FILED
Oct 02, 2026
07:37 AM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Patricia Evans Docket No. 2025-60-2109
v. State File No. 90422-2024
Kroger Company
Appeal from the Court of Workers’
Compensation Claims
Joshua D. Baker, Judge
Affirmed and Remanded
In this interlocutory appeal, the employee questions the trial court’s denial of her Rule 60 motion for relief from an order. The employee alleged an injury to her knee, and the employer initiated benefits, including medical care. After the authorized physician opined the employee’s condition was not primarily caused by her work injury, the employer declined to provide additional benefits. The employee filed a petition for benefits, and, over the course of approximately eleven months, the trial court held two expedited hearings. After each, the court found the employee was unlikely to prevail at trial and denied her claim for additional benefits. Neither of those orders was timely appealed. The employee then filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing she is entitled to relief because she did not receive the order in time to file an interlocutory appeal. The trial court denied the motion, and the employee has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case.
Judge Meredith B. Weaver delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined.
Patricia Evans, employee-appellant, pro se
Jenna M. Macnair and Heather H. Douglas, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employerappellee, Kroger Company
1
Memorandum Opinion1
As this appeal only concerns the trial court’s denial of a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the factual and procedural history is provided for context only. Patricia Evans (“Employee”) works for Kroger Company (“Employer”). On December 19, 2024, she turned to walk away from assisting a customer in the self-checkout area and heard a loud pop in the back of her left knee, which then “buckled.” Employee reported the incident immediately and selected American Family Care from a panel of urgent care clinics on December 20.
Employee was seen that day by Dr. Robert Jackson, who diagnosed her with a strain and assigned work restrictions. Ten days later, Dr. Jackson referred Employee to an orthopedist for “both back and knee.” Employer provided a panel, and Employee selected Dr. William Kurtz, who saw Employee on February 3, 2025. During that visit, Employee described the incident on December 19 as well as a history of knee issues. Upon reviewing her x-rays, Dr. Kurtz diagnosed Employee with an exacerbation of her preexisting osteoarthritis and a Baker’s cyst. Dr. Kurtz indicated Employee might eventually need a knee replacement due to her “bone-on-bone” arthritis, which he suggested would be covered “under her private insurance.” He provided an injection and referred her to physical therapy. Employee complained of ongoing pain at her follow-up one week later, and Dr. Kurtz again referred her to therapy.
On February 26, 2025, Dr. Kurtz completed a questionnaire for Employer in which he agreed that neither Employee’s osteoarthritis nor her Baker’s cyst was “more than 51%” caused by the December 19 work incident. He also stated, “[Employee’s need for] continuing treatment is due to her pre-existing arthritis.” As such, Employer issued a notice of denial on March 4, 2025.2 Employee obtained an unauthorized MRI on March 12, 2025, which indicated a meniscal tear. She filed a petition for benefits on April 2, 2025, and, following the issuance of a dispute certification notice, filed a request for expedited hearing on June 2, 2025.
Following a hearing, the court issued an order denying benefits on August 12, 2025, finding that Employee had not met her burden of establishing she will likely prevail at a hearing on the merits in light of the authorized physician’s opinion regarding the primary cause of her condition. That order was not appealed.
1
This decision is being filed pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-22-.03(1) (2023). 2
Employee returned to Dr. Kurtz on March 17, and he noted that she had requested an MRI at her February 10 appointment. He had explained an MRI was unnecessary as the x-rays showed bone-on-bone arthritis that preexisted the incident at work. He further stated that he anticipated an MRI would show degenerative meniscal tears due to her pre-existing arthritis and that he would be releasing Employee at maximum medical improvement at her follow-up in four weeks.
2
Employee filed a new request for expedited hearing in January 2026. At that point, she had seen two unauthorized orthopedic physicians, Dr. Lee Swiderick and Dr. Gregg Motz. Dr. Swiderick indicated Employee’s pain was primarily caused by “IT band syndrome” but declined to provide a causation opinion or be deposed.3 Dr. Motz indicated a new MRI would be necessary for further evaluation of her complaints, but he stated Employee “clearly will eventually need a [total knee replacement] for her [osteoarthritis].” His medical note contains no opinions regarding the reported work accident or causation.
Thereafter, Employer sent Dr. Kurtz another questionnaire, which he completed on May 11, 2026, and in which he confirmed his prior opinion regarding causation and medical treatment. A second expedited hearing was held on July 1, 2026, and the court issued an order on July 10, again finding Employee had not met her burden sufficiently to support an order for additional benefits. That order was not timely appealed.4
On July 27, 2026, Employee filed a “Motion to Set Aside Dismissal,” asking the court to set aside dismissal of her “appeal” because she “missed the deadline due to excusable neglect. I do not own a computer, my smartphone is complete [sic] unable to open the court portal or download legal files, and my physical mail has been heavily delayed.” Employee than asked the trial court to place her case “back on the active docket under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.” The trial court issued an order denying the motion on August 5, finding there was no clear and convincing evidence of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect as contemplated by Rule 60.02. It further observed that because the order denying benefits was interlocutory and not final, it was not subject to Rule 60. Employee has appealed.
Neither party filed a brief on appeal. In the absence of a brief, we have been presented with no meaningful legal argument to explain how Employee believes the trial court erred. As stated by the Tennessee Supreme Court, “[i]t is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her.” Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that “relief under Rule 60.02 is available ‘from a final judgment.’” Henry v. Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475, 480 (Tenn. 2003) (emphasis added). Given that no final judgment has been rendered in this case, Rule 60 is inapplicable. The order denying benefits is interlocutory in nature, and Employee may take appropriate steps
3
IT band syndrome, which stands for iliotibial band syndrome, is an inflammatory process that can cause lateral knee pain. See Razib Khaund & Sharon H. Flynn, Iliotibial Band Syndrome: A Common Source of Knee Pain, 71(8) Am. Fam. Physician 1529, 1545-50 (2005), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15864895/ [https://perma.cc/15864895] (last visited Sep. 30, 2026).
4
On August 10, Employee filed an untimely notice of appeal of the July 10 order, which we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(2)(A) (2026); Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-22-.01(3) (2023).
3
in the litigation process to obtain and submit additional proof in support of her claim for additional benefits.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand the case. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employee.
4