The Methodist Church of Cape St. Claire, et al. v. The Baltimore Washington Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc., et al., No. 1812, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Nazarian, J.
ECCLEASIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE – CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD –
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Resolving Local Churches’ claims that Annual Conference of United Methodist Church (UMC) had committed fraud and breached its fiduciary duty by failing to act in accordance with Church doctrine, custom, and practices, in good faith, and in the Local Churches’ best interests would have required circuit court to consider the sanctity of religious doctrine in violation of church autonomy doctrine.
ECCLEASIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE – FINANCIAL
MISMANGEMENT
Church autonomy doctrine prevents court from resolving Local Churches’ claim that Annual Conference had mismanaged clergy pension funds because circuit court would have to examine UMC’s view regarding the role of clergy and church leaders, their authority and compensation, and internal church management, a function that falls within the purview of a separate governing body within the church.
ECCLEASIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE – BREACH OF CONTRACT
Circuit court did not err when it declined to determine whether Annual Conference’s imposition of a payment requirement before Local Churches could disaffiliate from UMC was otherwise consistent with the UMC’s governing instrument, the Book of Discipline, because such determination would have required the circuit court to interpret UMC doctrine and interfere with church governance.
ECCLEASIASTICAL ABSTENTION DOCTRINE – DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT – QUIET TITLE TO PROPERTY
Claim that circuit court had failed to address whether Local Churches’ holding of property in trust for the UMC had been terminated after trust purposes had become unlawful, contrary to public policy, or impossible to achieve would have required circuit court to determine fundamental purpose of a trust formed with a particular religious purpose in mind and whether subsequent doctrinal changes had frustrated that purpose. Such consideration would have infringed on the protections bestowed under the First Amendment.
LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE – MULTIPLE CIRCUIT COURT RULINGS
Circuit court decision not to dismiss claims at motion to dismiss stage of litigation was interlocutory and did not bind it from disposing of the claims in later summary judgment ruling.
RECUSAL
Circuit court judge’s affiliation as a parishioner with local UMC church that was not a party to the dispute, without more, had no apparent impact on Local Churches’ ability to receive a fair trial and was insufficient, on its own, to overcome presumption of judicial impartiality.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-02-CV-23-000500
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 1812
September Term, 2024
THE METHODIST CHURCH OF CAPE ST.
CLAIRE, ET AL.
v.
THE BALTIMORE WASHINGTON
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
METHODIST CHURCH, INC. ET AL.
Nazarian,
Albright,
Beachley, Donald E.*
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Opinion by Nazarian, J. Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State ______________________________________ Government Article) this document is authentic.
2026.10.05 Filed: October 5, 2026
15:49:00 -04'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
* Beachley, J., now a Senior Judge, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of the Court. He participated in the adoption of this opinion after being recalled pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A.
Thirty-seven Maryland Methodist churches (the “Local Churches”), all part of the
Baltimore Washington Conference (the “BW Conference”) of the United Methodist
Church (“UMC”), sought to disaffiliate from the UMC and to retain the real properties
each has held in trust for the UMC since becoming part of the national church. Citing the
national church’s governing documents, the BW Conference conditioned disaffiliation and
property retention on the Local Churches’ payment of fifty percent of the assessed value
of the real property they wished to retain (the “payment requirement”) in addition to other
payment terms established by the UMC for disaffiliating churches. The Local Churches
objected to the payment requirement and sued the BW Conference, its Board of Trustees
(the “Board”), and its presiding bishop, LaTrelle Easterling (the “Bishop”) (collectively,
the “Conference”) in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. In two phases, the circuit
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Conference on the grounds that the Local
Churches hadn’t generated a genuine dispute of material fact and that the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine barred secular courts from deciding their claims. The Local Churches
appeal the court’s application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1968, the Methodist Church and the Evangelical United Brethren Church merged
to form the UMC. The UMC’s Book of Discipline is “the instrument for setting forth the
laws, plan, polity, and process by which United Methodists govern themselves” as written
and amended over time by UMC General Conferences of denominations. It details the
UMC’s constitution, doctrine and general rules, organizational structure, and policies
relative to church property and judicial administration.
The UMC operates under a hierarchical structure set forth in the Book of Discipline.
At the top of the hierarchy is the General Conference, which is vested with “full legislative
power over all matters distinctively” related to the UMC’s theology of Connectionalism,
including matters of church governance. The General Conference meets once every four
years and is comprised of both clergy and lay delegates elected by the Annual Conferences.
The Annual Conferences have the right to vote on amendments to the UMC’s constitution,
to elect delegates to the General Conference, and to “discharge such duties and exercise
such powers as the General Conference . . . may determine.” Each Annual Conference is
supervised by a bishop and oversees all local churches, or “Charge Conferences,” within
its boundaries. The UMC also has a Judicial Council, which serves as its highest judicial
authority. The Judicial Council is the sole body charged with interpreting the Book of
Discipline and with determining if acts of the General Conference and decisions of law
made by the bishops of the Annual Conferences adhere to the provisions of that instrument.
Paragraph 2501 of the Book of Discipline provides that “[a]ll properties of the
United Methodist local churches . . . are held, in trust, for the benefit of the entire
denomination” and that “ownership and usage of church property is subject” to the Book
of Discipline. The trust requirement, it says, “reflects the connectional structure” of the
UMC “by ensuring that the property will be used solely for purposes consonant with the
mission of the entire denomination as set forth in” the Book of Discipline. Paragraph 2503
requires written instruments of conveyance by which real property is held or acquired by
local churches for use by the UMC to contain a “trust clause” stating that the premises shall
be kept and maintained for the UMC’s benefit. That paragraph provides as well, however,
2
that the absence of a trust clause in such an instrument doesn’t exclude the property held
or conveyed from the trust requirement. And the Book of Discipline’s trust requirement is
codified in section 5-326 of the Corporations & Associations Article (“CA”) of the
Maryland Code, which reads:
All assets owned by any Methodist Church . . . whether
incorporated, unincorporated, or abandoned:
(1) Shall be held by the trustees of the church in trust for the
United Methodist Church; and
(2) Are subject to the discipline, usage, and ministerial
appointments of the United Methodist Church, as from time
to time authorized and declared by the General Conference
of that church.
CA § 5-326.
In 2019, the General Conference amended the Book of Discipline and added
Paragraph 2553, titled the “Disaffiliation of a Local Church Over Issues Related to Human
Sexuality.” Paragraph 2553 recognized a “current deep conflict within The [UMC] around
issues of human sexuality” arising from recent changes by the General Conference to the
Book of Discipline’s requirements and provisions regarding “the practice of
homosexuality” and the ordination and marriage of “self-avowed practicing homosexuals.”
Paragraph 2553 created a new disaffiliation path: it granted a local church that wished to
disaffiliate from the denomination “for reasons of conscience” related to those changes a
limited right to do so by a specified date and on certain conditions without forfeiting any
real property held by that church in trust for the UMC. According to Paragraph 2553, the
General Conference was to develop a standard form for Disaffiliation Agreements that
recognized “the validity and applicability of the [trust requirement], notwithstanding
3
[Paragraph 2553’s] release of property therefrom.” If a two-thirds majority of a local
church’s professing members voted to disaffiliate, the board of trustees of the applicable
Annual Conference would then establish terms and conditions for the disaffiliation to be
“memorialized in a binding Disaffiliation Agreement.” But Paragraph 2553 provided as
well, and specifically, that Annual Conferences “may develop additional standard terms”
for disaffiliation “not inconsistent with the standard form” of the Disaffiliation Agreement
developed by the General Conference. And under Paragraph 2553, the BW Conference
imposed the payment requirement at issue in this case as a standard term of disaffiliation
for the local churches under its oversight.
On March 13, 2023, the Local Churches sued the Conference in the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County. The original complaint set forth nine counts. Count I sought a
declaratory judgment that the trust had terminated, or alternatively that it is revocable, and
a declaration of the Local Churches’ entitlement to quiet and exclusive possession of their
“respective properties.” Count II asked the circuit court to terminate the trust under the
Estates & Trusts Article (“ET”) of the Maryland Code or, alternatively, “to have
themselves clearly established as the trustee of each respective trust with all power to
revoke the trust and/or dispose of the property as Maryland law allows.” Under Counts III
and IV, the Local Churches alleged that the Board and the Bishop had constructively
defrauded and breached their fiduciary duty both to them and to the BW Conference by
misusing and mismanaging the Local Churches’ financial apportionments and real and
personal property held in trust; by concealing from the Local Churches material facts about
the use of discretionary funds, including management of the conference pension fund; and
4
by making false statements about the pension fund or, alternatively, grossly mismanaging
the fund. The Local Churches demanded a court-ordered accounting of the Board and
Bishop’s management of the pension fund (Count V), and they asserted claims for quantum
meruit (Count VI) and unjust enrichment (Count VII) based on years of having provided
apportionments, ministerial services and the use of their real and personal property to the
Conference. Count VIII alleged promissory estoppel based on claims that the Local
Churches relied reasonably on the understanding that other options for disaffiliation had
been and would continue to be available customarily.
On May 19, 2023, the Local Churches filed a First Amended Complaint that added
a breach of contract claim, Count IX, based on alleged promises in the Book of Discipline
and mismanagement of the pension fund. And under (now) Count X of the complaint, they
sought quiet title on behalf of the Methodist Church of Cape St. Claire (“St. Claire”), which
had purchased its land before the UMC’s formation.
On June 21, 2023, the Conference moved to dismiss the Local Churches’ complaint
and the parties appeared before the circuit court on September 18 for a motions hearing.
On September 18, 2023, the court granted the Conference’s motion to dismiss Count II
(seeking judicial modification of the trust) and Counts VI–VIII (quantum meruit, unjust
enrichment, and promissory estoppel). The court didn’t dismiss Count I (declaratory relief)
after concluding that neutral principles of law could resolve disputes about the operability
of trust provisions on the property of a disaffiliating church. The court determined that the
Local Churches’ allegations of gross mismanagement of pension funds under Counts III
and IV (constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary duty) could fall under the fraud or
5
collusion exception to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and that relief under Count V
(demand for accounting) called for court enforcement of obligations under Maryland law
and did not interfere with church government or interpretation of church doctrine. The
circuit court decided it wasn’t necessary to dismiss Count IX (breach of contract) at the
motion-to-dismiss stage of the case, but the court recognized that even though “the issues
of implied duties and financial liabilities are clearly secular, eventually the Court would
likely need to interpret [the Book of Discipline] to determine whether there was a breach.”
Lastly, the court denied the Conference’s motion to dismiss Count X (quiet title) because,
it reasoned, property disputes are an exception to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
After discovery closed, the Conference moved for summary judgment. The
Conference argued that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived the circuit court of
subject matter jurisdiction, that disaffiliation was no longer an available remedy because
Paragraph 2553 of the Book of Discipline had expired on December 31, 2023, and that
even if the court did have subject matter jurisdiction and could award a remedy, the Local
Churches had failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact. The court held a
summary judgment hearing on July 1, 2024. The Local Churches indicated that the
financial documents produced by the Conference during discovery may have addressed
Count V of their complaint (demand for accounting) and the parties agreed to dismiss that
claim after the hearing. At that point, their claims for declaratory judgment, constructive
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and quiet title remained.
With regard to the Local Churches’ request for a declaratory judgment, the circuit
court concluded that there was “no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the
6
[Book of Discipline] created an irrevocable trust.” The court reasoned that the text of the
Book of Discipline states expressly that the trust is irrevocable, that its trust clauses don’t
reserve for local churches the right to revoke, and that Maryland case law presumes that
trusts are irrevocable unless the power of revocation has been reserved. Because there was
no dispute that the Local Churches held their property in trust for the UMC and had
consented to the trust provisions in the Book of Discipline, the court found the Conference
entitled to summary judgment. For these same reasons, the court awarded summary
judgment to the Conference on their quiet title claim.
The circuit court also found that the Local Churches’ constructive fraud claim fell
outside the fraud or collusion exception to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and that
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the court from examining how the UMC
governs and manages the Conference’s pension fund. The court determined further that
summary judgment was appropriate because the Local Churches hadn’t generated a
genuine dispute of material fact in support of their allegations that the Conference had
made false statements and mismanaged pension funds, allegations that the Conference had
refuted with admissible evidence. The court found that their breach of fiduciary duty claim
lacked a factual basis. And the court concluded that adjudicating this claim would require
it to analyze how the Conference had decided to establish the 50% payment requirement,
a matter that the UMC’s judicial council can resolve and to which the court should defer
under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
Finally, the circuit court found that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded
the court from adjudicating the Local Churches’ breach of contract claim. Determining
7
whether the Conference had breached the Book of Discipline, the court reasoned, would
require it to interpret the governing law of the UMC and to reference or analyze the Book
of Discipline, church polity, and church doctrine. The court determined that it would be
improper for it to resolve whether different provisions of the Book of Discipline are
consistent for purposes of Paragraph 2553. The court concluded that there was no neutral
principle by which it could resolve the Local Churches’ breach of contract claim and
entered summary judgment in favor of the Conference. The Local Churches noted a timely
appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
The Local Churches raise five questions1 on appeal. The Conference objects on
1
The Local Churches phrased their Questions Presented as follows:
1. Did the trial court err by applying the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine to
preclude judicial review of secular and property-related provisions of the
Book of Discipline, thereby denying Appellants their right to a jury trial on
disputed factual issues?
2. Did the trial court improperly dismiss Appellants’ claims for declaratory
judgment and quiet title under the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine?
3. Did the trial court err by failing to adhere to the law of the case doctrine in
reconsidering prior rulings that the Book of Discipline could be interpreted
using neutral principles of law?
4. Did the trial court’s denial of judicial review violate Appellants’
constitutional rights?
5. Did [the trial judge’s] refusal to recuse himself constitute an abuse of
discretion?
The BW Conference stated seven Questions Presented:
Continued . . .
8
preservation grounds to the fourth issue—whether the circuit court violated the Local
Churches’ constitutional rights when it granted summary judgment. On this issue, the Local
Churches highlight that the authority of the Book of Discipline and the holding of UMC
property in trust have been codified into Maryland law, and they assert that foreclosing
judicial review of church actions in either respect amounts to a deprivation of due process
and potential violations of the establishment and equal protection clauses of the United
States Constitution. They argue further that denying judicial review of disputes arising
under the Book of Discipline burdens their religious freedom and amounts to an
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing claims challenging the consistency of
Conference disaffiliation procedures with the UMC’s central governing
document for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction?
2. Did the trial court err in dismissing claims based on the Conference’s alleged
mismanagement of clergy pension funds for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction?
3. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to Appellees on
Appellants’ claims for constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary duty based
[on] a lack of evidence to create a genuine dispute of fact on refuted
allegations that Appellees made false statements regarding clergy pension
fund liabilities, or had mismanaged clergy pension funds or otherwise
mismanaged the Conference’s finances?
4. Did the trial court err in finding a lack of genuine factual dispute and entering
summary judgment for Appellees on claims that sought to terminate or
modify the irrevocable trust over local church property?
5. Did the law of the case doctrine require the trial court to adhere to its previous
rulings on subject-matter jurisdiction?
6. Did the trial judge err in declining to recuse himself based on his and his
family’s membership in non-party local churches affiliated with the UMC?
7. Should the Appellate Court exercise its discretion to hear several arguments
raised by Appellants for the first time on appeal whose resolution would not
facilitate adjudication of Appellants’ claims on remand?
9
unconstitutional judicial taking by nullifying their property rights without just
compensation.
The Conference objects to these constitutional arguments on preservation grounds,
arguing that allowing the Local Churches to raise them for the first time on appeal would
be substantially prejudicial because the “claims were not raised or developed at all” before
the circuit court. The Conference urges us not to hear these constitutional concerns because
they don’t change the circuit court’s limited subject matter jurisdiction, offer useful
guidance to the trial court, or promote judicial economy. We agree with the Conference.
The Local Churches didn’t preserve their constitutional arguments for appellate
review. Ordinarily, appellate courts will not decide non-jurisdictional issues “unless it
plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court . . . .” Md.
Rule 8-131(a). “The question in determining whether an issue [has been] preserved . . . is
not simply whether it was raised in some fashion, but whether it was raised with sufficient
precision, clarity, and emphasis to give the [adjudicator] a fair opportunity to address it.”
Concerned Citizens of Cloverly v. Montgomery Cnty. Plan. Bd., 254 Md. App. 575, 602
(2022) (quoting Ctr. for Sustainable Economy v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 688, 602 (D.C. Cir.
2015)). The party must make the substance behind their assertion clear to the court, and a
“passing reference” is not enough. Id. at 603. And, most of all, the trial court must have
had an opportunity to answer the question or solve the problem. We have the discretion to
hear new arguments on appeal when the circumstances compel it, but there needs to be a
really good reason to depart from the normal requirement that parties raise issues in trial
courts first.
10
The Local Churches didn’t raise their constitutional objections sufficiently to
preserve them for our review, and the record reveals no rulings on the constitutional claims.
Their original complaint asserted that the payment requirement infringed on their
“fundamental rights to property and freedom of religion.” The complaint claimed also that
court intervention was necessary to enabling “the free exercise of [their] constitutional
religious and property rights” and alleged that judicial abstention would impede their
freedom of religion under the state and federal constitution. These allegations endured
through to their First Amended Complaint. In their opposition to the Conference’s motion
to dismiss, the Local Churches claimed that being forced to either comply with the payment
requirement, abandon their land, or remain affiliated with the UMC in conflict with their
religious beliefs, if approved by the court, would amount to a “judicially approved private
taking or a violation of their First Amendment rights.” But they embodied these asserted
constitutional violations in the declaratory, corporate governance, real estate, and contract
claims that followed. They didn’t assert independent violations of their free exercise rights,
judicial takings, or violations of due process or the establishment or equal protection
clauses.
Nor did the Local Churches build on these assertions in their opposition to the
Conference’s motion for summary judgment. At the summary judgment hearing, they
referenced their “valuable property rights” and how not allowing them to sue the
Conference would create “a number of constitutional concerns,” but then said they weren’t
at the hearing to argue those concerns. Later in the hearing, their counsel suggested that a
legal system that would keep them from suing while allowing the Conference to sue them
11
if they disaffiliated might violate due process and the establishment and equal protection
clauses, but left the discussion there. Nor did the Local Churches present a developed legal
argument or analysis of how the Conference violated these constitutional provisions to the
circuit court at the summary judgment motion hearing.
The Local Churches articulated the impact on their religious freedom and other
constitutional rights in the form of the secular state law counts they alleged in their
complaints—presumably in an understandable effort to keep their arguments and their
injuries as grounded as possible in secular state law rather than more ephemeral and
ecclesiastical principles. That makes sense, and the Local Churches left things there—they
didn’t give the circuit court broader or more abstract constitutional arguments to consider
and address. Sage Title Group LLC v. Roman, 455 Md. 188, 211–12 (2017) (in deciding
whether an issue has been preserved sufficiently, appellate courts consider “whether the
trial judge ‘could identify . . . the argument that was being made in support of the motion.’”
(quoting Nelson v. Carroll, 350 Md. 247, 250 (1998))); see also Lockett v. Blue Ocean
Bristol, LLC, 446 Md. 397, 417–18 (2016) (issue preserved where both parties disputed it
before the court); Carroll v. Konits, 400 Md. 167, 183 (2007) (issue preserved sufficiently
based on the substance of appellant’s arguments). As a result, they didn’t raise these
independent constitutional theories for purposes of Maryland Rule 8-131(a) and preserve
them for appellate review.
From there, we rephrase the Local Churches’ four issues: first, whether the circuit
court applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine properly in granting summary judgment
on their constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract claims; second
12
whether the court erred when it dismissed their declaratory judgment and quiet title claims;
third, whether the circuit court contravened the law of the case doctrine when it resolved
their claims; and fourth, whether the court abused its discretion when it declined to recuse
in response to their motion for disqualification.
We review a circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, Walk v.
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 382 Md. 1, 14 (2004) (citation omitted), and we review the record
independently to determine if there is a genuine dispute of material fact and if the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Similarly, “we review de novo the grant
of a motion to dismiss.” Reiner v. Ehrlich, 212 Md. App. 142, 151 (2013) (cleaned up)
(quoting Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 142 (2012)). “Whether the law of
the case doctrine should be applied” in a particular case is likewise “a legal question” that
we review without deference. Baltimore Cnty. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Balt. Cnty.
Lodge No. 4, 449 Md. 713, 731 (2016) (citations omitted). Finally, “[t]he decision of
whether to recuse is a matter within the sound discretion of the court, and will not be
disturbed on appeal except for abuse of discretion.” In re Colin R., 63 Md. App. 684, 701
(1985) (citation omitted).
A. Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine
1. Application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to dismiss
the constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of
contract claims.
The Local Churches argue first that the circuit court ignored viable exceptions to
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and dismissed their constructive fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and breach of contract claims incorrectly. Citing case law from other
13
jurisdictions, they contend that the court could have applied neutral principles of law and
could have recognized the fraud exception to the doctrine to resolve those claims. The
Conference responds that the court concluded rightly that neutral principles of law couldn’t
resolve the Local Churches’ claims because they would have required the court to interpret
the Book of Discipline and assess the Conference’s compliance with its own ecclesiastical
law. The Conference argues that the cases cited by the Local Churches are distinguishable,
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to scrutinize the UMC’s financial operations and
internal governance, and that the fraud exception is narrow and doesn’t apply here.
Ecclesiastical abstention, also known as the church autonomy doctrine, prohibits
civil courts from resolving religious questions, as proscribed by the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Vaughn
v. Faith Bible Church of Sudlersville, 248 Md. App. 477, 485 (2020) (citing Lang v. Levi,
198 Md. App. 154, 169 (2011)); Bourne v. Ctr. on Children, Inc., 154 Md. App. 42, 52–53
(2003) (“religious organizations require ‘an independence from secular control or
manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine’” (quoting Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952))); Marjorie Shields, Annotation,
Construction and Application of Church Autonomy Doctrine, 123 A.L.R. 5th 385 (2004)
(“the ‘church autonomy doctrine’ deals with a church’s First Amendment right to
autonomy in making decisions regarding its own internal affairs, including matters of faith,
14
doctrine, and internal governance.”).2 In particular, secular courts must avoid adjudicating
disputes “‘on the basis of religious doctrine and practice,’” resolving matters of “‘church
doctrine or governance,’” or deciding secular matters in ways that entangle the court in
“‘questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.’” Nouri v. Dadgar, 245 Md. App.
324, 345 (2020) (first quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); then quoting Downs
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Balt., 111 Md. App. 616, 622 (1996); and then quoting
From the Heart Church Ministries v. African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, 370 Md.
152, 179 (2002)). If the core of a dispute concerns “‘theological controversy, church
discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of [church members] to the
standard of morals required by them,’” we are constrained constitutionally from getting
involved. Downs, 111 Md. App. at 622 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1872)).
And even if the dispute before us is one that would otherwise be justiciable if presented by
secular litigants, it falls outside our authority if resolving it “would require [us] to
adjudicate matters of church doctrine or governance, or to second-guess ecclesiastical
decisions made by a church body created to make those decisions . . . .” Id.
That said, this constitutional constraint applies only to matters “‘strictly and purely
ecclesiastical [in] character,’” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of America and Can.
2
The Maryland Declaration of Rights protects religious liberty as well. See Md. Const. art. 36; see also Barghout v. Mayor and City Council, 325 Md. 311, 324–28 (1992) (considering a challenge under Article 36). The parties have not briefed whether Article 36 imposes any independent limitation on the role of Maryland courts in resolving ecclesiastical disputes, so we don’t address that question and we resolve this case entirely under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
15
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 733), where
“religious doctrine, biblical interpretations, or other ecclesiastical matters” form the basis
of the dispute. Vaughn, 248 Md. App. at 491; Nouri, 245 Md. App. at 324. After all, some
controversies are “‘simply disputes as to the meaning of agreements on wills, trusts,
contracts, and property ownership [that are] . . . questions of civil law and are not predicated
on any religious doctrine.’” From the Heart, 370 Md. at 181 (quoting Presbytery of BeaverButler of United Presbyterian Church v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 489 A.2d 1317,
1321 (Pa. 1985)). Other disputes involve nondoctrinal questions, such as whether there was
an agreement between the parties and, if so, the terms of their agreement. Middlesex
Presbyterian Church, 489 A.2d at 1321. “‘The relevant inquiry is whether the question can
be decided on the basis of neutral principles of law which do not involve the resolution by
the court of ecclesiastical issues, or doctrinal proprieties.’” Mt. Olive Afr. Methodist
Episcopal Church of Fruitland, Inc. v. Bd. of Incorporators of the Afr. Methodist Episcopal
Church Inc., 348 Md. 299, 312 (1997) (quoting Calvary Presbyterian Church of Balt. City
v. The Presbytery of Balt. of United Presbyterian Church in U.S., 39 Md. App. 405, 417
(1978)); see Eritrean Orthodox Tweahdo Diocese of USA & Canada v. Sinoda, ___ Md.
___, No. 49, Sept. Term 2025, slip op. at 7 (filed July 23, 2026) (“If a court need not answer
an ecclesiastical question to resolve a dispute, and can instead apply neutral principles of
law to decide the merits, then the court must do so.”).
“Neutral principles of law are principles that are ‘applicable not only to religious
bodies, but to public and private lay organizations and to civil governments as well.’” From
the Heart, 370 Md. at 180 (quoting Kennedy v. Gray, 807 P.2d 670, 676 (Kan. 1991)).
16
Which neutral principles should apply “will vary with the subject matter of the case.”
Nouri, 245 Md. App. at 346. See generally, id. at 346–47 (courts can use neutral principles
of law to decide breach of contract); Vaughn, 248 Md. App. at 486 (courts can apply neutral
principles of law to resolve a secular dispute between religious organizations that require
“interpretation of corporate charters or bylaws.”); From the Heart, 370 Md. at 179–80
(courts can rely on neutral principles of law to resolve church property disputes). “Each set
of circumstances must be evaluated on an individual basis by the court to determine
whether, under the facts of the particular case, a court would be forced to wander into the
‘theological thicket’ in order to render a decision.” American Union of Baptists, Inc. v.
Trustees of Particular Primitive Baptist Church at Black Rock, Inc., 335 Md. 564, 574
(1994). This neutral analysis “may involve examination of some religious instruments,
such as a church constitution, [but so long as] the inquiry [is] performed in purely secular
terms without relying ‘on religious precepts’” civil courts will have observed the
constitutional line. From the Heart, 370 Md. at 180 (quoting Jones, 443 U.S. at 604).
The Local Churches claim that the circuit court applied the church autonomy
doctrine improperly to decline review of their constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
and breach of contract claims. We begin with their constructive fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty claims, see Moon v. Fam. Fed’n for World Peace and Unification Int’l, 281
A.3d 46, 62 (D.C. 2022) (“In determining whether a controversy is justiciable,
we . . . consider ‘the actual issues the court has been asked to decide’” (quoting Family
Fed'n for World Peace v. Hyun Jin Moon, 129 A.3d 234, 249 (D.C. 2015)), to which they
argue that the court should have applied a fraud or collusion exception to the church
17
autonomy doctrine. See id. at 70 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has “strongly
suggested” that an exception exists where courts could decide ecclesiastical disputes “when
religious figures act in bad faith for secular purposes.” (cleaned up)). The general idea
behind this exception is that although “freedom to believe is absolute . . . freedom to act
cannot be [and a] church may not hide behind the first amendment when perpetrating fraud
upon the public or its members.” Roman Cath. Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So.2d
1213, 1240 (Miss. 2005). But the tort of intentional misrepresentation, or fraud, is a
separate cause of action that the Local Churches didn’t plead in their amended complaint,
see generally Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 28 (2005) (stating elements required to prove
fraud claim in Maryland); D’Aoust v. Diamond, 197 Md. App. 195, 216 (2010) (unlike
constructive fraud, actual fraud is an intentional tort), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 424 Md.
549 (2012). And even if they had, the record does not reveal a secular purpose that could
have motivated the Conference’s adoption of the payment requirement or its management
of the pension funds. As a result, we fail to see how such an exception could apply here.
Constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary duty are similar causes of actions in
Maryland. Constructive fraud occurs when a defendant is in a confidential relationship with
a plaintiff that gives rise to a legal or equitable duty and the defendant breaches that duty
“in a way that ‘tends to deceive others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure
public interests.’” Thompson v. UBS Fin. Services, Inc., 443 Md. 47, 69 (quoting Canaj
Inc. v. Baker & Div. Phase III, LLC, 391 Md. 374, 421–22 (2006)). The plaintiff does not
need to prove that the defendant harbored a dishonest purpose or intended to deceive them,
Ellerin v. Fairfax Sav., F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 236 n.11 (1995), but does have to prove the
18
tort by clear and convincing evidence. Dowling v. A.R.T. Institute of Wash., Inc., 372
F.Supp.3d 274, 295 (D. Md. 2019). The elements of breach of fiduciary duty are “the
existence of a fiduciary relationship,” a breach of the fiduciary’s duty to the beneficiary,
and “harm to the beneficiary.” Plank v. Cherneski, 469 Md. 548, 559 (2020).
Courts in other jurisdictions have applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in
declining to review fraud and fiduciary duty claims where resolving those claims would
require the court to decide questions about the truth or meaning of religious doctrine or,
more to the point here, to resolve disputes over church governance. In Gaddy v.
Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 551
F.Supp.3d 1206 (D. Utah 2021), the United States District Court for the District of Utah
applied the doctrine and declined to review several fraud-based claims brought against the
Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the “LDS
Church”) by a former church member on behalf of herself and others in a putative class
action lawsuit. Id. at 1209, 1222–23. The plaintiff alleged that the LDS Church’s leadership
held no sincere belief in the story of its founding that it promoted to its members and had
misrepresented intentionally the circumstances of the founding to induce members’ faith.
Id. at 1209–10. The LDS Church moved to dismiss the complaint and the court granted the
motion, noting that although the First Amendment doesn’t prohibit courts from resolving
fraud claims against churches or religious organizations if those claims involve secular
issues, it does prohibit courts from resolving claims grounded in issues of faith or religious
doctrine. Id. at 1221–22. Because the fraud-based claims involved in the case before it
“directly implicate[d] the truth of the [LDS] Church’s teachings” on matters of faith, the
19
court ruled that the First Amendment barred it from resolving them. Id. at 1222–23.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Moon v.
Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International, 281 A.3d 46 (D.C.
2022), when asked to resolve an ecclesiastical dispute. When Reverend Sun Myung Moon,
founder of the Unification Church, passed away after leading the church for almost sixty
years, a “religious schism” that had fractured the church shortly before his death ripened
into litigation between parties with competing visions for the church’s future. Id. at 49–50.
On one side was Reverend Moon’s eldest son, whom the reverend once had declared as his
“spiritual successor” and who served as Chairman of the board of directors of Unification
Church International (“UCI”), a non-profit corporation. Id. at 50. The Reverend’s eldest
son viewed the church as a decentralized, non-denominational interfaith movement. Id. On
the other side were Reverend Moon’s widow and their youngest son, both of whom claimed
to be the reverend’s spiritual successor and each of whom had led the Family Federation
for World Peace and Unification International (the “Family Federation”) at different times.
Id. Reverend Moon’s widow and youngest son believed that the Family Federation was
“the institutional embodiment” of the Unification Church and that, as a result, UCI was
bound to support the Family Federation. Id.
This schism ripened into litigation when the Family Federation sued the reverend’s
eldest son and the rest of UCI’s board of directors alleging that they had breached their
fiduciary duty to the Unification Church. Id. The Family Federation claimed that UCI’s
board of directors had breached its fiduciary duty to the church in two ways: first by
donating half of UCI’s nearly one billion dollars in assets—set aside for the advancement
20
of the Unification Church and its principles—to entities unaffiliated with the Family
Federation against its wishes and second by amending UCI’s articles of incorporation to
facilitate the donations. Id. Specifically, the board removed from UCI’s articles purposes
like “assisting, coordinating, and guiding the activities of Unification Churches” and
“further[ing] the theology of the Unification Church” and replaced them with purposes like
“support[ing] the understanding and teaching of the theology and principles of the
Unification Movement.” Id. (alterations in original). The Family Federation moved for
summary judgment of its claims in the trial court, which granted the motion after deciding
that it could resolve the issues using neutral legal principles. Id.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at 51, 70. That court held
that the First Amendment precluded a civil court from deciding the Family Federation’s
breach of fiduciary duty claims because a court couldn’t resolve them “without answering
core questions about religious doctrine.” Id. at 51. It concluded that there were no neutral
principles it could apply to resolve either issue on appeal. Id. at 64, 69–70. To determine if
the board’s donations “ran afoul of UCI’s corporate purposes” or if the board had altered
UCI’s articles of incorporation fundamentally, a court would need to “pass judgment on
whose vision for the Unification Church, or the Unification Movement, [was] more faithful
to the purposes UCI was established to advance.” Id. at 51, 65, 67, 69–70. The court held
that this “religious question” was not one that a civil court could answer. Id. at 51, 70.
In Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265 (N.C. 2007), the Supreme Court of North
Carolina reversed the trial court’s denial of a Baptist church’s motion to dismiss under the
church autonomy doctrine claims brought by members of its congregation. Id. at 268, 271,
21
273, 275. After the death of the church’s pastor in 1998, the congregation voted to install
a new pastor and approved soon after a new set of bylaws for the church that established
an internal governing body with broad authority to manage its business and affairs. Id. at
267. Members of the congregation grew concerned about these organizational changes and
sought access to the church’s financial records, which the church refused at first. Id. at 268.
When the church produced the records finally under a court order, the members believed
that the church, the pastor, and others involved in church management had misappropriated
church funds. Id. They sued the church and its managers for, among other claims, breach
of fiduciary duty and conversion of funds. Id.
The defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
and the trial court denied the motion. Id. at 268, 271. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
reversed, holding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded a civil court from
deciding the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 273–75. To determine whether the defendants acted
properly in expending church funds or had breached their fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs
by misusing those funds, the court reasoned, the court would need to examine “the church’s
view of the role of the pastor, staff, and church leaders, their authority and compensation,
and church management.” Id. at 273. The court concluded that none of the plaintiffs’ claims
could be resolved using neutral principles of law and that the church’s internal governing
body was thus the only entity with authority to resolve them. Id. at 273–74.
Courts have held in other instances that they could resolve claims of fraud or breach
of fiduciary duty against religious organizations using neutral legal principles. Huntsman
v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 127
22
F.4th 784 (9th Cir. 2025), for example, involved a fraud claim filed against the LDS Church
by a former member. Id. at 786. The plaintiff alleged that the LDS Church had acted
fraudulently by using tithing funds (funds contributed annually by church members,
amounting to ten percent of each member’s annual income) to finance the redevelopment
of a commercial shopping mall in Salt Lake City after stating that it wouldn’t. Id. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the LDS Church and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 786, 792. Applying neutral legal principles,
the Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court that no reasonable juror could have found that
the church had committed fraud against its members. Id. at 790. The court recounted that
when the church’s former president first announced the mall redevelopment project, he had
indeed promised that the church would not use tithing funds to finance that project. Id. at
787, 790. He stated also, however, that the church would use income earned from investing
a portion of its annual income that it set aside as “reserve funds” (a portion that included
some tithing funds) to finance the project. Id. The evidence indicated that the church had,
in fact, used the income on its reserve funds, rather than tithing funds, for the
redevelopment project. Id. at 790–91. Accordingly, the court determined that no reasonable
juror could find the church had made any misrepresentation to its members about the source
of funds for the City Creek project. Id. at 792. In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit noted that
nothing in its analysis of the plaintiff’s fraud claim required it to “delve[] into matters of
Church doctrine or policy” and that its decision thus did not “run afoul of the church
autonomy doctrine.” Id.
In Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 2005),
23
a mother and her three children sued the Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson, Mississippi,
and raised breach of fiduciary duty and fraud claims involving alleged sexual abuse of the
children by a priest. Id. at 1219–20. The plaintiffs alleged that the Diocese had breached
its fiduciary duty to them as parishioners by hiring and retaining the priest despite his
“alleged predilection for sexually molesting children” and concealed fraudulently from
parishioners its “knowledge of illegal sexual abuse of children.” Id. at 1223, 1240. The trial
court denied the Diocese’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, holding that the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine did not divest the civil courts of jurisdiction over the breach of fiduciary
duty and fraud claims. Id. at 1220, 1235–36, 1240–41. The church autonomy doctrine, the
court noted, prohibits courts only from taking jurisdiction “over a religious organization’s
internal, ecclesiastical matters.” Id. at 1236. Whether the Diocese failed to protect children
from sexual abuse and whether it had defrauded its members, the court concluded, were
secular questions that the First Amendment didn’t prohibit civil courts from answering. Id.
at 1237, 1240.
Finally, and perhaps closer to this case, in Fifth Avenue United Methodist Church
of Wilmington v. North Carolina Conference, Southeastern Jurisdiction, of the United
Methodist Church, Inc., 297 N.C. App. 246 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024), the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina reversed the trial court’s dismissal of several claims—including fraud and
constructive fraud—brought by a local Methodist church against that church’s Annual
Conference. Id. at 248–49. After the UMC’s General Conference enacted Paragraph 2553
of the Book of Discipline, the plaintiff church contacted its Annual Conference to inquire
24
about the disaffiliation process. Id. at 249–50. The local church’s council voted to
disaffiliate two weeks later and submitted the required paperwork to the Annual
Conference, which confirmed its receipt of the documents and scheduled an informal
meeting on the local church’s disaffiliation request. Id. at 250. But two days before the
meeting, and without informing the local church, the Annual Conference closed the church
and seized its property under Paragraph 2549 of the Book of Discipline. Id. The Annual
Conference asserted that the church’s pending request for disaffiliation and an alleged
decline in membership constituted “exigent circumstances” that warranted closure of the
church. Id. at 250–51. The local church sued the Annual Conference for fraud, claiming
that it “colluded to take [their] [p]roperty ‘under the guise of legitimate action. . . .’” Id. at
262.
On review of the trial court’s denial of the Annual Conference’s motion to dismiss,
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina agreed with the local church that a civil court could
decide the fraud and constructive fraud issues according to neutral principles of law without
weighing or interpreting church doctrine. Id. at 263. The court noted that it couldn’t address
without “tread[ing] on the sanctity of church doctrine” the Annual Conference’s contention
that it decided to close the church based on alleged declining membership “in good faith,”
in the church’s best interest, and in accordance with church doctrine. Id. at 262–63 (citation
omitted). It could, however, determine using neutral principles whether the Annual
Conference had defrauded the local church by representing that it had received the church’s
paperwork and would hold a meeting on its disaffiliation request while intending instead
to close the church and seize its property “under the guise of legitimate action. . . .” Id. at
25
262–63.
Here, the Local Churches’ constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary claims rest on
nearly identical allegations, although a different posture. The Local Churches allege that
they have paid the Conference millions of dollars in apportionments and entrusted the
Conference with their real property as part of a confidential relationship between the
parties. They allege that they “placed special trust and confidence” in the Conference to
manage their financial contributions and real property in the Local Churches’ best interest
and “in accordance with the long-held characteristic doctrines, usages, customs, and
practices of the UMC.” Accordingly, they allege, the Conference owed them a duty to “act
in good faith and with due regard to their interests,” a duty to disclose all material facts
related to the management of the Conference’s resources, and a fiduciary duty. The Local
Churches assert that the Conference breached these duties by leveraging their control over
the trust property to impede their disaffiliation and penalize them for their religious beliefs;
by withholding material facts about the Conference’s management of pension funds,
claiming falsely that the pension funds have unfunded liabilities, and mismanaging pension
funds; and by using its position as a fiduciary for its own financial benefit and to the
detriment of the Local Churches. A key difference is the posture: in this case, the
Conference didn’t close the Local Churches on its own, nor are there any disputes about
administrative or logistical details.
Resolving the claims alleged in this case would require a trial court to examine the
UMC’s religious doctrine and the Conference’s management of church resources in a
manner prohibited by the First Amendment. We look first at the Local Churches’ allegation
26
that the Conference engaged in constructive fraud and breached its fiduciary duty by failing
to act in their best interest and in accordance with the UMC’s doctrine, custom, and
practices. This is not a case, like Morrison, where the resolution of the plaintiffs’ fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Diocese required the court to answer purely
secular questions about whether the Diocese had concealed its knowledge of sexual abuse
and failed to protect its parishioners’ children from that abuse. 905 So.2d at 1237, 1240.
Nor is this case analogous factually to Fifth Avenue, where the question before the court
was whether the Annual Conference defrauded the local church by acting as if it was
processing the local church’s disaffiliation request while intending instead to close the
church and seize its property. 297 N.C. App. 246 at 262–63. The Local Churches’ claims
in this case—that the Conference committed fraud and breached its fiduciary duty by
failing to act in accordance with the UMC’s doctrine, custom, and practices—“directly
implicate” religious matters, Gaddy, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 1223, and a court could not resolve
them “without answering core questions about religious doctrine.” Moon, 281 A.3d at 51.
As the Court of Appeals of North Carolina recognized in Fifth Avenue, a secular court
could not determine whether the Conference acted in good faith, in the Local Churches’
best interest, and in accordance with church doctrine without “tread[ing] on the sanctity of
church doctrine.” 297 N.C. App. 246 at 262–63 (citation omitted). The circuit court
properly declined to do so.
We reach the same conclusions with respect to the Local Churches’ claims that the
Conference committed constructive fraud and breached its fiduciary duty by mismanaging
church funds or by making misrepresentations about its use and management of those
27
funds. Unlike Huntsman, this is not a case that applies neutral principles to determine
whether the Conference acted fraudulently by using certain funds for a certain purpose
after stating affirmatively that it wouldn’t. 127 F.4th at 786, 792. Instead, the Local
Churches in this case seek a determination by the circuit court about whether the
Conference managed its clergy pension funds properly—a determination that would
require the court to examine “the church’s view of the role of the [clergy] and church
leaders, their authority and compensation, and church management.” Harris, 643 S.E.2d at
273. Because a secular court could not conduct such an examination using neutral
principles of law, the UMC’s internal governing bodies are the only entities with authority
to resolve the Local Churches’ claims. Id. at 273–74.
We turn now to the Local Churches’ breach of contract claims. They claim in
essence that the Book of Discipline is a contract that binds all units of the UMC, including
the Local Churches and the Conference. They claim further that the Conference breached
that contract by imposing a payment requirement not mandated by Paragraph 2553 and by
mismanaging the Conference pension fund.3 Under our Supreme Court’s precedent, we
may treat the Book of Discipline as an enforceable contract “if, but only if: (1) it can be
interpreted under ‘neutral principles of [contract] law,’ without court involvement ‘in any
theological or doctrinal matter’” and (2) it constitutes an enforceable agreement when
3
Because we hold above that the circuit court declined properly under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to address the Local Churches’ claims involving the Conference’s alleged mismanagement of its clergy pension funds, we address their breach of contract claim only insofar as it relates to the Conference’s decision to impose the payment requirement as a condition of retaining its real estate after disaffiliating.
28
“scrutinized . . . in purely secular terms.” Nouri, 245 Md. App. at 347 (first quoting
American Union of Baptists, 335 Md. at 575–76; then quoting From the Heart, 370 Md. at
187).
The Appellate Court of Illinois held in Gabriel v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran
Church, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), that the trial court dismissed a breach of
contract claim under the church autonomy doctrine properly because enforcing the contract
would require a civil court to conduct “‘a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry’
into church doctrine.” Id. at 683–84 (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of
America and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 723 (1976)). There, the plaintiff sued the
defendant—a not-for-profit religious corporation engaged in preaching and teaching “the
Bible and Lutheran confessions as set forth” in the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod’s (the
“Missouri Synod”) constitution—for breach of contract after the defendant withdrew an
offer to employ her as a kindergarten teacher at a parochial school. Id. at 682. The offer
took the form of a “divine call,” the Missouri Synod’s usual method of soliciting teachers
and clergy for its parochial schools and churches. Id. The plaintiff claimed that she
“accepted” the call by signing the document and returning it to the school’s principal but
that the defendant refused later to honor its agreement to employ her. Id. The defendant
moved to dismiss her complaint on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the plaintiff
was a “commissioned minister of religion” who, “in addition to acceptance of the call,”
needed to be “installed” by church officials before her employment became effective. Id.
Defendant alleged that the church congregation voted to withdraw the issuance of the call
before the plaintiff was installed because her acceptance of the call wasn’t timely. Id. The
29
trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the Appellate Court of Illinois
affirmed, recognizing that the First Amendment “precludes governmental interference with
ecclesiastical hierarchies, church administration, and the appointment of clergy.” Id. at
683–84. Although the factors the defendant relied on in deciding not to employ the plaintiff
weren’t “independently ecclesiastical in nature,” the court reasoned, they were “related to
a pastoral appointment determination” with which the First Amendment prohibited a civil
court from interfering. Id. at 684.
We held in Nouri v. Dadger, 245 Md. App. 324 (2020), that a civil court could
enforce a mahr (a provision in an Islamic religious marriage contract requiring one spouse
to make a payment to the other) if, under secular principles of contract law, the mahr
satisfied the requirements for an agreement entered by parties in a confidential relationship.
Id. at 333. Nouri involved consolidated appeals from circuit court judgments in two divorce
actions between couples married in both civil and religious ceremonies. Id. at 333, 337,
339, 342. In each case, the wife sought to enforce a mahr against her husband requiring
him to pay her a certain number of gold coins. Id. at 337–39, 340–42. The circuit court
ruled in each case that the mahr was enforceable under neutral principles of contract law.
Id. at 339, 342. We agreed that a Maryland court can enforce a mahr without violating the
First Amendment “if: (1) [the mahr] can be interpreted under ‘neutral principles of law,’
without court involvement ‘in any theological or doctrinal matter’” and (2) it constitutes
an enforceable agreement when “scrutinized . . . in purely secular terms.” Id. at 347 (first
quoting American Union of Baptists, 335 Md. at 575–76; then quoting From the Heart,
370 Md. at 187). We disagreed with the circuit court only as to the applicable secular legal
30
framework, holding that a mahr could be enforced by a civil court only if the mahr’s secular
terms satisfied the requirements for an agreement entered into by parties in a confidential
relationship. Id. at 348–49. In other words, the parties seeking enforcement of the mahr
had to prove that it was supported by mutual assent and consideration and that there wasn’t
any unfairness or inequity in its procurement or result. Id. at 363–64 (citations omitted).
Courts in other jurisdictions have found contracts to be enforceable against religious
entities when enforcement of those contracts wouldn’t require a court to interpret religious
doctrine or to interfere excessively with a religious organization’s operations. In McKelvey
v. Pierce, 173 N.J. 26 (N.J. 2002), a former Roman Catholic seminarian sued the Diocese
of Camden and several priests for allegedly breaching an implied contract by creating a
hostile education and work environment. Id. at 32–33. He alleged that the Diocese had
represented impliedly—via dating prohibitions in the seminary’s student handbook and
condemnations of sexual misconduct in church guidelines and in a written statement by the
bishop—that he wouldn’t be exposed to sexual conduct during his seminary program. Id.
at 35. Despite these representations, he claimed, he suffered repeated sexual harassment by
priests until he was forced to leave the program after he complained to several supervisors.
Id. at 32, 36–37. The trial court ruled that even if the documents the plaintiff relied on
created a legally enforceable contract, it couldn’t interpret them without violating the First
Amendment. Id. at 37. The appellate court agreed but the Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed and held that a court could resolve the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants
breached a quasi-contract for education by subjecting him to sexual harassment without
interpreting church doctrine or interfering with church governance. Id. at 37, 54–55. The
31
court noted that “sexual harassment is not doctrinally based” or “inherent in church
administration,” then qualified its holding by cautioning that the plaintiff could not rely on
church teachings about celibacy or sexual behavior to establish the existence of an implied
promise by the Diocese that he wouldn’t be exposed to sexual conduct during his seminary
training. Id. at 55–56.
In Fifth Avenue, again, the local church sued its Annual Conference for breach of
contract after the Annual Conference closed the church as its request for disaffiliation was
pending. 297 N.C. App. 246 at 250–51, 255. As with the local church’s fraud-based claims,
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that the trial court had erred in dismissing the
breach of contract claim under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Id. at 262. The court
reasoned that determining whether the Annual Conference had complied with the UMC’s
disaffiliation procedures as outlined in the Book of Discipline wouldn’t require a court to
weigh or interpret church doctrine. Id. at 261 (citation omitted). Rather, the court opined,
resolving the local church’s claim would require a civil court to decide simply “whether
the parties performed pursuant to the plain language of their contractually agreed upon
terms.” Id.
In this case, the circuit court properly declined to enforce the Book of Discipline
against the Conference as the Local Churches requested because it couldn’t interpret the
Book of Discipline “under ‘neutral principles of [contract] law,’ without court involvement
‘in any theological or doctrinal matter.’” Nouri, 245 Md. App. at 347 (quoting American
Union of Baptists, 335 Md. at 575–76). Unlike McKelvey, which asked whether the Diocese
breached a quasi-contract for education by subjecting the plaintiff to sexual harassment,
32
the question of whether the Conference breached the provisions of the Book of Discipline
by imposing the payment requirement in this case is “doctrinally based.” 173 N.J. at 55.
This is not a case, like Fifth Avenue, where a local church asked the trial court to determine
simply if the Annual Conference “performed pursuant to the plain language of their
contractually agreed upon terms” regarding the procedures for disaffiliation. 297 N.C. App.
246 at 261. To decide in this case if the Conference’s payment requirement is consistent
with Paragraph 2553 of the Book of Discipline would go an impermissible step further and
require the court both to interpret church doctrine and to interfere with church governance.
See McKelvey, 173 N.J. at 54–55. Because resolving the Local Churches’ breach of
contract claim would require the circuit court to conduct “‘a searching and therefore
impermissible inquiry’ into church doctrine,” Gabriel, 640 N.E.2d at 683 (quoting
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 723), we hold that the court declined properly to resolve it.
2. Dismissal of the declaratory relief and quiet title claims.
The Local Churches maintain that the circuit court’s dismissal of their declaratory
judgment and quiet title claims, based on its determination that the trust was irrevocable,
failed to consider Maryland statutes that allow courts to terminate, modify, or reform trusts
under certain circumstances. The Conference counters that internal church authority has
spoken on this matter and that the circuit court must defer to that conclusion.
In their complaint, the Local Churches sought a declaration that their trust
relationship with the Conference had terminated because the trust’s purposes had become
unlawful, contrary to public policy, or impossible to achieve. In the alternative, they sought
a declaration that the trust was revocable. In addition, the Local Churches asked the circuit
33
court to declare that they “are entitled to the quiet, exclusive, uninterrupted, and peaceful
possession of their respective properties” without interference by the Conference.
On more than one occasion, Maryland courts have applied neutral principles of law
to resolve disputes about the ownership of real property when a local entity in a hierarchical
religious organization has sought to disaffiliate from that organization’s regional or mother
entity. See Maryland & Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 254 Md. 162, 166–71 (1969) (analyzing Maryland statutory law, the
language of the deeds conveying the disputed property to the local churches, the local
churches’ charters, and the constitution of the mother church using neutral legal principles
to determine if any of those documents contained any provision that the local churches
would forfeit their real property in the event of their disaffiliation from the mother church);
Polen v. Cox, 259 Md. 25, 34–40 (1970) (analyzing church documents using neutral
principles to determine if the disaffiliated local church had adopted the “basic governing
and doctrinal positions” of the mother church and, if so, whether the local church had the
power to lease the real property titled in its name without approval from its state overseer);
Mt. Olive, 348 Md. at 301–02, 320–25 (applying neutral principles to determine if a local
church retained ownership of property titled in its name after disaffiliating from the mother
church); From the Heart, 370 Md. at 157–58, 184–90 (same); see also Calvary, 39 Md.
App. at 417 (noting that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine doesn’t prohibit courts from
resolving all church property disputes because “[w]ere it otherwise, [such]
controversies . . . might never be resolved, and the title to the church property would be
enmeshed in a quagmire from which extrication would be nearly impossible”).
34
Here, the circuit court engaged in a similar analysis to determine if, by their plain
language, Paragraphs 2501 and 2502 of the Book of Discipline create an irrevocable trust.
The circuit court relied primarily on Paragraph 2501.2 of the Book of Discipline, which
states expressly that “[t]he trust [requirement recognized in Paragraph 2501] is and always
has been irrevocable, except as provided in” the Book of Discipline. Because it found that
the trust clauses provided in Paragraph 2503 of the Book of Discipline contain no language
reserving the right of the Local Churches to revoke the trust, the circuit court ruled that the
trust was irrevocable and entered summary judgment for the Conference on the Local
Churches’ declaratory judgment and quiet title claims. The Local Churches contend that
the circuit court erred by failing to address the alternative basis for their declaratory
judgment and quiet title claims: that the trust had been terminated “because the purposes
of the trust have become unlawful, contrary to public policy, or impossible to achieve.” We
hold that the circuit court did not err because the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
prohibited it from addressing their alternative argument.
The Local Churches note correctly that Maryland courts have the authority,
conferred by statute, to terminate or modify trusts under certain circumstances. See Md.
Code (2001, 2022 Repl. Vol., 2025 Cum. Supp.), § 14.5-409(a)(2) of the Estates & Trusts
Article (“ET”) (“[A] trust terminates to the extent” that “[t]he purposes of the trust have
become unlawful, contrary to public policy, or impossible to achieve.”); ET § 14.5-4011(a)(1) (“The court may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust or
terminate the trust if, because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification
or termination will further the purposes of the trust.”); ET § 14.5-413 (“The court may
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reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to the intention of
the settlor if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the intent of the settlor
and the terms of the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression
or inducement.”). But to do so here, as the Local Churches request, would require the trial
court to interpret the UMC’s religious doctrine and encroach impermissibly on
ecclesiastical matters. The Local Churches assert that by making “material changes to the
disaffiliation process,” the UMC “altered its core religious doctrines and, therefore,
necessarily also altered the fundamental purpose of the trust” from what the Local
Churches contemplated when they affiliated with the UMC. But a court can’t determine
the fundamental purpose of a trust “formed with a particular religious purpose in mind” or
whether “subsequent doctrinal changes . . . frustrated that purpose,” as the Local Churches
requested without infringing the protections bestowed upon religious entities under the
First Amendment. Whether the General Conference’s amendment of the Book of
Discipline to include Paragraph 2553 contradicted longstanding church practices and
existing provisions of the Book of Discipline allegedly allowing local churches to
disaffiliate without forfeiting their real property is a question for the UMC’s Judicial
Council to answer. And according to the Conference, the Judicial Council has, in fact,
answered it.
B. Law Of The Case
The Local Churches argue next that the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment
disregarded the law of the case doctrine. They maintain that the circuit court’s December
2023 order, issued by one judge, was binding on subsequent proceedings addressing the
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constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory judgment, and quiet title claims.
They contend that the court’s October 2024 order, issued by a second judge, contradicted
the December 2023 conclusions and dismissed those claims, relying in part on the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. And the Local Churches maintain that none of the
exceptions to the law of the case doctrine warranted reversal or revision of the
“jurisdictional and substantive issues” resolved by the court in December 2023.
The Conference emphasizes that the October 2024 order rendered a decision based
on a “full summary judgment record” from which the court could ascertain more fully
whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine should apply, unlike the December 2023
ruling on its motion to dismiss. The Conference asserts that the law of the case doctrine
doesn’t apply to trial court decisions and that the December 2023 order was subject to
revision at any time pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602 because it wasn’t a final judgment.
The Conference is right.
In this case, the December 2023 order was not the law of the case, and the law of
the case doctrine didn’t bind the circuit court as it considered the Conference’s summary
judgment motion in October 2024. Under the doctrine, “‘a legal rule or decision between
the same parties in the same case controls in subsequent proceedings between them’
and . . . ‘a ruling by the trial court remains binding until an appellate court reverses or
modifies it.’” Baltimore Police Dep’t v. Cherkes, 140 Md. App. 282, 301–02 (2001)
(quoting Ralkey v. Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co., 63 Md. App. 515, 520 (1985)). The doctrine
doesn’t bind circuit courts until there has been a decision that “finally disposes of the
matter,” Ralkey, 63 Md. App. at 521, because trial courts are “‘courts of coordinate
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jurisdiction,’” id., that can review de novo prior, interlocutory rulings from other judges of
the same court. Cherkes, 140 Md. App. at 300 (“‘As a general principle, one judge of a
trial court ruling on a matter is not bound by a prior ruling in the same case by another
judge of the court; the second judge, in [their] discretion, may ordinarily consider the
matter de novo.’” (quoting State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 449 (1984))). In fact, the
Maryland Rules provide specifically that interlocutory trial court rulings remain subject to
revision at any time before entry of a final judgment, Md. Rule 2-602(a), and that circuit
courts retain jurisdiction to revise judgments for thirty days after entry (if there’s a timely
motion). Md. Rule 2-535.
Because the December 2023 ruling was interlocutory, the law of the case doctrine
didn’t apply and the ruling remained subject to the court’s revisory power. The Local
Churches argue that the circuit court’s December 2023 denial of the Conference’s motion
to dismiss Counts III, IV, and IX of their complaint should have bound the court and
prevented it from granting summary judgment to the Conference on those claims in
October 2024, but “the denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final judgment,” City of Dist.
Heights v. Denny, 123 Md. App. 508, 514 (1998), and we have rejected this very argument
before. See Howard v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Md. App. 549, 554 (2002)
(concluding that “denial of appellee’s motion to dismiss was an interlocutory order [that]
did not constitute the law of the case or preclude another judge from considering appellee’s
subsequent motion for summary judgment.”). In this case, it is beyond dispute that the
December 2023 ruling didn’t dispose of all the Local Churches’ claims. The court granted
the Conference’s motion to dismiss Counts II, VI, VII, and VIII, dismissed Count I
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partially, and left Counts III, IV, V, and IX “undisturbed” to “continue in the regular
course.” As a result, the December 2023 ruling was “an order . . . that adjudicate[d] fewer
than all the claims in [the] action” and remained “subject to revision at any time before the
entry of a judgment that adjudicates all of the claims by and against all of the parties,” Md.
Rule 2-602(a), and the court could revise those rulings in October 2024 as it did.
C. Recusal
Finally, the Local Churches argue that the summary judgment court had “extensive
personal, familial, and current ties to the UMC” and churches within the Conference that
raised reasonable doubts about the judge’s ability to consider and decide these issues
impartially. The Local Churches assert that through this “active membership,” the court
was subject to the authority of the Conference and that the summary judgment ruling in the
Conference’s favor suggests “a potential bias rooted in personal and institutional loyalty.”
In response, the Conference argues that the judge’s membership in a Methodist church that
wasn’t a party to the dispute, by itself, does not meet the heavy burden required to
overcome the presumption in favor of the court’s impartiality. Moreover, the Conference
contends, basing recusal on religious membership alone would require the trial court to
apply a “religious test” to substitute judges in violation of Maryland and United States
constitutions.
“Maryland law guarantees litigants the right to a judge who is, and has the
appearance of being, unbiased and impartial,” Harford Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Jones, 264
Md. App. 520, 541 (2025), and violation of that right amounts to an abuse of discretion.
Id. (first citing Archer v. State, 383 Md. 329, 356 (2004); then Jackson v. State, 364 Md.
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192, 207 (2001); Reed v. Balt. Life Ins. Co.. 127 Md. App. 536, 553 (1999)). In Maryland,
there is a presumption that judges are impartial adjudicators. Id. To overcome that
presumption, the party seeking recusal must “prove that the judge has a bias or prejudice
derived from an extrajudicial—personal—source.” Reed, 127 Md. at 556. “Bald allegations
and adverse rulings” aren’t enough. Id.
To review a claim of judicial bias, the record must contain “sufficiently detailed
facts demonstrating alleged bias and counsel [must] plainly call[] out the bias and request[]
a remedy for it.” Harford Mem’l Hosp., 264 Md. App at 546. From there, we employ an
objective standard and ask “‘whether a reasonable member of the public knowing all the
circumstances would be led to the conclusion that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.’” Id. at 554 (quoting Surratt v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 320 Md. 439,
465 (1990)). We do not take this occasion to review the conduct of the judge, however—
only the impact, if any, the alleged bias had on the appellant’s opportunity for a fair trial.
Id.
The circuit court’s decision to deny the Local Churches’ motion for disqualification
did not abuse the court’s discretion in a manner that went “‘beyond the fringe’” of what is
“‘minimally acceptable.’” Harford Mem’l Hosp., 264 Md. App. at 538 (quoting North v.
North, 102 Md. App. 1, 14 (1994)). At a hearing on their motion for discovery sanctions
and after granting and denying that motion in part, the judge disclosed to the parties his
personal ties to the UMC:
THE COURT: And I will go ahead and disclose on the record,
I am a Methodist. I am not an active Methodist. I mean, I try to
go once a month. None of the churches affiliated—that I
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believe are in the lawsuit, I don’t believe I have ever been there.
I may know where they are. I guess if anybody has any concern
with the fact that—and I guess in full disclosures, my uncle
was a pastor. My uncle has passed. He was in western
Maryland. He was at the Barton United Methodist Church.
And I mean—so I know a little bit about what you are talking
about. But candidly, what I do know and any information I
have, it mere—it did help me in understanding when—maybe
not everyone is familiar with the disaffiliation process. I am, at
least, because I would read the newspaper articles, as anyone
else could have read, just because, you know, that is the church
that I grew up in. And does anyone have any concern with that?
[COUNSEL FOR THE LOCAL CHURCHES]: No, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Did anyone have a concern from the fact that I
am a—Methodist is—a Methodist Church—and so the
Methodist Church I am a member of is Trinity United
Methodist in Odenton, which actually, I don’t even know
whether they—I don’t know whether they are just a sister
church to the Community United Methodist of Crofton or
whether they are just their own standalone church. Because
now you are getting past my understanding of how it all works.
[COUNSEL FOR THE CONFERENCE]: I think we have one
Odenton church as a Plaintiff, but I don’t believe it is Trinity.
But either way, Your Honor, we have no issue . . . .
At a status conference before the same judge one month later, the judge described
his personal ties to the UMC in more extensive detail. In addition to disclosing his
attendance at the Trinity United Methodist Church in Odenton, the judge disclosed his prior
attendance at Methodist churches in Crofton, Hanover, and Cumberland and in
Fayetteville, North Carolina. And he shared the extent of his family members’ active
membership and participation in Methodist churches in Swanton, Maryland, Cumberland,
Maryland, and Bridgeville, Delaware. The judge didn’t believe these ties amounted to a
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conflict of interest and opined that he could render a fair and impartial judgment in the
case. Still, he invited the parties to file recusal motions within fourteen days if they had
any concerns.
The Local Churches moved to disqualify the judge under Maryland Rule 18-202.11
due to his status as a parishioner of a church under the Conference’s regional purview. The
motion expressed doubt that he could “separate his personal interests in his local church
from his professional obligations as arbiter of claims . . . [that] may be contrary to his local
church’s policies.” The Local Churches moved for a judge with “no vested or material
interest in the outcome of the case” and no indirect or direct association with any of the
parties. The circuit court denied the motion without explanation.
These circumstances are insufficient to overcome the presumption of judicial
impartiality. True, the judge identified a rather extensive set of ties, personally and through
family, historically and currently, to different congregations of the UMC, but none of the
churches disclosed are parties to this dispute. None of the ties disclosed suggest any active
participation or membership on the BW Conference or Board level of UMC or any personal
connection to the Bishop. The judge disclosed that the church he attends is a member of
the BW Conference and that his church had voted to remain affiliated with UMC. That
disclosure reveals only an indirect tie to a party in this case by virtue of the judge’s status
as a parishioner. It didn’t reveal any information about his personal views on the internal
controversy regarding human sexuality, whether he participated in the vote of his church
to remain affiliated, or, if he did, how he voted. The same can be said for the judge’s
disclosure that a member of his family belongs to the LGBTQ community: that disclosure
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didn’t reveal anything about where the judge stands personally on that issue or on the
UMC’s position, or even what kind of relationship he has with that family member. See
Cochran v. Griffith Energy Serv., Inc., 191 Md. App. 625, 658–69 (2010) (“recusal is
required only when the source of the alleged bias is information received outside the
courtroom,” for the purpose of avoiding “‘a determination not so founded upon facts
brought forth in court, but based on attitudes and conceptions that have their origins in
sources beyond the four corners of the courtroom.’” (quoting Doering v. Fader, 316 Md.
351, 355–56 (1989))). The judge’s affiliation with the UMC as a parishioner, without more,
has no apparent impact on the Local Churches’ ability to receive a fair trial in a dispute
between members of the UMC. See Reed, 127 Md. App. at 560 (“Absent specific evidence
indicating bias, [appellant] is unable to rebut the strong presumption that the court acted
impartially.”).
Ultimately, the judge’s sole connection to the controversy in this case is that he is a
parishioner of a church that falls under the regional purview of a party to the case, the BW
Conference. His religious affiliation and status as a parishioner, without more, do not
qualify as grounds to question his impartiality and do not, on their own, suggest that the
judge had an interest in the outcome of the case one way or the other. Without any
indication, let alone evidence, of what the alleged bias is, we perceive no prejudice to the
Local Churches’ ability to receive a fair proceeding and hold that the judge’s decision not
to recuse did not abuse the court’s discretion.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY
AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY
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COSTS.
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