In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-24-00351-CV
GARY W. SHAW AND PAMELA SHAW, Appellants
V.
1910 LONGMIRE LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23-02-02487-CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION
1910 Longmire LLC (“Longmire”) sued Gary W. Shaw and Pamela Shaw
(collectively, “the Shaws”) doing business as “All Metal Buildings” over the
construction of two metal buildings.1 After a bench trial, the trial court signed a Final
Judgment for Longmire awarding $56,703.16 in damages and $4,250.00 in
attorney’s fees plus post-judgment interest. In six issues, the Shaws challenge the
1
For purposes of clarity, where necessary, we refer to Gary and Pamela by their first names.
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trial court’s judgment complaining: in issue one, that the trial court erred in its
findings of fact and application of the law; in issues two through five, that specific
evidence purportedly admitted at trial supported the Shaws’ version of events; and
in issue six, that Longmire failed to timely provide the Shaws with its trial exhibits.
The Shaws also contend that Longmire lacked standing to bring this lawsuit. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment as discussed below.
Background
In February 2023, Longmire filed its Original Petition against the Shaws.
Longmire pleaded that it entered into contracts with the Shaws for the construction
of two metal buildings. Robert Powell was Longmire’s president and designated
corporate representative. The record shows that the Shaws submitted proposals for
the construction of the metal buildings that stated they were for “the Powell Office
Building A” and “the Powell Office Building B.” Documents showed that the Shaws
sent the proposals to the attention of Jack Carlisle, who was the corporate
representative of In the Loop Construction, LLC, which acted as Longmire’s general
contractor. That said, Powell himself signed the proposals. The record also contains
multiple communications between Powell and Gary directly regarding terms,
specifications, price, and delivery.
Longmire alleged that Gary represented steel prices would increase in March
2022, and if Longmire paid forty percent down, Gary would “lock in” the lower steel
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price. Longmire pleaded that it paid All Metal Buildings $45,446.17 “to enable Gary
Shaw to place the order for the materials at the lower steel rate.” It claimed that
Gary’s representation was false, and Gary failed to order the materials for the
buildings until after Christmas 2022. Longmire also alleged that All Metal Buildings
did not use any of the $45,446.17 as a down payment on the materials to lock in the
lower rate for steel. It pleaded that Gary also falsely represented that the materials
for one building would be delivered on December 17, 2022, and the materials for the
other building would be delivered on December 22, 2022. It claimed that Gary knew
this was false when he made the representations, because no materials were ordered
until after Christmas 2022. Longmire asserted causes of action for breach of contract,
common-law fraud, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. It sought
actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
The Shaws’ Original Answer contained a verified denial asserting that they
did not contract with Longmire. Instead, they asserted that the contract was between
Gary and Carlisle, the “Owner/Managing Member” of In the Loop Construction.
Thus, the Shaws claimed they were not liable to Longmire as alleged.
After a bench trial, on September 13, 2024, the trial court signed a Final
Judgment for Longmire and awarded damages of $56,703.16 plus attorney’s fees of
$4,250.00 to be paid jointly and severally by the Shaws. It also awarded postjudgment interest. The trial court based its judgment on the “trial evidence,
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testimony and c[re]dibility of the witnesses presented at trial[.]” The Shaws timely
appealed.
On appeal, the Shaws provided this Court a single reporter’s record volume
containing only the exhibits. They did not provide the reporter’s record that included
any testimony adduced at trial.
Standing
To begin, the Shaws contend that Longmire lacked standing to sue, as their
contract was with Longmire’s general contractor, Carlisle of In the Loop
Construction. They also argue that “all communications, deliverables and delays”
were due to the general contractor.
“[S]tanding is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining a suit[.]” Tex. Ass’n
of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). Subject-matter
jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case, and standing is a
prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34
S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000). “[S]tanding focuses on the question of who may
bring an action.” Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex.
1998) (citation omitted). To establish standing, the plaintiff must allege “a concrete
injury ... and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the
court.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012) (citations
omitted). Capacity and standing are necessary to bring a lawsuit. See Coastal
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Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex.
2001). “A plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of
whether it is acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal
authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the
controversy.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610
S.W.3d 763, 775 (Tex. 2020) (citation omitted). We review questions of standing de
novo, construing the pleadings in the plaintiff’s favor and considering relevant
evidence offered by the parties. See In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018).
Despite the Shaws’ argument that their agreement was with Carlisle, the
limited information available to us in the reporter’s record shows that although Gary
sent the proposals containing the agreement’s terms to Carlisle’s attention, Powell
signed the proposals. The record also reflects that Powell was the president and
designated corporate representative of Longmire. While this undercuts the Shaws’
claim that Longmire should not be suing them, as their contract was with the general
contractor, this is a question of legal authority implicating capacity to sue rather than
standing. See Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 775; Coastal Liquids Transp., 46 S.W.3d at 884.
Longmire pleaded that based on Gary’s representations, it paid a sum of money for
the purchase of materials to lock in a lower price, but Gary failed to order the
materials timely and deliver them as promised, resulting in higher prices for
materials and damages to Longmire. Thus, Longmire has alleged “a concrete injury
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... and a real controversy” between it and the Shaws “that will be resolved by the
court.” See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154.
Liberally construing the pleadings in Longmire’s favor and looking at the
evidence in the record, we conclude that Longmire had standing to sue the Shaws.
See In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 155.
Issues One through Six
We now turn to the Shaws’ issues. The Shaws challenge the trial court’s
judgment in six issues and complain: in issue one, that the trial erred in its findings
of fact and application of the law; in issues two through five, that specific evidence
purportedly admitted at trial supported the Shaws’ version of events; and in issue
six, that Longmire failed to timely provide the Shaws with its trial exhibits. Each of
these issues requires a complete reporter’s record for review. That said, the Shaws
have submitted a single volume of the reporter’s record containing only the trial
exhibits. We do not have a transcript containing the testimony adduced at trial, the
parties’ objections, or the basis for any objections. The trial court did not make any
express findings of fact or conclusions of law.
In a bench trial, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility and weight of the evidence and is responsible for resolving conflicts in
the evidence. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819–21 (Tex.
2005); Webb v. Crawley, 590 S.W.3d 570, 578 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2019, no
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pet.). When there are no findings of fact or conclusions of law filed, all necessary
findings to support the trial court’s judgment are implied. See Webb, 590 S.W.3d at
577; Sonnier v. Sonnier, 331 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, no
pet.). “We review the trial court’s implied findings of fact for legal and factual
sufficiency, using the same standards applied in cases tried before juries.” Webb,
590 S.W.3d at 578 (citing Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.
1996); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991)).
An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears the burden to
furnish this Court with a record supporting their allegations, and absent a record of
what the trial court considered, we must presume the omitted portions of the record
support the trial court’s judgment. See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229–30
(Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (“The court of appeals was correct in holding that, absent
a complete record on appeal, it must presume the omitted items supported the trial
court’s judgment.”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Gallagher v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 950 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. 1997)); Menifee v. Chandler, No. 09-20-00127-CV, 2020 WL 7756149, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (citations omitted) (“When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence
supporting the trial court’s judgment against him, he cannot prevail without first
meeting his burden of presenting a sufficient record on appeal because it is presumed
that the omitted portions of the record support the trial court’s judgment.”).
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“[R]eviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence necessarily entails our
review of a reporter’s record since without one, ‘we do not know what, if any,
evidence was presented to the trial court.’” In re D.D.H., No. 09-07-00139-CV, 2008
WL 4509343, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 9, 2008, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (quoting In re Marriage of Spiegel, 6 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
1999, no pet.)).
Likewise, where an appellant alleges the trial court committed error that
warrants reversal, the error must have “probably caused the rendition of an improper
judgment.” Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). Appellate courts can only assess error in the
context of the entire record. See In re Commitment of Jones, 602 S.W.3d 908, 914
(Tex. 2020); Shorkey v. Wells, No. 02-25-00068-CV, 2025 WL 2989764, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Oct. 23, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). “The burden is on the
appellant to see that a sufficient record is presented to show error requiring reversal.”
Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990) (citations omitted); see
MSW Corpus Christi Landfill, Ltd. v. Gulley-Hurst, L.L.C., 664 S.W.3d 102, 109
(Tex. 2023) (citation omitted) (explaining that “[a] party complaining” of an abuse
of discretion “has the burden to bring forth a record showing such abuse”). When
the appellate record does not include a complete reporter’s record, absent
circumstances not applicable here, “the reviewing court must presume that the
evidence before the trial judge was adequate to support the [resulting] decision.”
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MSW Corpus Christi Landfill, 664 S.W.3d at 109 (citation omitted); see also
Menifee, 2020 WL 7756149, at *1 (citation omitted); King’s River Trail Ass’n v.
Pinehurst Trail Holdings, L.L.C., 447 S.W.3d 439, 449–51 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (discussing appeals based on partial reporter’s record
under Rule 34.6(c)).
Here, as the party challenging sufficiency of the evidence to support the
implied findings that support the trial court’s judgment, the Shaws had the burden to
present us with an adequate reporter’s record on appeal. See Bennett, 96 S.W.3d at
229–30; Gallagher, 950 S.W.2d at 371; Menifee, 2020 WL 7756149, at *1. The
Shaws repeatedly reference a “Bill of Lading” as Defense Exhibit 13. The reporter’s
record containing the exhibits does not show that this exhibit was admitted at trial
or even offered. While the Shaws presented a volume containing the parties’
exhibits, the record does not contain any testimony adduced at trial or establish that
the Shaws sought to introduce this exhibit. Without this, we must presume the
missing portions of the record support the trial court’s judgment. See Bennett, 96
S.W.3d at 229–30; Gallagher, 950 S.W.2d at 371; Menifee, 2020 WL 7756149, at
*1. In a sufficiency challenge, without the missing portions, we cannot tell what
testimony the Shaws adduced at trial. See In re D.D.H., 2008 WL 4509343, at *2
(citation omitted).
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To the extent that the Shaws’ brief can be read to complain that the trial court
abused its discretion by excluding Defense Exhibit 13, this likewise cannot be
established without a reporter’s record containing a transcript of the proceedings,
and the Shaws bore the burden of presenting an adequate record. See MSW Corpus
Christi Landfill, 664 S.W.3d at 109; Christiansen, 782 S.W.2d at 843; Shorkey, 2025
WL 2989764, at *2. Without this, we cannot see that the evidence was properly
offered, what objections were made, whether any objections were meritorious, and
whether the trial court’s rulings constituted an abuse of discretion. In other words,
in this instance, because the Shaws failed to meet their burden to present an adequate
record on appeal, we cannot assess in light of the whole record whether any alleged
error “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.” See Tex. R. App. P.
44.1(a); In re Commitment of Jones, 602 S.W.3d at 914.
We overrule issues one through five.
In issue six, the Shaws complain that Longmire failed to timely provide the
Shaws with its trial exhibits. For the same reasons discussed in issues one through
five above, we cannot tell whether the Shaws properly objected to this at trial, the
basis of those objections, or that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
Longmire’s exhibits. Since the Shaws failed to meet their burden to present an
adequate record on appeal showing that the trial court abused its discretion, we
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likewise overrule issue six. See MSW Corpus Christi Landfill, 664 S.W.3d at 109;
Christiansen, 782 S.W.2d at 843; Shorkey, 2025 WL 2989764, at *2.
Conclusion
Having overruled the Shaws’ issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice
Submitted on June 4, 2026
Opinion Delivered October 1, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.
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