SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
Case No. 6D2025-2413
Lower Tribunal No. 2024-CA-002218
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellant,
v.
ALEAH A. HOLMS,
Appellee.
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Collier County.
Lauren L. Brodie, Judge.
October 2, 2026
KAMOUTSAS, J.
Progressive Michigan Insurance Company appeals a nonfinal Order Denying
Exceptions and Approving the General Magistrate’s Status Report and
Recommended Order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(a)(3)(C)(i). However, as explained below, we dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction because the order on appeal does not determine personal jurisdiction.
The relevant procedural history is as follows. Aleah Holms filed a complaint
and in response, Progressive filed an answer and affirmative defenses, which
concededly did not raise the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Progressive then moved for leave to amend its answer to include this affirmative
defense and filed a proposed amended answer raising lack of personal jurisdiction.
Progressive also moved to dismiss count II of Holms’s complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The trial court granted Progressive’s motion for leave to amend and
accepted its proposed amended answer and affirmative defenses as filed. Holms
moved to strike portions of Progressive’s amended pleading with respect to the lack
of personal jurisdiction as an affirmative defense. The trial court referred
Progressive’s still-pending motion to dismiss and Holms’s motion to strike to a
general magistrate under rule 1.490.
After a hearing, the magistrate entered a recommended order, which stated:
Defendant had the option to raise a lack of personal jurisdiction defense
either in a pre-answer motion or the answer. See Gannon v. Cuckler, 281
So. 3d 587, 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). If the defense is not joined in the
pre-answer motion it may not be asserted in a subsequent motion . . . any
defense not asserted in a pre-answer motion or the answer is waived. Id.
Defendant, Progressive Michigan Insurance Company failed to assert a
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(2) motion to dismiss at the outset of the action
and instead elected to raise personal jurisdiction as an affirmative
defense in its amended answer which superseded its original answer.
The current motion to dismiss was filed after the filing of the initial
answer and the amended answer, and therefore, the defense of personal
jurisdiction cannot be raised in the current motion.
The recommended order concluded that “Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Portions of
Progressive Michigan Insurance Company’s Lack of Personal Jurisdiction as an
Affirmative Defense is DENIED [and] Progressive Michigan’s Motion to Dismiss
Count II of Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is DENIED.” After a hearing
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on Progressive’s exceptions to the recommended order, the trial court entered the
order on review denying Progressive’s exceptions and approving the recommended
order.
Jurisdiction is a threshold matter. Progressive Marathon Ins. v. Rivera, 430
So. 3d 367, 368 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026); Art. V, § 4 (b)(1), Fla. Const. (“District courts
of appeal . . . may review interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided
by rules adopted by the supreme court.”); Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(B) (“District
courts of appeal shall review, by appeal . . . nonfinal orders as prescribed by rule
9.130.”). Appellant asserts appellate jurisdiction based on rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i),
which authorizes this Court’s review of non-final orders, but such review is “limited
to those that . . . determine . . . the jurisdiction of the person.” We have recently
recognized that “[t]he rule requires that an interlocutory order on appeal must
actually adjudicate and determine the personal jurisdiction issue.” Rivera, 430 So.
3d at 368 (quoting Torres v. SBE Hotel Grp., LLC, 403 So. 3d 883, 885 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2023)).
The Florida Supreme Court has said, “Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, Unabridged, defines ‘determine’ as, among other things, ‘to fix
conclusively or authoritatively,’ ‘to settle a question or controversy about,’ and to
‘decide by judicial sentence.’” Doctor's Hosp. of Hollywood, Inc. v. Madison, 411
So. 2d 190, 191 (Fla. 1982).
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Substantively, the order on appeal, which approves the findings of the
recommended order, does not settle a question and does not fix conclusively or
authoritatively or decide by judicial sentence as to the issue of personal jurisdiction
with respect to Progressive, nor does it find that Progressive waived the defense.
Appellant seeks to convince this Court that the order has by operation determined
the issue of personal jurisdiction, and therefore, the appeal falls within the orbit of
our jurisdiction. But on its face, that is not what the order did, nor are we allowed to
expand the scope of our jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4 (b)(1), Fla. Const.; Dexx Med.
Indus., CA v. Fitesa Naotecidos S.A., 346 So. 3d 1215, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)
(“A plain reading of rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) demonstrates ‘the requirement that we
are to construe narrowly the categories of non-final orders subject to interlocutory
appeal.’” (quoting Citizens Prop. Ins. v. Calonge, 246 So. 3d 447, 450 (Fla. 3d DCA
2018))). It follows that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.
DISMISSED.
NARDELLA and GANNAM, JJ., concur.
Joye B. Walford, Michael C. Clarke and Paz A. Garcia Griego, of Kubicki Draper, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
Stephen G. Edlund, of Sawgrass Law, PLLC, Bradenton, for Appellee.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
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