Opinion issued October 2, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
No. 01-25-00348-CV
CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant
V.
VONYAE Q. JORDAN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 127th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2024-10196
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellee Vonyae Q. Jordan sued the City of Houston after his vehicle
collided with a police car on the highway. The City filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing it is immune from suit. The trial court denied the motion. We
reverse and render judgment dismissing Jordan’s suit for want of jurisdiction.
Background
In March 2022, Houston Police Officer Keith Taylor was assigned to work
night shifts on a task force aimed at deterring street crimes associated with an autoracing event in Houston. On the night of the accident, the weather was clear and
there was little traffic, but most of the vehicles Officer Taylor observed were
exceeding the speed limit and traveling “very fast.” The portion of the freeway
where Officer Taylor was positioned has five lanes. Officer Taylor had his cruiser
positioned just past an overpass that limits drivers’ visibility.
Shortly before midnight, Officer Taylor observed a car driving over the
overpass. As it reached grade level, the car passed Officer Taylor and came to a
stop in the middle lane (lane three). The Houston Police Department classifies
traffic hazards of this sort as a “priority two emergency call.” Officer Taylor
“immediately believed that the conditions were ripe for another motorist to come
over the overpass and slam into the back of the disabled vehicle” and “knew [he]
needed to react immediately and reposition [his] police cruiser behind the disabled
vehicle so if an accident occurred, it would be with the police vehicle rather than
the disabled motorist.” Accordingly, he began driving his cruiser from the
shoulder to reposition it behind the disabled vehicle.
Officer Taylor kept his emergency lights on, activated his siren, and checked
his rearview and side mirrors as he crossed the freeway. According to Officer
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Taylor, when he entered lane two, a vehicle driven by Jordan swerved from the
center lane into lane two to avoid the disabled vehicle. Jordan’s car collided with
Officer Taylor’s cruiser, knocking off its side mirror.
The police report of the accident states that Taylor’s vehicle had his
emergency lights activated when he “began to merge into lane 3 of 5.” Per the
report, Jordan “made an unsafe lane change and crashed into [Officer Taylor] as he
“began to merge from lane 4 to lane 3.” Jordan was “issued a citation and released
from the scene.”
Video from Officer Taylor’s body camera shows that shortly after the
accident, Jordan stated he intended to leave the scene, to which Officer Taylor
responded, “You cannot leave,” “You hit me,” “You see the flashing lights?,” and
“You hit a police car with flashing lights.” When Jordan told Officer Taylor, “You
came into my lane,” Officer Taylor responded, “Yeah, because would you rather
hit him, drilled him in the back?” and “Yeah, I did, because I was trying to get
behind this car [the disabled vehicle].”
Jordan tells a different story. According to Jordan, he “was driving straight
down [his] lane” when he “did see a stalled vehicle[,] but it was notable and visible
enough that there was no danger of [his] crashing into it[.]” In Jordan’s account,
Officer Taylor’s vehicle moved into his lane “suddenly and without warning.”
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Jordan sued the City for negligence, negligence per se, and negligent entrustment,
alleging he suffered personal injuries from the collision.
The City moved for no-evidence and traditional summary judgment, arguing
in part that Jordan could produce no evidence negating that the Texas Tort Claims
Act’s (TTCA) emergency exception preserves the City’s immunity. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2). The trial court denied the City’s motion, and
this interlocutory appeal followed. See id. § 51.014(a)(8).
The TTCA Emergency Exception
Among other issues, the City argues the trial court erred by denying the
portion of the motion for summary judgment contending Jordan can present no
evidence to negate the TTCA’s emergency exception. We agree.
A. Relevant law
The parties’ burdens and the de novo standard of review regarding the City’s
no-evidence motion for summary judgment are settled—in short, when the
nonmovant fails to present more than a scintilla of competent evidence raising an
issue of material fact as to the challenged elements, the “court must grant the
motion.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); see also City of Houston v. Kelly, No. 01-24-00057-CV, 2025 WL 1521542, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 29,
2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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The TTCA provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity for
damages caused by the negligence of a governmental employee acting within the
scope of his employment and arising from the operation or use of a motor-driven
vehicle. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE § 101.021(1). But the TTCA identifies
several circumstances in which the immunity waiver does not apply, including the
emergency exception, under which the waiver does not apply to a claim arising
“from the action of an employee while responding to an emergency call or reacting
to an emergency situation if the action is in compliance with the laws and
ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of such a law or
ordinance, if the action is not taken with conscious indifference or reckless
disregard for the safety of others[.]” Id. § 101.055(2).
The City’s no-evidence motion asserted that Jordan was unable to produce
evidence that Officer Taylor (1) was not reacting to an emergency situation, (2)
failed to comply with applicable laws and ordinances, (3) or acted recklessly. We
consider whether Jordan presented evidence creating a fact issue on these
elements.
B. No fact issue created on whether it was an emergency situation
The TTCA does not define “emergency call” or “emergency situation,” but
courts have interpreted the term “emergency” broadly. See City of San Antonio v.
Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667, 672–73 (Tex. 2006); City of Houston v. Hussein, No.
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01-18-00683-CV, 2020 WL 6788079, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov.
19, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g) (collecting cases). “[A]s commonly
used, the term ‘emergency’ refers to unforeseen circumstances that call for
immediate action[.]” Jefferson Cnty. v. Hadnot, 699 S.W.3d 787, 797 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2024, no pet.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has emphasized that courts should avoid construing the
emergency exception “to exclude emergencies the Legislature might have intended
to include.” Hartman, 201 S.W.3d at 673.
Applying these principles, Texas courts have held that police officers
responding to obstructions on roadways qualify as “emergency situations.” See,
e.g., City of San Antonio v. Smith, 562 S.W.3d 75, 82–83 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2018, pet. denied) (“Texas appellate courts have concluded that claims arising
from objects blocking lanes on highways were emergency situations, and the
actions of government employees in response to these emergency situations fell
within the scope of [the TTCA’s emergency exception].”).
Jordan averred in his affidavit that the stalled vehicle “was notable and
visible enough that there was no danger of my crashing into it nor do I believe
there was a true danger of anyone else doing so.” But Jordan’s ability to see and
avoid the disabled vehicle, and his personal belief that it was not a “true danger,”
does not—without more—raise a fact issue on whether the vehicle stopped on the
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highway created an emergency situation for purposes of section 101.055(2). Given
the high speed that vehicles are driven on highways, and that drivers unfortunately
often are not being fully attentive, a person’s ability to see a stalled vehicle does
not support that an emergency situation did not exist. A stalled vehicle in the
middle of the highway is an unforeseen circumstance that calls for immediate
action whether it is avoidable or not, and to hold otherwise would exclude
emergencies the Legislature might have intended to include in this exception. See
Hartman, 201 S.W.3d at 673; see also Gordon v. N. Tex. Tollway Auth., No. 02-24-00538-CV, 2025 WL 2370936, at *4 n.5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 14,
2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A] firsthand observation of [drivers] swerving was not
required for the debris [on a roadway] to constitute ‘an unforeseen combination of
circumstances or the resulting state that call[ed] for immediate action.’” (citation
omitted)).1 Jordan did not raise a material fact issue on this element.
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Jordan also points to a part of Officer Taylor’s affidavit: “The weather was clear
and the roads were dry. On this stretch, those conditions typically result in traffic
traveling at high speeds. It was approximately 11:45 p.m. so it was dark, but the
freeway was lit by overhead lights. There was almost no traffic, but the vehicles
that were on the road were traveling very fast.” Jordan argues that Officer
Taylor’s admission “there was notable visibility and low traffic” means there was
no emergency. But again, the high speed of the vehicles on the highway, which
Officer Taylor acknowledges, means the mere ability to see the stalled vehicle
does not negate the emergency.
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C. No fact issue created on whether Officer Taylor acted recklessly
Because Officer Taylor was responding to an emergency situation, the
emergency exception applies unless he did not act “in compliance with the laws
and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of such a law or
ordinance, [his actions were] . . . taken with conscious indifference or reckless
disregard for the safety of others.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2).
The only law or ordinance Jordan identifies as having been violated by Officer
Taylor is Texas Transportation Code § 546.005. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE
§ 546.005. Section 546.005 “largely corresponds” to the recklessness prong of the
TTCA’s emergency exception. See City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 455
(Tex. 2024). The parties do not argue that application of section 546.005, as
opposed to the recklessness prong, would lead to a different result here, so we
consider whether the evidence raises a fact issue about recklessness. See Harris
County v. Gariet, No. 01-24-00175-CV, 2026 WL 2575354, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
The Transportation Code defines “reckless driving” as driving “a vehicle in
wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” TEX. TRANSP.
CODE § 545.401(a); see also City of Houston v. Gomez, 716 S.W.3d 161, 165 (Tex.
2025). “[R]ecklessness for purposes of the emergency exception likewise involves
a ‘willful or wanton disregard’ for the safety of others.” Gomez, 716 S.W.3d at
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165 (quoting City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 531 (Tex. 2022)).
A “momentary judgment lapse” is not enough to establish reckless disregard, nor is
“mere inattentiveness.” Id. at 165–66 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Instead, invocation of the emergency exception’s recklessness standard
requires conscious indifference or subjective awareness of an extreme risk. Id. at
165 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Relative to recklessness, Jordan points to parts of Officer Taylor’s bodycamera video in which he (1) asked Jordan, “would you rather hit him, drilled him
in the back?,” (2) said he came into Jordan’s lane because he was “trying to get
behind this car [the stalled vehicle],” (3) said he was supposed to sit on the freeway
with his lights on and “if I do something I’m going to get hit,” and (4) did not deny
that he was the person who came into Jordan’s lane. These statements do not
support a finding that Officer Taylor was acting with a “willful or wanton
disregard” for the safety of others. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 531. At most, they
show Officer Taylor was involved in an accident with Jordan when Officer Taylor
was trying to get his patrol car behind the stalled vehicle. “Mere involvement in a
collision does not create an inference or conclusion that a driver is incompetent or
reckless.” Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 461 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Jordan likewise did not raise a material fact issue on this element.
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Accordingly, Jordan failed to present evidence negating application of the
emergency exception. We sustain the City’s first issue, which means the City’s
immunity from suit is not waived. We need not reach the City’s other issues.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment granting the City’s
no-evidence motion for summary judgment based on the emergency exception and
dismissing this case for want of jurisdiction.
Andrew Johnson
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guiney and Johnson.
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