Porsha Anderson v. State of Maryland, No. 1191, Sept. Term, 2024. Opinion by Tang, J.
PROCESS – DEFECTS, OBJECTIONS, AND AMENDMENT – DEFECTS AND
IRREGULARITIES IN SERVICE OR RETURN OR PROOF THEREOF
The appellant filed a complaint against the State of Maryland under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Maryland Code Annotated, State Government §§ 12-101 to 116, which provides that service of a complaint is sufficient only if made on the Treasurer or the Treasurer’s designee. The caption of the appellant’s complaint named the “State of Maryland” as the defendant and indicated that service of process be made on the Attorney General, rather than the Treasurer or the Treasurer’s designee. The summons, complaint, and related papers were ultimately delivered to the Treasurer’s designee.
Although the caption of the complaint directed service to the Attorney General rather than the Treasurer (or its designee), there was no dispute that the State of Maryland was properly identified as the defendant and was not misled in any way. Therefore, to the extent that the circuit court dismissed the action for insufficient service of process because of the alleged error in the caption in the complaint, the court erred in concluding that this error constituted insufficient service of process and abused its discretion in dismissing the action on that basis.
PROCESS – SERVICE – PERSONAL SERVICE IN GENERAL – MODE AND
SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE
The clerk issued a summons correctly naming the defendant in the caption and directory section in the summons but, for unknown reasons, included the wrong address. However, the private process server ultimately located the Treasurer’s designee at the correct address. It is undisputed that the server handed the papers to the Treasurer’s designee, who reviewed them and attempted to return them because the summons did not include the correct address for the State Treasurer’s Office. The server then dropped the papers and left the office.
The circuit court erred in concluding that service of process was insufficient. The server effected service of process on the Treasurer’s designee despite her refusal to accept the summons and related papers. Similarly, the fact that counsel for the Treasurer later returned the papers to plaintiff’s counsel did not defeat service of process.
The incorrect address in the summons did not invalidate service of process. There is no indication that the State was misled about the summons being directed to it; the summons (and complaint) clearly named the State as the defendant. Nor is there any indication that the State was otherwise prejudiced or denied substantial right by the incorrect service address in the summons. Because the dismissal of the complaint was based on the circuit court’s incorrect legal determination that service of process was insufficient, the court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint on that ground.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-23-002837
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 1191
September Term, 2024
PORSHA ANDERSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Tang,
Albright,
Hotten, Michele D.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Tang, J.
Filed: October 5, 2026
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.
2026.10.05
15:45:44 -04'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
The appellant, Porsha Anderson (“Anderson”), filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City against the State of Maryland under the Maryland Tort Claims Act
(“MTCA”), Maryland Code Annotated, State Government (“SG”) §§ 12-101 to 110. After
unsuccessful attempts to effect service on the State, Anderson’s private process server
dropped the summons, complaint, and related papers at the State Treasurer’s Office, in the
presence of the Treasurer’s designee. In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss the
action for insufficient service of process, asserting, among other things, that the summons
contained a clerical error. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action without
prejudice.
Anderson appealed, presenting one question for our review,1 which we rephrase:
Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by dismissing the action for
insufficient service of process?
For the reasons that follow, we answer in the affirmative. Consequently, we shall
reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On June 23, 2023, Anderson, through counsel, filed a complaint against the State of
Maryland. She alleged that she was sexually harassed and assaulted by a correctional
1
Anderson’s brief presents the issue as follows:
Whether an otherwise valid summons that is properly served on a defendant
notifying them: a) that an action has commenced against them in the same
court that issued the summons; and b) that failing to answer the complaint
may result in the entry of judgment against the defendant; is rendered invalid
because it contains a clerical error[.]
officer while she was incarcerated at the North Branch Correctional Institution.2 Under the
MTCA, she asserted two claims: one for negligence and another for negligent hiring,
training, retention, and supervision.
The MTCA provides that “[i]n an action under this subtitle, service of the complaint
and accompanying documents is sufficient only if made on the Treasurer.” SG § 12-108(a).
The “Treasurer” is “the State Treasurer of Maryland or the Treasurer’s designee.” Md. Code
Regs. 25.02.01.02B(6). The “Treasurer’s designee” includes “the Director of the Insurance
Division of the State Treasurer’s Office.” Md. Code Regs. 25.02.01.02B(7)(a)(ii). During
the relevant time, Joyce Miller served as the Director of the Insurance Division of the State
Treasurer’s Office and was the Treasurer’s designee. The State Treasurer’s Office is located
at 80 Calvert Street in Annapolis, Maryland.
The caption of the complaint named the “State of Maryland” as the defendant. It
indicated that service of process be made not on the Treasurer or the Treasurer’s designee,
but on the Attorney General, as follows:3
2
The North Branch Correctional Institution is an institution of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, a principal department of the State government. See Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 2-101.
3
It is not clear why Anderson named the Attorney General as the person to be served. It is possible that she relied on Maryland Rule 2-124(j), which provides that
2
Anderson’s counsel filed a line with the complaint requesting that the circuit court
clerk issue a summons and return it to counsel for service by private process server.
Apparently, Anderson’s counsel did not receive the initial summons. Despite making
additional requests, counsel remained unsuccessful in obtaining the summons. After
several months, the court issued a notice of contemplated dismissal under Maryland Rule
2-507. Anderson’s counsel filed a motion to defer dismissal, explaining that the delay in
serving the State was due to never receiving the summons from the clerk despite repeated
requests. In January 2024, the court granted the motion, deferring its dismissal until June
10, and permitting additional attempts to serve the State.
On February 5, 2024, Anderson’s counsel requested another summons and for it to
be returned to him so service could be made by private process server. The clerk issued a
summons on February 12. The caption of the summons named the “State of Maryland” as
the defendant. The summons directed service on the “State of Maryland” but listed
Anderson’s counsel’s office address as the service address for the State, as follows:
“[s]ervice is made upon the State of Maryland by serving the Attorney General.” However, section (a) of that Rule states that the “provisions of this Rule do not abrogate any statute permitting or requiring service on a person.” Md. Rule 2-124(a). The Committee note following that section states that “[e]xamples of statutes permitting or requiring service on a person include the [MTCA], [SG] § 12-108(a) (service of a complaint is sufficient only when made upon the Treasurer of the State).”
3
wanted to coordinate service with her. Ms. Miller asked the server how the summons was
addressed, and the server responded that it was “to the State of Maryland at 6205 Executive
Blvd., Rockville, Maryland 20852.” Ms. Miller advised the server that she could not accept
service because the summons contained the incorrect address for the State Treasurer’s
Office.
On April 10, 2024, the private process server went to the State Treasurer’s Office
located at 80 Calvert Street in Annapolis and attempted to hand Ms. Miller an envelope
with the summons, complaint, and related papers. After reviewing the summons, which
was addressed to the “State of Maryland” but still contained the wrong address, Ms. Miller
told the server that she could not accept service because the summons “was not addressed
to the [State] Treasurer’s Office correctly.” When Ms. Miller “attempted to return the
envelope back to [the server], [the server] dropped it and left the building.”
In an affidavit of service, the process server affirmed that on April 10, 2024, she
“served by delivering the Writ of Summons Issued February 12, 2024, Complaint, Exhibit,
and Civil Non-Domestic Case Information Report to: Joyce Miller as State Treasurer for
State Of Maryland, S/O Maryland State Treasurer, at the address of: 80 Calvert St,
Annapolis, MD 21401.”
On April 16, 2024, counsel for the Treasurer informed Anderson’s counsel of the
private process server’s “appear[ance]” at the State Treasurer’s Office, asserting that the
“process server cannot ‘drop and run’ for effective service, particularly where, as here, the
summons [wa]s not correctly addressed.” Accordingly, counsel for the Treasurer said she
was “returning the complaint and summons” to Anderson’s counsel.
5
On April 22, 2024, Anderson’s counsel filed the affidavit of service with the court.
Motion to Dismiss
On May 21, 2024, the State filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322. Citing SG § 12-108(a), which requires that service of the complaint and accompanying
documents be made on the Treasurer, the State explained that service of process was
directed to the Attorney General, not the Treasurer. Additionally, the summons listed an
incorrect address that was not the one for the State Treasurer’s Office. Relying on Ms.
Miller’s affidavit detailing the April 10 encounter with the private process server, as
recounted above, the State asserted that “service could not be accepted.” Accordingly, the
State argued, the complaint was not served in compliance with SG § 12-108(a) and should
be dismissed under Rule 2-322(a)(4) for “insufficient service of process.”
Anderson filed an opposition to the motion. She argued that pursuant to Rule 2-121(a) (governing service of process) and SG § 12-108(a), she had effectuated service on
the State by having the required papers delivered to the Treasurer’s designee on April 10.
Moreover, she argued that the State effectively acknowledged receipt of the summons and
complaint through the Treasurer’s counsel’s correspondence attempting to return the
documents. Accordingly, she contended that she had met the requirements under the Rule
and SG § 12-108(a), and thus, service was effectuated on the State.
Anderson further argued that the complaint and summons clearly identified the State
as the defendant. Although the clerk had included the wrong address for the State in the
summons, it was a clerical error that did not undermine effective service. Furthermore, she
6
noted that the State had failed to explain how the alleged deficiencies deprived it of fair
notice or opportunity to be heard in the case.
The State filed a reply in response to Anderson’s opposition. It argued that, because
“the summons [was] not correctly addressed to the [State] Treasurer’s Office,” it did not
receive a “proper summons,” and therefore “service was insufficient.” The State suggested
that it was Anderson’s duty to ensure that the summons contained the correct address for
the State Treasurer’s Office. It further explained that the clerk’s clerical error of listing the
wrong address on the summons was “intrinsically tied to [Anderson’s] ability to properly
serve [the State], as the State of Maryland cannot accept a summons that is not properly
addressed to it.” Moreover, the State argued that the State Treasurer’s Office had explicitly
stated that it could not accept service of the summons containing an incorrect address and
subsequently returned the documents to Anderson’s counsel.
According to the State, since “service of process” was defective, it resulted in a
jurisdictional defect that could not be cured notwithstanding the State’s actual knowledge
of the proceeding. It added that making service on the Treasurer (or its designee) was a
mandatory condition precedent for a plaintiff like Anderson to avail herself of the limited
waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity for tort actions under the MTCA. Because
Anderson did not serve a “proper summons” on the Treasurer’s designee, she failed to
comply with the requirements under the MTCA, and thus, the State’s sovereign immunity
had not been waived. Accordingly, the State argued, Anderson’s complaint must be
dismissed.
7
On July 15, 2024, the court entered an order granting the State’s motion to dismiss
without a hearing.4 In the order, the court stated that “for the reasons stated in the Motion
[to Dismiss],” the motion was granted, and the action was dismissed “for insufficient
service of process without prejudice.”
Anderson noted this timely appeal.5
DISCUSSION
Anderson argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in dismissing the
complaint for insufficient service of process. She continues to maintain that she made
service on the State by delivering to the Treasurer’s designee the summons, complaint, and
other papers filed with it. Notwithstanding the incorrect address in the summons, she argues
that the summons complied with the Rules. Moreover, she argues that the State did not
4
Maryland Rule 2-311(f) provides that “[a] party desiring a hearing on a motion . . . shall request the hearing in the motion or response under the heading ‘Request for Hearing,’” and “[t]he title of the motion or response shall state that a hearing is requested.” (emphasis added). The Rule continues: “Except when a rule expressly provides for a hearing, the court shall determine in each case whether a hearing will be held, but the court may not render a decision that is dispositive of a claim or defense without a hearing if one was requested as provided in this section.” (emphases added).
The State did not include a request for a hearing in its motion to dismiss. In her opposition, Anderson included a request for a hearing on the last page under a heading titled “Request for Hearing,” located beneath counsel’s signature block. However, she did not include the request in the title of the opposition. Anderson does not challenge the court’s dispositive ruling without a hearing.
5
A plaintiff whose complaint is “dismissed without prejudice” has the right to note an appeal. Hariri v. Dahne, 412 Md. 674, 680 (2010); see Moore v. Pomory, 329 Md. 428, 431 (1993) (explaining that circuit court’s order dismissing complaint without prejudice and without expressly providing leave to amend the complaint or file an amended complaint was a final judgment because it “puts the plaintiff out of court and terminates the particular action in [that] court”).
8
contest that it had received the summons and related papers or that it had been deprived of
fair notice.
The State responds that the court properly dismissed the complaint, contending that
Anderson had failed to properly serve the Treasurer’s designee. The State makes three
contentions consistent with arguments made below. First, the State argues that the caption
of the complaint was wrong; while it correctly named the State as the defendant, the caption
incorrectly stated that service should be made on the Attorney General, rather than the
Treasurer (or its designee). Second, the State argues that the service address for the State
in the summons was wrong and thus did not comply with the Rule governing the content
of process. Third, counsel for the Treasurer subsequently returned the summons and related
papers to Anderson’s counsel, explaining that “drop and run” was not effective service,
particularly where, as here, the summons was not correctly addressed. The State therefore
maintains that there was “defective service of process” resulting in a jurisdictional defect,
which cannot be cured notwithstanding the State having actual knowledge of the action.
Because the court did not specify which argument(s) it relied on when it dismissed
the complaint “for insufficient service of process” and instead stated that it did so “for the
reasons stated in the [m]otion [to dismiss],” we shall assess whether any of the State’s three
contentions justified dismissal.
A.
Overview of Relevant Law
We highlight several Maryland Rules implicated in this case, many of which are
modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). As we will discuss
9
later, federal court decisions offer valuable guidance in analyzing the issues here. See Allen
v. Allen, 105 Md. App. 359, 369 (1995) (“Where Maryland rules of civil procedure are
patterned after the federal rules, we will look to federal decisions interpreting the
corresponding federal rules for guidance in construing the similar Maryland rule.”).
Maryland Rule 1-301 governs the form of court papers. In relevant part, subsection
(a) provides:
(a) Caption and Titling. Every pleading and paper filed shall contain a
caption setting forth (1) the parties or, where appropriate, the matter, (2) the
name of the court, (3) the assigned docket reference, and (4) a brief
descriptive title of the pleading or paper which indicates its nature. An
original pleading[6] shall contain the names and addresses, including zip
code, of all parties to the action if the names and addresses are known to the
person filing the pleading. If the address of a party is unknown, the pleading
shall so state. In other pleadings and papers, it is sufficient to state the name
of the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of other parties.
Md. Rule 1-301(a) (emphases added); see id. (source note) (explaining that section (a) is
derived in part from the 1937 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a), and the 1963 version of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2)).
“Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk shall issue forthwith a summons for
each defendant and shall deliver it, together with a copy of each paper filed and a blank
copy of the information report form . . . to the sheriff or other person designated by the
plaintiff.” Md. Rule 2-112(a) (emphasis added); see id. (source note) (explaining that
section (a) is derived in part from the 1980 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)).
6
As pertinent here, an “[o]riginal pleading” means “the first pleading filed in an action against a defendant.” Md. Rule 1-202(t).
10
A “summons” is “a writ notifying the person named in the summons that (1) an
action against that person has been commenced in the court from which the summons is
issued and (2) in a civil action, failure to answer the complaint may result in entry of
judgment against that person.” Md. Rule 1-202(ee).
Rule 2-114 governs the content of process. “Process” is “any written order issued
by a court to secure compliance with its commands or to require action by any person and
includes a summons.” Md. Rule 1-202(y) (emphasis added). Rule 2-114 states:
(a) Generally. All process shall be under the seal of the court and signed by
the clerk.[7]
(b) Summons. A summons shall contain (1) the name of the court and the
assigned docket reference, (2) the name and address of the party requesting
the summons, (3) the name and address of the person to be served as set forth
in the complaint,[8] (4) the date of issue, (5) the time within which it must be
served, (6) the time within which the defendant must file a response to the
complaint by pleading or motion, (7) notification to the defendant that failure
to file the response within the time allowed may result in a judgment by
default or the granting of the relief sought, and (8) the time within which the
return of service shall be made.
7
This case does not implicate a violation of Rule 2-114(a). See PAUL V. NIEMEYER & LINDA M. SCHUETT, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 211–12 (6th ed. 2026)
(explaining that the requirement under Rule 2-114(a) is mandated by Article IV, Section 13 of the Maryland Constitution and a summons that violates this section is ineffective and must be reissued in proper form).
8
The language “as set forth in the complaint” was added to the rule to streamline the issuance of a summons by the clerk. See Commentary on the New Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 Md. L. Rev. 669, 703 (1984) (“[T]he Committee did not want issuance of the summons to be delayed simply because the plaintiff does not know the defendant’s address.” (citing Letter from Hon. John F. McAuliffe, Chairman of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., to the Judges of the Ct. of Appeals of Md. (Sept. 22, 1983)). Thus, if the plaintiff does not know the defendant’s address and states so in the complaint, “the summons will issue without it, and the plaintiff can employ a private process server to locate and serve the defendant.” Id.
11
Md. Rule 2-114 (emphases added); see id. (source note) (“The Rule is derived from former
Rule 103 f.”).
Rule 2-121 governs service of process in personam. “A court obtains in personam
jurisdiction over a defendant when that defendant is ‘notified of the proceedings by proper
summons.’” Conwell L. LLC v. Tung, 221 Md. App. 481, 498 (2015) (citation omitted).
“[T]he court has no jurisdiction over [a defendant] until such service is properly
accomplished, or until service is waived by a voluntary appearance by the defendant, either
personally or through a duly authorized attorney.”9 Id. (citation modified). “A party’s
failure to comply with the Maryland Rules governing service of process ‘constitutes a
jurisdictional defect that prevents a court from exercising personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.’” Id. (quoting Flanagan v. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 412 Md. 616, 624 (2010)).
As relevant here, “[s]ervice of process may be made within this State . . . by
delivering to the person to be served a copy of the summons, complaint, and all other papers
filed with it.” Md. Rule 2-121(a)(1); see id. (source note) (explaining that section (a) is
derived in part from the 1993 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)).
A defendant may raise various defenses for preliminary decision by the filing of a
motion to dismiss under sections (a) and (b) of Rule 2-322, as follows:
(a) Mandatory. The following defenses shall be made by motion to dismiss
filed before the answer, if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the person, (2) improper venue, (3) insufficiency of process, and (4)
insufficiency of service of process. If not so made and the answer is filed,
these defenses are waived.
9
Anderson does not argue that service was waived in this case.
12
(b) Permissive. The following defenses may be made by motion to dismiss
filed before the answer, if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (3) failure to join a party under Rule 2-211, (4) discharge in
bankruptcy, and (5) governmental immunity. If not so made, these defenses
and objections may be made in the answer, or in any other appropriate
manner after answer is filed.
Md. Rule 2-322(a)–(b) (emphasis added); see PAUL V. NIEMEYER & LINDA M. SCHUETT,
MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 363 (6th ed. 2026) (“Maryland Rules Commentary”)
(“The rule is derived, with some modification, from the 1966 version of Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b), (d), (e), (f), and (g). The broad base of decisional authority constructing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12, as well as commentaries, such as Moore’s Federal Practice and Wright & Miller’s
Federal Practice and Procedure, are available as useful authority.”).
This case implicates a motion to dismiss under section (a). Rule 2-322(a)(3)—
“insufficiency of process”—concerns the form of the process, i.e., as relevant here, the
content of the summons required under Rule 2-114. In contrast, Rule 2-322(a)(4)—
“insufficiency of service of process”—concerns the manner or method of its service, i.e.,
as relevant here, the requirements under Rule 2-121(a). In discussing the federal analogues
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) (insufficient process) and (5) (insufficient service of process),
Federal Practice and Procedure provides as follows:
Technically, . . . a Rule 12(b)(4) [insufficient process] motion is proper only
to challenge noncompliance with the provisions of Rule 4(b) or any
applicable provision incorporated by Rule 4(b) that deals specifically with
the content of the summons. A Rule 12(b)(5) [insufficient service of process]
motion is the proper vehicle for challenging the mode of delivery, the lack of
delivery, or the timeliness of delivery of the summons and complaint. Other
than those cases in which it is confused with a motion under Rule 12(b)(5),
a motion under Rule 12(b)(4) is fairly rare.
13
5B WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1353 (4th ed. 2008),
Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2026) (footnotes omitted).
“In disposing of the motion, the court may dismiss the action or grant such lesser or
different relief as may be appropriate.” Md. Rule 2-322(c). “For example, with respect to
inadequate process or service of process, the court may quash the process and require its
reissuance and service.” Maryland Rules Commentary, at 367; see id. at 363–64 (“Effective
July 1, 1986, section (c) was amended to clarify that the court is not limited under this rule
to dismissing the action and the court may instead grant lesser or different relief, such as
quashing process or service of process . . . .”).
B.
Standards of Review
The determination whether a person has been served with process is essentially a
question of fact, which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. See Wilson v. Md.
Dep’t of the Env’t, 217 Md. App. 271, 286 (2014). In contrast, the determination whether
service of process was insufficient is a legal conclusion that we review de novo, without
deference to the trial court. See United States ex rel. Walterspiel v. Bayer AG, 639 F. App’x
164, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (“In reviewing an order to dismiss for insufficient service of
process, we review de novo the determination that service of process was insufficient . . .
.” (citation omitted)).
A trial court’s decision to dismiss for insufficient service of process is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Md. Dep’t of Health v. Myers, 260 Md. App. 565, 610 (2024).
“[T]here is an abuse of discretion where no reasonable person would take the view adopted
14
by the [trial court] . . . or when the court acts without reference to any guiding principles.”
Conwell L. LLC, 221 Md. App. at 499 (citation omitted). “[T]o be reversed ‘[t]he decision
under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the
reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’”
Hariri v. Dahne, 412 Md. 674, 687 (2010) (quoting Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396
Md. 405, 418–19 (2007)).
Moreover, “[a] decision that is legally incorrect is an abuse of discretion.” U.S. Life
Ins. Co. in City of N.Y. v. Wilson, 198 Md. App. 452, 464 (2011); see Caffrey v. Dep’t of
Liquor Control for Montgomery Cnty., 370 Md. 272, 290 (2002) (“[A]bsent a showing of
abuse of that discretion or a predicate erroneous legal conclusion, [the court’s
discretionary decision] generally will not be disturbed on appeal.” (emphasis added));
Guidash v. Tome, 211 Md. App. 725, 735 (2013) (explaining that a court can abuse its
discretion when it “makes a decision based on an incorrect legal premise”); Cunningham
v. Balt. Cnty., 246 Md. App. 630, 700 (2020) (“An abuse of discretion will be found when
a court bases a decision on an incorrect legal standard.”).
C.
Analysis
In its motion to dismiss, the State specifically invoked Rule 2-322(a)(4)
(insufficiency of service of process). It did not move for dismissal under Rule 2-322(a)(3)
(insufficiency of process). Rather, it incorporated its challenge to the content of the process
within its primary challenge to the service of process, asserting before the circuit court that
15
listing the wrong address on the summons was “intrinsically tied to [Anderson’s] ability to
properly serve [the State].”
Failure to properly raise a specific mandatory defense in the motion to dismiss
renders it vulnerable to a waiver challenge. See Md. Rule 2-322(a) (“If not so made and
the answer is filed, these defenses are waived.”); Maryland Rules Commentary, at 364
(explaining that the defenses under section (a) are waived if not raised in a timely motion
under the Rule); see also Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide
any . . . issue [other than subject matter or personal jurisdiction] unless it plainly appears
by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court . . . .”). Because the State
never invoked Rule 2-322(a)(3) as a basis for dismissing the complaint, we will not address
that rule. However, since the State challenged the content of the summons in connection
with its primary challenge under Rule 2-322(a)(4), we will consider the insufficiency of
process only insofar as it relates to the challenge to the sufficiency of service of process.
1. Caption of the Complaint
We first address the State’s argument that the caption of the complaint was wrong.
Specifically, the State argues that although the caption named the State as a defendant, it
incorrectly directed that service be made on the Attorney General, rendering the service of
process insufficient.
Preliminarily, we note that the State’s first challenge is to the caption of the
complaint, not the service of process—that is, the State does not cite any of the
requirements under Rule 2-121(a), as relevant here. An error in the caption of the complaint
is not a proper basis for dismissal under Rule 2-322(a)(4) for insufficient service of process.
16
Cf. Conwell L. LLC, 221 Md. App. at 500 (holding that service of process was insufficient
under Rule 2-121(a) because the papers delivered to the defendant did not include a
complete version of the complaint filed with the court).
In any event, the caption in this case named the correct defendant—the “State of
Maryland”—as required by Rule 1-301(a)(1). Although the caption directs service to the
Attorney General rather than the Treasurer (or its designee), there is no dispute that the
State was properly identified as the defendant and was not misled in any way. Cf. Morrel
v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 224 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that there
was no possibility the defendant did not understand that the plaintiffs sought to bring them
into court, specifically noting that “[t]he lack of the abbreviation ‘Inc.’ [in the caption of
the complaint naming the defendant] misled no one”); Creque v. Accu-Fab, Inc., No. 5:11-CV-133-FL, 2011 WL 3664419, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 18, 2011) (“As long as the process
‘names [the defendant] in such terms that every intelligent person understands who is
meant . . . it has fulfilled its purpose; and courts should not put themselves in the position
of failing to recognize what is apparent to everyone else.’” (quoting Morrell, 188 F.3d at
224)).10
10
“It is the policy of this Court to allow the citation of unreported opinions from federal courts and courts of other states as long as the jurisdiction where it was issued would allow its citation for persuasive value in its courts.” Critzos v. Marquis, 256 Md. App. 684, 695 n.4 (2023). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1(a) provides that “[a] court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: (i) designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.” Accordingly, this Court may consider unpublished federal opinions issued on or after January 1, 2007 for their persuasive value.
17
To the extent that the caption directing service on the Attorney General instead of
the Treasurer (or its designee) constitutes a violation of Rule 1-301(a), the defect can be
amended under Rule 2-341. Rarely, if ever, should a case be dismissed for violations
involving matters of form. Maryland Rules Commentary, at 62 (citing Md. Rule 1-201,
which provides that the Rules “shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness
in administration, and elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay”). “Attacking a
pleading or paper based on improper form or titling alone accomplishes nothing but added
delay and expense . . . .” Id.; see, e.g., Cherry v. Brothers, 306 Md. 84, 91–92 (1986) (citing
predecessor to Rule 2-341(c) (“Errors or defects in a pleading not corrected by an
amendment shall be disregarded unless they affect the substantial rights of the parties.”))
(holding that the fact that notice of action to nullify health claims arbitration award was
miscaptioned did not mandate dismissal, but, rather, trial court should have disregarded
defect or allowed amendment, given that defendants were not misled). Here, the State
acknowledges that it was the named defendant, and there is no indication that it was misled
by the purported error in the caption of the complaint. Therefore, to the extent that the court
dismissed the action for insufficient service of process because of an error in the caption in
the complaint, the court erred in concluding that the purported error in the caption
constituted insufficient service of process and abused its discretion in dismissing the action
on that basis. Cf. Morrel, 188 F.3d at 224 (“[S]ervice of process is not legally defective
simply because the complaint misnames the defendant in some insignificant way.”).
18
2. Content and Service of Process
The State contends that the summons included an incorrect address for the State and
thus failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 2-114(b) governing the content of
process. It argues that this defect in the summons rendered service of process ineffective.
In addition, the State contends that service was insufficient because counsel for the
Treasurer subsequently returned the summons and related papers to Anderson’s counsel
and asserted that the “drop and run” was not effective service, particularly where the
summons was “not correctly addressed.” Accordingly, it maintains that the court’s
dismissal of the complaint for insufficient service of process was proper.
a. Clerical Error in Summons
“It is generally held that where a summons substantially complies with the statute,
a . . . clerical error which does not mislead the defendant to his prejudice is merely an
irregularity which may be amended.” North v. Town Real Est. Corp., 191 Md. 212, 218
(1948). The Supreme Court of Maryland illustrated this principle in North v. Town Real
Estate Corp., 191 Md. 212 (1948). There, the plaintiff sued the defendant in Baltimore
City. Id. at 215. In renewing the issuance of writ of summons on October 14, 1947, the
clerk of the court neglected to stamp on the summons that the writ was renewed to a
November return date. Id. As a result, the writ indicated that it was returnable on October
14. Id. at 215–16. The writ with the October 14 return date was served on October 17,
rendering it impossible for the defendant to comply. Id. at 217. The court then entered a
default judgment against the defendant since no plea had been filed. Id. at 216. The
19
defendant thereafter moved to quash the writ of summons and vacate the judgment, which
the court granted. Id. The plaintiff appealed. Id.
The Supreme Court, recognizing that the trial court clerk clearly made a mistake,
stated that “the test to be applied in a case like this is whether there has been an error which
denied the defendant a substantial right.” Id. at 220. It referenced decisions from other
courts to illustrate contrasting outcomes—cases where a clerical error in the summons date
either did or did not prejudice the defendant:
It is generally held that where a summons substantially complies with the
statute, a palpable mistake in the return day, or any other clerical error which
does not mislead the defendant to his prejudice is merely an irregularity
which may be amended. Condon v. Barr, 47 N.J.L. 113 (N.J. 1885); Flanery
v. Kusha, 173 N.W. 652 (Minn. 1919); Spokane Merchs. Ass’n v. Acord, 170
P. 329 (Wash. 1918). For instance, in Michigan, where a summons served
December 24, 1913, notified the defendant to appear within fifteen days after
service, it was held that the fact that the return day was stated as January 19,
1913, whereas it should have been January 19, 1914, did not invalidate the
summons, inasmuch as the only object of mentioning the return day was to
inform the officer when he was required to serve the summons. Neidhold v.
Henry, 178 N.W. 30 (Mich. 1920).
On the other hand, it has been held that a summons commanding the
defendant to appear at a past date is void, and is therefore sufficient ground
for dismissing the suit. Hall v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 9 S.E.2d
45 (W. Va. 1940).
North, 191 Md. at 218–19 (internal citations modified).
The Court concluded that, because the summons required the defendant to appear
on a date that had already passed, and the defendant did not waive any objection to this, a
default judgment could not be supported. Id. at 219. Accordingly, the Court held that the
trial court was correct in quashing the writ of summons and vacating the judgment. Id. at
220.
20
Steed Mortgage Co. v. Arthur, 37 Md. App. 592 (1977), concerned a case where a
defect in the writ was overlooked because it contained sufficient information to inform the
party that the writ was directed to it. Id. at 601–02. In that case, a judgment was entered
requiring the ex-husband to pay alimony, child support, counsel fees, and investigative
costs. Id. at 593–94. When the ex-husband failed to make these payments, the ex-wife
moved for summary judgment to recover the past due amounts. Id. at 594. The court then
entered a judgment against the ex-husband for $2,150. Id. Subsequently, the ex-wife caused
a writ of attachment to be issued against the ex-husband’s company, Steed Mortgage
Company (“Steed”), as garnishee. Id. The writ directed the sheriff to attach the exhusband’s property up to the value of the judgment and to require the ex-husband to appear
in court to show cause for why the property should not be used to satisfy the judgment in
favor of the wife. Id.
Under the relevant rule at the time, the proper mode of giving notice of an
attachment on a judgment required that the writ of attachment substantially comply with
the predecessor to Rule 2-114 (former Rule 103 f), which required a summons to include
the names of all parties. Id. at 599. We explained the role of the rules governing process,
as well as issuance and return, “is essentially to provide methods which tend to [e]nsure
the ultimate reception by the [defendant] of actual notice that an action has been filed
against it.” Id. at 598.
The writ of attachment failed to name Steed and therefore did not strictly conform
to the Rule. Id. at 597–98. However, we explained that although the writ did not specifically
name Steed as the garnishee, it contained the requisite scire facias clause that placed Steed
21
on notice that it was expected to appear in court on a designated date to show cause why
the property of the ex-husband, held by Steed, should not be taken from them and turned
over to the ex-wife. Id. at 601.
In sum, North and Steed Mortgage Co. teach that a technical error in the summons
does not render it insufficient if the error does not deny the defendant a substantial right or
otherwise prejudice the defendant.
b. Service of Process
“Defendants have frequently sought to evade or defeat service of process upon them
by flight or refusal to accept the process handed them by the serving officer, but the courts
have held such efforts futile.” Boggs v. Inter-Am. Mining & Smelting Co., 105 Md. 371,
385 (1907) (emphasis added). In Boggs v. Inter-American Mining & Smelting Co., 105 Md.
371 (1907), the serving officer went to the defendant’s office to serve the defendant. Id. at
384. The serving officer told the director of the defendant mining company that he had “a
paper to serve on you,” to which the director responded, “I know what you have” and
started to leave. Id. The serving officer reached for the director with the papers, but the
director kept running and went to the next room and slammed the door. Id. The serving
officer then laid the papers on the table and left. Id. The Supreme Court of Maryland held
that, assuming the director was the right person to be served, service was sufficient. Id. at
385 (“[The director] was fully informed as to the institution of the suit by Boggs against
the company and the desire of the sheriff to summon the company by serving the papers
on him as one of its directors, and knew that the deputy was about to make that service
22
when he attempted to elude him and evade the service by running out of the room and
slamming the door in the officer’s face.”).
A similar issue arose in Williams v. Williams, 305 Md. 1 (1985). There, the plaintiff
sued her ex-husband seeking to enforce the terms of their settlement agreement. Id. at 3.
The court issued a show cause order directing that a copy of the verified petition and the
order be served on the defendant. Id. When a process server approached him in a parking
garage near his attorney’s office, the defendant initially identified himself, asked about the
documents, and began reading them, but then disavowed his identity, refused to accept the
papers, and abruptly walked away. Id. at 3–4. The defendant left the garage, with the server
following him, then entered a building and took an elevator to his attorney’s office. Id. at
4. While in the attorney’s office, the defendant identified himself to the receptionist in the
server’s presence. Id. The server again attempted to hand the documents to the defendant,
who once more refused to accept them. Id. The server then informed the defendant that he
would leave the documents on the receptionist’s counter, left the documents there, and
exited the office. Id. The defendant later claimed that service of process was insufficient.
Id. at 6. Relying on the facts and reasoning in Boggs, the Supreme Court concluded that
service was sufficient. Id. at 6–7.
c. The Court Erred in Concluding that Service of Process was Insufficient
and Abused Its Discretion in Dismissing the Action.
In the instant case, the clerk issued a summons correctly naming the defendant—the
“State of Maryland”—in the caption and directory section in the summons but, for
unknown reasons, included the wrong address. However, the private process server
23
ultimately located the State Treasurer’s Office at the correct address. It is undisputed that
the server handed the papers to Ms. Miller, who reviewed them and attempted to return
them because the summons did not include the correct address for the State Treasurer’s
Office. The server then dropped the papers and left the office. Given these undisputed facts,
the question becomes whether this amounted to insufficient service of process.
Applying the de novo standard of review, we hold that the court erred in concluding
that service of process was insufficient. The facts here are not materially different from
those in Williams, where the defendant refused to accept the papers, and the server left
them at the receptionist’s counter in front of the defendant. Williams, 305 Md. at 3–4;
accord 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process § 174, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2026) (“[P]ersonal
service of process . . . should not become a game of wiles and tricks and a defendant should
not be able to defeat service simply by refusing to accept the papers . . . . Even though a
defendant refuses physical acceptance of a summons, service is complete if a defendant is
in close proximity to a process server under such circumstances that a reasonable person
would be convinced that personal service of the summons is being attempted.”). Similarly,
the fact that counsel for the Treasurer returned the summons and related papers to
Anderson’s counsel does not defeat service of process any more than the Treasurer’s
designee’s refusal to accept them. Under SG § 12-108(a), “[s]ervice of the complaint and
accompanying documents” was “made on the Treasurer” through its designee.
The incorrect address in the summons did not invalidate service of process. There
is no indication that the State was misled about the summons being directed to it; the
summons (and complaint) clearly named the State as the defendant. See North, 191 Md. at
24
218. Nor is there any indication that the State was otherwise prejudiced or denied a
substantial right by the incorrect service address in the summons. See id. at 220. This
holding is supported by decisions by courts in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Broadway v.
adidas Am., Inc., No. 3:07cv000149 SWW, 2008 WL 2705566, at *4 (E.D. Ark. July 10,
2008) (“Under federal law, if the summons and complaint have been successfully delivered
to the defendant and service is otherwise proper, purely technical errors in the form of the
summons may not invalidate service absent a showing of prejudice.”); Rodriguez v. Irwin,
No. 7:10-CV-102-FL, 2011 WL 737316, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2011) (explaining that
while the summons contained an incorrect address for the defendant, the minor irregularity
did not invalidate otherwise effective service because the defendant’s name was clearly
indicated in the caption and directory section of the summons and in the caption of the
complaint, “thereby leaving no question as to the identity of the actual defendant”); Berg
v. Burke, 46 N.W.2d 786, 791 (N.D. 1951) (determining service was complete and valid
where defendant received the notice, summons, and complaint, even though the envelope
contained an incorrect street address because it did not interfere with delivery to the
defendant).
As stated, we review the court’s dismissal of the complaint for insufficient service
of process for abuse of discretion. As also mentioned, a discretionary decision premised on
an incorrect interpretation of the law is an abuse of discretion. See U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City
of N.Y., 198 Md. App. at 464. Here, the court erred in concluding that service of process
was insufficient. Because the dismissal of the complaint was based on this incorrect legal
determination, the court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint on that ground.
25
Cf. Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt, 170 Md. App. 572, 609 (2006) (explaining that where a prior
interlocutory ruling was legally incorrect, it was an abuse of discretion for the judge
subsequently in the position of applying the ruling to leave it uncorrected); Ireton v.
Chambers, 229 Md. App. 149, 154 n.4 (2016) (“Because the discretionary decision being
challenged involved entering (or revising) a judgment based on what we regard as an
erroneous interpretation of the law, the court had no discretion to refuse a timely request to
fix the problem.”). For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and
remand the case for further proceedings.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED AND
CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLEE.
26