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Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney
SACHEM CAPITAL CORP. v. GERALD J.
YONEY ET AL.
(AC 47614)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Wilson, Js.*
Syllabus
The defendants appealed from the trial court’s judgment of possession for the substitute plaintiff. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in denying their motion to open the default judgment. Held:
This court could provide no practical relief to the defendants, as, due to intervening circumstances, a controversy between the parties no longer existed; accordingly, this court dismissed the defendants’ appeal as moot.
Argued April 16, 2025—officially released October 6, 2026
Procedural History
Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, Housing Session at Bridgeport, where the court, Spader, J., granted the
motion to substitute Bros, Mgmt., LLC, as the plaintiff;
thereafter, the court, Cirello, J., granted the substitute plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of default and rendered judgment of possession for the substitute plaintiff; subsequently, the court, Cirello, J., denied the defendants’ motions to open the default judgment, from which the
defendants appealed to this court; thereafter, the appeal was withdrawn as to the named defendant. Appeal dismissed.
Joseph L. Rini, for the appellants (defendants Sarah
E. Yoney and Theresa A. Yoney)
Christopher J. Picard, for the appellee (substitute
plaintiff).
Opinion
ELGO, J. In this summary process action, the defendants Sarah E. Yoney and Theresa A. Yoney appeal from
the judgment of the trial court denying their respective
*
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney
motions to open a default judgment rendered in favor of
the substitute plaintiff, Bros, Mgmt., LLC.1 We conclude
that the defendants’ appeal is moot due to intervening
circumstances and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff commenced this summary process action in November 2019.
The action was held in abeyance for several years due to
the COVID-19 pandemic, which temporarily stayed all
executions on evictions and ejectments, as well as Gerald J. Yoney’s chapter 13 bankruptcy protection filing in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut, which invoked an automatic bankruptcy stay.
On March 9, 2023, the substitute plaintiff filed a
motion for a default judgment against the defendants due
to their failure to appear. On March 15, 2023, the court
granted that motion and rendered judgment of possession
for the substitute plaintiff. The defendants thereafter
filed separate motions to open that default judgment.
The court held a hearing on the defendants’ motions
to open on April 29, 2024. It subsequently denied their
respective motions to open, and this appeal followed.
After oral argument before this court, we ordered the
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the issue of whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction
over the summary process action as to the defendants.
On February 17, 2026, the parties filed a joint motion
for an extension of time to comply with that directive,
in which they stated: “The parties represent [that] this
matter is incorporated into an arbitration arising out of [Yoney Realty Corp. v. Sachem Capital Corp., Superior
1
Gerald J. Yoney also was named as a defendant in this action. Although he initially joined Sarah E. Yoney and Theresa A. Yoney in this appeal, he was removed as a party by order of this court on June 20, 2024. For clarity, we refer to Sarah E. Yoney and Theresa A. Yoney as the defendants and Gerald J. Yoney by name in this opinion.
In addition, we note that, although Sachem Capital Corp. commenced this summary process action, Bros, Mgmt., LLC, was substituted as the plaintiff in July 2022. We therefore refer to Sachem Capital Corp. as the plaintiff and Bros, Mgmt., LLC, as the substitute plaintiff in this opinion.
Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney
Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-20-6099254-S].” In addition, the parties averred in relevant part: “[Subsequent to oral argument before the Appellate
Court] the parties entered into binding arbitration to . . . incorporate a global resolution to several cases inclusive of this matter. Arbitration is scheduled to occur . . .
beginning on March 4, 2026, and set to conclude on March
6, 2026. Depending on the outcome of the arbitration,
this [appeal] will either be withdrawn, or the eviction
can proceed unimpeded by the defendants.” This court
granted that extension request.
On March 31, 2026, the parties filed a second motion
for an extension of time. In that filing, the parties again represented in relevant part: “[T]he parties entered into binding arbitration to . . . incorporate a global resolution to several cases inclusive of this matter. Arbitration
commenced [in March 2026] and has been continued to
April 2026. Depending on the outcome of the arbitration,
this matter will either be withdrawn, or the eviction
can proceed unimpeded by the defendants.” This court
granted that second extension request.
On June 18, 2026, the parties filed a third motion for
an extension of time, averring in relevant part: “[T]he
parties entered into binding arbitration to . . . incorporate a global resolution to several cases inclusive of this matter. Arbitration commenced [in March 2026] and is
now in the briefing stages. The outcome of the arbitration directly affects this appeal as to whether this matter will be withdrawn, or the eviction can proceed unimpeded
by the defendants.” This court once again granted that
extension request.
On August 6, 2026, this court, sua sponte, ordered the
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing “whether
this court can provide the parties any practical relief or whether the appeal must be dismissed as moot in light
of the parties’ joint representation to this court, as
averred in three motions for extension, that the parties
have ‘entered into binding arbitration to . . . incorporate a global resolution to several cases inclusive of this
Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney
[appeal]’ and that, ‘[d]epending on the outcome of the
arbitration, this [appeal] will either be withdrawn, or
the eviction can proceed unimpeded by the defendants.’ ”
The defendants filed a supplemental brief in accordance
with that order on September 11, 2026. In that brief, the defendants averred in relevant part that “[t]he arbitration agreement referenced in the motions for extensions
of time . . . provides that the outcome of the arbitration decision will determine, in part relative to this action, whether the eviction of [the defendants] will proceed
without any interference of the parties to the summary
process action. The arbitration agreement further provides [that the substitute plaintiff] shall not proceed
with any efforts to remove [the defendants] from possession of the subject property by virtue of an execution or otherwise. . . . The arbitration agreement was entered into after the argument of the appeal in this matter . . . and expressly provides that, after the Appellate Court
would render its decision, the summary process action
would be stayed until the decision was rendered in the
arbitration.” With respect to the mootness issue raised
in this court’s August 6, 2026 supplemental brief order,
the defendants stated in relevant part: “As a decision of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court or a decision sustaining the appeal will not control the ultimate question of whether an eviction will take place, the Appellate Court cannot give any practical relief and the Appellate
Court can dismiss the appeal as moot . . . .”2
It is well established that “[m]ootness presents a legal
question and implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction, a threshold matter to resolve. . . . This court
has a duty to dismiss cases over which it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction, which cannot be conferred by the
consent of the parties.” (Citation omitted.) Gladstein
v. Goldfield, 325 Conn. 418, 424, 159 A.3d 661 (2017).
“[T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction, because
it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be
2
The substitute plaintiff did not file a supplemental brief with this court.
Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney
raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) M&T Bank v. Lewis, 349 Conn. 9,
20, 312 A.3d 1040 (2024). Our review of the question of
mootness is plenary. See State v. Rodriguez, 320 Conn.
694, 699, 132 A.3d 731 (2016).
“Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to
a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated
by the judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant. . . . [I]t is not the province of appellate
courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the
granting of actual relief or from the determination of
which no practical relief can follow. . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti,
328 Conn. 726, 754–55, 183 A.3d 611 (2018).
“Mootness presents a circumstance wherein the issue
before the court has been resolved or had lost its significance because of a change in the condition of affairs between the parties. . . . A case becomes moot when due
to intervening circumstances a controversy between the
parties no longer exists.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 88 Conn.
App. 523, 529, 871 A.2d 380 (2005), aff'd, 282 Conn. 1,
917 A.2d 966 (2007). That is the case here. During the
pendency of this appeal, the parties entered into binding arbitration to resolve several cases, including the one
giving rise to this appeal. As a result of that arbitration, this appeal ultimately will “either be withdrawn, or the
eviction can proceed unimpeded by the defendants,” as
the parties repeatedly averred in motions they jointly
Sachem Capital Corp. v. Yoney
filed with this court. Moreover, the defendants affirmatively represented to this court in their September
11, 2026 supplemental brief that the arbitration agreement between the parties “expressly provides that [if]
the Appellate Court [issues] its decision [in the present appeal], the summary process action would be stayed
until the decision was rendered in the arbitration.” For
that reason, the defendants concede that this court cannot provide them with any practical relief.
In light of those intervening circumstances, we conclude that the present appeal has become moot, as this
court can provide no practical relief to the defendants.
See Moraski v. Connecticut Board of Examiners of
Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 291 Conn. 242, 255,
967 A.2d 1199 (2009) (“[a] case is considered moot if an
appellate court cannot grant the appellant any practical
relief through its disposition of the merits” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, this court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants’ appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.