In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-26-00039-CR
EX PARTE BRADLEY THOMAS
On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 1
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR-2020-01729-A-WHC
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Walker, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Birdwell
OPINION
Appellant Bradley Wayne Thomas, proceeding pro se, appeals the trial court’s
denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
art. 11.072. Because Thomas has forfeited the issues he attempts to raise on appeal
due to inadequate briefing, we affirm.
I. Background
In December 2019, Thomas was arrested and charged with misdemeanor
assault after the police responded to the home he shared with the complaining
witness, C.W., and their children. 1 The State alleged that Thomas had “intentionally or
knowingly or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to [C.W.], a member of [his] family or a
member of [his] household or a person with whom [he] . . . had a dating relationship,”
either (1) by striking her with his hand, causing her pain, or (2) by striking her with a
door, which chipped her tooth and caused her pain. A jury later convicted Thomas of
Class A misdemeanor assault against a family member, and the trial court made a
finding of family violence. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1), (b); Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 42.013. The trial court assessed Thomas’s punishment at 365 days’
confinement and an $800 fine and suspended his sentence for 24 months of
community supervision.
1
To protect the children’s identities, we refer to C.W. by this pseudonym. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10; Thomas v. State, No. 02-24-00044-CR, 2024 WL 4899019, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 27, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
2
Thomas appealed his conviction to this court arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction. See Thomas, 2024 WL 4899019, at *1.
Specifically, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he had struck
C.W. with his hand; that she had suffered bodily injury from being struck with the
door; and that he had intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused her bodily injury
by opening the door. Id. at *2. We disagreed:
Viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to
the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could have found that
Thomas struck C.W. with an open hand, causing pain. See [Tex. Penal
Code § 22.01(a)(1)]; Jackson[v. Virginia], 443 U.S. [307,] 319, 99 S. Ct.
[2781,] 2789 [(1979)]; Ellis v. State, No. 05-15-00950-CR, 2017 WL
343592, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). Because the evidence was sufficient to prove
this manner and means of assault, we need not address the parts of
Thomas’s issue challenging the alternative manner and means alleged. See
Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999) (noting that when alternate manner and means are charged,
sufficient evidence of just one supports the verdict).
Id. at *3. Having concluded that the evidence supported Thomas’s conviction, we
affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at *4.2
Thomas subsequently filed a pro se application for writ of habeas corpus
arguing six grounds for relief: (1) actual innocence; (2) “due process – insufficient
evidence & perjury”; (3) prosecutorial misconduct; (4) ineffective trial counsel;
2
After this court affirmed his conviction, Thomas filed a civil suit for defamation against C.W. See Thomas v. [C.W.], No. 02-25-00488-CV, 2026 WL 706441, at *1, *2 n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 12, 2026, pet. denied). When that suit was dismissed for want of prosecution, Thomas appealed the dismissal to this court, and we affirmed. Id. at *1, *3.
3
(5) ineffective appellate counsel; and (6) cumulative error. The evidence attached to
Thomas’s application included an affidavit from a defense witness who had testified at
trial and his own affidavit, and he included a “link” to videos that had been admitted
as evidence in his underlying trial. The State filed a response attaching affidavits from
Thomas’s trial counsel, his appellate counsel, and the prosecutor who tried the case.
The trial court denied Thomas’s requested habeas relief without a hearing and
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its denial order, the trial court
stated that it had “taken judicial notice of [its] file in the underlying case and [had]
considered” Thomas’s application and attached exhibits, the State’s response and
attached exhibits, the trial court’s “own personal recollection of trial,” and “the
pertinent law.” The trial court found that the State had presented evidence that
Thomas committed the offense of assault causing bodily injury by hitting C.W. with
his hand and by hitting her with a door. It also found that Thomas had failed to
provide any new evidence of his actual innocence; that his evidentiary sufficiency
claim was not cognizable and had been rejected on direct appeal; that the evidence did
not support his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct; that he had not met his
burden to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel; and that he
had failed to show or prove cumulative error. Thomas timely appealed.
II. Discussion
Thomas’s brief contains several confusing, disjointed arguments without any
substantive analysis. The issues he purports to raise in his brief do not align with his
4
arguments, and his citations to the record and to authorities—when he actually uses
them—are deficient. Further, it appears that he relied on artificial intelligence (AI) to
prepare his brief.
A. Thomas’s Brief
In the sixty-five unnumbered pages of his amended brief, 3 Thomas presents
four issues:
1. Whether the Habeas Court abused its discretion by executing a
summary denial on a purely written record, ignoring Appellant’s pending
Motion for Continuance, and unconstitutionally denying Appellant’s
Sixth Amendment right to Compulsory Process to secure certified files
with metadata, which represents the third denial of that fundamental
right. (Argument I)
2. Whether the Habeas Court abused its discretion by invoking
the alternative manner and means doctrine to hold Appellant’s structural
claims moot, thereby insulating a conviction via an unconstitutional,
post-hoc partitioning of the offense after the trial court had explicitly
adjudicated on the record that the allegations constituted a single, nonseverable continuous transaction . . . , leaving a conviction built upon a
fabricated falsehood under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
(Argument II)
3. Whether the Habeas Court abused its discretion by failing to
find a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation under Ex parte
Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), where the State secured
a conviction using a scientifically and mathematically impossible physical
timeline—bolstered by a coached minor witness . . . , active witness
collusion . . . , and a manufactured chronological anachronism—
irrespective of the prosecution’s subjective knowledge or bad faith.
(Argument IV)
3
After Thomas filed his opening appellant’s brief, which consisted of fourteen pages, this court granted him leave to file an amended brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.7.
5
4. Whether the Habeas Court abused its discretion by rejecting
Appellant’s claim that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to
the Effective Assistance of Counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), when trial counsel: (a) completely failed to request Ake
expert funding; (b) failed to investigate documented prior fabrications
(Beaumont PD Case No. 2016-026217) known by a witness; (c) failed to
file a motion to suppress despite bodycam statements demonstrating
zero probable cause and the senior officer’s explicit admission that he
never found probable cause for assault . . . ; (d) executed a crossexamination that actively salvaged the State’s impossible geometry by
inventing an un-testified “dodge to the right” . . . a falsity presented to
the jury multiple times, even in closing, and the Prosecution
objected . . . ; and (e) failed to present mitigating neurodivergent context
explicitly permitted by the court . . . . (Argument III)
In the “Statement of Facts” section of his brief, Thomas presents—with
limited record references—his perception of his underlying trial. Specifically, this
section of Thomas’s brief consists of approximately eleven pages of “facts” like the
following excerpts:
The only visible, physical injury contemporaneously and objectively
documented at the scene of the alleged incident was a fracture to the
complainant’s front tooth (#8), which she alleged was caused by the
door mechanism. All other physical allegations introduced at trial,
including photographs depicting subsequent leg bruising, were entirely
absent from the contemporaneous on-scene police recordings and were
provided exclusively by the complainant at a later date.
. . . [T]he State relied on heavily coached, non-sequential
testimony at trial. The defense attempted to introduce raw screenrecordings of the TikTok webpage user interface—Defense Exhibit 7
(dated December 7, 2019) and Defense Exhibit 5 (dated December 24,
2019)—visually demonstrating to the court that tooth #8 was already
fractured weeks before the December 28, 2019 allegation date.
6
Because counsel had failed to issue these pre-trial corporate
subpoenas, the court summarily excluded the dental defense based on a
“lack of authentication at this time” . . . .[4] The trial judge later made
the catch-22 explicit[.]
. . . The prosecutor fed the witness the essential legal nexus,
asking[,] ‘And do these photographs accurately depict the injuries you
suffered as a result of the defendant’s actions on December 28,
2019?’ . . . Trial counsel completely failed to object to the leading nature
of this question or the total lack of medical foundation linking
subsequent, delayed bruising to the immediate physical mechanics tried.
The trial court’s willingness to admit subsequent, un-anchored State
photographs on a single leading ‘yes’ while completely banning
structural, pre-existing digital defense files exposes a deeply biased,
asymmetric execution of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
The contemporaneous scene recordings explicitly document the
complainant’s immediate financial and custodial motives to fabricate . . .
. On Sergeant James’s bodycam, the complainant openly complained
about her income level, stating the argument was over money, and
whined: “He makes me pay my own bills” . . . .
Subsequent family court records confirm that this false allegation
was the launchpad for a pre-calculated extortion scheme. Following the
conviction, the family court stripped Appellant of all visitation and
awarded the complainant full custody and maximum child support—an
amount exceeding her peak historical earnings.
. . . Despite acknowledging that the incident was isolated—and
despite Appellant having no prior criminal record of any kind over fifty
4
Thomas misrepresents the facts. While the trial court initially excluded the exhibits, it later admitted them when Thomas’s counsel re-urged their admission. Indeed, the jury saw these exhibits.
7
years of life—the court nevertheless imposed the maximum statutory
period of probation (24 months) and explicitly penalized Appellant’s
natural, chemically sedated autistic traits, condemning his flat affect as
“arrogant,” “scary,” and lacking “remorse” . . . . The court’s own
concession that the incident was isolated eliminates any legitimate
penological justification for a maximum sentence, exposing the sentence
as an unconstitutional penalty based on disability, not conduct.
In the “Standard of Review” section of his brief, Thomas provides a list of five
“[c]laims” and their supposed “[s]tandard”: (1) “Compulsory Process/Catch-22”;
(2) “Actual Innocence (New Evidence)”; (3) “False Evidence (Napue/Chabot)”;
(4) “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel”; and (5) “Continuous Transaction.”
Thomas then provides a three-page “[s]ummary” of his argument in which he
claims that his “fundamental constitutional right to compulsory process was denied”
by the trial court’s denying his habeas application without a hearing, without ruling on
his continuance motion, and without “granting requested subpoenas.” He asserts that
“[t]his post-conviction barrier was compounded by court-appointed trial counsel’s
prior failure to request state-funded expert assistance.” Thomas also claims in this
section of his brief that newly obtained evidence5 contradicts the evidence admitted at
trial; that the State “cannot now slice” the alternative manner and means by which he
was indicted—i.e., that he had caused bodily injury to C.W. by striking her with his
5
The “evidence” to which Thomas refers is a “Forensic Odontologist Expert Affidavit of Merit,” which appears to have been prepared as part of his previous civil appeal. Thomas appended this document to his brief, but it is not contained in the appellate record. We therefore do not consider it or any other document appended to his brief that is not contained in the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.1; Johnson v. State, 624 S.W.3d 579, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“An appellate court cannot consider an item that is not a part of the record on appeal.”).
8
hand or by striking her with a door—because the trial court “ruled on the record that
‘it’s part of the same transaction’”; that “every alternative manner and means of [his]
criminal charge is provably false, [so] the conviction cannot stand as a matter of law”;
and that his conviction “violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”
Then, in the argument section of his brief, Thomas presents the following five
headings:
ARGUMENT I: THE HABEAS COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY EXECUTING A SUMMARY DENIAL ON
WRITTEN AFFIDAVITS ALONE, CREATING AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CATCH-22 THAT STRIPPED
APPELLANT OF HIS RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS
ARGUMENT II: THE ALTERNATIVE MANNER AND
MEANS DOCTRINE CANNOT LEGALLY INSULATE A
CONVICTION WHERE THE FOUNDATIONAL “BODILY
INJURY” ELEMENT IS PROVEN TO BE A PRE-CALCULATED
FABRICATION
ARGUMENT III: TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER STRICKLAND
ARGUMENT IV: MATERIAL FALSE EVIDENCE UNDER
NAPUE AND CHABOT
ARGUMENT V: APPELLANT SATISFIES BOTH THE
HERRERA AND SCHLUP STANDARDS FOR A FINDING OF
ACTUAL INNOCENCE, DEMANDING REVERSAL AND
VACATUR OF THE CONVICTION.
9
Under each of these headings, Thomas purports to raise what appear to be several
sub-arguments. For example, under “ARGUMENT I,” Thomas asserts that the trial
court “[i]gnored [his] [m]otion for [c]ontinuance”; that the trial court’s “[s]plit
[s]ubpoena [r]uling [c]reated a [f]atal [p]rocedural [d]efect”; and that “[h]armless
[e]rror is [i]napplicable to [s]tructural [e]rrors.” Under “ARGUMENT II,” Thomas
asserts that “[p]remeditated [f]raud and [c]oordinated State [a]ction [p]oisoned the
[s]tructural [i]ntegrity of the [c]ontinuous [t]ransaction” and that during his trial, the
State “introduce[ed] a . . . manufactured injury to the jury.” As part of “ARGUMENT
III,” Thomas argues that his trial counsel “[f]ailed to [p]resent [m]itigating
[n]eurodivergent [c]ontext to [p]reempt [s]ystemic [d]emeanor [p]rejudices”; he claims
that he has autism and “severe” PTSD.
Other sub-arguments in Thomas’s brief include allegations that his trial counsel
“[d]emonstrated an [a]bsolute [a]bdication of [a]dversarial [t]esting by . . . [f]ail[ing] to
[o]bject to . . . [e]xplicit [a]dmissions of [s]patial [c]onfusion”; that the State presented
“[p]remeditated [d]ental [f]raud and [c]oordinated State [p]erjury”; that the “[p]hysical
and [g]eometric [r]ealities [e]radicate the State’s [a]lternative [m]echanism [n]arratives”;
and that “[t]he [s]tructural [f]alsification of [v]ictim [s]tatus [c]ontaminated the [e]ntire
[f]act-[f]inding [f]ramework.”
B. Pro Se Litigants and Inadequate Briefing
A pro se litigant is required to comply with the rules of evidence and the rules
of procedure and “will not be granted any special consideration solely because he
10
assert[s] his pro se rights.” Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988); see Carte v. State, No. 2-03-324-CR, 2004 WL 1636010, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth July 22, 2004, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(“A pro se appellant is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney . . . .”); see also
August v. State, No. 02-22-00266-CR, 2023 WL 3879665, at *3–4 & n.9 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth June 8, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing
Carte and refusing to apply “a less stringent standard” in pro se appeal). Although it is
“undoubtedly” a litigant’s right to proceed pro se, he should be aware that doing so is
“to embark on a risky course.” Johnson, 760 S.W.2d at 279; see Bender v. State, No. 02-17-00342-CR, 2018 WL 4401745, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 23, 2018, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that appellant’s frustration
with trial court “appear[ed] to have been primarily rooted in his expectation of
entitlement, . . . his inability to understand legal procedure . . . , and the trial court’s
understandable refusal to act as his personal law professor”).
“The right to appellate review extends only to complaints made in accordance
with our rules of appellate procedure.” Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 210 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995). Under Rule 38.1, an appellant’s brief must “state concisely and
without argument the facts pertinent to the issues or points presented” and must
contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate
citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g), (i). A brief that
does not comply with Rule 38.1 presents nothing for our review. See Alvarado, 912
11
S.W.2d at 210. Thus, if an appellant’s brief provides no argument or legal authority to
support his position, we may properly overrule the issue as inadequately briefed. See
Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
(overruling point as inadequately briefed when brief contained no supporting
argument or citation to authority); Ochoa v. State, 355 S.W.3d 48, 56 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (“An appellant waives an issue on appeal if he
fails to adequately brief that issue by presenting supporting arguments and
authorities.”). And if the appellant’s brief does not refer the appellate court to the
pages in the record where the error allegedly occurred, we may properly overrule the
issue as inadequately briefed. Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166, 179–80 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017); Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896.
Further, if the complaints raised in the appellant’s brief fail to adhere to Rule
38.1’s clarity requirement, we will consider those complaints forfeited. Ex parte
Williams, No. 01-23-00565-CR, 2024 WL 3892483, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Aug. 22, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see Tex. R.
App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring “clear and concise argument”). An issue that does not
present “clear and sufficient supporting arguments and substantive analysis” has not
been adequately briefed. Williams, 2024 WL 3892483, at *6; see, e.g., Heffner v.
Haverkamp, No. 02-25-00472-CV, 2026 WL 1700293, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
June 11, 2026, pet. filed) (concluding that appellant waived issues on appeal when
arguments in brief were “a confusing, disjointed, rambling . . . stream of
12
consciousness . . . without cogent analysis”); Player v. Booker, No. 02-24-00318-CV,
2025 WL 1006282, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 3, 2025, no pet.) (holding that
appellant waived complaint due to inadequate briefing because, among other reasons,
she had failed to explain how the authorities cited in her brief supported her appellate
argument); Abel v. State, No. 02-18-00051-CR, 2020 WL 5048078, at *24 n.14 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Aug. 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(overruling argument as inadequately briefed because appellant did not develop the
argument in his brief); Lara v. State, No. 04-14-00553-CR, 2015 WL 9487578, at *4
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 30, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding that appellant forfeited ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
complaint because his argument was “difficult to discern”); Muniz v. State, Nos. 12-07-00363-CR, 12-07-00364-CR, 12-07-00365-CR, 2009 WL 1492838, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Tyler May 29, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling
appellant’s issue when he “failed to offer any meaningful argument in his brief”).
Under Rule 38.9, we are required to construe appellate briefs liberally so as not
to preclude the right to appellate review. Tex. R. App. P. 38.9; In re J.D., No. 02-24-00515-CV, 2025 WL 2810523, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 2, 2025, no pet.);
see Hernandez v. State, 501 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d)
(applying liberal construction of parties’ briefs). But “an appellate court has no
‘obligation to construct and compose [an] appellant’s issues, facts, and arguments with
appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.’” Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325,
13
343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008)); see Alvarado, 912 S.W.2d at 210 (“As an appellate court, it is not our task
to pore through hundreds of pages of record in an attempt to verify an appellant’s
claims . . . , [nor is it] our task to speculate as to the nature of an appellant’s legal
theory.”). Indeed, we will not make an appellant’s arguments for him. Wyatt v. State, 23
S.W.3d 18, 23 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Ex parte Lee, 673 S.W.3d 755, 757 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2023, no pet.); see Hernandez, 501 S.W.3d at 271 (“[W]e are not
compelled to decide this case on a theory appellant did not discuss or argue . . . .”).
Inadequate briefing has become more common since the development of
ChatGPT and other AI tools, particularly when appellants choose to represent
themselves pro se. See Wilcox v. Duran, No. 02-25-00643-CV, 2026 WL 2357615, at *3
& n.4, *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2026, no pet. h.) (holding that pro se
appellant who confirmed she used ChatGPT to prepare her brief had waived
complaint on appeal due to inadequate briefing when authorities cited in brief were
inaccurately quoted and did not support proposition for which she cited them); Byrd v.
Vills. of Woodland Springs Homeowners Ass’n, No. 02-23-00078-CV, 2024 WL 3529431, at
*4 n.12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 25, 2024, no pet.) (overruling pro se appellant’s
issues as inadequately briefed and noting that court “c[ould ]not tell from [appellant’s]
brief” if he had used ChatGPT or another AI tool because authorities cited in the
brief did not exist); Lee, 673 S.W.3d at 756, 757 & n.2 (holding that appellant, who
was represented by counsel, had inadequately briefed his appellate issue and affirming
14
trial court’s denial of habeas relief when it appeared that appellant’s brief had been
prepared by AI because it cited authorities that did not exist and failed to include
citations to the record); see also In re C.R., No. 04-24-00576-CV, 2026 WL 823060, at
*6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 25, 2026, no pet.) (Brissette, J., concurring) (“We
are seeing an increase in pro se litigants who believe that taking on their own
representation in court is as easy as pulling up ChatGPT on their browser.”). This is
likely because “ChatGPT currently lacks the ability to produce reliable and accurate
results when given a legal query.” David T. Laton, A Cautionary Tale of AI as a Research
Tool for Lawyers, 70 Prac. Law. 42, 43 (2024).
We strongly caution litigants—both pro se litigants and those represented by
counsel—against using ChatGPT or other AI tools to prepare legal documents and
filings, including appellate briefs. See id.; see also C.R., 2026 WL 823060, at *6 (Brissette,
J., concurring) (“ChatGPT can no more prepare you to meet the challenges of a
complex legal matter . . . than it can teach you how to surgically remove a
tumor . . . .”); AGiza v. Franklin, No. 04-25-00099-CV, 2025 WL 2058089, at *2 n.1
(Tex. App.—San Antonio July 23, 2025, pet. denied) (noting pro se appellant’s
apparent use of ChatGPT or other AI tool and cautioning litigants against doing the
same); Lee, 673 S.W.3d at 757 n.2 (considering consequences for attorney’s apparent
use of AI to prepare appellant’s brief, such as “report[ing] the attorney to the State
Bar of Texas for a potential investigation for a violation of the State Bar rules”).
15
Appellants who use ChatGPT or other AI tools to prepare their briefs choose to do
so at the risk of having their complaints forfeited due to inadequate briefing.
C. Analysis
It appears that Thomas may have used ChatGPT or another AI tool to attempt
to develop the authorities and arguments in his brief. Several arguments and factual
assertions in Thomas’s brief are unsupported by citations to authorities or to the
record. For those citations that he has included, many of the record citations are
incomplete, 6 and many of the citations to authorities are fictitious or inaccurate, do
not contain the language quoted by Thomas, or do not state the proposition for
which he cites them. For many others, Thomas does not explain how the cited
authorities support his argument.
In what he labels as “ARGUMENT I,” Thomas cites “Ex parte Arjona, 402
S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)” for the proposition that “[t]he Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals has firmly established that when a habeas application presents
material, scientifically complex factual parameters that cannot be safely determined on
the four corners of a paper record, the court abuses its discretion by failing to hold an
oral evidentiary hearing.” That case does not exist in the South Western Reporter.
Instead, that volume and page number of the South Western Reporter belong to a
6
For example, Thomas provides the following reference: “The prosecutor then used this false physical narrative . . . to validate the complainant’s overall truthfulness (p. 24).” Assuming that he intends to cite page 24, Thomas does not provide the case, record, or volume number in which it can be found.
16
parental-rights-termination case in the Texas Supreme Court: In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d
239, 240–50 (Tex. 2013).
Thomas cites “Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. App. Houston [1st
Dist.] 2009, no pet.)” for the proposition that “[a] habeas court abuses its discretion”
by denying relief without a hearing, by “fail[ing] to issue necessary subpoenas for
exculpatory evidence,” by “ignor[ing] a reasonable request for a continuance,” and by
“appl[ying] an incorrect legal standard.” But that case appears to be fictitious or the
citation inaccurate; the citation takes the reader to the background section of
Winningham v. State, 334 S.W.3d 289, 294 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d),
which involves an evidentiary-sufficiency challenge to a murder conviction, id. at 291,
and has nothing to do with the proposition for which Thomas cites it.
In his brief’s index of authorities, Thomas lists “Garcia v. State, 571 S.W.3d 815
(Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d).” He does not provide the page
number of his brief on which the case appears—though none of the pages in his brief
are numbered—and a search through the document reveals that it is not actually cited
in the brief. In any event, that case also appears to be fictitious or the citation
inaccurate. But see Vernon v. State, 571 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (affirming indecency-with-a-child conviction on direct appeal).
Thomas’s brief also contains the following deficiencies:
• He fails to state the pertinent facts without argument. See Tex. R. App. P.
38.1(g).
17
• He misrepresents facts in the record.
• He misquotes Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
• He purportedly quotes statements by his trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the
trial court, but he does not provide any record citations to these alleged
statements.
• He fails to include any record citations pointing us to where we might find the
motion for continuance that he asserts he filed; it does not appear to be in the
record.
• He claims that the trial court denied him subpoenas but does not provide any
record citations for the requested subpoenas or point us to where in the record
the trial court purportedly denied them.
• He cites no authority to support his proposition that “[w]hile appellate courts
under Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) must defer to
reasonable factfinder conclusions, they are constitutionally forbidden from
protecting a verdict that requires inventing a phantom physical narrative to
bring an absolute evidentiary void.” Laster sets forth the legal- and factualsufficiency standards of review, see id., but does not otherwise support this
proposition.
• In his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument, Thomas asserts without
citing to the record that “[u]nder Texas law, a simple chipped tooth does not
meet the strict statutory threshold for [s]erious [b]odily [i]njury.” He does not
cite any authority or otherwise support this assertion with “Texas law.”
• He asserts that “[u]nder Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a trial
strategy built entirely on a misinterpretation of fundamental criminal law is
objectively unreasonable per se.” This law statement does not appear anywhere
in that case, and Thomas fails to explain how, even if it did, it would apply to
his argument.
• He claims that his trial counsel failed to investigate “specific law enforcement
data” related to an alleged 2016 sexual assault committed by “a law
enforcement witness.” This entire “argument” is unsupported and contains no
citations to authorities or to the record.
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• He claims that he was “psychological[ly] harm[ed] by this prosecution” and
offers several unsupported statements about his purported autism and PTSD.
He fails to explain how this is pertinent to his appellate issues.
• He argues in conclusory fashion that he “[s]atisfies” the standard under Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), asserting without citing to
authorities or to the record that the “newly obtained” affidavit by the forensic
odontologist—which we cannot consider, see supra note 5—constitutes
“affirmative evidence of innocence” and “completely obliterates” the State’s
case. He does not actually identify the law in Herrera.
• He asserts that he “satisfies the Schlup[ v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S. Ct. 851
(1995)] gateway because the conviction is the direct product of structural
constitutional errors.” He does not identify the “Schlup gateway,” provide any
substantive analysis, or cite to the record.
These are only a few examples of the deficiencies in Thomas’s brief.7
We cannot say that Thomas has adequately briefed the issues he attempts to
raise on appeal. Indeed, he has not provided this court with “clear and sufficient
supporting arguments and substantive analysis, with appropriate citations to
authorities and to the record.” Williams, 2024 WL 3892483, at *6; see Tex. R. App. P.
38.1(i). Although we construe appellate briefs liberally, to reach the merits of
Thomas’s appeal, we would have to speculate as to the nature of his legal theories and
pore through the record to verify his claims. This we will not do, nor will we make his
arguments for him. Accordingly, we hold that Thomas has forfeited his complaints
due to inadequate briefing, and we overrule his purported issues.
7
Thomas’s reply brief fares no better. For example, he misquotes certain cases, cites and purports to quote cases that do not actually exist in the South Western Reporter; and sparingly provides appropriate citations to the record. And he relies on documents appended to his opening brief that are not in the record and that we cannot consider. See supra note 5.
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III. Conclusion
Having overruled Thomas’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order denying his
requested habeas relief.8
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell
Justice
Publish
Delivered: September 24, 2026
8
Throughout the pendency of this appeal, Thomas has filed various pro se motions and requests, including a noncompliant motion to abate the appeal. Given our disposition of the appeal, all pending motions are denied as moot.
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