Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-26-00148-CV
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M., Children
On appeal from the
474th District Court of McLennan County, Texas
Judge Nikki Mundkowsky, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 2024-2119-6
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a bench trial, the parental rights of M.R. (Mother) to the
children, N.Ad.M., N.Av.M., 1 and G.M.M., were terminated. The parental
0F
rights of R.M. (Father) to the children N.Ad.M. and N.Av.M., were also
terminated. 2 Mother and Father appealed.
1F
A. Background
The original petition in this case was filed August 7, 2024, concerning
Mother’s three children: seven-year-old twins N.Ad.M. and N.Av.M. and fourmonth-old G.M.M. G.M. was the acknowledged father of G.M.M., and the
1
We will use N.Ad.M. and N.Av.M. to distinguish between the children with the same initials. 2
The parental rights of G.M., father of G.M.M., were also terminated, but G.M. did not appeal. twins’ father was not initially known, but was later identified as Father. G.M.
had two other children, eight-year-old A.M. and ten-year-old N.M., who lived
in the home.
B. Mother’s Appeal
1. Predicate Grounds
The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had
violated Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N), and
termination was in the children’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
161.001(b). In her first issue, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to support termination under Subsections
161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). In her second issue, Mother argues that the evidence
is legally and factually insufficient to support termination under Subsection
161.001(b)(1)(N).
The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
in cases involving the termination of parental rights are well established and
will not be repeated here. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264–68 (Tex. 2002)
(legal sufficiency); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (factual sufficiency).
In a bench trial, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 2
In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under
Section 161.001 of the Family Code, the Department of Family and Protective
Services (the Department) must establish by clear and convincing evidence two
elements: (1) that the respondent parent committed one or more acts or
omissions enumerated under subsection (b)(1), termed a predicate violation,
and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 161.001(b); In re J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d 373, 381 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020)
(mem. op.), aff ’d, 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021). Proof of one element does not
relieve the petitioner of the burden of proving the other. J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d
at 381.
Termination of parental rights under subsections (D) or (E) requires
proof of endangerment, which means to expose the child to loss or injury, or to
jeopardize. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.
1987).
The endangerment analysis under Subsection (D) focuses on evidence
relating to the child’s environment to determine if the environment was a
source of endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being. In re
M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). A child
is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that the
parent is aware of but disregards. Id. A parent’s conduct in the home can
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 3 create an environment that endangers the well-being of a child. In re J.T.G.,
121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
Termination under Subsection (E) requires clear and convincing
evidence that the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child
with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or
emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
The relevant inquiry under subsection (E) is whether sufficient evidence exists
that the endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the
parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re E.M., 494
S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied). However, it is not
necessary that the parent’s conduct be directed at the child or that the child
actually suffer injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. To determine whether
termination is necessary, courts look to parental conduct both before and after
the child’s birth. In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2004, pet. denied).
Scienter is not required for a parent’s own acts to constitute
endangerment under subsection (E). See In re L.S., No. 10-22-00119-CV, 2022
WL 3655395, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). It is
also not necessary to show that the parent’s conduct was directed at the child
or that the child suffered actual injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. The specific
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 4 danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred from the parent’s misconduct
alone. Id. Furthermore, we may consider conduct both before and after the
child’s removal in an analysis under subsection (E). In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d
351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). If the
endangering person is someone other than the appealing parent, then the
parent generally must have known of the other person’s endangering conduct.
T. D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 683 S.W.3d 901, 913 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2024, no pet.).
Mother argues that there was not clear and convincing evidence that she
was physically abusing the children to support termination under Subsection
(D) because her own actions constituted discipline. Mother also argues that
there is a lack of support for termination under Subsection (E) because G.M.’s
crimes occurred before she knew him, the danger to the children was removed
when he was incarcerated, and there was no evidence that Mother had
knowledge of G.M.’s crimes. Finally, she argues that the “restriction by the
Department on Mother’s visitation should not allow for a termination on the
(N) ground, for constructive abandonment.”
The evidence here shows many circumstances relevant under
Subsections (D) and (E). Because the evidence is interrelated concerning these
two statutory grounds for termination, we consolidate our examination of the
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 5 evidence as to both grounds. In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
Anna Smith, the Department Investigation Supervisor, testified about
the initial involvement of the Department. She stated that there had been
ongoing Department involvement starting in July 2024 because N.M. was
hospitalized due to mental health concerns. In August 2024, law enforcement
was called after N.M. had fled from the home to a nearby apartment and asked
someone to call 911. Officers observed extensive bruising on her back, arms,
legs, hands, face, and neck. N.M. told officers that Mother tried to drown her
in the sink and beat her. During the investigation, officers also observed that
A.M. also had extensive bruising on her buttocks, legs, and arms, and the
bruising appeared to be in various stages of healing. N.M. and A.M. also had
scratches and cuts on various parts of their bodies. Photos taken on scene and
a couple hours later once the children were removed show the extent of N.M.
and A.M.’s injuries. These photos were admitted into evidence during the trial.
Law enforcement requested Department involvement due to the nature of the
allegations. Mother was arrested for injury to a child. G.M. was not present
at the time of the removal.
Smith further testified that in forensic interviews, both N.M. and A.M.
reported that Mother beat them with a wooden back scratcher on August 3,
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 6 2024 and August 6, 2024, and both reported sexual abuse by their father, G.M.
N.Ad.M. was also interviewed and described witnessing the beatings and the
wooden back scratcher. N.Av.M. was not interviewed because she was nonverbal at the time and has Down Syndrome. G.M.M. was also not interviewed
because she was approximately four months old. Mother was interviewed as
part of the investigation. Mother initially stated that N.M. provoked her and
was a manipulative child and that N.M. had told Mother she sexually abused
the younger children which “set [Mother] off.” Mother admitted that she beat
N.M. “longer than expected” because N.M. was moving around. She later
denied causing the marks and stated N.M. and A.M. caused the injuries
themselves. Mother also stated that she suspected an inappropriate
relationship between N.M. and G.M. and noticed sexualized behavior and
photos, but she did not take any action or report her suspicions. Smith stated
that A.M. made her outcry to Mother on August 3rd and Mother was trying to
get N.M. to outcry to her on August 6th. Additionally, despite both A.M. and
N.M. needing medical attention, Mother had not sought medical attention for
either child. Smith testified that the Department removed all five of the
children from the home.
Emily Tabor, a Department supervisor assigned to the case, testified
regarding the ongoing involvement of the Department. She stated that the
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 7 main concern of the Department was the outcries of sexual assault and lack of
protectiveness by Mother. She stated that while Mother completed services
and had housing and employment, the Department continued to have concerns
related to the abuse and protective capacity. Tabor noted that Mother was
inconsistent and contradictory in her communications with the Department.
She gave the example that Mother originally said she was concerned about
N.M. and A.M.’s behaviors and suspected inappropriate interactions with
G.M., but then later Mother said N.M. and A.M. love G.M. and that he could
not have done anything wrong to them. Tabor was also concerned by the
testimony Mother gave at trial because it seemed that Mother had not learned
anything from the services provided to her. Tabor expressed concerns about
Mother’s lack of accountability and that Mother maintained that the children
were lying about their outcries. Tabor testified that she had not seen any
change in Mother’s behavior that would make Mother a safe, appropriate
parent.
As stated above, the Department’s initial concerns included physical
abuse, lack of control, and lack of protectiveness by Mother. Based on the
testimony from multiple witnesses, these concerns remained throughout the
pendency of the case and were still concerns at the final hearing. Considering
the evidence presented in this case in the light most favorable to the trial
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 8 court’s finding and considering the evidence as a whole, we conclude that the
evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination of Mother’s
rights under Subsections (D) and (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §161.001(b)(1).
Because we have found that the evidence is sufficient to support at least
one predicate ground, we do not address the sufficiency of the evidence as to
Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(N).
Therefore, we overrule Mother’s first and second issues.
2. Best Interest
In her third issue, Mother argues that there was not clear and convincing
evidence that termination was in the best interest of the children.
In determining the best interest of a child, several factors have been
consistently considered, which were set out in the Supreme Court of Texas’s
opinion of Holley v. Adams. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). The Holley
factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs
of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the
child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking
custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals; (6) the plans for
the child by these individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) the acts or
omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child
relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 9 the parent. Id. This list is not exhaustive but simply identifies factors that
have been or could be pertinent in the best-interest determination. Id. at 372.
There is no requirement that all these factors be proven as a condition
precedent to parental termination. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002).
The absence of evidence about some factors does not preclude a factfinder from
reasonably forming a strong conviction that termination is in the child’s best
interest. Id. In fact, while no one factor is controlling, the analysis of a single
factor may be adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that
termination is in the child’s best interest. In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 268
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
The Holley factors focus on the best interest of the child, not the best
interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 907
S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ).
Mother argues that the Holley factors weigh against termination.
Specifically, she argues that the desires and physical and emotional needs of
the children would be met by her because her children know and love her, and
she loves her children. She states that her parental abilities and stability of
the home are adequate because she has maintained a stable residence and
completed services. Finally, she argues that because G.M., A.M., and N.M. are
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 10 no longer in the house, any continuing danger to the children has been
removed.
Regarding the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the
future, evidence of past misconduct or neglect can be used to measure a
parent’s future conduct. See Williams v. Williams, 150 S.W.3d 436, 451 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied); Ray v. Burns, 832 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex.
App.—Waco 1992, no writ) (“Past is often prologue.”). Evidence relating to the
predicate grounds under Subsection 161.001(b)(1) may be relevant to
determining the best interest of the child. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. In our
analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination pursuant to
Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), we have detailed Mother’s misconduct
both leading up to the Department’s involvement and during the pendency of
this case. The record shows that the Department’s concerns for the children’s
safety at the outset of the case remained throughout the case and were still
present at the time of the final hearing.
Regarding Mother’s parenting abilities, the trial court was not required
to measure Mother’s progress by completion of the service plan alone. See In
re A.C.B., 198 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.); In re
A.N.S., No. 04-25-00808-CV, 2026 WL 2254584, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Aug. 5, 2026, no pet. h.). Instead, it could evaluate whether those services
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 11 translated into improved parenting abilities and greater protective capacity.
See In re R.P., 708 S.W.3d 723, 731 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024, no pet.); In
re A.C.B., 198 S.W.3d at 298. As previously discussed, Tabor testified
regarding the Department’s ongoing concerns with Mother’s lack of
accountability and protectiveness. Specifically, the evidence shows that
Mother continued to minimize her own role in the reasons for removal and
maintained that the children were lying in their outcries.
Overall, the trial court was entitled to weigh Mother’s assertions against
her continued minimization of the abuse allegations, her lack of accountability,
and the Department’s continued safety concerns persisted throughout the case.
Viewing the evidence under legal and factual sufficiency standards, we
conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction
that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.
As such, we cannot say that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial
court’s best interest finding.
Therefore, we overrule Mother’s third issue.
C. Father’s Appeal
On May 26, 2026, Father filed a “Motion to Withdraw Appeal,” asking
this Court to dismiss his appeal in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1).
Dismissal of this appeal would not prevent another party from seeking relief
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 12 to which it would otherwise be entitled. See id. Father’s motion to withdraw
his appeal is therefore granted, and his appeal is dismissed.
D. Conclusion
Having overruled Mother’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order of
termination. Additionally, Father’s appeal is dismissed.
MATT JOHNSON
Chief Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: September 30, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Motion granted; Appeal dismissed
CV06
In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M. Page 13