In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-26-00304-CV
CAROLINE HAYLES BROOKS, Appellant
V.
AUDLEY W. BROOKS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 360th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 360-752702-24
Before Kerr, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Caroline Hayles Brooks (Wife) files this pro se appeal from an agreed
final divorce decree based upon the terms of a mediated settlement agreement (MSA).
In what amounts to a single issue,1 Wife attempts to argue that the trial court abused
its discretion by signing a final divorce decree that materially differs from the MSA.
But Wife has forfeited her appellate complaint due to inadequate briefing.
Pro se appellants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must
comply with the applicable laws and rules of procedure; otherwise, pro se parties
“would be given an unfair advantage over [parties] represented by counsel.” Mansfield
State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); see Flores v. Off. Depot, Inc.,
No. 02-10-00311-CV, 2011 WL 2611140, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 30,
2011, no pet.); see also Smale v. Williams, 590 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2019, no pet.) (“The law is well settled that ‘[a] party proceeding pro se must comply
with all applicable procedural rules’ and is held to the same standards as a licensed
attorney.” (quoting Paselk v. Rabun, 293 S.W.3d 600, 611 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009,
pet. denied))). Thus, all appellants—whether acting pro se or through counsel—must
1
Wife enumerates five issues in her brief, but at their core, they all raise the same complaint—that the trial court abused its discretion by signing a divorce decree that materially differs from the MSA. Accordingly, we treat her issues as a single appellate complaint. See, e.g., Est. of Meyers, No. 02-25-00189-CV, 2025 WL 3723746, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 23, 2025, no pet.).
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properly present their appeals in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Smale, 590 S.W.3d at 639; Flores, 2011 WL 2611140, at *2.
The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant’s brief to contain,
among other things, a “clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
Wife’s brief wholly fails to comply with this requirement. It contains no citations to
the record, and while it lists the names of four cases, it does not actually cite any of
them or—with one exception—even identify the respective courts that decided them.
Nor does it explain how the enumerated cases support Wife’s appellate argument. See
Player v. Booker, No. 02-24-00318-CV, 2025 WL 1006282, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Apr. 3, 2025, no pet.) (holding that appellant had waived complaint due to
inadequate briefing because, inter alia, she had failed to “explain how [her cited]
cases—or any other authorities cited in her brief—support[ed] her appellate
argument”).
Further, Wife’s argument is unclear. She vaguely asserts that “[c]hanges were
made to [d]ischarge from discovery[,] [p]roperty division, [d]ebt, NOTICE, [t]axes,
[r]elease of ALL [c]laims stated on divorce[,] and other sections,” but she does not
identify any specific variances between the MSA and the divorce decree or reference
any particular language in either document. She also generally claims that the decree
“allocates debts and financial obligations not contained in the MSA” and that the
decree contains “interest provisions” that “were never agreed to,” but she fails to
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specify the particular “debts,” “obligations,” or “interest provisions” that are the
subject of her complaint. And, as noted, she failed to include any record citations in
her brief that would help us to identify the specific provisions of the decree that she
seeks to challenge.
We interpret the appellate procedural rules “reasonably, yet liberally, so that the
right to appeal is not lost by imposing requirements not absolutely necessary to effect
the purpose of a rule.” Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616–17 (Tex. 1997); see also
Tex. R. App. P. 38.9 (providing that substantial compliance with the briefing rules is
sufficient). Nonetheless, it is “absolutely necessary” for a party asserting error on
appeal to “acquaint the court with the issues in a case and to present argument that
will enable the court to decide the case” by demonstrating how the record and the law
support her contentions. Tex. R. App. P. 38.9; Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 616–17; see San
Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2005, no pet.) (recognizing that “parties asserting error on appeal still must put forth
some specific argument and analysis showing that the record and the law supports
their contentions”). When, as here, an appellant fails to make a clear argument and
provides no record references, no legal analysis, and no citations to relevant legal
authorities, nothing is presented for our review. See Sister Initiative, LLC v. Broughton
Maint. Ass’n, No. 02-19-00102-CV, 2020 WL 726785, at *25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Feb. 13, 2020, pet. denied) (“An appellant’s failure to cite legal authority to or provide
substantive analysis of a legal issue presented results in waiver of the appellant’s
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complaint.”); AMX Enters., L.L.P. v. Master Realty Corp., 283 S.W.3d 506, 525 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (“An issue unsupported by citation to
any legal authority presents nothing for the court to review.”); Karen Corp. v. Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 107 S.W.3d 118, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet.
denied) (“For this court to rule on an issue on appeal, the party who brings the point
forward must support it by argument and authorities.”); see also San Saba Energy,
171 S.W.3d at 338 (holding that “[e]ven under a liberal construction” of the briefing
requirements appellant had inadequately briefed its issue because it had “cite[d] no
part of the record and [had] ma[d]e no specific [legal] argument”). We cannot
speculate as to the specific legal bases for Wife’s challenges to the trial court’s divorce
decree, nor can we “redraft and articulate for [Wife] what we think [she] meant to
raise on appeal.” Strange v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2004, pet. denied) (holding the appellant’s inadequate briefing failed to preserve any
issues for review where the brief contained no argument, no record references, and no
citations to legal authority). Thus, we conclude that Wife has forfeited her sole
appellate issue, and we affirm the trial court’s divorce decree.2 See Tex. R. App. P.
38.1, 38.9.
Because our review of the divorce decree has revealed no material variances
2
from the MSA, Wife’s appellate complaint would fail on the merits even if it had not been forfeited. See In re T.L.T., No. 05-16-01367-CV, 2018 WL 1407098, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 21, 2018, no pet.) (“Parties to a[n] MSA need not agree to all of the provisions to be contained in the divorce decree. They are required only to reach an agreement as to all material terms.” (citation modified)). As noted, Wife asserts that
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/s/Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Delivered: September 24, 2026
the decree “allocates debts and financial obligations not contained in the MSA.” But the only debt allocated to Wife in the decree that is not specifically enumerated in the MSA is a $77,500 debt to be paid to Husband within 180 days of the decree’s entry, and although the MSA does not list this as a “debt” allocated to Wife, it explicitly obligates Wife to pay this amount to Husband within the 180-day timeframe set forth in the decree. Further, to the extent that Wife complains about the decree’s language providing that the $77,500 debt “shall bear interest at [five] percent per year” if it is not timely paid, such language merely effectuates the parties’ agreement; it does not materially alter it. See Glynn v. Glynn, 651 S.W.3d 348, 354–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (“If the decree adopts mechanisms to enforce the parties’ agreement while remaining consistent with their intent, it is enforceable.” (citing Davis v. Davis, No. 01-12-00701-CV, 2014 WL 890899, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2014, no pet.))); see also Davis, 2014 WL 890899, at *9 (clarifying that the “proper inquiry” when evaluating whether a trial court has failed to enforce an MSA “is not a mechanical examination of whether the divorce decree varies from the terms of the MSA”; rather it is “whether variances by the trial court significantly alter the parties’ written agreement in a way that deviates from the parties’ intent as manifested in that agreement”).
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