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Ragsdale v. Driend
LILLY RAGSDALE v. TARYN DRIEND ET AL.
(AC 47601)
Elgo, Wilson and Pellegrino, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s summary judgment for the defendant D in her negligence action stemming from a motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff was injured by a vehicle driven by D and owned by the defendant S. In a prior action, the plaintiff had set forth a claim against S only, claiming that S both owned and operated the vehicle during the accident. After the trial court granted S’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff, within one year, brought a second action against S and D, pursuant to the wrong defendant statute (§ 52-593). She claimed that the court improperly concluded that § 52-593 did not save her action, which was not commenced within two years of the underlying motor vehicle accident as required by statute (§ 52-584). Held:
The trial court erred in granting D’s motion for summary judgment, as the plaintiff, in her second action, named the correct defendant as to the legal theory alleged in her complaint and commenced that action within one year of the termination of the prior action, and, thus, the necessary prerequisites for the application of § 52-593 were established and the general remedial purpose of § 52-593 was satisfied by permitting the action to continue.
Argued February 9—officially released October 6, 2026
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, personal
injuries sustained as a result of the named defendant’s
alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the plaintiff withdrew her claims as to the defendant
Candace Smith; thereafter, the court, Hon. Kenneth
B. Povodator, judge trial referee, granted the named
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and rendered
judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to
this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Devin W. Janosov, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Dirk D. Bender, for the appellee (named defendant).
Ragsdale v. Driend
Opinion
PELLEGRINO, J. In this negligence action, the plaintiff, Lilly Ragsdale, appeals from the summary judgment
rendered in favor of the named defendant, Taryn Driend.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that General Statutes § 52-593 did not save
her action, which was not commenced within two years
of the underlying motor vehicle accident as required by
General Statutes § 52-584. We agree with the plaintiff
and, accordingly, reverse the summary judgment rendered by the trial court.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. In a complaint dated January 31,
2019 (first action), the plaintiff set forth a claim of negligence against Candace Smith stemming from a motor
vehicle accident that occurred on February 1, 2017. The
plaintiff alleged therein that, while she was driving in
a westerly direction in her Honda Accord (Accord) on
Captain Thomas Boulevard in West Haven, a truck negligently operated by Smith “came into direct and violent
collision with the plaintiff’s [Accord] . . . .” The plaintiff further alleged that, as a result of this motor vehicle
accident, she suffered “serious and permanent injuries.”
On June 10, 2019, Smith filed a motion for summary
judgment. Smith asserted that she was not the operator
of the truck that collided with the plaintiff’s Accord.
Smith attached two documents to her memorandum of
law. The first was her affidavit in which Smith averred
that, on February 1, 2017, although she owned the truck
referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint, she was not
driving that vehicle at the time of the accident, nor was she present during that incident. Additionally, Smith’s
affidavit stated that Driend was operating her truck at
the time of the accident. Smith also attached a copy of
the police report to her memorandum of law. That report
listed Smith as the owner of the truck and Driend as the
operator.
Ragsdale v. Driend
On July 27, 2020, the court, Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe,
judge trial referee, denied Smith’s motion for summary
judgment. The court set forth the following reasoning:
“The complaint alleges that [Smith] was BOTH the owner
and operator of the [truck]. If the [truck] was being operated with the permission of the owner, then liability
for the negligent operation of that [truck] may attach.
Bogart v. Tucker, [164 Conn. 277, 320 A.2d 803] (1973).
Permissive use remains a question of fact.”1 That same
day, Smith filed a motion for reargument pursuant to
Practice Book § 11-12. The court denied this motion on
August 10, 2020.
On February 17, 2021, Smith filed a second motion for
summary judgment. She argued that no genuine issue
of material fact existed that “she was not operating the
[truck in] question as alleged in the complaint nor was
the operator of the [truck] her agent.” Smith attached
the police report to this motion, as well as two affidavits. In her affidavit, Smith averred that Driend operated the
truck on February 1, 2017, as Driend had requested to
use it to transport materials to a school for use in her
employment. Further, while Smith had acquiesced to
Driend’s use of her truck, Smith had not asked Driend
to perform any task or duty on her behalf.
Driend also provided an affidavit in which she averred
that she had operated the truck owned by Smith when it
collided with the plaintiff’s Accord on February 1, 2017. Driend further averred that she had borrowed Smith’s
truck to transport materials to her place of employment, a school, and, after dropping off these materials, she drove to an appointment. After this appointment, the accident occurred on the way to return the truck to Smith.
Finally, Driend stated: “At no time during the use of the 1
In Bogart v. Tucker, supra, 164 Conn. 281, our Supreme Court stated: “At the outset, we note that our so-called agency statute, [General Statutes] § 52-183, generally precludes the direction of a verdict for the defendant on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to establish agency. . . . The statute creates the presumption that the operator of a car is the agent of the owner, and it places the burden of rebutting the presumption on the owner.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.)
Ragsdale v. Driend
[truck] was I performing any task or duties requested by
. . . Smith but instead requested the use of the [truck]
to perform errands for my purposes . . . .” The plaintiff filed an objection, with an accompanying memorandum
of law, to this motion for summary judgment.
On January 6, 2022, Judge Radcliffe issued a memorandum of decision granting Smith’s second motion
for summary judgment. Specifically, the court stated:
“[Smith] was not the operator of the [truck], and [Driend] the operator of the [truck] has refuted agency. Therefore, the rebuttable presumption in [General Statutes
§] 52-183 . . . has been rebutted.”2 The plaintiff did not file an appeal from that decision. See Ragsdale v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (January 6, 2022).
On December 12, 2022, the plaintiff brought the present action against Driend and Smith.3 In count one, the
plaintiff set forth a negligence claim against Driend
based on the motor vehicle accident described in the first action. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Driend was operating a truck with the express consent, authority,
knowledge, and/or permission of the owner, Smith, when
the February 1, 2017 accident occurred. The plaintiff
further claimed that she had expended large sums of
money for medical treatment and care and will incur
such expenses in the future, sustained a disruption of
her ability to carry on and enjoy life’s activities, and
2
See generally Schimmelpfennig v. Cutler, 65 Conn. App. 388, 392–93, 783 A.2d 1033 (where record unequivocally established that there was no claim that operator was agent or employee of owner and used motor vehicle only with permission of owner, § 52-183 was inapplicable), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 934, 785 A.2d 230 (2001).
3
In Connecticut, an action is commenced when the complaint is served upon the defendant. See Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 549, 848 A.2d 352 (2004); see also Russell v. Mitchell Properties, Inc., 148 Conn. App. 635, 639–40, 87 A.3d 591, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 912, 100 A.3d 404 (2014). Additionally, we note that our Supreme Court has observed that no substantive distinction exists between the phrases “bringing an action” and “commencing an action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocco v. Garrison, supra, 549. These interchangeable phrases are used to describe the initiation of an action. See id.
Ragsdale v. Driend
suffered anxiety and fear of increased injuries in the
future. The first count concluded with an allegation that the plaintiff brought this suit pursuant to § 52-593, the so-called “wrong defendant” statute,4 in that she failed
to obtain a judgment in the first action by reason of the failure to name the correct defendant therein, and made
service of process in the present action within one year
of the termination of the first action.
In count two of the complaint, the plaintiff, incorporating the allegations from count one, asserted that Smith
was vicariously liable for Driend’s conduct and resulting damages. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Driend
operated Smith’s truck with Smith’s express consent,
authority, knowledge, and/or permission. In support of
this claim, the plaintiff cited General Statutes §§ 52-182 and 52-183.5
On February 8, 2023, Driend and Smith filed an answer
and raised the special defenses of comparative negligence 4
See DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 123 Conn. App. 583, 586, 2 A.3d 963 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, 306 Conn. 107, 49 A.3d 951 (2012); Imperati v. MS Gill, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 27, 2026).
5
General Statutes § 52-182 provides: “Proof that the operator of a motor vehicle or a motorboat, as defined in section 15-127, was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle or motorboat was being operated as a family car or boat within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption.”
General Statutes § 52-183 provides: “In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption.”
This statute establishes that, in an action brought against the nonoperator of a motor vehicle for damages that are the result of the negligent operation of that motor vehicle, the operator shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner and operating it in the course of his employment. See Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 836–37, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). Further, § 52-183 “goes further than merely establishing a presumption, in that it expressly places upon the defendant
Ragsdale v. Driend
and the statute of limitations. Specifically, as to the second special defense, they set forth the following: “The
plaintiff’s action against [Driend and Smith] is barred by the applicable statute of limitations set forth in § 52-584 and not saved by . . . § 52-593 on the grounds that the
correct defendant was properly named in the original
action.” The plaintiff denied these special defenses.
On July 25, 2023, Driend and Smith moved for summary judgment and set forth two grounds. First, they
asserted that the action against Smith alleging vicarious liability was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Second, Driend and Smith claimed that the applicable
statute of limitations barred the action and that § 52-593 was inapplicable. In the attached memorandum of law,
they argued that the “doctrine of res judicata applie[d] to the [vicarious liability claim alleged in the second count of the complaint] against Smith since she is being prosecuted for the same cause of action in the same capacity
as the [truck’s] owner.” Driend and Smith concluded by
stating that the plaintiff “had the opportunity to litigate her claim against . . . Smith in the prior action—and
in fact, did litigate the matter against . . . Smith. Res judicata bars her ability to relitigate the claim against . . . Smith now.”
As to their argument that § 52-593 did not save the
action from the application of the statute of limitations, Driend and Smith claimed that Smith had been named
as both the owner and operator of the truck in the first
action. Smith, therefore, properly was characterized as
a correct defendant in both actions. They further argued
that the failure to include all potentially liable parties in the first action did not fall within the ambit of § 52-593 the burden of introducing evidence to rebut the presumption . . . . Indeed, [t]he presumption ceases to be operative [only] when the trier finds proven facts which fairly put in issue the question. . . . [I]f no evidence relevant to the issue is produced, or, if countervailing evidence is produced but the trier does not believe it, the presumption applies, and the plaintiff is entitled to have the issue found in his favor.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 837–38; see also Engram v. Kraft, 83 Conn. App. 782, 786–87, 851 A.2d 363 (2004).
Ragsdale v. Driend
and, thus, the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. On July 27, 2023, the plaintiff objected
to the motion for summary judgment and withdrew
her claim as to Smith as set forth in count two of her
complaint.
The court, Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial
referee, heard argument on the motion for summary
judgment on November 6, 2023. On March 1, 2024, the
court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor
of Driend, the remaining defendant in the action. At the
outset, the court observed that the dispositive issue in the case was whether § 52-593 applied and saved the action
from the statute of limitations. The court then observed
that it was bound by the final judgment rendered in the
first action. After reviewing the applicable appellate
case law, the court determined that the plaintiff had not named the wrong defendant, as that term is used in the
context of § 52-593, in the first action because she had
sued Smith in her capacity as the owner of the truck that collided with the plaintiff. The court further explained
that “[t]he granting of summary judgment in the earlier
case went to ultimate liability and not whether a ‘wrong’ party was named for that purpose.” The court concluded
that “the facts do not fit within the scope of any recognized application of . . . § 52-593, and cannot reasonably be made to do so. The plaintiff sued a proper party [in the first action]—the owner of the ‘other’ vehicle under a
proper statutory claim of vicarious liability for the fault of the driver. That the plaintiff also incorrectly named
the owner as a driver did not detract from the fact that
the [first] action had named a proper defendant—and
under a properly applicable theory. That based on the
facts presented in the [first action], the court concluded that there could be no vicarious liability does not come
within the scope of the statute. Simplistically, there is no presumptive equivalence between a ‘wrong’ defendant
under § 52-593 and a nonliable owner under . . . § 52-183.”
Pursuant to Practice Book § 11-11, on March 4, 2024,
the plaintiff moved to reargue the summary judgment
Ragsdale v. Driend
rendered in favor of Driend. She maintained that the
complaint in the first action named an incorrect person,
Smith, in an incorrect capacity, the operator of the truck that collided with the plaintiff’s Accord. The plaintiff
further asserted that, as a result of this error, she was unable to obtain judgment in the case and, therefore, the conditions of § 52-593 were satisfied. Driend objected to the motion to reargue on March 5, 2024. The court heard
argument on this motion on April 1, 2024.
The court denied the merits of the plaintiff’s motion
to reargue on April 12, 2024. The court explained that,
although the complaint in the first action incorrectly
named Smith as the operator, that pleading set forth a
“theoretically proper claim against a proper defendant
[i.e., Smith as the owner] for that claim.” This appeal
followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The following applicable standard of review and legal
principles inform and guide our analysis. “Practice Book
§ [17-49] requires that judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof
submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact
that will make a difference in the result of the case. . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden
of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all
material facts, which, under applicable principles of
substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. . . . The party opposing such a motion must provide
an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact. See Practice Book
§§ [17-44 and 17-45]. In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The
test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed
verdict on the same facts. . . . Our review of the trial
court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is plenary. . . . Summary judgment may be granted
Ragsdale v. Driend
where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russell v. Mitchell
Properties, Inc., 148 Conn. App. 635, 638, 87 A.3d 591,
cert. denied, 314 Conn. 912, 100 A.3d 404 (2014); see also Connex Credit Union v. Madgic, 354 Conn. 459, 463, 354
A.3d 709 (2026); Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes,
230 Conn. App. 1, 20–21, 329 A.3d 256 (2024).
We agree with the trial court that the determination
of whether § 52-593 applies to save the plaintiff’s action constitutes the dispositive issue. The motor vehicle accident occurred on February 1, 2017. The plaintiff commenced the present action on December 12, 2022, when
Driend, as the defendant, received service of process. See Russell v. Mitchell Properties, Inc., supra, 148 Conn.
App. 639–40. This action, therefore, indisputably was
brought outside the applicable two year statute of limitations. See General Statutes § 52-584.6 Accordingly, the
plaintiff relies on § 52-593 to preserve the viability of her action against the defendant. See, e.g., Billerback v. Cerminara, 72 Conn. App. 302, 307, 805 A.2d 757 (2002)
(no dispute that, if action is not saved by § 52-593, then it is time barred by § 52-584). In determining whether
the court misconstrued § 52-593 under these facts and
circumstances, we are guided by the fundamental principles of statutory construction. See Finkle v. Carroll,
315 Conn. 821, 830, 110 A.3d 387 (2015); see also Cogan
v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn.
1, 7–8, 882 A.2d 597 (2005). These principles include
ascertaining and giving effect to the apparent intent
of the legislature. See Ulbrich v. Groth, 310 Conn. 375,
448, 78 A.3d 76 (2013); see also General Statutes § 1-2z.7
6
General Statutes § 52-584 provides in relevant part: “No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained . . . .” See generally PascolaMilton v. Millard, 203 Conn. App. 172, 174–75, 247 A.3d 652, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 934, 248 A.3d 710 (2021); Mocek v. Robinson, 10 Conn. App. 393, 394, 523 A.2d 916 (1987).
7
This court previously has determined that § 52-593 “is not clear and unambiguous, [and, therefore] we are not constrained by the plain meaning rule. Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., [supra,
Ragsdale v. Driend
We begin our analysis by setting forth the language
of the statute. Section 52-593 provides in relevant part: “When a plaintiff in any civil action has failed to obtain judgment by reason of failure to name the right person as defendant therein, the plaintiff may bring a new action
and the statute of limitations shall not be a bar thereto if service of process in the new action is made within one year after the termination of the original action. . . .” The saving provision in this statute, therefore, “applies if the plaintiff has failed to obtain judgment in the original action on the basis of her failure to name the right
person as defendant . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial
Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 8.
Our Supreme Court has set forth the following interpretation of § 52-593, based on the various appellate
decisions that have considered this statutory text. “In
its simplest application, the wrong defendant statute
contemplates the situation in which a plaintiff erroneously sues A under the mistaken belief that A negligently operated or owned a vehicle, when in fact B operated
or owned the vehicle. . . . This language contemplates
that, so long as the second action is brought within the
one year time limitation, the defendant in that action
may not avail itself of the statute of limitations. The
general remedial purpose of this statute is to relieve
a plaintiff of the statute of limitations consequences
where the plaintiff made a factual mistake in selecting
her original defendant for the legal theory of the action, so long as the plaintiff brings the second action against the right person within the one year period. Because
the statute is remedial in nature, it should be construed broadly to accomplish its remedial purpose. . . . In addition, any ambiguities should be resolved in a manner that furthers, rather than thwarts, the [statute’s] remedial
purposes. . . . Nevertheless, as the Appellate Court has
aptly observed, an excessively broad reading of § 52-593
276 Conn. 7–8].” DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 123 Conn. App. 583, 593, 2 A.3d 963 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, 306 Conn. 107, 49 A.3d 951 (2012).
Ragsdale v. Driend
would undermine the statute of limitations because a
plaintiff could unilaterally extend the limitation period simply by filing an action against a defendant who could
not be liable based on a legal theory. To allow [such an] action to continue at this time would defeat the basic
purpose of the public policy that is inherent in statutes of limitation[s], i.e., to promote finality in the litigation process. . . . Under Connecticut law, a right person, as
that term is used in § 52-593, is one who, as a matter of fact, is a proper defendant for the legal theory alleged. . . . As this court has previously stated, failure to name all
of the defendants from whom [the plaintiff] could have
recovered in [the] original action does not constitute a
failure to name the right person as defendant within
the meaning of § 52-593.” (Citations omitted; emphasis
altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Finkle v.
Carroll, supra, 315 Conn. 830–32; see also Krom v. InVest, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (October 5, 2010) (50 Conn. L.
Rptr. 798, 800) (there is required nexus between factual
error as to identity of liable party and theory of liability alleged).
In the present case, the trial court focused its reasoning on the principle that a plaintiff’s failure to name
all of the defendants from whom he or she could have
recovered in the original action does not constitute the
failure to name the right person as a defendant for purposes of § 52-593. Specifically, the court explained that, in its view, the plaintiff sued Smith in the first action as both the owner and operator of the truck and the court
in that action rendered judgment not because Smith
was the wrong defendant for the legal theories alleged,
but rather there was no genuine issues of material fact
as to the two issues of agency and that she was not the
operator of the truck. Smith provided evidence that
established, as a matter of law, that Driend operated the truck on February 1, 2017, for her own purposes and was
not performing any task or duties on behalf of Smith.
“The granting of summary judgment in the [first action]
Ragsdale v. Driend
went to the ultimate liability and not whether a ‘wrong’
party was named for that purpose.”
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on several cases from our appellate courts. First, it cited to
Perzanowski v. New Britain, 183 Conn. 504, 440 A.2d
763 (1981). In that case, the plaintiff initially brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in federal court against the city
of New Britain (city) and certain individual defendants
after his real property was demolished. Id., 504–505.
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed this action against the city on January 4, 1974, because the city “was not a person amenable to
suit under [§ 1983].” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 505. A jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of the individual defendants. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced an
action in state court against the city on January 9, 1978, on the basis of the city’s conduct pertaining to the 1972 demolition of his building. Id. The trial court granted
the city’s motion for summary on the basis of the statute of limitations. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly concluded, inter alia, that his action was not saved by § 52-593. Id.
Our Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim,
stating that “[t]he short answer . . . is that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that he failed to obtain judgment
by reason of (his) failure to name the right person as
defendant. . . . The record plainly shows that he failed
to obtain judgment in federal court (1) because the city
could not be liable for the civil rights violations alleged and (2) because the jury [returned] a general verdict in
favor of the remaining defendants who were sued in
their individual capacity. Neither result arises from
a mistake in naming a defendant.” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 507.
Next, the trial court considered our decision in Iello v. Weiner, 129 Conn. App. 359, 20 A.3d 81 (2011). There,
the plaintiff filed a dental malpractice action against
Kenneth Epstein, her former dentist, and Family Dental Group, P.C. (Family Dental), on September 4, 2003.
Ragsdale v. Driend
Id., 361. This negligence action was based on Epstein’s
postoperative treatment of the plaintiff following her
dental surgery. Id. The plaintiff voluntarily withdrew
this action on January 30, 2006. Id. Nearly one year
later, on January 17, 2007, the plaintiff commenced a
second action against Michael Weiner, a dentist, and
Family Dental again based on a theory of negligence following the dental surgery described in the first action.
Id. “Notably, the plaintiff conceded that both Epstein
and [Weiner] provided postoperative care to her following her dental surgery.” Id. Weiner and Family Dental
both moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
the statute of limitations had expired and that § 52-593
did not save the plaintiff’s action. Id. “In support of his motion, [Weiner] claimed, inter alia, that because both
the first action and the second action alleged negligence in the postoperative treatment provided by Epstein and
[Weiner], respectively, and because the plaintiff conceded that both Epstein and [Weiner] provided postoperative care to her, the plaintiff had in fact named
a ‘right person’ in her first action, as that term is used in § 52-593. Therefore, [Weiner] argued that § 52-593
was inapplicable, as Epstein was a proper defendant for
the legal theory of negligence alleged by the plaintiff
in the first action.” Id., 361–62. The trial court agreed and ultimately rendered summary judgment in favor of
Weiner on the grounds that the plaintiff’s action was
barred by the statute of limitations and was not saved
by § 52-593. Id., 362.
At the outset of our analysis, this court stated: “Under
Connecticut law, a right person, as that term is used
in § 52-593, is one who, as a matter of fact, is a proper defendant for the legal theory alleged. . . . Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial [Corp., supra, 276 Conn.
8] . . . . Moreover, the plaintiff’s failure to name all of the defendants from whom she could have recovered in
her original action does not constitute a failure to name the right person as defendant within the meaning of . . . § 52-593.” (Emphasis altered; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Iello v. Weiner, supra, 129 Conn. App. 363.
Ragsdale v. Driend
We then conducted a plenary review of the record and
concluded that the legal theory alleged in the initial
action was negligence in the postoperative treatment
provided by Epstein. “Although it may be the case that
the plaintiff’s failure to name [Weiner] as a defendant in the first action was a benign oversight, our law is clear that [t]he fact that the complaint in the plaintiff’s original action failed to name all potentially liable defendants is immaterial. . . . Because the plaintiff’s first action, premised on a theory of negligence, was brought against
a right person, § 52-593 is inapplicable and cannot save
the plaintiff’s second action from being time barred by
§ 52-584.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 363–64.
Finally, the trial court discussed Isidro v. State, 62
Conn. App. 545, 771 A.2d 257 (2001). That case arose
from an accident involving a pedestrian and a motor
vehicle owned by the state and operated by a state trooper. Id., 547. The plaintiff commenced a negligence action
against the state trooper, who was acting in the course
of his employment at the time of the accident. Id. The
trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the
state trooper on the basis of immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 4-165.8 Id. More than three years after
the accident, the plaintiff commenced a second action in
which she named the state as a defendant on the basis of
vicarious liability for the conduct of the state trooper. Id. The plaintiff, in an effort to save the action from the applicable two year statute of limitations, relied upon
§ 52-593. Id., 547–48. The trial court rejected such reliance and rendered summary judgment in favor of the
state in this second action. Id., 548.
On appeal, we explained that “[o]ur Supreme Court
has recognized that § 52-593 applies only in circumstances in which the plaintiff’s original action failed by 8
“General Statutes § 4-165 (a) provides in relevant part: No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Isidro v. State, supra, 62 Conn. App. 547 n.3.
Ragsdale v. Driend
reason of naming, in fact, the wrong defendant; that is,
in cases in which the naming of the wrong defendant was
the product of a reasonable and honest mistake of fact
as to the identity of the truly responsible individual.”
Id., 549–50. This court then explained that the initial
action failed not because the plaintiff failed to name the proper defendant as a matter of fact, but as a result of
the statutory immunity afforded to the state trooper.
Id., 550. Accordingly, this court affirmed the judgment
of the trial court.
We conclude that the present case is distinguishable from the precedent cited by the trial court in its
memorandum of decision. At the outset, we note that,
in determining whether the court properly concluded
that § 52-593 did not apply under these facts and circumstances, we conduct a plenary review of the record
to determine whether the plaintiff named the proper
defendant for the legal theory alleged in the first action. See Finkle v. Carroll, 134 Conn. App. 278, 288, 37 A.3d
851 (2012), aff’d, 315 Conn. 821, 110 A.3d 387 (2015);
Iello v. Weiner, supra, 129 Conn. App. 363. In the complaint filed in the first action, the plaintiff identified Smith as the owner and operator of the truck that hit the plaintiff’s Accord on February 1, 2017. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that “the [truck] owned and operated
by . . . Smith . . . came into direct and violent collision with the plaintiff’s [Accord] . . . .” The plaintiff further alleged that the Smith’s negligence caused the collision due to her failure to keep a lookout, by operating
her truck unreasonably fast with reckless disregard for
traffic and conditions, by failing to keep her truck under proper control, and by operating it with faulty and defective brakes. The plaintiff then claimed that the accident occurred due to Smith’s carelessness and negligence.
In the memorandum of law in support of her motion
for summary judgment, Smith summarized the complaint as identifying her as the operator of the truck
that struck the plaintiff’s Accord and that her purported negligent operation of said truck caused the collision
Ragsdale v. Driend
and resulting injuries to the plaintiff. It does not appear that the plaintiff filed a response to Smith’s motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, the court in the first
action sua sponte injected the issue of Smith’s potential liability based on a new legal theory of vicarious liability resulting from the use of her truck by another individual. Indeed, in Smith’s July 27, 2020 motion to reargue the
denial of her motion for summary judgment, she stated:
“As a threshold matter, permissive use is irrelevant
because the plaintiff could not recover upon a claim that the unnamed operator of the [truck] was operating it
with the permission of [Smith]. The plaintiff’s recovery
is of course limited to the allegations of the complaint
and the allegations in the complaint clearly limit her
claim to the factual predicate that [Smith], not another
individual, was operating the [truck] in question. The
ONLY allegations of negligence against [Smith] involve
her alleged negligent operation of the [truck]. There are zero allegations that [Smith] is responsible for the negligence of another.”9 (Emphasis added.)
In her second motion for summary judgment, dated
February 17, 2021, Smith asserted that there was no
genuine issue of material fact that (1) she was not the
operator of the truck that struck the plaintiff’s Accord
on February 1, 2017, and (2) said operator was not her
agent. In the plaintiff’s February 24, 2021 objection
to Smith’s second motion for summary judgment, she
asserted that Smith had not satisfied her burden to have
summary judgment rendered in her favor. In her April
9, 2021 reply, Smith again contended that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged only the negligent operation of the
truck by Smith. Judge Radcliffe ultimately rendered
summary judgment in favor of Smith on January 6, 2022.
Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced the present action
on December 12, 2022. Service of process, therefore, was
made upon Driend within one year of the termination
of the first action as required by § 52-593. See Finkle
9
Judge Radcliffe summarily denied Smith’s motion to reargue the denial of her first motion for summary judgment on August 10, 2020.
Ragsdale v. Driend
v. Carroll, supra, 315 Conn. 830. In her complaint, the
plaintiff alleged that Driend operated the truck that
struck her Accord on February 1, 2017, with the express
consent, authority, knowledge and/or permission of
Smith as the truck’s owner.10 The plaintiff also alleged
vicarious liability against Smith in the second count of
the complaint, but she subsequently withdrew that count
on September 27, 2023, two days after the defendants
moved for summary judgment. The sole remaining cause
of action, therefore, is negligent operation of the truck by Driend.
In granting Driend’s motion for summary judgment
and concluding that § 52-593 did not apply to the present action, the court determined that, in the first action, the plaintiff had alleged, inter alia, a theory of liability against Smith as the owner of the truck that negligently
struck her Accord on February 1, 2017. The court further
reasoned that Smith was the “right defendant” for this
theory. Next, it explained that, under our law, the failure to name all potentially liable defendants is “immaterial” for purposes of saving an untimely action pursuant to §
52-593. See Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial
Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 10–11; Isidro v. State, supra,
62 Conn. App. 550–51.
We have reviewed the complaint filed in the first action, not for the purpose of determining whether that court
properly rendered summary judgment in that matter,11
10
Our Supreme Court has stated that “the word owner is one of flexible meaning and it varies from an absolute proprietary interest to a mere possessory right” and has “held that [it] . . . includes both the legal and equitable owner, and any one having an interest in the automobile under a special title. Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer & Lighterage Terminal, Inc., 100 Conn. 114, 120, 123 A. 16 [(1923)]; Marciel v. Berman, 104 Conn. 165, 168, 169, 132 A. 397 [(1926)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hope v. Cavallo, 163 Conn. 576, 580–81, 316 A.2d 407 (1972).
11
We emphasize that our analysis, and the outcome of this appeal, is limited to the present action, the 2022 action filed by the plaintiff against Driend as the operator of the truck in the February 1, 2017 accident, and does not alter or change the judgment rendered in the first action involving the plaintiff’s claim against Smith brought in 2019 and not appealed to this court. Stated differently, we are not concerned with,
Ragsdale v. Driend
but to determine whether § 52-593 applied in the matter presently before us. In doing so, we remain mindful
that our Supreme Court has directed that “[t]he general
remedial purpose of this statute is to relieve a plaintiff of the statute of limitations consequences where the
plaintiff made a factual mistake in selecting her original defendant for the legal theory of the action, so long as
the plaintiff brings the second action against the right
person within the one year period. Because the statute
is remedial in nature, it should be construed broadly to
accomplish its remedial purpose. . . . In addition, any
ambiguities should be resolved in a manner that furthers, rather than thwarts, the [statute’s] remedial purposes.”
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Finkle v. Carroll, supra, 315 Conn. 831; see also Connex
Credit Union v. Madgic, supra, 354 Conn. 469 (Supreme
Court interprets remedial statutes broadly to effectuate
their purpose); Thames Talent, Ltd. v. Commission on
Human Rights & Opportunities, 265 Conn. 127, 137,
827 A.2d 659 (2003) (remedial statute is construed liberally in favor of those whom it is intended to protect); Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Pettison, 112 Conn. 652,
655, 153 A. 789 (1931) (remedial statute requires liberal, rather than strict, construction in aid of its manifest
purpose); Freese v. Dept. of Social Services, 176 Conn.
App. 64, 67, 169 A.3d 237 (2017) (Supreme Court construes remedial statutes liberally to give effect to their purpose). Further, we emphasize that § 52-593 serves to
relieve a plaintiff from the consequences of the statute
of limitations; see Finkle v. Carroll, supra, 831; and thus advances the policy “to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his [or her] day in court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 558, 848
A.2d 352 (2004); see also Laiuppa v. Moritz, 350 Conn.
457, 465, 325 A.3d 151 (2024) (purpose of savings statute, § 52-592, is to bring about trial on merits of dispute and do not specifically address, whether the trial court in the first action properly rendered summary judgment in favor of Smith; instead, our focus remains the applicability of § 52-593 given the record of the first action and the present action.
Ragsdale v. Driend
whenever possible and secure litigant’s day in court and
our practice does not favor termination of proceedings
without determination of merits of controversy when
such determination can be brought about with due regard
to necessary rules of procedure).
The allegations set forth in the complaint in the first
action contain two references to Smith as the owner of the truck that struck the plaintiff’s Accord on February 1,
2017. The legal theory alleged in this pleading, however, was Smith’s purportedly negligent operation of a truck
that resulted in the collision with the plaintiff’s Accord. The plaintiff specifically alleged that Smith “turned left . . . and came into direct and violent collision with the plaintiff’s [Accord that was] being driven by the plaintiff . . . .” The plaintiff further alleged that the collision was caused by Smith’s negligence in operating her truck
and that, as a result of Smith’s negligent operation of
the truck, she caused the collision with the plaintiff’s
Accord, which in turn directly and proximately caused
the plaintiff’s injuries. Significantly, the complaint does not contain allegations, or a separate count, suggesting
that another individual operated the truck at the time of the collision with the Accord and that Smith was vicariously liable or responsible as the truck’s owner.
On the basis of our review of the complaint in the
first action, we conclude there is nothing to support the determination that the plaintiff sued Smith on the legal
theory that Smith bore responsibility for the plaintiff’s damages due to her ownership of the truck that struck
the plaintiff. “The interpretation of pleadings is an issue of law. . . . The allegations of a complaint limit the issues to be decided on the trial of a case and are calculated to prevent surprise to opposing parties. . . . It is fundamental in our law that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to the allegations of his complaint. . . . The purpose of a complaint . . . is to limit the issues at trial, and . . . pleadings are calculated to prevent surprise. . . . It is fundamental to our law that the right of a [party] to recover is limited to the allegations in [her pleading].”
Ragsdale v. Driend
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Villwell Builders I, LLC v. Pereira, 237 Conn. App. 45,
63, 349 A.3d 590 (2026); see also Esposito v. Rabin,
239 Conn. App. 681, 724, ___A.3d ___ (2026) (same);
In re Barbera, 236 Conn. App. 640, 667, 349 A.3d 340
(2025) (complaint must place defendant on notice of
claims against her and Superior Court is not permitted
to decide issues outside of those raised in pleadings).
We note that decisions of the Superior Court have
reasoned that negligence is a separate cause of action,
distinct from an action for vicarious liability. See Rothstein v. Silva, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (May 24, 2024);
Edwards v. Nagorska, Superior Court, judicial district
of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 16, 2022); Bergenholtz v. Taroua, Superior Court,
judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-18-6045529-S (December 10, 2019); Chen v. Gutierrez,
Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket
No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (November 9, 2007) (44 Conn.
L. Rptr. 511). Indeed, one decision from the Superior
Court has remarked, “[t]here is a difference in the factual predicate and legal elements between claims of passive vicarious liability and active negligence.” Edwards
v. Nagorska, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2022 WL
6390631, *5 (Conn. Super. September 16, 2022); see
also Tetteh v. Barnes, Superior Court, judicial district
of Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX (December
21, 2018). Our review of the record in the first action
reveals that the plaintiff did not allege a cause of action for vicarious liability separate from the allegations of
negligence stemming from the operation of the truck
on February 1, 2017.
We conclude that the complaint in the first action
provided Smith with fair notice only of the claim alleging the negligent operation of a motor vehicle and not
vicarious liability due to her status as the owner of the truck that struck the plaintiff. In other words, we are
not persuaded that the plaintiff set forth a claim alleging
Ragsdale v. Driend
vicarious liability with respect to Smith on the basis of ownership. Furthermore, while we are aware of the presumption created by § 52-183,12 that presumption only
applies when a plaintiff alleges a legal theory based on a defendant’s ownership of the motor vehicle rather than
his or her negligent operation. In our view, it is a bridge too far to conclude that the plaintiff’s complaint in the first action set forth a claim of vicarious liability against Smith and thus implicated § 52-183 based solely on the
two instances of the word “owner,” with nothing more,
in that pleading.13
We further conclude that the record demonstrates
that, in the first action, the plaintiff named the wrong
defendant, Smith, in the context of the sole legal theory alleged in that action, the negligent operation of the
truck, and, therefore, § 52-593 applies in these circumstances. In the present action, she has named the “right
defendant” as to the legal theory alleged in this complaint. See DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC,
123 Conn. App. 583, 594, 2 A.3d 963 (2010), rev’d on
other grounds, 306 Conn. 107, 49 A.3d 951 (2012). We
also iterate that the plaintiff commenced this action
within one year of the termination of the first action.
Accordingly, the necessary prerequisites for the application of § 52-593 have been established, and the general
remedial purpose of § 52-593 is satisfied by permitting
the present action to continue, despite the plaintiff’s
noncompliance with the applicable statute of limitations. See Kronberg v. Peacock, 67 Conn. App. 668, 672, 789
A.2d 510, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 902, 793 A.2d 1089
(2002). Indeed, this statute is intended to “avoid the
hardships arising from an unbending enforcement of
limitation statutes.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morrissey v. Board of Education, 40 Conn. Supp. 266,
12
See footnote 6 of this opinion.
13
Driend argues that the plaintiff “embraced” the theory of vicarious liability in the first action in her response to Smith’s second motion for summary judgment. We are not persuaded. In our view, the plaintiff merely argued that Smith had not met her burden of demonstrating her entitlement to summary judgment, particularly given the insertion of the issue of agency and vicarious liability by the trial court in that matter.
Ragsdale v. Driend
268, 491 A.2d 1126 (1985). Finally, to the extent that
Driend claims that public policy, namely, the finality of the ligation process, mitigates against the application
of § 52-593 under these facts, we are not persuaded,
given the purpose of the statute and the language used
in this statute.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.