In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-24-00298-CR
JONATHAN MENARD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. F21-37033
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Jonathan Menard of capital murder of multiple persons in a
single criminal transaction for the asphyxiation and strangulation of “Kim” and her
unborn child, “Kris.”1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(7)(A), (b). The jury then
1
We refer to the victims and their family members by pseudonyms to conceal their identities. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30 (protecting a crime victim’s “right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); Smith v. State, No. 09-17-00081-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1874 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 14, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
1
sentenced him to life without parole. See id. § 12.31(a)(2). On appeal, Menard raises
four issues challenging: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence relating to the murder of
Kris; (2) the trial court’s jury charge; (3) the trial court’s denial of the defense’s
motion for directed verdict as to venue; and (4) the trial court’s decision to allow a
witness to testify about an extraneous conduct and character evidence. We affirm
the trial court’s judgment for the reasons discussed below.
Background
Timothy Ledoux
Timothy Ledoux lives in Louisiana and works for a vacuum truck company.
On February 11, 2021, Ledoux was sent to a remote area in Calcasieu Parish south
of Interstate 10 in Vinton, Louisiana. He described the area as a large cattle ranch
and oil field. When Ledoux arrived at the ranch and went to open the gate, he noticed
trash in the grass to his left and “what looked like a bone or something[]” protruding
from the ground. When Ledoux looked more closely, he realized the bone appeared
to be from a human foot. He notified his employer who contacted the Calcasieu
Parish Sheriff’s Office.
Melissa Durflinger
Melissa Durflinger is a forensic detective with the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s
Office. On February 11, 2021, Durflinger was called to the scene in Vinton,
Louisiana. She described the area as “rural” and said not many people would know
it was there. That day, it was raining, sleeting, and cold. Durflinger started her
2
investigation, took photographs and video, and marked and collected evidence for
examination. Copies of the photographs and videos taken that day were admitted at
trial. At the scene, Durflinger found pieces of white fabric and tape scattered about,
leading investigators to believe it was “a deceased body wrapped in tarp, partially
exposed now in a shallow-type grave.” The next day, Durflinger was present at the
coroner’s office for the removal of the wrappings and covers on the victim’s body.
Copies of the photographs taken that day were admitted at trial. Durflinger noted
that the victim’s body was tied up with various types of tape, wire and ties along
with a tarp and a white cloth. The victim’s body was nude and areas that were
exposed to the elements were deteriorated, but parts of the victim’s body contained
in the material were preserved. Several identifying tattoos were observed on the
victim’s body.
Chris Davis
Chris Davis works in the Beaumont Police Department Crime Scene Unit. In
February 2021, Davis conducted an investigation at an apartment located at 1192
McFaddin in Beaumont. During the investigation, Davis took pictures of the
apartment that were admitted at trial.
Frank Coffin, III
Frank Coffin is a detective with the Beaumont Police Department. Coffin
interviewed Menard on January 6, 2021, before Kim’s body was found. At that time,
3
Kim was reported as a missing person, and prior to her disappearance, Kim and
Menard were in dating relationship and expecting a child together. A copy of the
interview was admitted and played for the jury. At the interview, Menard told Coffin
that Kim left because Menard told Kim he was going to do everything he could to
take their child away from her. Coffin did not believe Menard was being truthful in
his interview.
Casey LaFargue
Casey LaFargue is a commander with the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office.
LaFargue described the area the body was found as “[v]ery desolate[,]” “[r]emote[,]”
and “[r]ural.” LaFargue was on the scene to help assist with removing the body. He
was not surprised, based on the conditions that day and the conditions of the body,
that no other DNA was found. On February 11, 2021, LaFargue interviewed Menard
after Kim’s body was found. A copy of the interview was played for the jury. He felt
that overall, Menard was not being truthful in his interview, especially when he told
investigators he had nothing to do with Kim’s death or the disposal of her body.
LaFargue noted inconsistencies in Menard’s interview, including Menard’s
representations of how regularly Kim spoke with her mother.
Mother
Kim’s Mother (“Mother”) described her daughter as quiet and shy as a child.
Kim had a child in 2009 and graduated college in 2013. In August 2014, Kim was
4
charged with sexual assault for a relationship with a minor and, after a plea deal, was
sentenced to six years of incarceration. After nearly “five and half years” in prison,
Kim was released and sent to a halfway house in Beaumont in March 2020. Kim met
Menard at the halfway house. In June 2020, Kim moved out of the halfway house
and into an apartment with Menard. Kim and Mother continued to communicate
regularly. In September 2020, Kim told Mother she was pregnant. Kim began
prenatal care with doctors in Beaumont and found out she was having a boy.
The last time Mother and Kim talked was November 23, 2020. Mother
recalled that leading up to their last conversation, “I texted her several times with no
response. I, um, called and the phone just kept ringing. It didn’t, you know -- it didn’t
pick up. So, I sent Jonathan a text and I said, Hey, I’m trying to get ahold of [Kim].
Can you please have her call me.” Later that night, about 7 p.m., Kim called Mother
from Menard’s phone. After November 23rd, Mother continuously tried to contact
Kim, sending text and voice messages to Kim and Menard, and calling on
Thanksgiving. Mother became “extremely concerned” because her daughter never
called her back. Mother continued to try to contact Kim on her granddaughter’s
birthday and Christmas, including sending several messages to Menard. Menard
responded on December “10th or 11th” and Mother asked him to have Kim call her.
Kim never called Mother. On Christmas Day, Mother received an email from Kim,
5
a form of communication Kim rarely used with Mother. At first, Mother was excited
to receive any communication from Kim but then began to doubt its authenticity.
It just kept nagging at me, that I thought something about it didn’t seem
right, and all weekend I just kept reading it and reading it and reading
it. So, yeah, there was quite a bit that when I kinda looked -- I looked
at it from the standpoint of kinda the grammar and the language, the
style of it being written, and then I also looked at it from the standpoint
of really what was the content of it and did that make sense to me that
she would have written it.
Mother called Kim’s obstetrician and found out that she did not attend her last
prenatal appointment on December 15th.
On December 28th, Mother wanted to call the police, but first, she called
Menard and asked where Kim was. Menard told Mother “a couple of things[.]” First,
that he thought Kim had flown somewhere for Thanksgiving, which Mother believed
was unusual since Mother had offered to fly Kim home for Thanksgiving and Kim
had said she could not come. Menard also told Mother that someone came and picked
up Kim’s car. Menard told Mother he heard that Kim was living with a friend who
visited her in prison. Mother called this person, and the friend denied communicating
with Kim since March 2020, which Mother validated with Kim’s phone records.
Menard also mentioned that Kim’s social media page stated she moved to Dallas.
Mother did not believe this social media page was Kim’s for several reasons. Kim
did not really use social media, the page had a different name not used by Kim, Kim
did not like big cities such as Dallas, the account used an old picture of her, the
6
profile stated she was married when she was not, and the majority of her “friends”
connected to the page were in foreign countries. Mother also noted that Menard told
her that Kim had blocked him on social media, yet the social media page showed
Kim was following him, which Mother thought was “really odd” if Kim really did
not want Menard to know where she was.
The conversation with Menard did not alleviate Mother’s fears, and after
getting off the phone with Menard, Mother called the Beaumont Police Department
and reported Kim as missing. On February 11, 2021, Mother was told that Kim’s
body was found in Vinton, Louisiana. Mother identified Kim through the tattoos on
her body.
Carlos Young
Carlos Young worked with Menard at Jack in the Box. Young recalled that he
never approached Kim or talked to her because Menard would give him “looks” and
had “aggression[.]” Menard accused Young of having a relationship with Kim, but
Young denied it. Young described Menard and Kim’s relationship as “weird[,]” and
said that Menard controlled Kim. Kim would sleep in the car all night waiting for
Menard to get off his shift. Once, Young observed Menard physically assaulting
Kim while Young was visiting their apartment. Menard also sent texts to Young,
pretending to be Kim.
7
Chelsie Abbott
Chelsie Abbott was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and
sentenced to prison. She met Kim while serving her sentence. After being released
from prison, Abbott and Kim both were sent to the same program in Beaumont and
became reacquainted. She learned that Kim and Menard were in a relationship.
During this time, Abbott met David Maddox Moia and entered a relationship with
him.2 Eventually, Abbott and Moia and Menard and Kim moved to the same
apartment complex in Beaumont. Abbott recalled that the couples did not spend a
lot of time together and that Kim kept to herself. Abbott learned Kim was pregnant,
which was exciting because Abbott was pregnant was well. She recalled that Kim
was happy and excited to be pregnant, and Kim never told Abbott that the baby was
not Menard’s child. Abbott did not recall Kim ever cheating on Menard, and Abbott
denied that was in Kim’s personality to do.
Abbott, Moia, Menard and Kim made tentative plans to get together for
Thanksgiving. When Abbott and Kim went shopping for Thanksgiving items, Kim
was healthy and visibly pregnant. Abbott never saw Kim again after that day. She
never observed Kim packing boxes and moving away. Later, Menard and Moia
offered Kim’s car to Abbott, and spray painted the car a different color. After Kim
The record refers to David Maddox Moia as “Maddox[,]” but we refer to him
2
as “Moia” in this opinion.
8
was reported missing, Abbott and Moia both voluntarily went and spoke to law
enforcement multiple times. Abbott denied knowing what happened to Kim. Abbott
recalled a shift in Moia after one police interview in February 2021, noting he was
crying, hyperventilating, and visibly distressed even after they returned home. Moia
told Abbott why he was upset, and she believed him as his emotions were out of
character.
Rick Evans
Rick Evans was Kim’s obstetrician in Beaumont. Kim’s medical records were
admitted at trial. Evans confirmed Kim was pregnant in August 2020, and Kim was
diligent and regularly attended all her prenatal appointments until December 15,
2020, when she missed her scheduled appointment. He recalled that Kim’s
pregnancy progressed normally, and at her last visit on November 16, 2020, she was
around twenty weeks pregnant. Kim did not indicate that she wanted to terminate
her pregnancy, and she was happy and excited to be expecting a child.
Terry Welke
Terry Welke is a coroner physician for the Calcasieu Parish Coroner’s Office
in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Welke described his educational and professional
background and stated he has performed approximately 8,500 autopsies in his career.
On February 12, 2021, he performed an autopsy on Kim’s body. He noted that Kim’s
body was significantly deteriorated due to exposure and animals. He determined that
9
Kim probably died due to asphyxia, and he listed her manner of death as homicide.
Kim’s death would have caused the death of her unborn child as well. After
explaining that asphyxia can happen in many ways, he explained why he came to
the conclusion that asphyxia was the probable cause of death:
I did not see any evidence of gunshot wounds or stab wounds, so I put
down probable asphyxia. The reason I put “probable” is because, like I
said, a lower portion of the body was missing, so I don’t know whether
there might have been a knife that caused injuries to the abdomen and
I was unable to see. Like I said, when I did the examination, most likely
the pelvic area was gone because of animal participation, if you will,
but I really couldn’t rule out there wasn’t some sort of an injury process
involving the abdomen. So, I came up with probable asphyxia, reason
being is if someone comes and said, Well, I saw somebody shoot this
person or stab them in the lower abdomen, then I – it gives me the
ability to make a change in the death certificate in Louisiana.
During cross-examination, Welke conceded that he did not have evidence of
ligature or manual strangulation, petechial hemorrhaging, or external evidence of an
imposed injury. According to Welke there were not enough bodily fluids which
could be tested for a pregnancy hormone. Welke also denied that Kim’s body was
wrapped in a blue tarp.
Billy Stelly
Billy Stelly works in Vinton, Louisiana at Gray Ranch. Stelly recalled in
December 2020 while working on the ranch, he found a post hole digger and shovel
that did not belong to the ranch. Stelly gathered them and put them in the back of his
10
truck. Pictures of the tools were admitted at trial. In February 2021, Stelly gave the
tools to law enforcement after Kim’s body was found.
David Maddox Moia
David Maddox Moia was twenty-three years old at the time of trial and was
previously sentenced for aggravated assault as a juvenile. In 2019, Moia was
released and sent to halfway houses in San Antonio and Beaumont. While at the
halfway house in Beaumont, Moia met Menard, Kim and Abbott. He denied being
friends or hanging out with Menard or Kim. He and Abbott began a relationship and
moved into the same apartment complex as Kim and Menard.
One day, towards the end of November 2020, Menard approached Moia at
their apartment complex while Moia was walking his dogs. Menard asked Moia to
help him with something which he found “unusual[.]” Moia went to put his dogs
back in his apartment and followed Menard to his empty apartment. Kim’s body was
inside a storage room inside the apartment. He observed a “body figure” wrapped in
a blue tarp. Moia was shocked and scared. Menard and Moia picked up the body,
carried it downstairs, and put the body in the trunk of Kim’s car. Menard and Moia
then got in the car with Moia driving. He testified that when he became involved,
Kim was already dead. Moia denied knowing anything about how Kim was killed
and stated her body “wasn’t stiff but it wasn’t too loose[,]” with “[a] little stench but
not strong.” Menard gave Moia directions to drive from Texas to Louisiana. Moia
11
asked Menard what happened and Menard responded, “He was tired of her
cheating[,]” and that he “lashed out.” Moia recalled exiting the highway in
Louisiana, first going to Menard’s grandmother’s home and getting tools, which
Menard placed in the back seat of the car. Menard told Moia to cross the interstate
again and they took an isolated, not well-traveled road, to a point where the blacktop
ended and turned to gravel. Menard told Moia to stop at an area that was a “plain
field.” Menard and Moia traveled “[a] good ways[]” from the car and started digging,
Menard with a post hole digger and Moia with a shovel. Moia identified the shovel
and post hole digger found by Stelly as the same tools they used that day to dig the
hole. According to Moia, it took them about an hour to dig the hole which he
described as three feet down, five feet long, and two or three feet wide, big enough
to fit a body. Menard then told Moia to stop digging, they went back to retrieve
Kim’s body out of the car. When Menard moved the body, it fell to the ground and
the tarp opened. Moia could see Kim’s skin and that she was visibly pregnant.
Menard and Moia moved Kim’s body to the hole and Menard nudged her in the hole
and both men began to cover up her body with dirt. After covering the body, they
left Louisiana and returned to Beaumont. On the way back to Beaumont, Menard
told Moia, “It is done, don’t speak on it.” Moia denied that they had any other
conversation. Later, Moia agreed to buy Kim’s car, and Menard and Moia spray
painted the car another color.
12
After Kim was reported missing, Moia and Abbott spoke to law enforcement
several times. At first, Moia was not truthful but did tell the police what happened
to Kim’s body. Moia stated he was afraid that if he told, something would happen to
him or his family, especially Abbott and their baby. Moia regretted not telling the
police earlier and denied any of the events that happened that day were his idea.
During cross-examination, Moia stated he was truthful in his statement to law
enforcement. He did not recall whether he had his cell phone on him the day he
helped Menard dispose of Kim’s body. Moia specifically recalled telling law
enforcement that the tarp around Kim’s body was blue but acknowledged the tarp
found around her body was not blue. He also clarified that Menard drove that day.
Jerod Abshire
Jerod Abshire is a digital forensic investigator with the Calcasieu Parish
Sheriff’s Office. He explained that as a digital forensic investigator he “download[s]
and process[es] and analyze[s] a multitude of devices; cell phones, DVRs, vehicles.
I like to tell people if it’s an airplane that needs to be downloaded, we download it,
process it, analyze it and provide that in a format to -- so the investigator can view
it.” After Kim’s body was found, Abshire was called to do an extraction of Menard’s
phone obtained via search warrant. A copy of the information extracted was admitted
at trial. Abshire described his search and extraction as unbiased, explaining, “I don’t
know anything. I just -- I’m just trying to figure out what happened before and what
13
happened after this bang that might have occurred. So, I don’t know any different,
right? I don’t -- there’s no bias in that phone at all.”
Before November 23, 2020, Menard’s phone was in “good use[,]” with calls
being made and text messages being sent. Between November 23, 2020, and
November 25, 2020, Menard did not use the phone at all. Abshire stated that this
could be indicative of the phone’s content being deleted during that time. Abshire
found a photo of an Apple iPhone on Menard’s phone taken on November 29, 2020.
Menard’s phone was an Android phone. Abshire also found a photo taken at the
Texas/Louisiana state line at the Texas westbound rest stop. This photo was taken
on November 30, 2020, at 9:02 a.m.
Travis Lavergne
Travis Lavergne is a captain with the specialized investigations of the
Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Office. His specialty is cell phone analysis and mapping.
Lavergne described his educational and professional background and stated he was
tasked with analyzing cell phone records after Kim’s body was found in Vinton,
Louisiana on February 11, 2021. Lavergne explained what information is collected
from cell data records, noting this information and analysis was different than the
data collected by Abshire.
So, the call detail records are records that are maintained by the cell
carriers, and we will notify -- first, we will identify a target number that
we want to pursue a legal process on and begin preservation of the
records and then request those records maintained by the carrier, which
14
can include subscriber information; transactional records, call, text,
data transactions, could be estimated locate data, could be videos,
photographs, device identifiers, e-mails, voicemail’s, IP logs. There’s a
multitude of things that that company could maintain that we’re going
to attempt to recover.
Lavergne can use the data recovered to find where a phone is being used during a
certain time.
Lavergne managed to get a search warrant and analyze call detail records from
Kim’s and Menard’s phones. He obtained data from both phones to determine travel
at the end of November 2020. He found that their “home tower” was in Beaumont
at their apartment due to the amount of usage in that area. He disputed Menard’s
claim that he had not seen Kim since before Thanksgiving, as the records showed
their phones were near each other after Thanksgiving. On November 30, 2020,
around 3:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. both phones traveled together to Vinton, Louisiana.
Menard told investigators that his phone was stolen in November 2020 and that he
got a new phone. Lavergne disputed this and testified that based on phone records,
Menard had the same phone and used it normally throughout November 2020 and
January 2021. With Kim’s phone he noticed the following anomalies:
So, her cell phone usage, the phone’s transactions the network for what
was a known time of last contact from this investigation to the start of
the records that we pulled, her average transactions with the network
was around 200. The 22nd to the 23rd, there was a spike in transactions
up to 600, maybe around 800, kinda -- kinda significant spike, followed
by a brief valley thereafter, kind of a good little lull. I believe that the
phone lulled down to 80 transactions, which is not only less than the
day prior but less than what was typically seen on her device.
15
So, from the 23rd through the 24th, that phone was in the Beaumont
area on that Beaumont home tower. And then there is a four-day lull, I
believe, from the 24th through the 28th -- to the afternoon of the 28th.
The phone comes back on network. As a different phone now but still
the same tower and sector, home tower near Beaumont.
He explained the “lull” on her phone was “minimal to zero activity on the
phone. There are no data transactions. There are no text messages. There are no voice
calls. There’s no pinging of this phone to see where it is or where the best tower is.”
But late on November 29th and early morning November 30, 2020, Kim’s phone
reactivated and traveled to Vinton in the area near where her body was found.
Menard’s phone also traveled to Vinton, Louisiana at the same time. Lavergne
explained that around November 16, 2020, Kim’s phone changed models from an
iPhone 6 Plus to an iPhone 6, then on November 30, it changed to a prepaid phone
while still on the same cell phone service provider. After her phone was switched to
the prepaid phone, text messages were received associated with two factor
authentication “typically associated with a password reset from Google. You’re
trying to reset the password[,] and you don’t have an alternate e-mail, you can
provide a phone number for them to send that reset link to.” After the 30th, no
activity appeared on the network again for Kim’s phone.
During cross-examination, Lavergne agreed they did not have information
about where Kim’s phone was during the “lull” of data in late November, and law
16
enforcement did not have cell phone records that showed Moia being in Vinton,
Louisiana on November 24, 2020.
Brittany Burch
Brittany Burch and Menard were in a relationship and have two children
together. In the beginning, the relationship was “great[,]” but Menard became
“mentally, emotionally, [and] physically abusive.” Menard accused Burch of
cheating “[a]ll the time.” Burch testified that Menard choked her many times, but
she specifically recalled one time while she was pregnant where he placed his hands
around her neck, and she believed she lost consciousness.
I was pregnant with one of my children and holding the other one. He
was in a fit of rage. He pushed the refrigerator out of the kitchen into
the living room. It didn’t end up falling on me, but he did proceed to
choke me to the point of I was -- I was pretty peaceful. I thought I was
gonna die.
After Burch and Menard separated, Menard gained access to Burch’s social media
accounts and sent posts and messages to other people pretending to be Burch. During
their relationship he would use her social media account to try to get other people to
confess to having an affair with Burch.
James Robichaux
James Robichaux was called as a witness for the defense. Robichaux is a
detective with the Beaumont Police Department, and in 2020 and 2021, he was in
the Crimes Against Persons Department, which included investigating murders,
17
robberies, and assaults. Robichaux conducted interviews with Menard and Moia.
With Moia, he conducted at least four interviews, because he felt Moia was not being
truthful in his interviews. Robichaux confirmed that Kim’s body was found wrapped
in electrical tape and a tarp that was primarily orange, not blue, but since he was not
present when they removed the body he could not testify as to whether she was nude.
He confirmed that Moia said the tarp was blue and there was no tape even after law
enforcement questioned if he was right in his recollection. There was also no
physical evidence collected in Beaumont that connected Menard with this crime.
Additionally, no license plate readers showed Kim’s car going to or from Vinton,
Louisiana on November 24, 2020.
Video Evidence
Video evidence was admitted at trial of Menard’s law enforcement interview.
In the interview, Menard accuses Kim of infidelity, and Menard told law
enforcement the last time he saw Kim was the Sunday before Thanksgiving. He also
confirmed to law enforcement that Kim was about four months pregnant and had a
visible baby bump. Video footage was also admitted of the scene where Kim’s body
was found in Louisiana.
Issue Three
We begin our review with the issue that would afford Menard the greatest
relief on appeal, issue three in which he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
18
to support the murder of Kim’s unborn child, Kris. See Benavidez v. State, 323
S.W.3d 179, 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (explaining that insufficient evidence to
support a conviction may in some instances lead to rendition of an acquittal).
Kris’s murder
In his third issue, Menard argues the evidence is insufficient to find him guilty
of the death of Kris, Kim’s unborn child. Menard contends that although there was
evidence that Kim was pregnant in early November 2020, there was no evidence
presented that she was pregnant at the time of her death.
The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence and the weight
to be given to that evidence. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App.
2020). Thus, the jury is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, is free
to believe some, all, or none of a witness’s testimony, and may assign as much or as
little weight to a witness’s testimony as it sees fit. Id. Jurors may also draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007) (citation omitted). “[A]n inference is a conclusion reached by
considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.” Id. at 16.
When examining whether a criminal conviction is supported by legally
sufficient evidence, we compare the evidence to the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We consider all the evidence, viewed in the light most
19
favorable to the verdict, along with the inferences that could reasonably be drawn
from the evidence. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We do not assess the credibility of
the evidence, reweigh the evidence, nor substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citation
omitted).
The evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction if any rational trier
of fact could have found each of the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). “Each fact
need not point directly and independently to a defendant’s guilt, as long as the
cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
conviction.” Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)
(citation omitted); see also Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 761-62 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2023) (citation omitted) (“A proper review of evidentiary sufficiency considers
the cumulative force of the evidence.”).
A person commits capital murder if he commits murder, intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of an individual, and he murders more than one person
during the same criminal transaction. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 19.02(b)(1),
19.03(a)(7)(A). The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained:
Under the Texas Penal Code, a person commits capital murder if he
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of “more than one person
... during the same criminal transaction.” A “person” includes an
“individual.” The Penal Code in turn defines an “individual” as “a
20
human being who is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of
gestation from fertilization until birth.” It follows from these provisions
that a person who intentionally or knowingly causes the death of a
woman and her unborn child, at any stage of gestation, commits capital
murder.
Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (internal citations
omitted). Further,
[T]he State is not required to produce and identify the body or remains
of the decedent. The State’s possession of a dead body can make
proving the victim’s death easy, but the victim’s death can be proved
through other evidence, even if that evidence is circumstantial. The
notion that the careful and meticulous murderer might escape
punishment by destroying or forever concealing the body of his victim
is a distasteful one, and the murderer’s successful disposition of the
victim’s remains should not be rewarded.
And partly for this reason, it need not necessarily be known what caused
the victim’s death. [T]he cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances can support a murder conviction even if the evidence did
not prove the method of commission of the offense. Evidence of how a
victim died would likely be helpful in proving that the victim is dead
(as well proving other elements of murder), but the ultimate question is
whether the evidence, when viewed as a whole, is sufficient to establish
the victim’s death.
Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 263-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
Although Menard contends because the child’s body was not found and no
evidence was presented that Kim was pregnant at the time of her death, “[a] jury
may consider several factors in linking a defendant to the victim’s disappearance
(and ultimately to [his] death)” including circumstantial evidence. Williams v. State,
21
No. 12-24-00318-CR, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 4147, at *25 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr.
30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Neisbett 552 S.W.3d at 265). Mother testified
that Kim told her she was pregnant, Kim was pregnant when she stopped
communicating with Mother, and that Kim was receiving prenatal care. Evans stated
he was Kim’s obstetrician and that Kim regularly attended her prenatal
appointments, most recently in early November, at her last appointment she was
about twenty weeks pregnant, and she had a healthy pregnancy at the time of her last
appointment. Abbott testified that Kim told her she was pregnant, and Kim was
visibly pregnant when they went grocery shopping together for Thanksgiving dinner.
Finally, Moia testified that when he and Menard moved Kim’s body from the car
trunk, the body fell to the ground, the tarp moved, exposing Kim’s body, and she
was visibly pregnant.
Based on this evidence, a rational juror could have reasonably concluded
beyond reasonable doubt that Menard intentionally or knowingly caused the death
of Kim and her unborn child, Kris. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(7)(A); see
also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761-62; Balderas, 517
S.W.3d at 766; Lawrence, 240 S.W.3d at 915. Thus, we hold the evidence was
legally sufficient to establish that Menard committed capital murder of Kris. We
overrule this issue.
22
Issue Four
Venue
In his fourth issue, Menard argues the trial court erred when it denied his
motion for directed verdict challenging the trial court’s venue. Menard contends that
the evidence is legally insufficient to establish proper venue in Jefferson County
because the State failed to produce evidence that Kim’s death occurred in Jefferson
County, her body was found in Louisiana and the “State’s witness, [Moia] claimed
he had no knowledge as to the cause, manner or means of [Kim’s] death.”
“[Venue] is not a ‘criminative fact,’ [and] venue is not an ‘element of the
offense’ under Texas law.” Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014) (quoting Boyle v. State, 820 S.W.2d 122, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989),
overruled on other grounds by Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989)). “[V]enue is procedurally and substantively different from elements of the
offense.” Schmutz, 440 S.W.3d at 31. Lack of venue is not a finding of insufficient
evidence of a required element of the offense, and it does not mean that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction. Id. (citation omitted) “Although venue must be proven ‘at
trial to establish a defendant’s [legal] status,’ that ‘does not convert’ venue into an
‘element[] of the proscribed offense[].’” Id. at 35 (quoting State v. Mason, 980
S.W.2d 635, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). Therefore, failure to prove venue at trial
does not implicate sufficiency of the evidence, nor does it require acquittal. Id.
23
Moreover, failure to prove venue as alleged in the indictment does not constitute
structural or constitutional error. Id. at 36-37.
The State bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
venue is proper in the county in which the case is tried.3 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 13.17 (repealed eff. Jan. 1, 2025);4 Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 604 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003). Evidence is sufficient to prove venue if “from the evidence the
jury may reasonably conclude that the offense was committed in the county alleged.”
Rippee v. State, 384 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964) (citation omitted).
In reviewing a challenge to proof of venue, an appellate court must presume
that venue was proven in the trial court unless venue was disputed in the trial court
or the record affirmatively shows the contrary. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(c)(1) (creating
venue presumption for criminal cases). Here, because the defendant challenged
venue in a motion for directed verdict during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial,
the presumption does not apply. See Williams, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 4147, at *19.
“Instead, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and
determine whether a rational finder of fact could have found by a preponderance of
the evidence that venue was proper in [Jefferson] County.” Id. (citation omitted).
Venue may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Rippee,
We use the provisions of the code in effect at the time of Menard’s trial.
3
Act of January 1, 2025, 88th Leg., R.S., Ch. 765, § 3.001(6), 2023 Tex. Sess.
4
Law Serv. 1976 (for current version see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 13A.002).
24
384 S.W.2d at 718. “‘The trier of fact may make reasonable inferences from the
evidence to decide the issue of venue.’” Hernandez v. State, 198 S.W.3d 257, 268
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. ref’d) (quoting Bordman v. State, 56 S.W.3d
63, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d.)).
Here, evidence was presented that Menard and Kim lived in an apartment in
Beaumont. Moia and Abbott lived in the same apartment complex. Moia testified
that in late November 2024 Menard asked him to help move Kim’s body from
Menard’s apartment. Moia observed Kim’s body was wrapped in a tarp in a storage
closet in Menard’s Beaumont apartment and testified there was already a smell to
the body when it was moved by Menard and Moia. Additionally, even assuming
without deciding that venue was improper, Menard was not harmed. He was
provided with notice of the venue by the indictment, and he lived in Beaumont;
therefore, venue in Jefferson County was not inconvenient for Menard. Nor did
Menard argue that venue in Jefferson County would lead to a biased jury pool.5
On this record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that
venue was proper in Jefferson County, Texas. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
13.17. (repealed Jan. 1, 2025); Schmutz, 440 S.W.3d at 34. For the reasons explained
5
At trial and on appeal, Menard’s trial and appellate counsel argue venue must be established with evidence excluding Moia’s testimony as he was an accomplice witness. We do not address whether evidence other than Moia’s testimony is needed as we conclude and explain below that Moia was not an accomplice witness.
25
in Schmutz, we reject Menard’s contention that venue is an element of the offense
that the State must prove. See Schmutz, 440 S.W.3d at 34-35. Furthermore, even if
venue had not been properly proved at trial, any such error would have been
harmless. See id. at 35, 37, 39. We overrule issue one.
Issue Two
Jury Charge Error
In his second issue, Menard argues the trial court committed reversible error
by failing to include an accomplice-witness instruction in the jury charge during the
guilt-innocence phase of trial. According to Menard, Moia was an accomplice
because he “participat[ed] in the total offense” by helping Menard move the body
out of the apartment and into a vehicle, traveling with Menard to Louisiana and
helping Menard bury the body. The State responds that the trial court was not
required to submit an accomplice-witness instruction, because Moia was not an
accomplice.
“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless
corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense
committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission
of the offense.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14. “Because the rule requires
corroboration of accomplice-witness testimony before a conviction can stand, the
jury must be instructed accordingly, but the particular instruction that must be given
26
depends on the circumstances of each case.” Zamora v. State, 411 S.W.3d 504, 510
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “Whether a defendant is entitled to an accomplice-witness
instruction is a function of the evidence produced at trial.” Ash v. State, 533 S.W.3d
878, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). If the evidence raises a question of fact regarding
whether a witness is an accomplice, the trial court must include an instruction and
allow the jury to decide whether the witness is an accomplice; if the evidence
conclusively establishes that a witness is an accomplice, the trial court must instruct
the jury that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law. Druery v. State, 225
S.W.3d 491, 498-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). But “when the evidence clearly shows
that a witness is not an accomplice, the trial judge is not obliged to instruct the jury
on the accomplice witness rule—as a matter of law or fact.” Smith v. State, 332
S.W.3d 425, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
We review a trial court’s determination of whether the evidence supports an
accomplice-witness instruction under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Paredes
v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
If a witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial court is
required to provide an accomplice-witness instruction to the jury. If,
however, the parties present conflicting or unclear evidence as to
whether a witness is an accomplice, the jury must first determine
whether the witness is an accomplice as a matter of fact. The trial court
is not required to give the jury an accomplice-witness instruction when
the evidence is clear that the witness is neither an accomplice as a
matter of law nor as a matter of fact.
27
Cocke v. State, 201 S.W.3d 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (internal citations
omitted).
An accomplice is a person who participates with the defendant in the crime
by taking an affirmative act to assist in the commission of the crime before, during,
or after its commission, who acts with the required culpable mental state for the
crime, and who could have been prosecuted for the same offense or a lesser-included
offense. Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 498-99; see also Paredes, 129 S.W.3d at 536;
Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Mere presence at the
scene of the crime does not render a witness an accomplice. Druery, 225 S.W.3d at
498; Cocke, 201 S.W.3d at 748. “[T]here must still be some evidence of an
affirmative act on the part of the witness to assist in the commission of the charged
offense.” Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 499. “And complicity with an accused in the
commission of another offense apart from the charged offense does not make that
witness’s testimony that of an accomplice witness.” Id. at 498. Disposing of a body
after a murder does not make a witness an accomplice witness. See Smith v. State,
721 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (witness was not an accomplice
because there was no evidence that the person played any part in the commission of
the offense even though he was present when the murder was committed and helped
dispose of the body); Ruffins, 666 S.W.3d at 647.
28
The record before us does not contain evidence that Moia, acting with the
requisite mental state, participated with Menard by affirmatively acting to promote
or assist with the murder. See Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 498-99; see also Paredes, 129
S.W.3d at 536; see also Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 856. Moia’s participation in
disposing of the body after the murder, even if constituting evidence of a separate
offense, is not evidence that Moia was an accomplice in the murder. See Smith, 721
S.W.2d at 851; Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 498. “The defendant is entitled to an
accomplice-witness instruction if and only if ‘there is sufficient evidence in the
record to support a charge against the witness alleged to be an accomplice.’” Medina,
7 S.W.3d at 641 (citing Blake, 971 S.W.2d at 455). There is no evidence that would
justify prosecuting Moia for the offense of murder or a lesser-included offense.
Because the evidence is clear Moia was neither an accomplice as a matter of law nor
as a matter of fact, Menard was not entitled to an accomplice-witness instruction.
We overrule Menard’s second issue.
Issue One
Extraneous Conduct Testimony
In his final issue, Menard challenges the trial court’s ruling allowing Brittany
Burch to testify as to extraneous acts allegedly committed by Menard. During the
guilt-innocence phase of trial, Menard timely objected to Burch’s testimony under
article 38.36 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and Texas Rules of Evidence
29
Rules 403, 404(b), 405 and 406, arguing it was purely “conformity” testimony. In
response, the State argued Burch’s testimony was “a permitted use under 404(b),
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, lack of accident.”
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence and overrule objections
for an abuse of discretion. See De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). “As long as the trial court’s ruling is within the ‘zone of reasonable
disagreement,’ there is no abuse of discretion, and the trial court’s ruling will be
upheld.” Id. at 343–44 (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g)); State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439-40 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). If the trial court’s decision is correct on any theory of law
applicable to the case, we will uphold the decision. De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344;
Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
The erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence is generally reviewed under
the standard for nonconstitutional error contained in Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure if the trial court’s ruling merely offends the rules of evidence.
Melgar v. State, 236 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet.
ref’d); see also Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Under
Rule 44.2(b), even if the trial court erred in admitting the evidence, we may not
overturn a criminal conviction for nonconstitutional error if, after examining the
record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the error did not have a substantial
30
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Casey v. State,
215 S.W.3d 870, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In our determination of whether error
adversely affected the jury’s decision, we consider everything in the record,
including testimony, physical evidence, jury instructions, the State’s theories, any
defensive theories, closing arguments, and voir dire. Schmutz, 440 S.W.3d at 39-40
(discussing harm analysis in the context of statutory venue error).
“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Rule 404(b) codifies the
common-law principle that a defendant should be tried only for the offense for which
he is charged and not for other extraneous conduct. Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29,
32 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see also Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 87 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008). “Rule 404(b) sets out an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of
exceptions to the prohibition against admitting evidence of extraneous offenses
including ‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444, 451
n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)) (emphasis omitted);
Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that “‘Rule 404(b) is a rule of
inclusion rather than exclusion.’ The rule excludes only that evidence that is offered
31
(or will be used) solely for the purpose of proving bad character and hence conduct
in conformity with that bad character.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343 (internal
citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (discussing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)) (other citation omitted).
“Whether extraneous offense evidence has relevance apart from character
conformity, as required by Rule 404(b), is a question for the trial court.” Moses v.
State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Texas courts utilize a two-step
analysis for determining the admissibility of extraneous offenses or uncharged acts.
Rogers, 853 S.W.2d at 32-33. Courts determine first whether the evidence is relevant
to a material issue in the case and second whether the relevant evidence should be
admitted as an exception to Rule 404(b). Id. The trial court’s Rule 404(b) ruling
admitting evidence is generally within the zone of reasonable disagreement “if there
is evidence supporting that an extraneous transaction is relevant to a material, nonpropensity issue.” Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
(citations omitted).
Even if evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), it may still be inadmissible
under Rule 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, considerations of
undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Casey, 215 S.W.3d at
879; see also Tex. R. Evid. 403. Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence
32
and carries a presumption that relevant evidence is more probative than prejudicial.
Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Unfair prejudice does
not mean simply that the evidence injures the opponent’s case. Rogers v. State, 991
S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citation omitted). “Rather[,] it refers to
‘an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one.’” Id. (quoting Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 820
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).
In the extraneous conduct context, the “Rule 403 balancing test includes
the following factors”:
(1) how compellingly the extraneous offense evidence serves to make
a fact of consequence more or less probable—a factor which is related
to the strength of the evidence presented by the proponent to show the
defendant in fact committed the extraneous offense;
(2) the potential the other offense evidence has to impress the jury “in
some irrational but nevertheless indelible way;”
(3) the time the proponent will need to develop the evidence, during
which the jury will be distracted from consideration of the indicted
offense; and
(4) the force of the proponent’s need for this evidence to prove a fact of
consequence, i.e., does the proponent have other probative evidence
available to him to help establish this fact, and is this fact related to an
issue in dispute.
Irsan v. State, 708 S.W.3d 584, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (quoting De La Paz,
279 S.W.3d at 348-49).
33
The trial court is presumed to have engaged in the required balancing test
under Rule 403 once a party objects on the ground of Rule 403 and the trial court
rules on the objection, unless the record indicates otherwise. See Williams v. State,
958 S.W.2d 186, 195-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The opponent of the evidence, in
this case Menard, has the burden of demonstrating that the prejudicial effect of the
evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d
at 377.
Before Burch’s testimony, defense counsel approached the bench and
objected to Burch’s testimony under “all the 4s. It’s not relevant. It’s not -- it’s
character evidence. It’s specific instances of conduct. So, that’s 405. I mean, it’s --I’m objecting -- and then under 38.36. It doesn’t get the exception under 38.36,
which covers this relationship, not that one, unlike 38.37.” In response, the State
argued that Burch’s testimony demonstrated “[i]dentity and plan.” Specifically the
State argued the following.
Ms. Burch is going to be able to testify because she had a significant
relationship [with Menard]. She shares two children with the defendant.
She can testify as to when things went bad. He hacked into her social
media accounts, pretended to be her to communicate with other people
as her. He locked her out of her accounts. He was physically abusive,
included choking her to the point where she almost died and -- which
goes to this under 404(b)(2), permitted uses for crimes, wrongs or other
acts, intent, opportunity, motive, knowledge that he does know how to
do these things. We believe it is permitted use under 404(b).
34
The State also argued that in “appropriate cases extraneous offenses may be
admitted under the doctrine of chances to show […] the defendant intentionally
committed a similar offense.” The defense responded that the evidence was
inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 404(b) as character evidence offered to prove
Menard acted in conformity therewith and under Rule 403 as unduly prejudicial. The
trial court overruled the objections and admitted the testimony, explaining that the
evidence was relevant to the testimony that Kim probably died due to asphyxiation
which “makes this more relevant than it probably would have been without it in my
opinion[.]” The court gave a limiting instruction to the jury prior to the testimony,
and the jury charge also included a limiting instruction concerning extraneous
conduct evidence.
Welke testified Kim probably died by asphyxiation. There was evidence that
Kim’s social media accounts were being accessed, and Mother did not believe that
Kim was the author because the messages seemed suspicious and out of character
for Kim. Burch testified about her relationship with Menard, indicating that he was
abusive and falsely accused her of cheating. She recalled that there were several
instances of Menard choking her, including when she was pregnant, during which
she lost consciousness and thought she would die. She also testified that Menard
hacked into her social media accounts. Whether the similarities between the
relationships and occurrences were “sufficiently distinctive to qualify as an
35
exception to the general rule precluding the admission of extraneous-offense
evidence[]” was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Martin v. State,
173 S.W.3d 463, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The trial court could have reasonably decided that the
extraneous conduct evidence tended to show Menard previously engaged in conduct
sufficiently similar to that which was alleged in this case that it tended to show
identity, intent, motive or lack of accident, and had probative value other than a
tendency to show that Menard acted in conformity with a character trait. See Powell,
63 S.W.3d at 438.
The record before us does not affirmatively show that the trial court refused
to conduct a Rule 403 balancing test. Rather, the trial court overruled the Rule 403
objection, and we presume the trial court engaged in a balancing test before the court
ruled. See Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 195-96. Rule 403 favors the admission of
relevant evidence, and relevant evidence carries a presumption that it is more
probative than prejudicial. Id. at 196. It was Menard’s burden to demonstrate that
the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair
prejudice. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 377. We conclude Menard failed to
satisfy this burden and overcome the presumption.
Given the similarities noted above, the trial court may have reasonably
concluded Burch’s testimony was compellingly probative on the issues of identity,
36
intent, motive or absence of accident, outweighing the potential for the jury to be
impressed in an “irrational” and “indelible” way. The testimony did not take much
time to develop; Burch’s testimony comprises seven pages of the record. The trial
court may have also reasonably concluded that the State needed Burch’s testimony
in light of Welke’s lack of certainty—due to the condition of the body—that Kim
died of asphyxiation, and to rebut Menard’s defensive theories including lack of
identity, intent and motive.
Finally, even assuming the trial court erred in overruling Menard’s objections,
we will not reverse the judgment if the error was harmless. See Tex. R. App. P.
44.2(b). In addition to hearing Moia’s testimony that he helped Menard dispose of
Kim’s body in Louisiana, the jury also heard testimony regarding location and cell
phone data collected from Menard and Kim’s phones that place them together and
place Menard in Louisiana. The trial court also gave a limiting instruction, and we
presume that the jury followed this instruction. See Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d
574, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We conclude any error in admitting Burch’s
testimony did not affect a substantial right of Menard, and any such error must be
disregarded. See id.; Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(citation omitted). We overrule Menard’s final issue on appeal.
37
Conclusion
Having overruled all of Menard’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
KENT CHAMBERS
Justice
Submitted on May 29, 2026
Opinion Delivered September 30, 2026
Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.
38