Drokin v. Rubio

majority opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IVAN DROKIN, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 25-cv-1928 (JMC)

MARCO RUBIO, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ivan Drokin sues alongside his spouse, Elena Ericheva, and minor child, O.E. (collectively,

“Plaintiffs”), seeking to compel adjudication of their immigration visa applications. Plaintiffs

name as Defendants Secretary of State Marco Rubio; Acting Director of the Office of Screening,

Analysis, and Coordination (SAC) Robert Jachim; and Acting Director of the National Vetting

Center (NVC) Kenneth Platek. Plaintiffs contend that their applications, which remain in

administrative processing, have been unreasonably delayed in violation of the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA) and the Mandamus Act. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims

on various grounds. While the Court does not find persuasive Defendants’ arguments for dismissal

on the basis of consular nonreviewability or lack of discrete, nondiscretionary agency action, the

Court does agree that Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for unreasonable delay.

Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1

Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion by, for example, altering capitalization or omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.

I. BACKGROUND

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., governs

the issuance of visas to immigrants pursuing admittance into the United States. The INA authorizes

the issuance of employment-based visas to, among others, noncitizens who qualify as “priority

workers,” including noncitizens with “extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education,

business, or athletics.” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A)(i). Spouses and children “acquired before the

principal applicant’s admission to the United States . . . who [are] accompanying or following to

join” the applicant are accorded derivative status. 9 FAM 502.1-1(C)(2)(a); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1153(d). A noncitizen seeking an employment-based visa must first file with the U.S. Citizenship

and Immigration Services (USCIS) a Form I-140 immigrant visa petition. ECF 1 ¶ 30; see 8 C.F.R.

§ 204.5(a). If USCIS approves the petition, it is then sent to the NVC for pre-processing. ECF 1

¶ 36; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(n)(1); U.S. Dep’t of State, Immigrant Visa Process,

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/the-immigrant-visa-process/step-1-submit-a-petition/step-2-begin-nvc-processing.html.

After submitting fees, completing an online application, and providing supporting

documentation to the NVC, the visa applicant is interviewed by a consular officer. ECF 1 ¶¶ 37–38;

see also 22 C.F.R. § 42.62. At the conclusion of the interview, “the consular officer must [either]

issue . . . [or] refuse the visa.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). In some cases, a consular officer may

determine that a visa application requires “administrative processing,” and may provisionally

“refuse” the application under Section 221(g) of the INA pending review of additional information.

See U.S. Dep’t of State, Immigrant Visa Process, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/usvisas/immigrate/the-immigrant-visa-process/step-10-prepare-for-the-interview/step-12-after-theinterview.html.

Plaintiff Ivan Drokin is the principal applicant for an employment-based immigrant visa.

ECF 1 ¶ 50. Drokin’s spouse, Plaintiff Ericheva, and their minor child, Plaintiff O.E., are derivative

beneficiaries. Id. Drokin filed a Form I-140 petition with USCIS, seeking admission as a priority

worker, in June 2024. Id. ¶ 52. His petition was approved for processing and forwarded to the NVC

in July 2024. Id. ¶ 53. On December 17, 2024, Plaintiffs were interviewed by a consular officer at

the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia. Id. ¶ 1. According to Plaintiffs, at the conclusion of this

interview, the consular officer “informed Plaintiffs that their applications required further

administrative processing.” Id. ¶ 55. Drokin and Ericheva were also instructed to provide

additional information, including their CVs and a supplemental questionnaire, to the Embassy via

email. Id. ¶¶ 55–56. The State Department’s website listed Plaintiffs’ applications as “refused,”

but included additional text noting that if they were “informed by the consular officer that [their]

case was refused for administrative processing . . . [they would] receive another adjudication once

such processing [was] complete.” ECF 1-3 at 1.

Six months passed without any additional information regarding Plaintiffs’ application

status. See ECF 1 ¶¶ 11, 83. On July 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a complaint and petition for a writ

of mandamus in this Court seeking an order compelling Defendants to act on their visa

applications. Id. ¶ 12. Defendants moved to dismiss. ECF 5.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court resolves the pending motion under Rule 12(b)(6).2 Under that rule, a complaint

must allege facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

Defendants also seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). Defendants argue that, because no discrete, nondiscretionary agency action is outstanding, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving that the government has waived sovereign immunity. ECF 8 at 8–9. Defendants point to Payne v. Becerra, in which the court explained that, “if all three . . . threshold requirements” for mandamus relief—including that a “federal official is violating a clear duty to act”—are not met, “the court must dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” and that “sovereign immunity is waived under the APA only for claims where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” No. 22-cv-869, 2023 WL 3376630, at *5 (D.D.C. May 11, 2023). Here, Plaintiffs assert

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In making that determination, the Court relies on the

complaint itself, which may include “documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference

in the complaint.” Ward v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D.D.C.

2011); see also EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

The Court may also “take judicial notice of information posted on official public websites of

government agencies.” Arab v. Blinken, 600 F. Supp. 3d 59, 63 n.1 (D.D.C. 2022) (citing Cannon

v. District of Columbia, 717 F.3d 200, 205 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). The Court must treat the

“complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences” in the

plaintiffs’ favor. N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ case on several grounds. To start, Defendants assert

that two threshold issues bar review of Plaintiffs’ claims. First, they argue that “this suit runs

headfirst into the consular non-reviewability doctrine.” ECF 5 at 14. Second, they contend that

Plaintiffs’ visa applications have already been refused, and, as a result, there is no remaining

nondiscretionary agency action pending, precluding relief under the Mandamus Act and the APA.

Id. at 9. The Court concludes that neither of these threshold issues warrants dismissal. The consular

nonreviewability doctrine does not apply here because Plaintiffs do not seek judicial review of any

consular officer’s final determination; rather, Plaintiffs’ claims are based on Defendants’ failure

to render a final decision on their pending applications. Additionally, the Court concludes that

Plaintiffs can bring this suit to compel a final decision on their applications because issuing a

decision on their pending visa applications is a discrete agency action required by law.

that “Defendants owe Plaintiffs a nondiscretionary, mandatory duty to adjudicate their immigrant visa applications.” ECF 7 at 30. And, as discussed in detail, infra Section III.B, the Court concludes that issuing a final decision on Plaintiffs’ pending visa applications is a discrete agency action required by law. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that it has subject matter jurisdiction.

Having resolved those issues in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court turns to Defendants’ third basis

for dismissal—that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for unreasonable delay. Only six months

elapsed between Plaintiffs’ consular interview and the filing of their complaint.3 Plaintiffs have

not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim that this delay is unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court

grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

A. Consular Nonreviewability

The Court begins with Defendants’ argument for dismissal based on the doctrine of

consular nonreviewability. ECF 5 at 14. The doctrine of consular nonreviewability “shields a

consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa from judicial review . . . .” Baan Rao Thai

Rest. v. Pompeo, 985 F.3d 1020, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Because decisions regarding the admission

and exclusion of noncitizens “may implicate relations with foreign powers or involve

classifications defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances[,] . . . such

judgments are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the

Executive.” Id. (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 702 (2018)).

This doctrine, however, does not apply where plaintiffs “do not seek judicial review of a

consular decision, but instead seek a final decision on their applications.” Afghan & Iraqi Allies

Under Serious Threat Because of Their Faithful Serv. to the U.S. v. Pompeo, No 18-cv-1388,

2019 WL 367841, at *10 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2018). That is the case here. Plaintiffs are not asking

the Court to pass judgment on a consular officer’s reason for refusing their application—they wish

to compel Defendants to make a decision on their applications that remain in administrative

processing. Indeed, “a long line of decisions” from courts in this district have concluded that the

Plaintiffs contend that the Court should consider the time between USCIS’s last action and the issuance of this Court’s opinion. ECF 7 at 49 n.12. However, as discussed, infra Section III.C.1, even assuming delay should be measured in this way, Plaintiffs still have not sufficiently pled that the delay in this case is unreasonable.

doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not prohibit judicial review in cases like this one

because the doctrine “applies only to final decisions and thus does not bar judicial review of a

consular officer’s delay when a visa application has been provisionally refused pending a final

decision.” Al-Gharawy v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 617 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2022)

(collecting cases).

Defendants point to an unpublished D.C. Circuit opinion, Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178,

2024 WL 3517852 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024) (per curiam), arguing that a consular officer’s initial

refusal of a visa application under INA § 221(g) is a “final” decision, and thus unreviewable.

ECF 5 at 16. In Karimova, the D.C. Circuit determined that a visa applicant could not compel a

consular officer to take further action on her application, which had been refused and placed in

administrative processing, because her matter had “already been concluded.” Karimova, 2024 WL

3517852, at *4. However, as this Court has previously recognized, because Karimova is an

unpublished decision, it is not binding precedent under the D.C. Circuit’s rules. See, e.g., Tehran

v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-1584, 2025 WL 3551629 at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2025); Asghari v. Rubio,

No. 25-cv-1666, 2026 WL 890411 at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026); see also D.C. Cir. R. 36(e)(2)

(“While unpublished dispositions may be cited to the court in accordance with FRAP 32.1 and

Circuit Rule 32.1(b)(1), a panel’s decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel

sees no precedential value in that disposition.”).4

In support of Karimova’s precedential value, Defendants point to Khaksari v. Chairman, Broadcasting Board of Governors, another unpublished decision in which the D.C. Circuit cited D.C. Circuit Rule 32.1(b)(1)(B) and noted that a prior unpublished decision “ha[d] the force of precedent.” 451 F. App’x 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also ECF 5 at 11 n.2. Rule 32.1(b)(1)(B) states only that some unpublished dispositions “may be cited as precedent.” D.C. Cir. R. 32.1(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). It does not provide that any such opinion is binding. Indeed, as cited above, D.C. Circuit Rule 36(e)(2) makes clear that “while unpublished dispositions may be cited to the court[,] . . . a panel’s decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that disposition.” D.C. Cir. R. 36(e)(2); see also In re Grant, 635 F.3d 1227, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (highlighting features of unpublished opinions that make them “not suitable for governing future cases”).

Moreover, the Court is still persuaded by the reasoning of many courts in this district that

have held—including after Karimova—that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not bar

review where plaintiffs sufficiently allege that their applications have not reached final

adjudication, including where applications have been placed in administrative processing. See,

e.g., Shushkov v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-2265, 2025 WL 2389939, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2025)

(concluding that, where plaintiff’s visa application was placed in administrative processing

following his consular interview, plaintiff “sufficiently alleged that he has not yet received a final

decision”); Alsaraj v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 24-cv-3399, 2025 WL 2732704, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept.

25, 2025) (same); Tolymbekova v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-295, 2025 WL 2576312, at *4–5 (D.D.C.

Sept. 5, 2025) (same); Aramnahad v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-1817, 2025 WL 973483, at *8 (D.D.C.

Mar. 31, 2025) (“The court’s conclusion in Karimova that refusing an application and placing it in

administrative processing is a ‘final’ decision does not square with the facts Plaintiffs have

alleged . . . . The officer’s decision to place Plaintiffs’ application in administrative processing is

not equivalent to rendering a final decision.”).5

Because the Court “must focus on what is actually happening” and not allow the

government to “elevate form over substance to avoid review,” the Court considers the facts

Plaintiffs have alleged to determine whether a final decision has been made on their applications.

Aramnahad, 2025 WL 973483, at *8 (quoting Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 16). After all, at

the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court is bound to assume the truth of Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded

Defendants also invoke published decisions of the D.C. Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court, asserting that they “reaffirm[]” the “scope” and “confin[e] the exceptions to the doctrine” of consular nonreviewability. ECF 5 at 14–15 (citing Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899 (2024); Baan Rao Thai Rest. v. Pompeo, 985 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2021)). In particular, Defendants highlight language from Baan Rao confirming that the doctrine “shields [from judicial review] a consular officer’s decision to . . . withhold a visa[.]” Id. at 14 (quoting Baan Rao, 985 F.3d at 1024). As explained above, the Court agrees that it cannot review a consular officer’s final decision to refuse, or “withhold”, a visa. But that is not what Plaintiffs seek in this case. And neither of the cases Defendants cite addresses the question of whether nominal refusal of a visa application pending administrative processing is a final decision for purposes of consular nonreviewability. Accordingly, these cases do not alter the Court’s analysis.

material factual allegations. See N. Am. Butterfly, 977 F.3d at 1249. Plaintiffs allege that, at the

conclusion of their consular interview, they were told that their applications “required further . . .

processing” and were instructed to provide additional information and documentation. ECF 1 ¶ 55.

Plaintiffs further allege that the online status of their applications includes a notice indicating that

they “will receive another adjudication once [administrative] processing is complete.” Id. ¶ 57.

Taking these facts together, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that their

applications remain under consideration and that they are still awaiting a final decision. See Janay

v. Blinken, 743 F. Supp. 3d 96, 112 (D.D.C. 2024) (“In other words, the application is still being

processed and a decision is still forthcoming. It has only been ‘refused’ in the far-from-literal sense

that it has not yet been ‘granted’ or ‘denied.’”).

Because Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to review a consular officer’s decision, but instead

seek to compel a final determination on their applications, the doctrine of consular

nonreviewability does not bar judicial review of Plaintiffs’ claims.

B. Nondiscretionary Duty to Take Agency Action

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have failed to “identify a clear, nondiscretionary duty

requiring a consular officer to take any action,” and, as a result, have failed to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. ECF 5 at 9. To assert a claim of unreasonable delay under the APA,

a plaintiff “must first allege that the agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required

to take.” Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off., 80 F.4th 330, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting

Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (requiring

agencies to take nondiscretionary actions within a “reasonable time”); 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (granting

courts the authority to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”). To

obtain a writ of mandamus, a plaintiff must show that the government possesses “a clear duty to

act” under the circumstances. Fornaro v. James, 416 F.3d 63, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2005)); see also

28 U.S.C. § 1361 (providing district courts with jurisdiction over mandamus suits to compel action

by an officer of the United States). Because “the standards for obtaining relief” under the APA and

the Mandamus Act are “essentially the same” in this context, the Court evaluates these claims

jointly. Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 17 (quoting Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d

654, 659 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).

Plaintiffs assert that completing the processing of their visa applications is a

nondiscretionary action that Defendants are required by law to take. See ECF 1 ¶ 80–81. They

contend that this duty arises from, among other sources: (1) the text of the INA, which states that

“all immigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer,” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1202(b); see also ECF 7 at 31; and (2) 22 C.F.R. 42.81(e), which provides that “if a visa is

refused, and the applicant within one year from the date of refusal adduces further evidence tending

to overcome the ground of ineligibility on which refusal was based, the case shall be reconsidered,”

ECF 7 at 19. Defendants, on the other hand, again argue that Karimova compels the Court to

conclude that a final adjudication has already occurred and that there is no remaining agency action

they are required to take. ECF 5 at 13.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have the better argument. As discussed above, Karimova is

not binding Circuit precedent. See supra Section III.A. The decision would be, at best, persuasive,

not “dispositive” as Defendants claim. ECF 5 at 13. The Court has already concluded that

Plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleges that they are still awaiting a final decision on their visa

applications. See Hajizadeh v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1766, 2024 WL 3638336, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug.

2, 2024) (“Issuing a final decision on a visa application is plainly a discrete agency action, and it

is required by both the APA and federal regulations.”).

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ reliance on additional sources for Defendants’ purported duty

distinguishes this case from Karimova. In Karimova, the plaintiff “rooted the asserted duty to

act . . . in Section 555(b) of the [APA],” “an ancillary provision stating that ‘each agency shall

proceed to conclude a matter presented to it’ ‘with due regard for the convenience and necessity

of the parties or their representatives and within a reasonable time.’” Karimova, 2024 WL

3517852, at *2–3 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)). The court in Karimova considered whether 5 U.S.C.

§ 555(b)—“and only Section 555(b)”—“place[d] a clear, nondiscretionary duty on [a] consular

officer.” Id. at *3. The court found that, as an “ancillary,” “non-specific directive,” it did not. Id.

Here, Plaintiffs do not solely invoke APA Section 555(b); they also ground their request in

8 U.S.C. § 1202(b) and 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e), arguing that both provisions supply a

nondiscretionary agency duty to act. ECF 1 ¶ 49, 80–81; see also ECF 7 at 19, 31. The Court

agrees and considers each provision in turn below.

Starting with 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b), this Court has previously held that the statute supplies a

nondiscretionary duty to render a final decision on visa applications and remains persuaded by the

authority that led to its conclusion. See, e.g., Tehran, 2025 WL 3551629, at *5; Asghari, 2026 WL

890411, at *5. But the Court recognizes that, while some courts in this district have similarly

concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b) “confers on consular officers a nondiscretionary duty to review

and adjudicate immigrant visa applications,” see, e.g., Thein v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2369, 2025 WL

2418402, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2025); Filazapovich v. Dep’t of State, 560 F. Supp. 3d 203, 235

(D.D.C. 2021), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Goodluck v. Biden, 104 F.4th 920 (D.C. Cir.

2024); Gomez v. Trump, 485 F. Supp. 3d 145, 198 n.23 (D.D.C. 2020), others have determined

that § 1202(b) does not supply such a nondiscretionary duty, see, e.g., Rahiminejad v. Rubio,

No. 24-cv-3495, 2025 WL 2144092, at *3 (D.D.C. July 29, 2025) (concluding that the relevant

language in § 1202(b) merely illustrates “who reviews visa applications rather that whether all

applications must be reviewed”); Tesfaye v. Blinken, No. 22-cv-411, 2022 WL 4534863, at *4

(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2022) (explaining that cases locating a nondiscretionary duty in § 1202(b) in the

context of challenges to “general policies” halting visa application processing do not provide

support for the “contention that Defendants have a non-discretionary, mandatory duty to complete”

review of any individual plaintiff’s visa application). Accordingly, the Court takes this opportunity

to elaborate on its position. The Court reached its conclusion that § 1202(b) supplies a

nondiscretionary duty because the statute requires that “all immigrant visa applications shall be

reviewed.” Accordingly, the provision “establishes a specific principle of comprehensive review

and adjudication by consular officers,” and thus supplies a nondiscretionary duty to act. Thein,

2025 WL 2418402, at *11. This conclusion follows logically from the plain text of the statute. In

addition to including the word “shall,” which “ordinarily . . . indicates a mandatory duty,” Anglers

Conservation Network v. Pritzker, 809 F.3d 664, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2016), the relevant language in

§ 1202(b) has as its subject “all immigrant visa applications,” 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (emphasis

added). In light of the “cardinal principle of statutory construction that [courts] must give effect,

if possible, to every . . . word of a statute,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000), the Court

reads § 1202(b) as conferring a duty to adjudicate “all” immigrant visa applications, and takes the

language to refer principally to that duty itself, rather than to the question of who must conduct the

adjudication. For related reasons, the Court is unpersuaded that § 1202(b) only supplies a

nondiscretionary duty where a broader policy limiting visa adjudications is challenged.

Defendants’ failure to move “all . . . visa applications”—including Plaintiffs’—toward a final

decision violates a nondiscretionary duty imposed by § 1202(b). See Thein, 2025 WL 2418402, at

*11.

The Court also agrees with Plaintiffs that 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e) provides another possible

source of a nondiscretionary duty to render a final decision on their applications that have been

provisionally refused. ECF 1 ¶ 49; see also ECF 7 at 19. Under 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e), “if a visa is

refused, and the applicant within one year from the date of refusal adduces further evidence tending

to overcome the ground of ineligibility on which the refusal was based, the case shall be

reconsidered.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e). “An agency can create a non-discretionary duty by binding

itself through a regulation carrying the force of law.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Internal Revenue

Serv., 910 F.3d 1232, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2018). And courts in this district have repeatedly

concluded—including after Karimova—that 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e) supplies a nondiscretionary duty

to act in cases involving immigrant visa applications that have been placed in administrative

processing, where the applicant provides additional information within the relevant timeframe.

See, e.g., Aramnahad, 2025 WL 973483, at *8; Diabin v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-3374, 2025 WL

1824841, at *4 (D.D.C. July 2, 2025).

Such is the case here. Plaintiffs submitted additional information on December 19, 2024,

two days after their applications were provisionally refused. ECF 1 ¶¶ 55–56. And drawing all

reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court finds that the fact that the additional

information submitted was requested by a consular officer strongly suggests that the information

would “tend[] to overcome the [relevant] ground of ineligibility.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e); see Diabin,

2025 WL 1824841, at *4; U.S. Dep’t of State, Administrative Processing Information,

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/administrativeprocessing-information.html (explaining that “a consular officer will request additional

information when she or he believes the information is relevant to establishing that an applicant

is eligible for the visa sought” (emphasis added)). Finally, the Court notes that while Defendants

raised arguments related to other potential sources of a nondiscretionary duty to act, they did not

address why § 1202(b) and 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e) would not confer such a duty. See generally

ECF 8.

In any event, even “absent binding precedent supporting [the] position that the INA

imposes a non-discretionary duty on the government to adjudicate . . . visas, the assumption of

reviewability permits consideration of the merits of [Plaintiffs’] visa mandamus claim.” Hamdan

v. Oudkirk, No. 24-cv-1001, 2024 WL 4553983, at *7 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2024). Plaintiffs have

sufficiently alleged that there remains a discrete action Defendants are required to take under

8 U.S.C. § 1202(b) and 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e). Accordingly, the Court proceeds to considering

whether Plaintiffs have adequately stated a plausible claim for unreasonable delay.

C. Unreasonable Delay

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim of unreasonable delay.

ECF 5 at 17. Plaintiffs counter that “unreasonable delay claims require fact-based inquiries not

suitable for disposition” at the motion-to-dismiss stage. ECF 7 at 45.6 However, courts in this

jurisdiction routinely assess unreasonable delay claims at this stage, and the Court finds it

appropriate to do so here as well. See, e.g., Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 346 (affirming district court

dismissal for failure to state a claim of unreasonable delay); Janay, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 118 (granting

motion to dismiss after assessing TRAC factors and determining plaintiff failed to state a claim for

Plaintiffs highlight that Defendants did not provide a certified administrative record or detailed government declaration with their motion to dismiss. ECF 7 at 12 n.1, 46. The Court agrees with Defendants that the production of an administrative record is not necessary here. Courts in this district have recognized that the Local Rule requiring submission of a certified list of the contents of the administrative record does not apply in cases involving agency inaction. See Nat’l L. Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty v. U.S. Dep’t of Vets. Affs., 842 F. Supp. 2d 127, 130 (D.D.C. 2012) (“If an agency fails to act, there is no ‘administrative record’ for a federal court to review.”); Mohammad v. Blinken, 548 F. Supp. 3d 159, 163 n.2 (D.D.C. 2021). In any event, the Court finds that an administrative record would not aid it in deciding this motion to dismiss; as a result, to the extent that Local Rule 7(n)’s requirements apply to this case, the Court waives compliance. See Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 344 F. Supp. 3d 279, 294 (D.D.C. 2018).

unreasonable delay); Hajizadeh, 2024 WL 3638336, at *6 (same). Ultimately, the Court agrees

with Defendants that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ delay warrants

judicial intervention.

The central question in evaluating a claim of unreasonable delay is “whether the agency’s

delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.” In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 79

(D.C. Cir. 1984)).7 To assess the reasonableness of delays, courts analyze six “TRAC factors”:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason;

(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with

which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme

may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in

the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare

are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on

agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take

into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the

court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold

that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80).

The TRAC factors are not “ironclad.” Hajizadeh, 2024 WL 3638336, at *4. Each case

“must be analyzed according to its own unique circumstances” and “will present its own slightly

different set of factors to consider.” Id. (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd.,

750 F.2d 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). In the visa application context, the first and fourth factors are

“most important.” Ahmed v. Blinken, 759 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2024) (citing Da Costa, 80

F.4th at 340). The Court considers the TRAC factors below.

Plaintiffs argue that, because TRAC “was . . . brought under a claim for writ of mandamus, not APA relief,” the “standard adopted in TRAC . . . is not adequate for addressing the distinct question of whether an agency’s delay is ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).” ECF 7 at 45. However, in the case Plaintiffs themselves cite, the D.C. Circuit made clear that, while the TRAC framework was “set forth . . . to assess whether agency delays are ‘so egregious as to warrant mandamus’ . . . we have routinely applied the same framework to assess claims that agency action has been ‘unreasonably delayed’ for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).” Afghan & Iraqi Allies v. Blinken, 103 F.4th 807, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2024).

1. Factors 1 & 2

The first two factors are typically analyzed together; they address “whether there is any

rhyme or reason—congressionally prescribed or otherwise—for an agency’s delay.” Hajizadeh,

2024 WL 3638336, at *4. Whether a delay is unreasonable “cannot be decided in the abstract, by

reference to some number of months or years beyond which agency inaction is presumed to be

unlawful, but will depend in large part . . . upon the complexity of the task at hand, the significance

(and permanence) of the outcome, and the resources available to the agency.” Mashpee

Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Where there is

no “congressionally supplied yardstick, courts typically turn to case law as a guide” to determine

whether a delay is reasonable. Sarlak v. Pompeo, No. 20-cv-35, 2020 WL 3082018, at *6 (D.D.C.

June 10, 2020).

Here, Plaintiffs offer 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) as a “congressionally supplied yardstick,” arguing

that the statute provides “a specific timetable where analogous statutory and regulatory exhortation

exist.” ECF 7 at 50. Section 1571(b) provides that “it is the sense of Congress that the processing

of an immigration benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days after the initial

filing of the application.” 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b). However, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, this “statutory

language is merely precatory.” ECF 7 at 50; see also Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344 (describing

§ 1571(b) as an “aspirational statement” that is “insufficient to set a deadline”). The Court thus

looks to caselaw “as a guide.” Sarlak, 2020 WL 3082018, at *6.

In this district, length of delay is usually evaluated from the most recent government action

to the date upon which a plaintiff seeks relief in court. See, e.g., Barazandeh v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

No. 23-cv-1581, 2024 WL 341166, at *7 n.7 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2024) (“The proper method for

calculating delay . . . is the length of time between the last action the government took on a visa

application and the filing of plaintiff’s complaint. The last action taken on plaintiff’s visa

application was his consular interview . . . .”). While the Court acknowledges that there are “no

bright lines” with respect to delay length, “district courts have generally found that immigration

delays in excess of five, six, seven years are unreasonable, while those between three to five years

are often not unreasonable.” Sarlak, 2020 WL 3082018, at *6.

Approximately six months elapsed between Plaintiffs’ consular interview and the filing of

their complaint. Even if the Court were to consider the approximately 21 months between the last

government action taken on Plaintiffs’ applications and the issuance of this decision, the timeline

in this case would still tilt in Defendants’ favor. See, e.g., Shabestary v. Sanders, No. 24-cv-362,

2024 WL 5118229, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2024) (concluding that a “22-month delay in

processing” was not unreasonable); Dastagir v. Blinken, 557 F. Supp. 3d 160, 165 (D.D.C. 2021)

(29 months); Arab, 600 F. Supp. 3d at 70 (30 months). The delay here falls within the realm of

general reasonableness no matter how the Court calculates it. As a result, the first and second

factors weigh in favor of Defendants.

2. Factor 4

The fourth TRAC factor requires an assessment of “the effect of expediting delayed action

on agency activities of a higher or competing priority.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. Because granting

relief in the context of visa applications would generally require “reorder[ing] a queue of applicants

seeking adjudication,” this factor often weighs strongly in favor of defendants. Tate v. Pompeo,

513 F. Supp. 3d 132, 149–50 (D.D.C. 2021); see also Akrayi v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 22-cv1289, 2023 WL 2424600, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2023) (“Precedent in this circuit recognizes that

expediting review here would merely redirect resources from other cases.”); Mashpee Wampanoag

Tribal Council, 336 F.3d at 1100 (noting that the court refuses to grant relief where “a judicial

order putting the petitioner at the head of the queue would simply move all others back one space

and produce no net gain”). However, where a plaintiff sufficiently alleges that “there is no true

queue,” defendants may be unable—at the motion-to-dismiss stage—to “maintain their argument

that prioritizing the adjudication of [a plaintiff’s] visa requests would displace others.” Ahmed,

759 F. Supp. 3d at 13–14.

Plaintiffs allege that certain forms of administrative processing are “not addressed or

resolved on a first-in-first-out basis.” ECF 1 ¶ 47. Specifically, Security Advisory Opinions—

interagency review processes that are conducted when consular officers deem that additional

security-related vetting is required—are not resolved in the order they are received. See id.; ECF

1-1 ¶ 14–15, 18, 27. And Plaintiffs argue that, because Defendants have not demonstrated the

existence of a “line Plaintiffs would be cutting through,” the fourth factor weighs in their favor.

ECF 7 at 54. It is true that, beyond asserting that “Plaintiffs [are asking] this Court to prioritize

Plaintiffs’ applications ahead of others,” ECF 5 at 21; see also ECF 8 at 26, Defendants do not

confirm that administrative processing is addressed on a first-come, first-served basis. However,

at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court looks to Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations to determine

whether the complaint states a claim for relief. Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged any specific facts

indicating that their applications are undergoing a form of administrative processing that does not

operate under first-in-first-out principles, or that compelling action on their applications would not

result in the improper reshuffling of agency priorities. As a result, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently

alleged that there “is no true queue,” such that the fourth factor would shift in their favor.

Accordingly, as is generally true in the visa application context, the fourth factor weighs in favor

of Defendants.

3. Factors 3 & 5

The third and fifth factors, often considered together, concern the impacts of processing

delays on Plaintiffs. The third factor addresses whether “human health and welfare are at stake.”

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. The fifth directs courts to take into account the “nature and extent of the

interests prejudiced by delay.” Id.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of processing delays, Drokin “has had to put his

professional prospects on hold,” and Plaintiffs have been forced to “indefinitely suspend their

professional and personal aspirations while they await a decision.” ECF 1 ¶ 63. Plaintiffs further

allege that the delay “has increased the cost of living abroad and introduced additional legal and

logistical expenses” as Plaintiffs have been temporarily residing in Montenegro. Id. ¶ 64. And

Plaintiffs assert that they “cannot plan for their minor child’s long-term education nor provide the

stability necessary for healthy emotional and developmental growth” due to the lack of “clarity

regarding their future residence.” Id. ¶ 65. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that, should their temporary

residence permits expire, they would be forced to return to Russia, where they would face “risks

to their personal and financial security.” Id. ¶ 64.

The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs’ situation and does not seek to minimize the ways in

which processing delays have disrupted their lives and livelihoods. However, the sort of “financial

harms” alleged by Plaintiffs, “along with the uncertainty that results any time an individual must

continue to wait to secure a benefit, are insufficient to tip TRAC factors three and five” in Plaintiffs’

favor. Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 345; see also Janay, 743 F. Supp. 3d at 117 (“Under TRAC and its

progeny, . . . economic harms are entitled to less weight in the analysis.”). And a conclusory

allegation about a risk to personal security, without more, lacks necessary specificity. Allegations

that are “generalized to the population” of the place in which a plaintiff resides, and that do not

“specifically link their personal circumstances” to hazardous conditions in that location, are

insufficient under TRAC factors three and five. Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 345. Accordingly, these

factors also tilt in favor of Defendants.

4. Factor 6

Finally, the sixth factor addresses “whether the agency’s bad faith caused the delay.”

Sawahreh v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 630 F. Supp. 3d 155, 164 (D.D.C. 2022). Plaintiffs argue that it

is “an act of bad faith on the part of Defendants [to fail] to adjudicate Plaintiff[s’] visa for so many

months . . . to the extreme detriment of Plaintiff[s’] rights and privileges.” ECF 7 at 54. Without

specific factual support in the complaint suggesting bad faith, this assertion is merely conclusory

and does not weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. However, the absence of

plausible allegations of impropriety does not weigh against Plaintiffs either. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80

(“The court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that

agency action is unreasonably delayed.”). Accordingly, this factor is neutral and does not alter the

Court’s analysis.

After weighing the TRAC factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not plausibly

alleged that the delay in administrative processing of their visas is unreasonable. Delays in visa

adjudications are undoubtedly frustrating, and the Court is cognizant of the significant impact these

delays have on individuals and families seeking admission to the United States. However,

accepting all of Plaintiffs’ well-pled factual allegations as true, the Court concludes that the TRAC

factors do not warrant judicial intervention. As a result, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for

unreasonable delay.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

ECF 5, is GRANTED. As a result, Plaintiffs’ complaint is DISMISSED. A separate order

accompanies this memorandum opinion.

JIA M. COBB

United States District Judge

Date: October 5, 2026

Drokin v. Rubio

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain