Opinion issued October 2, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00956-CV
KEITH GORDON, Appellant
V.
OSAZE ARHUNMWUNDE, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 24-CCV-075392
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this forcible-detainer case, Keith Gordon, the tenant under a lease of
certain real property in Katy, Texas, appealed a judgment awarding possession of
the property, and money damages, to the landlord under the lease, appellee Osaze
Arhunmwunde. If a defendant in a forcible-detainer action is no longer in
possession of the real property, then an appeal on the possession issue is moot
unless the defendant asserts a potentially meritorious claim of right to current possession of the property. Marshall v. Housing Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d
782, 787 (Tex. 2006). The existence of a landlord-tenant relationship provides a
basis for the lower court to determine the right to possession without resolving the
question of title, thus allowing the lower court to exercise jurisdiction. Crawford
v. Sharif, No. 01-24-00239-CV, 2026 WL 233135, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Jan. 29, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). An executed writ of possession in our
record shows that Gordon no longer possesses the property.
We issued a notice advising that this appeal may be moot and requesting that
Gordon file a response addressing mootness. In his response, Gordon recognizes
that the lease “establishes the contractual origin of [his] possession” of the
property. Moreover, as he did in his appellate briefing, Gordon mentions various
documents (that were not presented during trial in the county court at law) which
he asserts prove he has title to and a present right to possession of the property or
prove the underlying courts lacked jurisdiction because a title dispute is involved.
The mere existence of a title dispute does not deprive a justice court or
county court at law of jurisdiction; rather, a justice or county court on appeal is
deprived of jurisdiction only if “the right to immediate possession necessarily
requires the resolution of a title dispute.” Pina v. Pina, 371 S.W.3d 361, 365 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (quoting Bruce v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg.
Ass’n, 352 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied)) (internal
2
quotations omitted). Where an independent basis for possession exists, such as a
landlord-tenant relationship, jurisdiction remains proper regardless of any title
claim. See id.; Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., L.C., 61 S.W.3d 555, 559
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.).
Here, the courts below had jurisdiction over this case because the possession
issue turned on the landlord-tenant lease, not resolution of any title dispute.
Gordon provides no reason why he has a potentially meritorious claim of right to
current possession, nor does he challenge the part of the judgment awarding
Arhunmwunde a money judgment. Thus, the issue of possession is moot.
We vacate the part of the lower court’s judgment addressing entitlement to
possession of the property and dismiss the appeal from that part as moot. See
Stubblefield v. 2500 Houston, LLC, No. 0-5-24-00302-CV, 2025 WL 1018711, at
*2–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 4, 2025, no pet.). In all other respects, we affirm
the county court’s judgment.1
Andrew Johnson
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guiney and Johnson.
1
We dismiss all other pending motions and requests as moot.
3