judgment against Streeter for
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 14 of 23
the court costs. One can reasonably infer from the trial court’s order that, in
finding him indigent, the trial court determined that Streeter could pay some
costs, but not others. It was within the trial court’s discretion to reach this
conclusion. See Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 779.
III. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Imposing
$80.00 in Fees
[26] Again, we review a trial court’s imposition of costs and fees for an abuse of
discretion. Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 771. This standard allows reversal only when
a decision “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted). We review a “statute’s meaning and scope,” which are
legal questions, de novo. Id.
A. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Imposing the
Jail-Booking Fee
[27] Indiana Code section 36-2-13-17.4 provides that “[a] sheriff or an employee of a
jail may not charge an individual a fee for the individual to be incarcerated or
held in a jail unless the individual has been convicted of a crime for which the
individual was incarcerated or held in the jail.” In accordance with this statute
and pursuant to Porter County Local Criminal Rule 4940 (“LR 4940”),
following Streeter’s conviction, the trial court imposed a $75.00 jail-booking
fee. LR 4940 provides:
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 15 of 23
Pursuant to Porter County Ordinance 15-01 (February 18, 2015),
Every defendant who has been arrested, incarcerated in the
Porter County Jail, and who has been convicted of a
misdemeanor or felony offense in Porter County arising from
such arrest are liable for an Inmate Processing Fee in the sum of
$75.00. In the event an individual is incarcerated on multiple
criminal cases simultaneously, only one Inmate Processing Fee
shall apply to that period of incarceration. In the event an
individual is incarcerated at different times on separate cases, the
fee shall apply to each case and each incarceration.
Collection of the fee shall be as follows:
(a) CASH BONDS: The Clerk of Court shall
deduct $80.00 from the cash bond ($75.00 Inmate
Processing Fee and $5 Death Benefit Fee) of all
defendants designated above, and this deduction shall
take precedence over all other deductions from cash
bonds, unless a court shall specifically order to the
contrary, or shall waive the Inmate Processing Fee.
The Sheriff shall promptly notify the Clerk of Court
of the posting of such bond.
(b) SURETY BONDS: For every case in which a
surety bond is posted, whether posted individually, or
as a dual bond required by a court, an added cash
bond of $80 must be posted. The Sheriff shall
promptly notify the Clerk of Court of the posting of
such bonds.
(c) RECOGNIZANCE PROMISE TO APPEAR
RELEASE: The arrested individual is responsible for
payment of the fee upon conviction directly to the
Porter County Sheriff’s Department who shall issue a
receipt and promptly notify the Clerk of Court the fee
has been paid and the cause number for which it has
been paid. The Clerk of Court shall note said
payment on the chronological case summary.
(d) PAYMENT AS A CONDITION OF
PROBATION: An individual who has been placed
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 16 of 23
on probation and who has not paid the Inmate
Processing Fee shall pay the same as a condition of
probation in a manner consistent with their financial
ability to do so. The payment shall be made to the
Porter County Sheriff’s Department who shall issue a
receipt with the appropriate cause number and notify
the Clerk of Court of the payment. The Clerk of
Court shall note the payment on the chronological
case summary.
(e) INMATE COMMISSARY ACCOUNT: An
inmate released after conviction who has not
other[wise] paid the Inmate Processing Fee shall have
deducted from the inmate’s commissary fund at the
Porter County Jail an amount up to the full amount
of the Inmate Processing Fee. The Death Benefit Fee
is excluded from this collection method. The Porter
County Sheriff shall issue a receipt with the
appropriate cause number and notify the Clerk of
Court of the payment. The Clerk of Court shall note
the payment on the chronological case summary.
(f) INDIGENCY: Any Defendant found to be
indigent and unable to pay the Inmate Processing Fee
may apply to the Court for an Order waiving
collection of the fee.
https://www.portercountyin.gov/DocumentCenter/View/3978/2017-LocalRules-of-Court-for-the-Porter-County-Courts?bidId= (bold omitted, last visited
September 2, 2026).
[28] “If the trial court imposes fees within statutory limits, there is no abuse of
discretion.” Jackson v. State, 968 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The
$75.00 inmate processing fee was within the limits set by both Indiana Code
section 36-2-13-17.4 and LR 4940. However, the manner of collection ordered
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 17 of 23
by the trial court, i.e., including the fee as part of the judgment lien, is not one of
the collection options listed in the ordinance. Because the trial court’s order did
not comply with any of the collection options listed in LR 4940, we conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the fee. We, therefore,
reverse the imposition of the $75.00 jail-booking fee.
B. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Imposing the
$5.00 Death-Benefit Fee
[29] Streeter also challenges the trial court’s imposition of a $5.00 death-benefit fee.
The statutory authority for collecting a $5.00 death-benefit fee is found in the
chapter on bail bonds and is established by Indiana Code Section 35-33-8-3.2(d), which provides: “the clerk of the court shall: (1) collect a fee of five
dollars ($5) from each bond or deposit required under subsection (a)(1); and (2)
retain a fee of five dollars ($5) from each deposit under subsection (a)(2).” This
fee is, thus, retained from a bail bond or deposit. The trial court did not order
that this fee be retained from either a bail bond or deposit but rather included
the fee as part of the judgment lien. The fee was therefore not imposed
pursuant to the statutory authority for collection of the fee. Accordingly, the
trial court abused its discretion by imposing the fee, and we reverse the
imposition of the $5.00 death-benefit fee.
[30] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Felix, J., concurs.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 18 of 23 Tavitas, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
James Harper3
Harper & Harper, LLC
Valparaiso, Indiana
Kenneth B. Elwood
Rhame Elwood & McClure
Portage, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Kelly A. Loy
Section Chief for Criminal Appeals
Alexa R. Rojas
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
3
Attorney Harper represented Streeter during the majority of the instant appeal and filed both Appellant’s Brief and Appellant’s Reply Brief before the Court. However, effective August 20, 2026, Attorney Harper withdrew his representation, leaving Attorney Elwood as the only counsel of record for Streeter.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-509 October 2, 2026 Page 19 of 23
Tavitas, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[31] I concur with the majority’s decision that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (2) the trial
court’s indigency hearing was sufficient to cover both the appointment of
counsel and the imposition of costs and fees; (3) the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing the jail booking fee; and (4) the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing the death benefit fee. I disagree, however, with the
majority’s decision regarding the court costs. Accordingly, I concur in part and
dissent in part.
[32] Given the trial court’s determination that Streeter is indigent, I conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the court costs. Indiana Code
Section 33-37-2-3 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), when the court imposes
costs, it shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the
convicted person is indigent. If the person is not indigent, the
court shall order the person to pay:
(1) the entire amount of the costs at the time sentence is
pronounced;
(2) the entire amount of the costs at some later date;
(3) specified parts of the costs at designated intervals; or
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(4) the entire amount of the costs at some later date, less
any amount credited under subsections (g) through (i) for
the performance of:
(A) allowable community service work ordered by
the court as part of the person’s sentence or as part
of the person’s probation; or
(B) uncompensated volunteer work approved by
the court at a nonprofit or municipal corporation
that benefits the community, even if the volunteer
work is not ordered by the court.
(b) A court may impose costs and suspend payment of all or part
of the costs until the convicted person has completed all or part
of the sentence. If the court suspends payment of the costs, the
court shall conduct a hearing at the time the costs are due to
determine whether the convicted person is indigent. If the
convicted person is not indigent, the court shall order the
convicted person to pay the costs:
(1) at the time the costs are due; or
(2) in a manner set forth in subsection (a)(2) through
(a)(4).
(c) If a court suspends payment of costs under subsection (b), the
court retains jurisdiction over the convicted person until the
convicted person has paid the entire amount of the costs.
[33] In Spells, our Supreme Court noted:
By statute, “whenever the court imposes a fine, it shall conduct a
hearing to determine whether the convicted person is indigent”
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and it may order the payment of a fine only “[i]f the person is not
indigent.” I.C. § 35-38-1-18(a) (2007). When costs are imposed,
too, the court “shall conduct a hearing” into the person’s
indigency and order the costs paid only “[i]f the person is not
indigent.” I.C. § 33-37-2-3(a).
Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 775. The Court also noted that “an indigent defendant
may not be ordered to pay unaffordable fines, costs, or fees.” Id. at 777.
Further, this Court held in Howard v. State, 236 N.E.3d 735, 745 (Ind. Ct. App.
2024): “If, however, the trial court determines that the defendant is indigent or
fails to hold an indigency hearing at all, the trial court may not assess fines,
costs, and most fees.”
[34] Despite our Supreme Court’s holding in Spells, the State claims that an
indigency finding does not prohibit the trial court from imposing a fine and
costs. Appellee’s Br. p. 18 (citing McRoy v. State, 794 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003), clarified on reh’g, 798 N.E.2d 521). The State contends that the trial court
could impose the costs and fees based upon Streeter’s alleged earning ability
upon release.
[35] I acknowledge that our Court has held “[a] defendant’s indigency does not
shield him from all costs or fees related to his conviction.” Meunier-Short, 52
N.E.3d at 931. “An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant
from being imprisoned for his inability to pay.” Id. Spells, however, is a more
recent opinion by our Supreme Court, and we are required to follow it. See
Brookston Res., Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 243 N.E.3d 1127, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App.
2024) (noting that we are “bound by our supreme court’s decisions, and its
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precedent is binding on us until it is changed by our supreme court or legislative
enactment”), trans. denied.
[36] Moreover, the State is correct that a trial court may impose costs based upon a
defendant’s earning ability upon release, but this was not the procedure
followed by the trial court here. Indiana Code Section 33-37-2-3(b) allows a
trial court to impose costs, suspend payment until the defendant has completed
all or part of the sentence, and then conduct a hearing at the time the costs are
due to determine whether the defendant is indigent. Here, however, the trial
court imposed the costs and fees and reduced those costs and fees to judgment
liens; the trial court did not suspend payment pursuant to this statute.
[37] The trial court found Streeter to be indigent. Given our Supreme Court’s
opinion in Spells, I must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing court costs given Streeter’s indigency. Accordingly, I respectfully
concur in part and dissent in part.
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