Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00146-CR
James Keylan Willis,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
On appeal from the
19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas
Judge Thomas C. West, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 2023-406-C1
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found James Keylan Willis guilty of capital murder. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.03. The trial court assessed his punishment at life in the
penitentiary without the possibility of parole and sentenced him accordingly.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31. This appeal ensued. We will affirm.
A. Background
In December of 2022, Stanley Wilcox failed to appear at his family’s
Christmas celebrations. Waco Police officers went to Wilcox’s home for a
welfare check and encountered Willis, who had been renting a room with his
girlfriend in Wilcox’s home. When police first encountered Willis, he was
driving Wilcox’s white Ford Escape. Police found blood in the trunk of the
vehicle and in Wilcox’s home. Wilcox’s body was later found in a creek on
Baylor University’s campus. He had been shot five times, including three
times in his head.
Investigators recovered evidence connecting Willis to the killing. Cell
phone location data showed Willis had been at the location where Wilcox’s body
was dumped. Police discovered messages between Willis and a friend
discussing plans to rob and kill Wilcox. The contemplated plan, however, was
not carried out as described in the messages: there was no evidence that
Wilcox’s bank accounts were drained or that a PIN was used, and the vehicles
were not taken as planned. Additionally, police recovered the murder weapon
from another of Willis’s friends in Dallas, as well as video of Willis retrieving
that gun just before the murder and returning it soon afterwards.
Willis v. State Page 2
B. Issue One
In his first issue, Willis argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
his conviction for capital murder.
1. Standard of Review
The Court of Criminal Appeals has defined our standard of review of
a sufficiency issue as follows:
When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232
(Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the appellate court
to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve
conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson,
443 U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235
S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a
sufficiency review must not engage in a “divide and conquer”
strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.
Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate about
the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any
reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is
supported by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507
S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any
conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and
we defer to that resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive
judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight
to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial
Willis v. State Page 3
evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone
may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative
force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support
the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements
of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge
for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that
“accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does
not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or
unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried.” Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d
654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law as authorized by the
indictment” includes the statutory elements of the offense and
those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387
S.W.3d at 665.
Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
2. Authority
A person commits capital murder if he intentionally commits murder in
the course of committing or attempting to commit other specific felony offenses,
including robbery. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2). A person commits
murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02. A person commits a robbery if, in the course of
committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property,
he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another or
intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent
Willis v. State Page 4 bodily injury or death. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02. The intent to rob must
be formed before or at the time of the murder. Herrin v. State, 125 S.W.3d 436,
441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When establishing the underlying crime of robbery
or attempted robbery in a capital murder prosecution, the State is not required
to prove that an appellant completed a theft. Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854,
862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Bustamante v. State, 106 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003).
3. Analysis
Willis argues that “the evidence reveals a disjointed sequence: planning,
followed by murder, followed by an opportunistic taking of property.” He states
that there was no evidence that he “intended to steal at the time of the murder”
and that there was no proof that the intent to rob motivated the killing,
therefore the evidence was insufficient to support his capital murder
conviction.
The evidence shows that Wilcox had posted an eviction notice in Willis’s
room and gave him until December 23, 2022 to either pay his rent or face
eviction. In the days leading to the murder, Willis exchanged numerous
messages with Bradon Stephens and A.J. Benson discussing plans to use
masks and guns to drain bank accounts and steal vehicles from Wilcox. On
December 14, Willis texted Stephens that he needed some muscle and guns.
Willis v. State Page 5 Willis told Stephens and Benson that they had “a week at most” to carry out
their plan. When discussing how to get Wilcox’s PIN to access his bank
accounts, Willis texted that he would “put a bullet in him until he gives us
what we need.” Willis asked Stephens to get a sleeping bag or industrial sized
trash bags from Kroger. Late in the evening on December 21, Willis also texted
Stephens that they would get Wilcox’s bank account information, drain his
accounts, then split everything in the house including Wilcox’s guns. Stephens
asked whether Wilcox slept with the guns, and Willis responded that even if
he did, Wilcox would not have time to react because they will “run in” while he
is asleep.
Early in the morning of December 22, Willis drove Wilcox’s white Ford
Escape to Dallas, picked up Stephens, then drove to a nearby McDonald’s
where Benson worked. Benson wrapped what appeared to be a gun in a bag
and brought it out to Willis, who then left the McDonald’s and drove back to
Wilcox’s house with Stephens.
Early in the morning of December 23, video evidence showed Willis and
Stephens return to the same McDonald’s in Wilcox’s white Ford Escape, where
Willis handed a small item wrapped in a bag to Benson through the drive-thru
window. Willis and Stephens then drove back to Waco and drove to the
intersection of 9th Street and Interstate 35.
Willis v. State Page 6
On January 6, 2023, police discovered Wilcox’s body under a bridge at
the intersection of 9th Street and Interstate 35, and an autopsy showed Wilcox
had been shot five times, including three times in his head. Police located the
gun used to shoot Wilcox in Benson’s possession.
Viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
a rational jury could have reasonably inferred that Willis had committed the
murder during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery. See
Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Accordingly, the evidence was legally sufficient to
support Willis’s conviction for capital murder.
Therefore, we overrule Willis’s first issue.
C. Issue Two
In his second issue, Willis argues that the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of murder when the evidence
raised a fact issue as to whether Willis committed murder in the course of
committing or attempting to commit robbery.
1. Standard of Review and Authority
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser–included offense if
it is established “by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to prove
the offense charged.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(1). Texas courts
apply a two–step test to determine if such an instruction is required. Hall v.
Willis v. State Page 7 State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The first step is to “compare
the statutory elements of the alleged lesser offense and the statutory elements
and any descriptive averments in the indictment.” Ritcherson v. State, 568
S.W.3d 667, 670–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Because the first step in the
analysis is purely a question of law, appellate courts conduct a de novo review.
See Palmer v. State, 471 S.W.3d 569, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015,
no pet.) (citing Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). The
second prong asks whether there is some evidence in the record that would
permit a jury to rationally find that, if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only
of the lesser–included offense. Bullock v. State, 509 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016). The second step of the analysis is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard. Palmer, 471 S.W.3d at 570.
2. Analysis
Both parties agree that the first step is clearly satisfied here: murder is
a lesser–included offense of capital murder. Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384,
392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
As to the second step, Willis argues that since the evidence did not show
that Willis followed through on the details of the pre-offense plans to rob
Wilcox, the statutory nexus between murder and theft was severed. Therefore,
Willis contends that the jury could have concluded that if guilty, Willis was
Willis v. State Page 8 only guilty of the lesser-included murder. However, failure to prove a
completed theft would not, in and of itself, entitle Willis to a lesser-included
charge of murder. Llamas v. State, 270 S.W.3d 274, 278-279 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2008, no pet.).
We must review the evidence to determine if there is more than a
scintilla of evidence that would allow a rational jury to conclude that, if Willis
is guilty, he is guilty of only the lesser included offense. Bignall v. State, 887
S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). There must be some affirmative
evidence from which a rational juror could infer that Willis did not intend to
rob Wilcox when he killed him. Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012). Meeting this threshold requires more than mere
speculation—it requires affirmative evidence that both raises the lesserincluded offense and rebuts or negates an element of the greater offense. Id.
The mere fact that a jury might disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the
greater offense is not enough to warrant an instruction on a lesser-included
offense. See Bignall, 887 S.W.2d at 24. As previously discussed, the record
clearly shows that Willis and his co-defendants exchanged many messages
formulating a plan to rob and kill Wilcox. Willis points to the testimony of the
officer conducting the welfare check that Willis claimed Wilcox had given him
permission to use Wilcox’s vehicle as affirmative evidence rebutting or
Willis v. State Page 9 negating a robbery. However, planning to steal vehicles, divide all the property
in the house among the co-defendants, and “put a bullet” in Wilcox until he
discloses the PIN to access his bank accounts, shooting Wilcox in the leg and
hip before shooting him in the head three times, and later telling police that
he had permission to use Wilcox’s vehicle does not rationally support an
inference that Willis, if guilty, is only guilty of murder. See Cavazos, 382
S.W.3d at 385. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the instruction on the lesser included offense of murder.
See Palmer, 471 S.W.3d at 570.
Therefore, we overrule Willis’s second issue.
D. Issue Three
In his third issue, Willis argues that the mandatory sentence of life
without parole for an “emerging adult” violates the prohibition against “cruel
or unusual” punishment under the United States and Texas constitutions.
1. Standard of Review and Authority
The interpretation of the Texas Constitution is a question of law
reviewed de novo. Vexler v. State, 620 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
The constitutionality of a criminal statute is a question of law that appellate
courts review de novo after presuming that the statute is valid. Ex parte Lo,
424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Willis v. State Page 10
Section 12.31(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code provides that “[a]n individual
adjudged guilty of a capital felony in a case in which the state does not seek
the death penalty shall be punished by imprisonment ... for ... life without
parole, if the individual committed the offense when 18 years of age or older.”
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §12.31(a)(2).
2. Analysis
Willis makes three arguments in support of his assertion that, as applied
to him, the mandatory life without parole sentencing scheme for “emerging
adults” is unconstitutional.
First, Willis argues that the sentencing scheme violates the “cruel and
unusual” standard of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII.
Willis contends that the characteristics considered in Roper v. Simmons which
make juveniles categorically “less deserving of the most severe punishments”
are shared by emerging adults. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574, 125
S. Ct. 1183, 1198, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005). However, the Roper court recognized
criticisms of drawing a bright-line rule and rejected them:
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the
objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities
that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an
individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have
already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.
For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be
drawn.... The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for
many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we
Willis v. State Page 11
conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to
rest.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. Relying on Roper, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the
same categorical rule with the line of demarcation between juvenile and
adulthood at a defendant’s eighteenth birthday in Miller v. Alabama, which
specifically addresses a mandatory life-without parole sentencing scheme.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407
(2012) (holding that the imposition of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence
for a defendant who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment). The Miller Court specifically noted that its ruling would not
undermine precedent upholding mandatory sentences of life without parole for
adult offenders. See id. at 482 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111
S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991)).
Second, Willis argues that the Texas Constitution, which prohibits “cruel
or unusual punishment” provides greater protection than the United States
Constitution's prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.” Compare
TEX. CONST. ART. I, § 13, with U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII. The Court of Criminal
Appeals has rejected such a distinction. See Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627,
645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (finding no significance in differences between
Willis v. State Page 12 Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” phrasing and Texas Constitution’s
“cruel or unusual” phrasing).
Third, Willis argues that applying the “cruel and unusual” and “cruel or
unusual” standards to his sentence demonstrates that his punishment is
constitutionally excessive. As previously discussed, this argument has
repeatedly been rejected by the courts. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 994-96, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2701-702, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (mandatory life
sentence does not violate Eighth Amendment); see also Cormier v. State, 540
S.W.3d 185, 191 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref ’d) (mandatory
life sentence not in violation of prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment in U.S. or Texas Constitution); Lewis v. State, 448 S.W.3d 138, 147
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref ’d), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 136
S.Ct. 52 (2015) (mandatory sentence for capital murder does not violate right
to due process or prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment under U.S. or
Texas Constitution); Simms v. State, No. 06-18-00181-CR, 2019 WL 2479845,
at *11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 14, 2019, pet. ref ’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Speers v. State, No. 05-14-00179-CR, 2016 WL
929223, at *5-7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (mandatory sentence for capital murder does not
Willis v. State Page 13 violate right to due process or prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment in U.S. or Texas Constitution).
Therefore, Willis’s third issue is overruled.
E. Issue Four
In his fourth issue, Willis argues that the trial court erred in admitting
presumptive blood testing evidence because the State failed to establish
scientific reliability.
1. Standard of Review
The trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of scientific evidence is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012). The court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily,
unreasonably, or without reference to guiding rules and principles.
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Hill,
499 S.W.3d 853, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
2. Authority
Scientific evidence must satisfy three criteria to be considered reliable:
(a) the underlying scientific theory must be valid; (b) the technique applying
the theory must be valid; and (c) the technique must have been properly
applied on the occasion in question. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992). Seven non–exclusive factors guide the trial court’s determination
Willis v. State Page 14 of whether the reliability criteria have been satisfied: (1) the extent to which
the underlying theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant
scientific community; (2) the qualifications of the expert testifying; (3) the
existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory
and technique; (4) the potential rate of error of the technique; (5) the
availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity
with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to
the court; and (7) the experience and skill of the person who applied the
technique on the occasion in question. Id.
3. Analysis
Willis contends that testimony concerning Bluestar, a chemical spray
used to identify trace amounts of blood not visible to the naked eye, should not
have been admitted because the State failed to meet the reliability standards
for scientific evidence set forth in Kelly. The State counters that even if the
evidence was erroneously admitted, Willis was not harmed because
investigators saw visible blood stains in most areas where Bluestar was used
and subsequent lab tests confirmed the Bluestar results.
Ashley Roy, a Crime Scene Investigator for Waco Police Department,
testified that she observed significant blood stains in the trunk of Wilcox’s car
that were visible without the use of Bluestar. Additionally, Josef Andrew
Willis v. State Page 15 Lopez, a DNA analyst for the DPS Crime Lab, testified that lab testing
confirmed that the blood Roy saw in the trunk belonged to Wilcox. Bloodstains
were also observed in various locations in the house, including in Wilcox’s
bedroom and on a towel and sheet found in Willis’s bedroom. Bluestar was
used in these locations, and lab testing confirmed the blood was Wilcox’s.
Willis obtained a running objection as to testimony about the use of Bluestar
but did not object to evidence of visible bloodstains or lab test confirmation of
the presence of Wilcox’s DNA from the samples taken from the bloodstained
areas.
In light of the foregoing evidence, assuming without deciding that the
admission of the Bluestar results was error, the error was harmless. See Dean
v. State, No. 12-11-00267-CR, 2013 WL 4680510, at *10 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug.
29, 2013, pet. ref ’d); Cf. Anderson v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986) (error harmless when other evidence at trial is admitted without
objection and it proves the same fact as inadmissible evidence sought to prove).
Accordingly, Willis’s fourth issue is overruled.
F. Conclusion
Having overruled Willis’s four issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Willis v. State Page 16
MATT JOHNSON
Chief Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: September 30, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CRPM
Willis v. State Page 17