NUMBER 13-26-00295-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN THE INTEREST OF A.L.O., A CHILD
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW
OF ARANSAS COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron
In this accelerated appeal, C.Z. (Mother) seeks reversal of a judgment terminating
her parental rights to her child, whom we will pseudonymously call, “Amy.”1 TEX. R. APP.
P. 9.8(b)(2), 28.4. By two issues, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support: (1) termination pursuant to subsections (D) and (E), and (2) that
termination was in Amy’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Because we
1 The trial court’s order also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the alleged father, E.O.,
who is not a party to this appeal. Only Mother appealed.
conclude there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the findings, we affirm
the trial court’s order.
I. TRIAL TESTIMONY
At a bench trial held on February 27, 2026, the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services (the Department) called two witnesses, Linda Morales, a
conservatorship worker for the Department, 2 and Anthony Mendoza, 3 who transported
and supervised Mother’s visits with Amy. Mother also called two witnesses, herself and
Yvonne Flores, a “conservatorship supervisor” for the Department. These witnesses
testified at trial as described below, with the Department’s primary witness being Morales
and Mother’s primary witness being herself.
A. Linda Morales
On direct-examination, Morales explained that she was assigned the case on
March 17, 2025, after the Department was granted temporary conservatorship of Amy.
According to her testimony, the Department became involved at Amy’s birth because she
was born positive for methamphetamines and was having a hard time feeding. Initially,
Amy was placed in the hospital’s “NICU” (neonatal intensive care unit) 4 where they
addressed her “withdrawals, her seizures,” and her struggles to “take milk.” About a week
later, Amy was placed in foster care and was issued “phenobarbital” for the withdrawals
and seizures, which she continued to take until May 2025. As to Amy’s development,
Morales described her as “doing very well” in foster care. She explained she was “moving
2 Another Department employee worked on the case, but she did not testify.
3 Mendoza did not testify who he is employed by.
4 See MERIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, NICU, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/NICU (last visited September 16, 2026).
2
around, making noises, [and] very active.” 5 Morales testified that Amy has overcome the
initial health challenges and “eats very well,” but she did not know about any long-term
effects. Morales also testified that Amy goes to occupational therapy and goes more often
to her childhood checkups. She agreed, though, that Amy is meeting her milestones with
respect to her checkups and is doing well developmentally. Morales confirmed that the
foster placement where Amy is located is a foster-to-adopt home, and the foster parent
has indicated a willingness to adopt her.
Morales testified that to her knowledge at the time of removal and trial, Mother and
alleged father, E.O., were in a romantic relationship. Morales also testified that she visited
the residence in Rockport where Mother and E.O. lived at the time of removal and trial. 6
She explained that she did a walk-through of that residence in December and took
photographs. 7 She described the condition of the home as uninhabitable, saying the
“walls are not finished, there’s exposed insulation, they’re sleeping on the floor, there’s
no running water, there had not been any electricity, there’s no toilet, and there’s trash
and miscellaneous items everywhere.” In an attempt to assist Mother with securing an
appropriate living residence, the “[D]epartment . . . provided her with an application for
housing, put it in her hands, back in July.” Morales disagreed that Mother has tried to
secure an appropriate residence for Amy, and in her opinion the Rockport residence is
not a home Amy can be returned to. The dangers in the home for Amy were described
5 In cross-examination, Morales also described Amy as being “very attached to her” placement.
6 The evidence established that Mother lived in at least two other locations, but according to Morales, Mother moved back to this residence a “few weeks” before trial.
7 Ten photographs were admitted into evidence without objection.
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as it being “a fire hazard, the insulation is exposed. The walls are not finished, flooring is
not finished. There’s no running water, there’s no plumbing.”
Although she had not seen check stubs, Morales testified that Mother recently
secured employment as a “provider” for an “elderly person.” And, Morales testified that
Mother “seems to have” addressed her drug usage, as her “last positive was in August.”
Morales denied having any information on whether E.O. is sober and denied that he drug
tested for the Department. Although Mother is residing with E.O., Morales confirmed that
she does not know whether he is a safe and appropriate caregiver. When asked, “Do you
know whether [Mother] ever indicated that she and [E.O.] did any drugs together?”
Morales responded, “I know they did, he told me.” As to what drug he said they did
together, Morales answered, “meth.”
Morales denied that Mother demonstrated an ability to provide Amy with a safe
environment. According to her testimony, Mother completed her “parenting, her
substance abuse, her individual counseling, her psychosocial, and she did get
employment.” However, she explained that stable and safe housing “has not been
acquired.” Morales denied changes in Mother’s behavior explaining that the “goal on her
service plan with . . . Gulf Coast, was to secure stable and safe housing, and she has not
achieved that.” Morales testified that at her last visit, E.O. would not let her in, and
although Mother was there she, “just shrugged her shoulders” when E.O. would not let
Morales in. When asked, “[H]ave you explained to [Mother] that remaining with [E.O.]
could be considered a danger to [Amy]?,” she responded, “She’s aware. When he would
not participate in any services, when he flat out refused.”
4
Although Morales explained she initially could not locate E.O., she was able to do
so in June at his premises, but it did not go “well. He used a lot of profanity. He wasn’t
going to do anything, I’m just going to sign my rights away because I don’t have time for
all this S-H-I-T.” Morales acknowledged that E.O. never actually signed his rights away,
but she denied that he had engaged in services, done anything for the Department, or
ever tried to contact her. She confirmed E.O. has also been aggressive towards her when
she has gone to the home.
On cross-examination, Morales denied making an early-on decision that Amy was
going to live with her foster family. And, apart from maintaining stable and safe housing,
Morales agreed that Mother has completed everything. The following relevant exchange
then ensued:
[Mother’s counsel]: Okay. Is it your testimony to this court that
regardless of her complying with every other
condition of her plan, working, staying clean,
reporting, doing everything she needs to do,
going to visit her child, because she is
economically disadvantaged, . . . and cannot
afford to go get her own apartment or live
somewhere else, that that is sufficient for you to
terminate her rights?
[Morales]: It’s the Department’s recommendation.
[Mother’s counsel]: Who makes those decisions? You?
[Morales]: I don’t. We staff it. We go through all of the facts.
We go through the history.
Again, she denied making a decision that it is better for Amy to live with her foster
family because they have a nice home with more money. When asked by Mother’s
counsel, “[W]hat problem do you have with allowing her to have some rights to her child?”
5
Morales answered, “The environment that she is living in.” Morales also testified that
Mother had not applied for housing because the Department called the local housing
authorities, as Mother had indicated she was on a waiting list. If Mother was able to get
housing, Morales testified her objection would be having E.O. in Amy’s life.
On further cross-examination, Morales explained that E.O. is Amy’s alleged father
because he did not submit to a court-ordered paternity test. She also confirmed he was
ordered to do services. When asked by E.O.’s counsel, “And I don’t think you ever saw
him use drugs, fair?” Morales responded, “He told me he uses daily.” According to
Morales, she observed that Mother moved “four” times during the case.
Additionally, Morales confirmed Mother had a theft charge during the case and
said Mother indicated at a previous hearing that she would be taking a plea deal. She did
not know, however, if that had happened. As far as Mother’s compliance with her family
plan, Morales explained, “[s]he completed a program July 25th, and her goal—she was
able to recognize her own behaviors, parenting, healthy boundaries, relapse prevention,
and ways to create safer relationships and environment, but that has not happened.”
Morales described her concerns with the parents as their “situation is unstable.” Further,
with respect to her family plan, Morales testified that Mother is to “surround herself with
persons who do not have criminal background or engage in illegal substances, that has
not happened. And the housing, the safe housing, stable housing.”
On re-direct examination, Morales did not believe Mother could provide stability for
Amy. She expanded on this as follows:
[Department’s counsel]: Because although poverty is a concern, are
there some additional stability red flags that the
department has identified?
6
[Morales]: Yes.
[Department’s counsel]: And what are those?
[Morales]: Her living situation, the environment she’s in,
the people that live on the lot. Even the lot is
unstable. They owe three years of back taxes. I
don’t how long they can stay there, that is also
concerning, where is she going to go?
When asked, “What’s the underlying reason that the [D]epartment believes it is in
the best interest of this child for the mother’s rights to be terminated?” she responded,
“For the entire time of this case, [Mother] has not secured stable and safe housing for this
young baby.” As for the benefits Amy would receive if parental rights were terminated,
Morales explained Amy “could achieve permanency in the only home she’s known and
with the only parents she’s known.” On re-cross examination, with respect to Mother’s
employment, she described it as unstable because “if the lady passes or they let her go,
she cannot find another caretaker in that same agency. It’s not an agency.” She denied
knowing B.O. or that B.O. called expressing an interest in adopting Amy or that Mother
told her S.O. wanted to be considered for placement. 8
B. Anthony Mendoza
Mendoza testified on direct examination that he has been transporting Mother to
Houston since the week of Christmas, and he supervises the visits. The visits have been
“going pretty good.” He explained that they pick Amy up from daycare, and Mother is
“really good about putting the baby in the car seat.” They then take Amy to the local
8 When Mother testified, she identified B.O. as E.O’s older sister, and S.O. as E.O.’s cousin. When
discussing B.O., it appears Mother’s counsel is referring Morales to some notes, but these notes were not admitted into evidence.
7
McDonald’s and sit for two to three hours depending on the visit. He denied that Mother
has ever been inappropriate with Amy, and he has not had any sobriety issues with
Mother. He confirmed the visits have been appropriate, and he had no concerns with
Mother’s ability to care for Amy during the visitation.
On cross-examination, he described Mother as “real good with [Amy].” He
confirmed that Mother brings her items, snacks, buys her food at McDonald’s, and
interacts with the child the entire time. He confirmed that Amy is attached to Mother. And,
Amy is bonded with Mother during the visit.
C. Mother
Mother testified she applied for housing in Portland and Beeville. The housing
application for Beeville was done on July 12, 2025, and it was submitted on her phone. 9
For employment, she explained she is a caregiver for an elderly lady, and she has been
doing that “[s]ince [she] got out of jail September 29th.” She agreed she picked up a
misdemeanor theft case and, it is “still not resolved.” Mother denied that she would go to
prison for that and stated, “I’m just going to do community service. That’s it.”
Mother described learning that E.O.’s older sister, B.O., wanted to adopt Amy, but
denied the Department ever asked her about B.O. 10 Mother also described providing
Morales with E.O.’s cousin, S.O., but when she offered the name, she was told “that’s not
what they’re looking for, it’s not what they’re interested in or something, and then that it’s
already too late.” Mother agreed that she completed her services and made changes,
9 It appears the trial court and parties reviewed a screenshot of the application for housing in
Beeville, but a screenshot was not admitted into evidence. Mother explained that she did not have a screenshot for the “one” in Portland.
10 Given the context of the conversation, it appears Mother learned this information from the deidentified file, i.e., from produced discovery.
8
stating, “I’m sober. And then all my classes, I did learn a lot from my classes. I have a job
now. I get out of the house. I have bills to pay now.” She denied, however, having the
money to get a new apartment or rent a house. As for her bills, she pays for a storage
fee, her phone, toiletries, rent, “two-something a month[,]” electricity, and water.
Mother testified that the house in Rockport now has electricity and water, and she
had a bed despite Morales’s testimony otherwise. She denied that anyone from the
Department discussed with her resources for getting her GED or offered to help obtain
her driver’s license. She also denied hearing the term Catholic Charities from anyone at
the Department. And, she agreed she did not have much of a support system. Although
she previously resided with her grandfather, “he said [she] had to leave” when he learned
from her prior caseworker that she had tested positive.
Mother described her plan as “eventually mov[ing] to a different spot” and “getting
into a different home, a better home.” With regards to her plans for work, Mother stated,
“Yeah, so the lady that I—that I work with—or work for, she also—the one that has power
of attorney over this lady, she works through an agency, so she will just give me certain
people that need help, and she’ll give me their numbers and I’ll go do an interview with
them, and I’ll have a job. So I’m not too worried . . . if she passes, about me being jobless.”
As far as her bond with Amy, she described Amy as starting to get more familiar with her,
hanging on to her, and remembering her.
Mother confirmed that she is asking that her parental rights not be terminated, and
to find it is not in Amy’s best interest. Mother also confirmed that if she had the opportunity
to get another home, she would live in a different one away from E.O. When asked if that
was her plan, Mother responded, “Yes. That’s what it’s going—that’s what it’s pushing
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to.” Mother also confirmed she wants Amy, wants to at least maintain a relationship with
her, see her occasionally, and know about her. If she can get her own apartment or home,
she would also like to have Amy on weekends and believed once she gets on her feet,
she could do other things.
On cross-examination, Mother denied that there were any other potential fathers
besides E.O. Before obtaining her current sobriety, Mother admitted to being a
methamphetamine user for about “a year and a half.” She denied, however, that E.O.
ever gave her drugs. Mother described her relationship with E.O. as “a very rocky and
difficult subject.” She did not know why he does not come to court and stated, “He’s his
own person. He just kind of blocks me out every time I talk to him about it.” She believed
the relationship is healthy “in a way.” But, when it comes to Amy, “it’s just a hard topic.”
Mother said E.O. has an adult son, but she is unsure where he is. Mother also believed
E.O. was a good dad because she has seen how he is towards other people’s kids.
However, she denied she would have another child with him given his lack of compliance
in this case, and she does not plan to marry him.
Mother denied any drug use during the case, and stated, “My sobriety date is in
like a week.” She could not explain the positive August hair follicle test, though. Mother
acknowledged that a friend was possibly going to give her a trailer, but she ultimately
declined, explaining that the friend “wanted to be controlling, so [she] kind of just backed
out of it.” Mother denied that E.O. hangs around with people or brings people over that
are not good or who have criminal records, stating, “Nobody comes over. Now that I’m
not using anymore, nobody comes over anymore. Nobody even—we don’t even smoke
cigarettes inside like we used to smoke in the trailer.” When asked, “So are you saying
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that you know [E.O.] doesn’t use?” Mother answered, “Not in front of me.” Mother also
testified that she feels Amy is in a “good place” right now, but she does not “want to lose
her, like completely. I still want to know about her. I still want to see her.”
On further cross-examination, Mother stated that “at the moment” she is planning
on staying with E.O., but “probably not for much longer.” When asked how she planned
to support Amy if she were returned, Mother said, “[by] applying for child[]care, and,
hopefully, I have my own transportation and stuff by now. And I have been looking
into . . . getting my driver’s license and all that stuff.” And, when asked if she thought she
was prepared to take Amy home today, Mother answered, “Honestly, no, not at this point,
but I will eventually be.” Mother indicated she planned to remain in the current residence
with E.O. “because that’s pretty much all I’m working with right now.” As for the safety of
her current residence, Mother indicated she would not let anything happen to Amy and
does not think she would be in any harm. She admitted the trash outside needs to be
cleaned up but testified they fixed up the inside.
Mother further explained that she and E.O. would not let Morales in the residence
on her last visit because she “had figured out that [Morales] didn’t want the baby coming
home.” So, according to Mother, there was no point. She did not think it would have
helped if Morales could have verified things were better because “nothing’s ever going to
be enough and [E.O.] is still there.”
D. Yvonne Flores
On direct-examination, Flores denied that she believed that people that are
economically disadvantaged should not get access to their children. She was not aware
of a list the Department had to refer people for certain things and only knew of Catholic
11
Charities. Flores testified that Mother has made “some” changes in her life. She denied
that the Department made a premature decision to leave Amy in her foster placement.
When asked whether Mother doing her entire plan and not having the money to get a
place was sufficient to terminate her parental rights, Flores explained that “whenever we
review and stop the cases, it’s based off of information, not necessarily an opinion that
we believe.”
On cross-examination, Flores denied that Morales sought to terminate Mother’s
parental rights from the onset of the case. She explained that a month prior to the initial
permanency hearing, the Department does a “structured decision-making tool in our
system” and “based off of that information entered in there, it helps us determine whether
we should change the rules at that time or if we should continue with reunification efforts.”
Flores also denied that Mother had made sufficient progress for the Department to
recommend a full return and monitor, but she acknowledged “there was progress made.”
However, according to Flores, they usually do a “step-up” of unsupervised visits to a
return and monitor, but that was never reached in this case due to Mother’s instability and
the living environment.
E. Order
As referenced above, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights and
thereafter reduced its oral ruling to writing. This appeal ensued.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trier of fact must find two elements by clear and convincing evidence before it
can involuntarily terminate parental rights: (1) that a parent’s act or omission satisfies a
statutory ground for termination found in Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code;
12
and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. See id. §§ 161.001(b)(1), (2); In re
E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802–03 (Tex. 2012). Clear and convincing evidence means “the
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 101.007. Involuntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional
rights, Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985), and consequently, termination
proceedings must be strictly scrutinized. In re H.S., No. 24-0307, ____ S.W.3d ____,
____, 2026 WL 1614496, at *8 (Tex. June 5, 2026). In parental termination proceedings,
our legal and factual sufficiency standards honor this elevated burden of proof while
respecting the factfinder’s role. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018).
Where the distinction lies between legal and factual sufficiency is in the extent to
which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered. Id. When conducting a
legal-sufficiency review, a reviewing court “may not disregard undisputed evidence even
if that evidence is inconsistent with the verdict or finding.” In re H.S., 2026 WL 1614496,
at *8 (citing In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022)). We “look at all the evidence in
the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could
have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re K.N., No. 24-0881,
____ S.W.3d ____, ____, 2026 WL 1614378, at *7 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (quoting In re
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). In comparison, a factual sufficiency analysis,
“requires weighing disputed evidence contrary to the finding against all the evidence
favoring the finding.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. We must consider “whether disputed
evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the
finding” in a factual-sufficiency review. Id. “Evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of
13
the entire record, the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited
in favor of a finding is so significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief
or conviction that the finding was true.” Id. Under both legal and factual sufficiency
standards, we defer to the trier of fact’s determinations on the credibility of the witnesses
“so long as those determinations are not themselves unreasonable.” In re J.P.B., 180
S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); In re O.J.G., No. 13-25-00145-CV, 2025 WL
1912201, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 10, 2025, pet. denied) (mem.
op.). In a bench trial, the judge is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony. In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 311–12, 317 (Tex.
2021).
III. PREDICATE GROUNDS
First, Mother argues there is legally and factually insufficient evidence supporting
termination of her parental rights under subsections (D) and (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE
§§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).
A. Applicable Law
Subsections (D) and (E) involve findings of endangerment to the child. In re C.J.C.,
No. 08-26-00083-CV, 2026 WL 2018453, at *8 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 10, 2026, pet.
denied) (mem. op.). Under subsection (D), a trial court may terminate parental rights if it
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly
allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or
emotional well-being of the child[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). The
endangerment analysis under subsection (D) focuses on evidence of the child’s physical
environment but permits termination if the Department proves the parent’s conduct
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caused the child to be placed or remain in an “endangering environment.” In re L.D.M.W.,
No. 09-25-00495-CV, 2026 WL 1250188, at *6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 7, 2026, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 721–23 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)). “Subsection (D) addresses the child’s
surroundings and environment rather than parental misconduct, which is the subject of
subsection (E).” In re A.L.H., 624 S.W.3d 47, 56 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.)
(quoting In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 926 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)) (citation
modified). The endangering conditions or surroundings include unlawful conduct by
persons who live in the child’s home. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 721. Subsection D allows for
termination based upon only a single act or omission. In re P.H.S., No. 04-25-00838-CV,
2026 WL 1828577, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 24, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(citation omitted). The relevant time frame for evaluating subsection (D) is typically before
the child’s removal because, as a general matter, “conditions or surroundings cannot
endanger a child unless that child is exposed to them.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749.
Under subsection (E), a trial court may terminate parental rights if, in addition to a
best-interest finding, it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “engaged
in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which
endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 161.001(b)(1)(E). To “endanger” means to expose a child to loss or injury or to
jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. A
finding of endangerment under subsection (E) requires evidence that the endangerment
was the result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re
H.H., No. 12-26-00143-CV, 2026 WL 2212811, at *5 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 31, 2026, no
15
pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted). “Termination under subsection (E) must be based on
more than a single act or omission; the statute requires a voluntary, deliberate, and
conscious course of conduct by the parent.” In re S.W., No. 14-25-01153-CV, 2026 WL
1506476, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 28, 2026, pet. denied) (citation
omitted). Relevant evidence in determining whether a parent engaged in a course of
endangering conduct includes conduct that occurred before and after the child’s birth, in
the child’s presence and outside the child’s presence, and before and after removal by
the Department. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). Further,
endangerment “does not require [the parent’s conduct] to directly harm the child.” In re
N.L.S., 715 S.W.3d 760, 764 (Tex. 2025) (quoting In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 278
(Tex. 2024)). Instead, the proper inquiry is whether there is evidence that the parent
“exhibited a pattern of behavior presenting a substantial risk of harm” to the child. Id.
“Conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability, including instability in
housing arrangements, endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re
C.J.C., 2026 WL 2018453, at *11 (citations omitted).
The primary difference between subsection (D) and (E) is that subsection (D)
focuses on the child’s conditions or surroundings, while subsection (E) focuses on the
parent’s or another’s conduct whether by overt act or by omission. In re I.R., No. 13-24-00632-CV, 2025 WL 1261430, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 1, 2025,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted). “Even still, parental conduct is relevant to the child’s
environment under subsection (D) because the conduct of a parent or another person in
the home can create an environment that endangers the physical and emotional wellbeing of a child as required for termination under subsection (D).” In re C.W., No. 05-25-16
00991-CV, 2025 WL 3722810, at *15 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2025, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (citations omitted). Because the evidence pertaining to subsections (D) and (E) are
interrelated, we consolidate our review of the endangerment findings. In re J.C.B.G., No.
04-25-00675-CV, 2025 WL 4862158, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 17, 2025, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted); see In re B.C.F., No. 13-24-00210-CV, 2024 WL
4224007, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 18, 2024, no pet.) (mem.
op.).
B. Analysis
The evidence at trial showed that Mother used methamphetamine during her
pregnancy, Amy was born positive for methamphetamine, Amy exhibited feeding
problems after birth, and Amy was also treated for seizures and withdrawals following her
birth. See In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. 2024) (per curium) (“Drug use during
pregnancy supports a finding of direct injury to the child.”); In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749
(“Certainly, Mother’s use of controlled substances while pregnant created a dangerous
environment for [the child.]” (citation modified)). Based on Mother’s testimony, her
methamphetamine use spanned her entire pregnancy.
That evidence is coupled with Mother’s recent decision to return to live with E.O.,
who admitted to Morales that he engages in “daily” drug use, and who had been
aggressive towards Morales. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 (concluding there is
some evidence of endangerment under subsection (E) after reasoning, among other
things, that the father “admitted to daily marijuana use before the twins were born,
although he testified that he never used drugs in his older daughter’s presence”); see also
In re K.N., 2026 WL 1614378, at *14 (explaining that “we [have] affirmed the termination
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of parental rights of parents who use illegal drugs chronically, or while caring for children.”)
(citing In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278); In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281 (“When a pattern
of drug use is coupled with credible evidence of attendant risks to employment, housing,
and prolonged absence from the children, a factfinder reasonably can find endangerment
to the child’s physical or emotional well-being under (D) and (E).”); see generally In re
S.W., 2026 WL 1506476 at *5 (describing Father’s aggressive behavior towards
Department personnel and concluding this evidence was relevant to an endangerment
finding under subsection (E)). In other words, the trial court could have reasonably
inferred that despite Mother achieving her own sobriety, she chose to resume residing, at
least temporarily, with a chronic drug user, thereby creating a dangerous environment for
Amy. See In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 262–64 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet.
denied) (concluding there was legally sufficient evidence under subsection (E) after
reasoning in part that “the man with whom Appellant and [the child] lived at the beginning
of the case also admitted having a problem with cocaine”).
Additionally, it was undisputed that E.O. failed to drug test throughout the entirety
of the case, and although Mother denied that he used illegal drugs “in front” of her, the
trial court could have reasonably inferred again that her decision to live with him when
she was aware that he failed to drug test contributed to an endangering environment for
Amy. See In re S.G., No. 02-24-00045-CV, 2024 WL 1792764, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth, April 25, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that the quantum of evidence
was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under
subsections (D) and (E) after reasoning, among other things, that “Mother continued to
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live with Father despite his refusal to take court-ordered drug tests, and she arrived at
visits with Father while he smelled of marijuana”).
Moreover, despite Mother’s denial of her own drug use while the case was
pending, the trial court was entitled to consider Morales’s testimony that Mother tested
positive in August, as well as Mother’s inability to explain the result. See In re J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d at 346; In re L.A.T., No. 13-19-00217-CV, 2019 WL 4493702, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that the trial
court’s finding under subsection (E) is supported by legally and factually sufficient
evidence after explaining, among other things, that “Mother’s drug use evidenced by her
positive drug tests throughout [the child’s] case could also be considered by the trial
court”); M.R. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-23-00510-CV, 2024 WL
589907, at *13 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A parent’s
decision to use illegal drugs while the termination suit is pending, and the parent knows
he is at risk of losing his child, may support a finding of endangerment under subsection
(E).” (citations omitted)); In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d at 262–64 (concluding there was
legally sufficient evidence under subsection (E) after reasoning in part that “[a]ppellant
denied ever using cocaine or methamphetamines but could not explain why she had
tested positive for both (as well as other drugs) in April and May 2008”).
Finally, despite Mother’s argument that the Department’s housing evidence was
incomplete and speculative, it was undisputed where Mother resided at the time of trial
as well as Mother’s refusal to allow Morales to inspect the home on her last visit. See In
re S.A.L., No. 13-23-00045-CV, 2023 WL 3879856, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg June 8, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (finding the evidence legally sufficient
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under subsections (D) and (E), in part because “Mother did not allow the Department
access to her apartment so that they could conduct the requisite home evaluations
required for reunification” (citation omitted)). Additionally, since she had denied Morales
access to the home, the trial court was free to disbelieve Mother that the home had been
recently cleaned and now had water and electricity. Instead, the trial court could have
believed Morales’s testimony that the “walls” were still “not finished,” it lacked running
water and electricity, and “there” remained “trash and miscellaneous items everywhere.”
See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.)
(“In a bench trial, the trial judge is the factfinder who weighs the evidence, resolves
evidentiary conflicts, and evaluates witnesses’ credibility.”). Apart from two housing
applications (neither of which were admitted into evidence) being discussed by Mother
and assuming they were submitted, the evidence does not otherwise reveal the status of
the applications. Instead, the evidence revealed that Mother chose to live with E.O. for an
uncertain amount of time.
Based on the above, we disagree with Mother’s argument that the evidence
demonstrates that her financial hardship or poverty served as the basis for the trial court’s
endangerment grounds. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(c)(2) (providing that evidence
that a parent is economically disadvantaged “does not constitute clear and convincing
evidence sufficient for a court to make a [termination] finding under Subsection (b)”); see
also In re A.B.-G., No. 01-24-00509-CV, 2024 WL 4982500, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Dec. 5, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“While poverty is not a basis for
terminating parental rights, the preceding evidence indicates that the mother’s living
circumstances continued to be unstable through trial and that the recurrence of
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homelessness or something close to it was quite possible.”). Instead, we conclude the
evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support termination under subsections
(D) and (E), and we overrule her first issue.
IV. BEST INTEREST
Second, Mother argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to
support the trial court’s best-interest finding because the “evidence demonstrated
substantial rehabilitation, consistent visitation, employment, continued sobriety, and
ongoing efforts towards reunification.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2).
A. Applicable Law
“‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-andcircumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411
S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013). It is child-centered and focuses on the well-being, safety,
and development of the child. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. There is a strong
presumption that termination is not in a child’s best interest; thus, a parental-termination
order “must always be a last resort and never a first impulse.” In re H.S., 2026 WL
1614496, at *1. No unique set of factors need be proved with respect to the best interest
of the child. In re R.K.P-R., No. 10-21-00265-CV, 2022 WL 172381, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Waco Jan. 19, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). And evidence of each Holley factor is not
required to support a best-interest determination. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367,
371–72 (Tex. 1976). Those factors include: (1) the children’s desires; (2) the children’s
present and future emotional and physical needs; (3) the present and future emotional
and physical danger to the children; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking
custody; (5) the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the children’s
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best interest; (6) the plans for the children by those individuals or by the agency seeking
custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or
omissions that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is an improper one; and
(9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id. at 372. The Texas Family Code also
lists thirteen similar factors for determining the parents’ willingness and ability to provide
a safe environment. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307. “In analyzing these factors, the court must
focus on the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent.” In re J.C.H-P.,
No. 04-23-00636-CV, 2023 WL 7006285, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 25, 2023,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citation omitted).
B. Analysis
Amy was eleven months old when Mother’s parental rights were terminated, and
thus, too young to express her desires. See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d at 833 (“[T]he
general rule is that when a child is too young to express herself, her desires are neutral
as to the trial court’s best-interest finding, unless there is circumstantial evidence from
which the factfinder could infer her desires by proxy.”); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372
(considering the child desires as the first factor).
On the one hand, the evidence shows that Amy is doing “very well” in her foster
home, where she was placed after her discharge from the NICU and where she remained
at the time of trial, and she is in a “good place.” It was also undisputed that Amy is meeting
her checkup milestones and is “very attached” to her foster placement. See In re A.M.V.,
No. 04-25-00070-CV, 2025 WL 1512211, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 28, 2025,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) (explaining that in circumstances in which the child is young,
“courts . . . have held a fact[]finder may consider whether the child has bonded with the
22
foster family, is well cared for by them, and has spent minimal time with the parent”
(citations omitted)); In re E.M., No. 11-24-00310-CV, 2025 WL 1240792, at *10 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). On the other hand, the
evidence showed that Mother regularly attended her two-to-three-hour supervised visits
with Amy, and Mendoza confirmed the visits were appropriate. Mendoza also confirmed
that Mother would bring Amy items and snacks, buy her food during the visit, and interact
with her the entire time. Additionally, Mendoza confirmed that Amy is attached to Mother
and is bonded with her during the visit. Mother also described Amy as becoming more
familiar with her and hanging onto her. See In re R.R.G., No. 13-23-00032-CV, 2023 WL
4357039, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 6, 2023, pet. denied) (mem.
op.) (deciding the first Holley factor weighs “slightly against terminating [Mother’s]
parental rights” after describing the bond the sixteen-month-old child had with his
placement against the relationship he had with his mother as shown during her twice a
week two-hour supervised visits in which she would bring the child “toys, books, diapers,
food, etc.”). Accordingly, the first factor weighs slightly against terminating Mother’s
parental rights.
However, the same cannot be said as it relates to the plans for Amy and the
stability of the home or proposed placement. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (considering
the plans for the children by those individuals or by the agency seeking custody and the
stability of the home or proposed placement as the sixth and seventh Holley factors). As
mentioned above, the evidence shows that Amy resides in the same foster placement
she has been in since her release from the NICU and she is doing “very well” there. It
was also undisputed that the home where Amy is placed is a foster-to-adopt home that
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has expressed an interest in adopting her. See In re G.A.C., 499 S.W.3d 138, 141 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. denied) (“[A] child’s need for permanence through the
establishment of a ‘stable, permanent home’ has been recognized as the paramount
consideration in determining best interest.” (citations omitted)). In contrast, Mother’s plan
for Amy was unclear and ill-defined. See In re C.J.C., 2026 WL 2018453, at *15. For
instance, Mother admitted that she is not prepared at this point to take Amy home, and
testified she will care for her “[by] applying for child care, and, hopefully, I have my own
transportation and stuff by [then]. And I have been looking into . . . getting my driver’s
license and all that stuff.” Additionally, Mother discussed potentially having Amy on
weekends and acknowledged that once she gets on her feet, she can do other things.
Thus, after comparing Mother’s plan with that of the Department’s, the trial court could
have found that the above-referenced foster-to-adopt home will be able to offer Amy the
permanency and stability that she may never attain with Mother given Mother’s undefined
timeline to care for her. As such, these two factors weigh heavily in favor of termination.
See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a) (“[T]he prompt and permanent placement of the child
in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.”). Stated differently,
Mother’s plan effectively constitutes a plea to place Amy in limbo indefinitely. See In re
E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied).
Next, it was undisputed that Amy tested positive for methamphetamine at birth and
suffered from seizure and withdrawals. See id. at 608 (“A mother’s use of illegal drugs
during pregnancy endangers the physical wellbeing of her unborn child.” (citation
omitted)). It was also undisputed that Mother completed the majority of her services apart
from obtaining stable housing. Despite these achievements, however, Mother returned to
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live with E.O., who informed Morales of his daily drug use, who failed to participate in any
services, and who expressed to Morales a desire to sign his “rights away because [he]
d[id not] have time for all this S-H-I-T.” In other words, the trial court could have inferred
that Mother chose an environment that posed a danger to eleven-month-old Amy or,
found her continued relationship with E.O. demonstrated Mother’s inability to perceive the
danger of parental drug use. See In re L.W., 609 S.W.3d 189, 203 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2020, no pet.) (noting when addressing the second, third, and eighth Holley factors that
“young children require a great deal of time, attention, and protection”); In re A.H., No.
02-23-00348-CV, 2024 WL 191229, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 18, 2024, pet.
denied.) (mem. op.) (“And as to Mother’s continued relationship with Father—a man who
had tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine during the Department’s case
and who had admitted to dealing drugs and being around drug users—the factfinder could
have found that the continued relationship demonstrated Mother's inability to perceive the
danger of parental drug use.” (citation omitted)); TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(8) (listing
history of substance abuse by a child’s family or others who have access to a child’s home
as a best-interest consideration). Moreover, evidence of Mother’s housing instability, a
primary source of the Department’s concern at trial, supports the best-interest finding. In
re J.C.H-P., 2023 WL 7006285, at *3. For example, Morales testified that Mother moved
“four” times during the case; although, Mother appears to place blame on others for at
least two of the moves. See In re C.J.C., 2026 WL 2018453, at *14 (concluding the
evidence supported the trial court’s best interest finding in part because “ample evidence
that Mother struggled to maintain consistent housing, transportation, and employment
during the pendency of the case” including evidence that “Mother resided in at least four
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different homes, many of which had serious sanitation and cleanliness concerns”); see
generally In re L.W., 609 S.W.3d at 205 (“The trial court could have believed their
testimony and, combined with Mother’s inability to stay in one domestic violence program
and her poor judgment in repeatedly returning herself and her children to her abuser,
found that this evidence established a lack of parental abilities and a refusal to utilize
available programs.”). For her move from her grandfather’s, she blamed the Department
for reporting her positive drug test to him, and from her friend who was going to give her
a trailer, Mother complained that she was too “controlling.” Additionally, as referenced
above, apart from the submission of two housing applications, the evidence does not
otherwise reveal the status of these applications.
The trial court also was free to disbelieve Mother’s testimony that the inside of the
home that she and E.O. shared had been cleaned up and that it had running water and
electricity, as well as her excuse that she and E.O. denied Morales access to verify these
recent improvements because Mother “had figured out that [Morales] didn’t want the baby
coming home.” See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d at 823. Finally, although Mother testified
that she was “just going to do community service” for her pending misdemeanor theft
charge, she also admitted it was unresolved. Nevertheless, “criminal conduct and
incarceration affects a parent’s life and the ability to parent, thereby subjecting a child to
potential emotional and physical danger.” See In re R.M.H., No. 04-23-00765-CV, 2023
WL 8103188, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 22, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation
omitted). Accordingly, the trial court could have considered this evidence weighed against
Mother. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(11) (listing as a best-interest consideration “the
willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal
26
changes within a reasonable period of time”). After considering the remaining nonexhaustive Holley and the statutory factors discussed, we conclude they weigh in favor
of termination. Additionally, based on the above, we again disagree with Mother’s
argument that the evidence demonstrates that her financial hardship served as the basis
for the trial court’s termination. See generally In re A.B.-G., 2024 WL 4982500, at *13.
We do acknowledge, however, that not all the evidence is adverse to Mother. For
example, she completed parenting and substance abuse classes, attended individual
counseling, visited Amy, obtained employment, and demonstrated sobriety for a time.
However, evidence cannot be read in isolation and must be read in the context of the
entire record. See In re O.J.G., 2025 WL 1912201, at *9 (citation omitted). And when
viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we conclude
a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination
was in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2); In re A.C., 560
S.W.3d at 630. Further, the evidence to the contrary was not so significant as to preclude
such a finding. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630. We thus hold the evidence is legally
and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of the parentchild relationship between Mother and the child was in the child’s best interest, and we
overrule Mother’s second issue.
V. CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
JENNY CRON
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
28th day of September, 2026.
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