Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not
take any action in reliance upon this opinion until it is certified.
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In Re the Trusts of Rodolfo Echeverria, Sr., and Dido
Echeverria, Sr.
FILED
Rodolfo Echeverria, Jr., and Dido Gamble, Oct 02 2026, 9:14 am
Appellants/Petitioners CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
Dido Echeverria, Sr.,
Appellee/Respondent
October 2, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-TR-2618
Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court
The Honorable Andrew M. Hicks, Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-TR-2618 October 2, 2026 Page 1 of 7
Trial Court Cause Nos.
20D02-2505-TR-1
20D02-0906-TR-2
Opinion by Judge Bradford
Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur.
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] In 2009, Rodolfo E. Echeverria, Sr. (“Rodolfo”), and his wife, Dido Echeverria,
Sr. (“Dido”), set up reciprocal trusts (“the Rodolfo Trust” and “the Dido Trust”
collectively, “the Trusts”). Among other things, the Trusts provided for the
future creation of a trust for the benefit of their four children (“the Children’s
Trust”), who are Rodolfo Echeverria, Jr., Dido Gamble (collectively, “the
Children”), Connie Smyth, and Elisa Nilsen. In 2013, Rodolfo died, funding
the Dido Trust, and, in 2017, Dido removed the Children as future beneficiaries
of the Children’s Trust, which was now to dissolve upon her death. In
November of 2024, the Children petitioned the probate court for accountings of
the Trusts, which petitions were denied. The Children contend that the probate
court abused its discretion in denying their petitions for accountings. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 1, 2009, Rodolfo executed the Rodolfo Trust Instrument, which was an
amended version of a trust he had created in 1995, and Dido executed the Dido
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-TR-2618 October 2, 2026 Page 2 of 7
Trust Instrument (collectively, “the Trust Instruments”). The reciprocal Trust
Instruments provided that, if either spouse survived the other, the trust property
would be divided into two funds, the marital share, which would fund the
Marital Trust for the benefit of the survivor, and the exempt share, which would
fund the Exempt-Share Trust. The Trust Instruments also provided for the
creation of a Children’s Trust, which would remain unfunded until it had
received the remaining principal from the Exempt-Share and Marital Trusts
upon the death of the surviving spouse. The four beneficiaries of the Children’s
Trust were designated as the Children, Smyth, and Nilsen.
[3] Rodolfo died in 2013, which funded the Dido Trust. On July 1, 2017, Dido
amended the Dido Trust to provide that the Children’s Trust would terminate
upon her death, and the property that would have funded it would be
distributed to Nilsen, removing the Children and Smyth as beneficiaries. On
November 22, 2024, the Children petitioned the probate court to order an
accounting for both the Rodolfo Trust and the Dido Trust. On May 13, 2025,
the probate court ordered that the petitions be addressed in separate cause
numbers.
[4] On July 23, 2025, the probate court denied both petitions. Regarding the
Rodolfo Trust, the probate court found the Children were, at best, remainder
beneficiaries of the Children’s Trust, not the Rodolfo Trust, and that their
“double-contingent remainder interest in the unfunded Children’s Trust does
not imbue them with any present interest in the Rodolfo Trust.” Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 172. As for the Dido Trust, the probate court concluded that the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-TR-2618 October 2, 2026 Page 3 of 7
Children were neither direct, income, nor remainder beneficiaries of it, noting
that they were, at best, remainder beneficiaries of the Children’s Trust and that,
in any event, Dido had altered the Dido Trust in 2017 to effectively eliminate
the Children’s Trust.
[5] On August 22, 2025, the Children moved to correct error, which motion the
probate court denied on September 24, 2025. In November of 2025, we granted
the Children’s motion to consolidate both of their appeals of the probate court’s
denials of their petitions for accountings into this cause number.
Discussion and Decision
[6] The Children contend that the probate court abused its discretion in denying
their requests for accountings of the Rodolfo and Dido Trusts. The sole
question before us is whether the Children are entitled to request an accounting
of the Trusts because they qualify as beneficiaries of them. Pursuant to Chapter
5, section 12, of the Indiana Trust Code (the “Trust Code”), upon a petition by
a beneficiary, “the court may direct the trustee to file a verified written
statement of accounts[.]” Ind. Code § 30-4-5-12(c). “The term ‘may’ in a
statute ordinarily implies a permissive condition and a grant of discretion.”
Romine v. Gagle, 782 N.E.2d 369, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.
“Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court’s decision
whether to order an accounting.” Kovenock v. Mallus, 660 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs “if the trial court’s
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court[.]” DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Brown, 29 N.E.3d 729, 732 (Ind.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-TR-2618 October 2, 2026 Page 4 of 7
2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We do not reweigh the evidence
but, instead, determine whether the evidence before the trial court can serve as a
rational basis for its decision. Id.
[7] Three types of beneficiaries may be entitled to an accounting: a trust, income
beneficiaries, and remainder beneficiaries. Ind. Code § 30-2-14-2(2). The
Children are not a trust and have never been income beneficiaries of the Trusts,
who are “person[s] to whom net income of a trust is or may be payable.” Ind.
Code § 30-2-14-5. This leaves only the possibility that the Children are
“remainder beneficiaries,” who are “person[s] entitled to receive principal when
an income interest ends.” Ind. Code § 30-2-14-11; see also Ind. Code § 30-4-1-2(20) (“‘Remainderman’ means a beneficiary entitled to principal, including
income which has been accumulated and added to the principal.”).
[8] The Children are not remainder beneficiaries of the Dido Trust because the
Children’s Trust will not be funded upon Dido’s death, leaving no principal for
them to receive. As for the Rodolfo Trust, the Children seem to be remainder
beneficiaries of it, but that does not mean that they are automatically entitled to
an accounting; as we have stated, “it appears that in order to be considered
‘entitled to principal,’ and thus entitled to the rights and remedies of a
‘beneficiary’ under the Trust Code, a remainder beneficiary must have a vested
interest in the trust estate.” Lewis v. Clifton, 837 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 n.1 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005).
A remainder is vested when there is a present fixed right of future
enjoyment; in other words, it is given to an ascertained person and
is not subject to a condition precedent. A contingent remainder is
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-TR-2618 October 2, 2026 Page 5 of 7
merely the possibility or prospect of an estate which exists when
what would otherwise be a vested remainder is subject to a
condition precedent, or is given to an uncertain person or persons.
Id. at 1019 (citations omitted). In other words, “vested” means that the only
scenario in which you will not receive the remainder is if you die before it
passes to you. Although the Children claim that their interests in the Rodolfo
Trust are vested, this is incorrect; whatever interest they may have is contingent
(at the very least) upon Dido dying before them. Consequently, they do not
qualify as “beneficiaries” of the Rodolfo Trust and are not entitled to seek an
accounting of it. See id. at 1018 n.1, 1019.
[9] The Children draw our attention to Marshall v. Ilsley Trust Co., N.A. v.
Woodward, 848 N.E.2d 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), in which we concluded that a
contingent beneficiary could obtain an accounting, but only if he or she was a
named beneficiary in the trust instrument. Id. at 1184. Marshall does not help
the Children, however, because they are not named as beneficiaries in the
Rodolfo Trust, the Children’s Trust is, and Marshall specifically “limit[s] the
right of an accounting to those remote contingent beneficiaries who are named
in the trust document.” Id. (emphasis in original). We conclude that the
probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Children’s petitions for
accountings of the Trusts.
[10] We affirm the judgment of the probate court.
Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-TR-2618 October 2, 2026 Page 6 of 7 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
Robert J. Palmer
Brad L. Varner
Cortney N. Sweat
May • Oberfell • Lorber LLP
Mishawaka, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Mark D. Boveri
Alex C. Bowman
Krieg DeVault LLP
Mishawaka, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-TR-2618 October 2, 2026 Page 7 of 7