In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-24-00318-CR
DERRICK DERAN JONES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. F23-41594
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Derrick Deran Jones was indicted for robbery, a second-degree felony. See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2), (b). Jones pleaded “true” to two enhancement
paragraphs, and the jury convicted Jones and assessed his sentence as life
imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
On appeal, Jones argues the trial court committed reversible error in admitting
irrelevant evidence of injuries sustained in an extraneous offense, complains that the
jury did not make a determination regarding the enhancement paragraphs resulting
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in a void punishment sentence, and contends that the punishment exceeds what is
allowed by Texas Penal Code section 12.33. See id. § 12.33 (outlining second-degree
felony punishment). We affirm the judgment.
Background
Several witnesses testified at trial, but we will discuss only the background
facts necessary for the determination of the issues on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P.
47.1 (requiring appellate court to hand down an opinion as brief as practicable that
addresses all issues necessary to the appeal’s resolution). In the early morning hours
of December 31, 2022, Andisha Savoy was working at a gas station in Beaumont.
Savoy was on her phone with her cousin when she was robbed. Her cousin called
911 to report the robbery. The robber left the store before law enforcement arrived.
In court, Savoy identified Jones as the person who robbed her that night.
Later on December 31, law enforcement received a “priority disturbance” call
regarding a robbery at a Family Dollar store in Beaumont. The suspect in the Family
Dollar robbery was wearing clothes like the suspect in the gas station robbery.
Jamesha Joseph was working at the Family Dollar as an assistant manager on
December 31. The robbery occurred a little after eight in the morning, right after
Joseph opened the doors to the store. Joseph identified Jones in court as the robber.
Jones hit Joseph in the head multiple times with a gun during the robbery. Jones then
took Joseph to the store’s safe, took the money from the safe and exited the store,
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where police were waiting and he was arrested. When shown a picture of the person
who robbed the gas station earlier that day, Joseph identified that person as Jones,
stating he was wearing the same hat when he robbed the Family Dollar store. The
trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction on Joseph’s testimony regarding
extraneous offenses.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Jones guilty of robbery. In the
punishment phase of the trial, Joseph pleaded “true” to two enhancement paragraphs,
and the jury sentenced Jones to life imprisonment in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice. Joseph timely filed this appeal.
Issue One
In his first issue, Jones argues that the trial court erred by admitting extraneous
offense evidence. Jones complains that Joseph’s testimony that Jones harmed her
during the robbery at the Family Dollar store was irrelevant and that he was “entitled
to be tried before the jury upon the allegations in the indictment, not upon irrelevant
matters that were not germane to the decision of the jury.”
Error preservation is a systemic requirement and must be reviewed by an
appellate court, even when the issue is not raised by the parties. Bekendam v. State,
441 S.W.3d 295, 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
33.1 governs error preservation. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. A party cannot present a
complaint for appellate review unless the record shows that the party timely objected
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or made a motion stating the grounds for the requested ruling, unless the grounds
were apparent from the context. Id. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see Null v. State, 690 S.W.3d 305,
318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). A party must also obtain a ruling from the trial court
or object to the trial court’s refusal to rule on the objection. Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a)(2); Null, 690 S.W.3d at 318. Requiring a timely, specific objection serves
two purposes: (1) it informs the judge of the basis of the objection and gives him a
chance to rule; and (2) it provides opposing counsel an opportunity to respond to the
complaint. Null, 690 S.W.3d at 318 (quoting Williams v. State, 662 S.W.3d 452, 460
(Tex. Crim. App. 2021)).
Generally, a party must continue to object each time inadmissible evidence is
offered. See Martinez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting
Ethington v. State, 819 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); see also Tex. R.
App. P. 33.1. The exception to this is when a party obtains a running objection, or
the court hears the objection outside the jury’s presence. See Martinez, 98 S.W.3d at
193. Any harm from the erroneous admission of evidence is cured where the same
evidence comes in elsewhere without objection. Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 193
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003)); see also Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
(explaining that objection to evidence will not result in reversal when the same
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evidence was received without an objection, either before or after the complainedof ruling).
At trial, video footage obtained from Family Dollar taken during the robbery
was played for the jury as Joseph narrated what was happening. The video was
admitted without objection. Joseph testified without objection that during the
robbery, Jones hit her with a gun across the top of her head, leaving a large gash.
Jones’s trial counsel did not object until Joseph testified that it caused her pain. After
the trial court overruled Jones’s objection, Joseph continued to testify about her
injuries while the video played for the jury without any further objection from Jones.
Because Jones failed to request or obtain a running objection and failed to
timely object each time Joseph testified about her injuries, Jones failed to preserve
his complaint about that testimony. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Null, 690
S.W.3d at 318. “[A] party must object each time the inadmissible evidence is offered
or obtain a running objection.” Valle, 109 S.W.3d at 509. Accordingly, we overrule
Jones’s first issue.
Issues Two, Three, and Four
In his second and third issues Jones challenges the validity of his life sentence
in the absence of jury findings determining the truth of two prior felony convictions
which served to enhance the allowable range of punishment. In his fourth issue, he
argues that without the enhancements, his life sentence exceeds the punishment
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range allowed by Texas Penal Code section 12.33 for a second-degree felony. See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (providing a punishment range between two and
twenty years plus a fine not exceeding $10,000).
“‘[T]o establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists, and
(2) the defendant is linked to that conviction.’” Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 918
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007)). However, when a defendant pleads “true” to an enhancement
paragraph, the State is relieved of its evidentiary burden to prove the enhancement
allegations, and the defendant cannot complain on appeal that the evidence is
insufficient unless the record affirmatively reflects that the enhancements were
improper. See Hopkins v. State, 487 S.W.3d 583, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing
Roberson v. State, 420 S.W.3d 832, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)); see also Magic v.
State, 217 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (explaining
that by virtue of appellant’s plea of true, the evidence was sufficient to support the
court’s finding the enhancement was true).
The record here reflects that Jones pleaded “true” to both enhancement
paragraphs. Without objection, copies of Jones’s two prior felony convictions were
admitted into evidence and described by a detective. The jury charge included the
following instruction:
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The additional Indictment allegations in paragraphs 2 and 3 as read into
the record before the jury allege that prior to the commission of this
offense the Defendant was previously convicted of at least two NonState Jail Felony offenses:
(1) Attempted Burglary of a Building-Third Degree on June 7,
1991, in Cause No. 46873-2, in the Criminal District Court of
Jefferson County, Texas;
(2) Attempted Murder-Second Degree on July 20, 1994, in Cause
No. 62435 in the Criminal District Court of Jefferson County,
Texas;
The Indictment also alleges that the hereinabove number (2) previous
felony conviction was for an offense which occurred after the
conviction number (1) hereinabove had become final.
To the additional allegations, the Defendant has entered pleas of True.
You are instructed that you shall find that the additional Indictment
allegations of Defendant’s prior convictions are True. Such constitutes
Defendant to be a Habitual Felony Offender under Texas law.
Despite instructing the jury to find that the two prior convictions were true,
the charge did not include a question asking the jury to do so. Instead, based on the
truth of the prior convictions, the charge asked the jury to assess either a sentence of
between twenty-five and ninety-nine years of imprisonment or a sentence of life
imprisonment. Jones did not object to the charge, and the jury assessed a sentence
of life imprisonment.
Jones does not argue that the record affirmatively establishes that the
enhancements were improper or that the prior convictions as charged in the
indictment were not sequential or final. Rather, Jones argues that the enhancements
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in the indictment were mere allegations “that must be proven and found to be true
by the fact-finder[.]” We disagree. Jones’s plea of “true” dispensed with the
necessity of evidence and jury findings that the prior convictions were true. An
argument similar to Jones’s was rejected in Howell v. State:
The trial court’s punishment charge consisted of two paragraphs. The
first paragraph recited that the jury had convicted the appellant of
aggravated robbery; the second, the range of punishment pursuant to
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 12.42(c). The verdict forms gave the jury
two choices; life or a term of years. The jury assessed punishment at
fifteen years.
Here there was no issue as to the validity of the enhancement paragraph.
Appellant pled true, entered into a written stipulation that he was the
same named person previously convicted as alleged, and made no
objection to the introduction of the convictions. His rights were
adequately protected by the charge. Error, if any, was waived by his
failure to request the desired instructions and failure to object to the
charge as given.
[…]
It is appellant’s position that fundamental error was committed by the
trial court in accepting a verdict non-responsive to the allegations in the
indictment, as it does not indicate whether they found the enhancement
paragraph to be true, or whether the enhancing conviction formed a
basis for the conviction. There was no objection at trial.
As said earlier, the validity of the enhancement allegation was not in
issue. There was no need to submit its validity for the jury’s
consideration. The verdict, when read in connection with the indictment
and the court’s charge, is responsive.
563 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (citations omitted).
We overrule Jones’s second and third issues.
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In his fourth issue, Jones argues that without the enhancements, the trial
court’s punishment of life imprisonment exceeds the punishment range allowed by
section 12.33 of the Texas Penal Code. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33. Because
the truth of the prior convictions was established by Jones’s plea, and because the
record does not affirmatively show that enhancement based on the prior convictions
was invalid, the allowable punishment range was properly enhanced pursuant to
section 12.42(d) of the Penal Code. See id. § 12.42(d).
Jones was found guilty of robbery, a second-degree felony, which ordinarily
carries a punishment range of two to twenty years. See id. §§ 12.33(a), 29.02 In
addition to imprisonment, a second-degree felony may be punished by assessing a
fine not to exceed $10,000. Id. § 12.33(b). Jones’s previous convictions included
two felony convictions, one for attempted murder and another for attempted burglary
of a building. See id. § 12.42(d). Jones pleaded “true” to both enhancement
paragraphs, thereby enhancing the allowable punishment range to twenty-five to
ninety-nine years or life imprisonment. See id. We conclude that Jones’s life
sentence and $10,000 fine for robbery with two prior felony convictions falls within
the applicable punishment range. See id. §§ 12.42(d), 29.02. We overrule Jones’s
fourth issue.
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Conclusion
Having overruled all Jones’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
KENT CHAMBERS
Justice
Submitted on May 29, 2026
Opinion Delivered September 30, 2026
Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.
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