SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
Case No. 6D2025-0045
Lower Tribunal No. 2023-CA-009103
LONNE LETTERI,
Appellant,
v.
SAFEPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County.
Michael T. McHugh, Judge.
October 2, 2026
TRAVER, C.J.
Lonne Letteri appeals the trial court’s final summary judgment for Safepoint
Insurance Company. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).
Letteri raced to the courthouse to file a breach of contract lawsuit against his insurer
before the claims process broke down. Accordingly, Safepoint’s post-filing payment
of policy limits following an appraisal process that complied with the insurance
policy’s terms did not constitute a “confession of judgment” entitling Letteri to
recover his attorney’s fees under section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes (2022).
Letteri’s notice of intent to sue under section 627.70152, Florida Statutes (2022), does not change this conclusion. While this statute allowed Letteri to file his lawsuit,
it did not require it. Finally, the statute neither imposed an extra-contractual
appraisal deadline nor entitled Letteri to recover his attorney’s fees automatically.
We affirm. 1
I.
Letteri’s home suffered damage from Hurricane Ian, and he promptly filed a
claim. Safepoint inspected the property, accepted coverage, and issued payments
totaling about $200,000. A month later, Letteri submitted a notice under section
627.70152. This statute requires insureds to notify the Department of Financial
Services of their intent to sue. § 627.70152(3)(a). The notice must contain, among
other information, an explanation of “[t]he alleged acts or omissions of the insurer
giving rise to the suit” and a presuit settlement demand. § 627.70152(3)(a)2., 5.a.
The Department then notifies the insurer. § 627.70152(3)(a). The insured must give
notice at least ten business days before suing, but only after the insurer has made a
coverage determination. Id.
1
We separately affirm the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest without further discussion. See § 627.70131(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“However, failure to comply with this subsection does not form the sole basis for a private cause of action.”); see also Riley v. Heritage Prop. & Cas. Ins., No. 23-11678, 2025 WL 574244, at *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 21, 2025) (rejecting appellants’ breach of contract claims for insurance company’s failure to pay interest because claims were “thinly disguised claims for statutory breach of Subsection [(7)](a)” which were “precluded by Subsection [(7)](a)’s private action bar”).
2
Within ten business days of receiving notice, the insurer must respond to the
insured. § 627.70152(4). If the insurer does not deny coverage, it “must respond by
making a settlement offer or requiring the claimant to participate in appraisal or
another method of alternative dispute resolution.” § 627.70152(4)(b) (emphasis
added). If the insurer elects appraisal, and that process is incomplete within ninety
days after the expiration of the ten-day notice period, the insured “may immediately
file suit without providing the insurer additional notice.” Id.
When Letteri served his notice, section 627.70152 contained an attorney’s
fees provision. § 627.70152(8). That provision, since repealed, 2 grounded an
insured’s fee recovery, if any, under section 627.428(1). 3 § 627.70152(8)(a). It first
required determination of the difference between the “amount obtained” by the
insured and the insurer’s “presuit settlement offer,” and then a calculation of a
percentage based on that figure and the “disputed amount.” § 627.70152(2), (8)(a).
In his notice of intent to sue, Letteri sought more than $200,000 in additional
damages and $10,000 in attorney’s fees. In response, Safepoint required him to
participate in appraisal. See NCI, LLC v. Progressive Select Ins., 350 So. 3d 801,
806 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (“Appraisals are creatures of contract and the subject or
2
Ch. 2022-271, § 17, Laws of Fla. (eff. Dec. 16, 2022).
3
This statute has also since been repealed. Ch. 2023-15, § 11, Laws of Fla. (eff. Mar. 24, 2023).
3
scope of appraisal depends on the contract provision.” (quoting Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n
v. Branco, 148 So. 3d 488, 491 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014))). The policy outlined the
parties’ appraisal rights and procedure for it. “The goal of appraisal provisions is to
settle disputes without litigation.” Id. (citing SafePoint Ins. v. Hallet, 322 So. 3d
204, 207 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)).
The policy required each party to choose a competent appraiser within twenty
days. The appraisers would each set the amount of loss, and if they could not agree,
select a competent and impartial umpire. The policy did not contain a deadline for
the parties to complete appraisal, but if an appraisal award was filed, Safepoint had
to pay Letteri that amount within sixty days.
The appraisal process proceeded uneventfully. Both parties timely chose
appraisers, and those appraisers agreed on an umpire. But when the process did not
conclude within ninety days, Letteri sued Safepoint for breach of contract. He
alleged that Safepoint had breached the policy by refusing to pay him for his benefits
owed. Safepoint immediately moved to abate the lawsuit to allow for completion of
the appraisal process, and Letteri agreed. The umpire later issued an appraisal award
for policy limits, and Safepoint paid the award within the sixty days the policy
required. Below, Letteri conceded that any delay in finalizing the appraisal award
was nobody’s fault, and his appraiser attested that the umpire’s inability to complete
the process sooner stemmed from her post-hurricane workload.
4
Both parties moved for summary judgment. Letteri moved first, claiming the
appraisal award was a confession of judgment entitling him to recover his attorney’s
fees and prejudgment interest. Safepoint moved next, claiming it did not breach the
policy when it timely paid the appraisal award, and insisting it would have paid the
appraisal award whether Letteri sued or not.
The trial court granted Safepoint’s motion and denied Letteri’s. It concluded
the claims process had not broken down, and just because section 627.70152 allowed
Letteri to sue, it did not mean that an attorney’s fees award was appropriate or
authorized. It determined that the ninety-day deadline in section 627.70152(4)(b)
was not a deadline for appraisal’s completion, and that because Safepoint had elected
appraisal rather than make a settlement offer, section 627.70152(8)’s fee recovery
formula did not apply. Lastly, it observed that if an insurer unreasonably delayed
the appraisal process or payout, a confession of judgment allowing for fee
entitlement may occur. But it concluded that this had not occurred.
II.
We review de novo the trial court’s summary judgment. Pial Holdings, LTD
v. Riverfront Plaza, LLC, 379 So. 3d 547, 550 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (citing Volusia
Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000)). We
likewise review statutory interpretation issues de novo. See Marlin Constr. Grp.,
LLC v. Bollinger, 412 So. 3d 812, 815 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024).
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III.
On this record, no confession of judgment occurred. We decline to apply this
judicially created doctrine when the parties’ claim process has not broken down, and
the insured races to the courthouse to seek his attorney’s fees under section
627.428(1). Nothing about section 627.70152 alters this conclusion.
A.
Section 627.70152 has never provided an independent right to attorney’s fees;
our inquiry is driven by section 627.428(1)’s applicability. See Citizens Prop. Ins.
v. Vazquez, 368 So. 3d 456, 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). As the Fourth District
explained, section 627.70152(8)’s plain language recognizes section 627.428(1) as
the source of the insured’s fee claim. See id. (citing § 627.70152(8)). And we agree
with our sister court that “a dispute over attorney’s fees alone cannot be the trigger
for a lawsuit or a fee award” under section 627.70152. See id.
B.
Section 627.428(1) is inapplicable to Letteri’s case, and it does not compel his
fee recovery. Before its repeal, this statute provided that an insured could recover
his attorney’s fees “[u]pon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the courts
of this state against an insurer and in favor of any named or omnibus insured or the
named beneficiary under a policy or contract executed by the insurer.” § 627.428(1).
Of course, no such judgment occurred when Safepoint paid the appraisal award. But
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the Florida Supreme Court broadened section 627.428(1)’s applicability to include
situations where an insurer settled a case before a judgment’s entry. See Wollard v.
Lloyd’s & Cos. of Lloyd’s, 439 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1983). In Wollard, an insured
suffered a loss, and the insurer denied coverage. Id. at 217–18. The insured hired
an attorney and sued. Id. at 218. On the eve of trial, the parties settled. Id. The
trial court awarded the insured his attorney’s fees, but the district court reversed,
relying on section 627.428’s plain language requiring a judgment’s entry. Id. The
Wollard Court disagreed, reasoning that the statute’s “literal requirement . . . exalts
form over substance to the detriment of public policy.” Id. It observed that
“[r]equiring the plaintiff to continue litigation in spite of an acceptable offer of
settlement . . . puts an unnecessary burden on the judicial system, fails to protect any
interest—the insured’s, the insurer’s or the public’s—and discourages any attempt
at settlement.” Id. This “confession of judgment doctrine” thus addressed policy
considerations; the Wollard Court concluded it was unfair to require an insured to
continue litigating a lawsuit that the insurer forced him to file based on its belated
acceptance of its contractual breach. Id.
Untethered to the statute’s plain language, the confession of judgment
doctrine led to predictable questions. Relevant here, whether an insured is entitled
to fees when an insurer did not breach the policy, but the parties’ resolution occurred
after the insured had filed suit. Our sister courts have all said no. See, e.g., Allstate
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Fire & Cas. Ins. v. Castro, 351 So. 3d 127, 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022); Progressive
Select Ins. v. Hilchey, 396 So. 3d 775, 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024); Valdivieso v.
Citizens Prop. Ins., 388 So. 3d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024); People’s Tr. Ins. v.
Farinato, 315 So. 3d 724, 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Lorenzo,
969 So. 2d 393, 397 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). The Lorenzo court, for example, declined
to apply the confession of judgment doctrine “where the insureds were not forced to
sue to receive benefits; applying the doctrine would encourage unnecessary litigation
by rewarding a race to the courthouse for attorney’s fees even where the insurer was
complying with its obligations under the policy.” 969 So. 2d at 398. The Farinato
court asked whether the insured’s lawsuit “was filed for a legitimate purpose, and
whether the filing acted as a necessary catalyst to resolve the dispute and force the
insurer to satisfy its obligations under the insurance contract.” 315 So. 3d at 728
(quoting State Farm Fla. Ins. v. Lime Bay Condo., Inc., 187 So. 3d 932, 935 (Fla.
4th DCA 2016)). If it was not, the confession of judgment doctrine did not apply.
Id.
While we are bound by Wollard’s holding and must apply the confession of
judgment doctrine, we need not expand it to include situations to which the holding
does not pertain. See Pedroza v. State, 291 So. 3d 541, 547 (Fla. 2020). We thus
agree with our sister courts that the doctrine does not apply to a “race to the
courthouse” situation. And this is what Letteri did here. Safepoint accepted
8
coverage and elected its right to appraisal. This process led to a policy-limits payout
that Safepoint timely paid under the policy. Letteri did not have to sue Safepoint to
obtain this recovery. Safepoint did not, for example, avoid or delay appraisal or
payment following appraisal. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Ins. of Ill. v. Meadows
MRI, LLP, 900 So. 2d 676, 678–79 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (concluding confession of
judgment occurred post-appraisal when insured had to hire counsel to compel insurer
to accept coverage and seek declaratory relief on “an expensive and drawn out”
appraisal procedure); Goff v. State Farm Fla. Ins., 999 So. 2d 684, 688 (Fla. 2d DCA
2008) (awarding fees under confession of judgment theory because “lawsuit forced
[insurer] to request an appraisal and to pay significant additional amounts”).
Nobody forced Letteri to sue to receive his benefits, and his lawsuit did not act as a
necessary catalyst to resolve the dispute. The confession of judgment doctrine does
not apply.
IV.
Section 627.70152 does not alter this conclusion. It permitted Letteri to sue
Safepoint when appraisal had not concluded within ninety days. See §
627.70152(4)(b); Burzee v. Am. Traditions Ins., 425 So. 3d 1161, 1163 (Fla. 6th
DCA 2025). But the statute’s permissiveness did not compel his actions. See §
627.70152(4)(b) (“If the appraisal or alternative dispute resolution has not been
concluded within 90 days after the expiration of the 10-day notice of intent to initiate
9
litigation specified in subsection (3), the claimant or claimant’s attorney may
immediately file suit without providing the insurer additional notice.” (emphasis
added)).
Nor does this ninety-day deadline to sue constitute a deadline for an
appraisal’s completion. The statute does not reference such a deadline. Neither does
the policy. Concluding a deadline existed would require us to add something to the
statute that is not there, and we decline this invitation. See Dep’t of Child. & Fams.
v. J.H., 418 So. 3d 765, 775 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (citing Iselin v. United States, 270
U.S. 245, 251 (1926)).
Finally, we reject Letteri’s invitation to award fees based on section
627.70152(8)’s formula, which turned, in part, on the insurer’s presuit settlement
offer. Letteri insists that because Safepoint did not make a settlement offer, we
should assess its “presuit settlement offer” at $0. See id. § 627.70152(2), (8)(a). To
Letteri, a zero-dollar presuit offer justifies his fee recovery under the statute. But he
again misreads section 627.70152 to include words that are not there. The statute
did not require an insurer to make a settlement offer if it did not deny coverage and
instead elected to force an insured to participate in appraisal. See § 627.70152(4)(b)
(“If an insurer is responding to a notice provided to the insurer alleging an act or
omission by the insurer other than a denial of coverage, the insurer must respond by
making a settlement offer or requiring the claimant to participate in appraisal or
10
another method of alternative dispute resolution.” (emphasis added)). Because
Safepoint accepted coverage of Letteri’s loss and invoked appraisal, it need not have
made a presuit settlement offer. See id. § 627.70152(4)(b); Telophase Soc. of Fla.,
Inc. v. State Bd. of Funeral Dirs. & Embalmers, 334 So. 2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1976)
(“‘Or’ when used in a statute is generally to be construed in the disjunctive.” (citation
omitted)).
V.
On this record, the confession of judgment doctrine does not apply, and Letteri
has no basis to recover his attorney’s fees. We thus affirm.
AFFIRMED.
STARGEL and BROWNLEE, JJ., concur.
Michael A. Cassel, of Cassel Law, P.A., Hollywood, and Mark A. Boyle and Thomas E. Shepard, of Boyle, Leonard & Anderson, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant.
Patrick M. Chidnese and Frieda C. Lindroth, of Bickford & Chidnese, LLP, Tampa, for Appellee.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
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