Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed September 24, 2026.
In The
Fifteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 15-24-00116-CV
HOMERO R. BALDERAS, BRIAN D. NIPPER, MARK F. VAN
ROSENDAEL AND BRYAN K. HUGGHINS, Appellants
V.
TEXAS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT; GREGORY
STEVENS IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
TEXAS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT; AND JOHN
BEAUCHAMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COUNSEL FOR TEXAS
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT; AND T.J. VINEYARD, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAJOR FOR THE TEXAS COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT, Appellees
On Appeal from the 455th District Court
Travis County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-24-002797
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed by a group of police officers
employed by the City of Cibolo Police Department (the Officers) against the Texas Commission Law Enforcement and several Commission officials (collectively, the Commission Parties). In their suit, the Officers claimed in part that certain disciplinary actions taken against them by the Commission officials were ultra vires and that because the Commission denied their request for a hearing, their due process rights were violated. In response, the Commission Parties filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the Officers’ claims were barred by sovereign immunity. After the trial court granted the plea, the Officers timely filed this appeal. Because we conclude that the Officers have failed to allege a claim for which immunity has been waived or does not apply, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Arnulfo Cortez was hired as an officer by the Police Department for the City of Cibolo in July 2022. In March 2024, the Commission sent a letter to Cortez, notifying him that it was revoking his peace office license. In the letter, citing Commission Rule 217.1, the Commission informed Cortez that it had determined he was ineligible to receive his peace officer license because in 2014 he had been “convicted or placed on probation for the offense of Assault-Family Violence, a Class C misdemeanor.” 1
The Commission also sent letters to the Officers, all of whom were involved in Cortez’s hiring. Specifically, the Commission sent letters to Police Chief, Bryan Huggins;2 background investigator, Mark Van Rosendael; and supervisors, Brian
1
Commission Rule 217.1 lists the required standards for peace officer licensure by the Commission. In part, the applicant must show that he or she “has never been convicted or placed on community supervision in any court of an offense involving family violence as defined under Chapter 71, Texas Family Code.” 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 217.1(b)(7) (Tex. Comm’n on Law Enf’t, Minimum Standards for Enrollment and Initial Licensure); see Tex. Occ. Code § 1701.151 (rulemaking authority of the Commission).
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At the time of Cortez’s hiring, Huggins was the Approving Chief Administrator of the
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Nipper and Homero Balderas. The letters formally “warned” Huggins of the
results of the Commission’s audit and investigation and “reprimanded” the other Officers for their respective roles in the pre-hire investigation that led to Cortez’s employment, despite his criminal history.3 In addition, the letters informed the Officers that future violations could “result in formal disciplinary action, including license suspension or assessment of administrative penalties.”
Cortez and the Officers disagreed with the Commission’s decision to revoke
Cortez’s license. Specifically, they argued that Cortez received “deferred disposition” and, consequently, was not “placed on community supervision,” as required under Rule 217.1. Accordingly, Cortez and the Officers requested that the Commission rescind the disciplinary actions against them or, alternatively, refer the actions to the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) for contestedcase hearings. Although the Commission later referred the license-revocation action against Cortez to SOAH, it refused to refer the warning and reprimands against the Officers.
In May 2024, the Officers filed suit against the Commission Parties.4 The
Officers sought (1) a writ of mandamus to require the Commission to withdraw the warning and reprimands or to refer the actions to SOAH for a contested-case hearing; (2) alternatively, to the extent they are not entitled to a contested-case hearing, judicial review of the Commission’s actions, “pursuant to Texas
Department.
3
In their briefing, the parties treat the “warning” as functionally equivalent to the “reprimands,” and for purposes of this appeal, we will do the same.
4
Although Cortez was a plaintiff in the trial court and filed a notice of appeal in this Court, he withdrew as an appellant after the filing of the appellants’ brief. Consequently, for purposes of this opinion, we will discuss Cortez’s claims and arguments only to the extent necessary to resolve the Officers’ issues on appeal. According to the Commission Parties’ plea to the jurisdiction, Cortez’s case was docketed at SOAH on May 14, 2024, and the hearing was set for November 19, 2024.
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Occupations Code [Section] 1701.506”; and (3) declaratory relief that the warning and reprimands against the Officers violate their rights to due process and equal protection under the United States Constitution and their right to due course of law under the Texas Constitution.
In response, the Commission Parties filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the Officers’ claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the plea, and this appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that challenges the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction without regard to whether the asserted claims have merit. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, City of Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. 2020), and thus we review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo, Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. 2016).
The burden is on the plaintiff to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). When, as in this case the plea to the jurisdiction challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleadings, the court determines whether the plaintiff “has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Hous. Belt, 487 S.W.3d at 160. In determining whether the plaintiff has met that burden, we construe the pleadings liberally, taking all factual assertions as true and looking to the plaintiff’s intent. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. 2020). “But courts ‘cannot use a liberal construction of the petition as a license to read into the petition a claim that it does not contain.’” Tex. Tech Univ.
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Sys. v. Martinez, 691 S.W.3d 415, 419 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Flowers v. Flowers, 407 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.)). If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, the plea may be granted without affording the plaintiff an opportunity to replead. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227.
To the extent our jurisdictional analysis includes issues of statutory
construction, we also review these issues do novo. R.R. Comm’n v. Tex. Citizens for Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2011). “When construing a statute, our primary objective is to determine the Legislature’s intent which, when possible, we discern from the plain meaning of the words chosen.” In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 917 (Tex. 2007).
BACKGROUND LAW
Sovereign immunity generally protects the State and its agencies from
lawsuits against the State, absent a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity by the Legislature. Nazari v. State, 561 S.W.3d 495, 500 (Tex. 2018). When applicable, sovereign immunity “shield[s] the public from the costs and
consequences of improvident actions of their governments.” Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex 2006).
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act generally waives immunity for
declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of a statute. Abbott v. Mex. Am. Leg. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681, 698 (Tex. 2022). But to demonstrate that a claim falls within the scope of this waiver, the plaintiff must do more than label a cause of action and assert the existence of a constitutional claim. Eriksen v. Nelson, 708 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025, no pet.). If the constitutional claim is facially invalid, immunity from suit is not waived. Mex.
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Am. Leg. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d at 698.
Similarly, sovereign immunity does not bar claims alleging that a
government official acted ultra vires, or without legal authority, in carrying out his duties. Hous. Belt, 487 S.W.3d at 157–58. This is because a properly pleaded ultra vires suit “do[es] not seek to alter government policy,” City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009), but instead seeks to prevent state officials from exceeding their statutory or constitutional authority, see Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2021) (“Our precedent made clear that ‘suits to require state officials to comply with statutory or constitutional provisions are not prohibited by sovereign immunity.’” (quoting Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372)). To fall within the ultra vires exception to immunity, “a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” 5 Hous. Belt, 487 S.W.3d at 161 (quoting Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372).
Because sovereign immunity implicates a trial court’s subject matterjurisdiction, it may be properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Id. at 160. When, as in this case, a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the plaintiff’s pleadings based on an assertion of sovereign immunity, we must determine if the plaintiff has pleaded facts that, if true, affirmatively demonstrate that sovereign immunity either
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In this context, ministerial acts are those “where the law prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.” Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. 2016). A government official acts without legal authority, and thus ultra vires, if he or she exceeds the bounds of the granted authority or if his or her acts conflict with the law itself. Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. 2016). “[W]hether a suit attacking an exercise of limited discretion will be barred is dependent upon the grant of authority at issue in any particular case.” Id. at 164.
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does not apply or has been waived. Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex 2021).
ANALYSIS
In what we construe as five interrelated issues on appeal, the Officers
contend that the trial court erred in granting the Commission Parties’ plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing their claims. Renumbered and reorganized for clarity, the Officers contend that (1) they met their burden to affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court has jurisdiction over their request to compel the withdrawal of the warning and reprimands; (2) they met their burden to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction over their due process claims; (3) they met their burden to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction over their equal protection claim; (4) the trial court erred in construing Section 1701.504 of the Occupations Code to conclude that they are not statutorily entitled to a SOAH hearing; and (5) they met their burden to affirmatively demonstrate a waiver of immunity under Section 1701.506 of the Occupations Code.
Claim for Mandamus Relief based on Ultra Vires Conduct
We first consider the Officers’ argument that the trial erred in dismissing their claim for mandamus relief for lack of jurisdiction. In this claim, the Officers seek to compel the Commission Parties, by writ of mandamus, to withdraw the disciplinary actions (i.e., the warning and reprimands) because, they contend, the issuance of the actions constitute ultra vires conduct. In the trial court, and now on appeal, the Officers assert that the Commission officials “acted without legal authority” in issuing the warning and reprimands because there is no Commission rule or statute that authorizes the Commission to discipline officers for failing to
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adequately conduct or supervise backgrounds checks on prospective hires.
Because whether the Officers have pleaded a valid ultra vires claim depends on the scope of the Commission officials’ authority to discipline officers, see Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 234 (Tex. 2017), we begin our jurisdictional analysis by reviewing the relevant statutes.
Chapter 1701 of the Occupations Code requires the Commission to establish
minimum standards with respect to the creation and continued operation of law enforcement agencies, see Tex. Occ. Code § 1701.163, and to establish reporting standards and procedures for, among other things, the employment and the
termination of peace officers, id. § 1701.153(a)(1). As to the licensing of officers, the statute grants the Commission the authority “to establish minimum standards relating to competence and reliability.” Id. § 1701.151(2).
Section 1701.501, titled “Disciplinary Action,” states in subsection (a) that the Commission “shall revoke or suspend a license, place on probation a person whose license has been suspended, or reprimand a license holder for a violation of [Chapter 1701] . . . [or] a commission rule.” Id. § 1701.501(a). In addition, with limited exception not applicable here, the Commission is required to “revoke or suspend a law enforcement agency’s authority to employ a license holder, place on probation an agency whose authority to employ a license holder has been
suspended, or reprimand a law enforcement agency for a violation described by Subsection (a).” Id. § 1701.501(a-1); see also id. § 1701.507 (authorizing
administrative penalties). Finally, Section 1701.501, subsection (c), provides that the Commission “by rule may adopt other necessary enforcement procedures.” Id. § 1701.501(c).
Related to its authority to discipline, the Commission is also entitled to
access certain records maintained by law enforcement agencies, id. § 1701.162(a),
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and must audit law enforcement agencies at least once every five years, id. § 1701.162(b). Under Commission rules, if deficiencies are identified during the audit, the law enforcement agency is expected to correct the deficiencies, 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 211.26(d), (e) (Tex. Comm’n on Law Enf’t, Law Enforcement
Agency Audits), and the failure to correct deficiencies may result in disciplinary action, id. § 211.26(g).
In this case, the Commission contends that the Officers are subject to
reprimand under Section 1701.501 due to their violation of Chapter 1701,
specifically, Section 1701.451. That provision, titled “Preemployment Procedure,” states that “before a law enforcement agency may hire a licensed person” it must submit to the Commission, written confirmation that “to the best of [its] ability,” it obtained and reviewed certain background information about the potential hire.6 Tex. Occ. Code § 1701.451(a). The head of a law enforcement agency, or the
agency head’s designee, must review and sign each confirmation form before
submission to the Commission. Id. § 1701.451(f).
The Commission asserts that the Officers involved in Cortez’s hiring
violated Section 1701.451 by failing to obtain preemployment “proof that [Cortez] me[t] the minimum qualifications for enrollment in a training program.” Id. § 1701.451(a)(3)(B)(iv); see also id. § 1701.151(2) (authorizing Commission to establish minimum standards for licensure of peace officers). Specifically, according to the letters to the Officers, the Commission’s audit and subsequent investigation revealed that the Officers had failed to confirm that Cortez “has never
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In addition, the head of the law enforcement agency (or its designee) must review and sign the confirmation form before submitting it to the Commission, and the failure of an agency head or the agency’s designee to sign the review and sign confirmation constitutes grounds for suspension of the agency head’s license. Tex. Occ. Code § 1701.451(f).
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been convicted or placed on community supervision in any court of an offense involving family violence.” See 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 217.1(b)(7) (Tex. Comm’n on Law Enf’t, Minimum Standards for Enrollment and Initial Licensure). Conversely, in their pleadings and now on appeal, the Officers allege that the Commission acted ultra vires by bringing disciplinary actions under Section 1701.501 because, in their view, nothing in Chapter 1701 or the Commission’s rules requires individual officers, as opposed to the hiring law enforcement agency, to conduct an adequate pre-employment background check. Based on the plain
language of the relevant statutory provisions, we disagree.
As outlined above, in Chapter 1701, the legislature has expressly granted the Commission broad authority to set minimum standards relating to Officer
competence and reliability. Further, the legislature has put the onus, at least in part, on law enforcement agencies to properly vet potential hires to ensure that they meet these eligibility standards. Because a law enforcement agency acts through its individual officers, we conclude that Section 1701.451 necessarily requires the individual officers involved in hiring to ensure that a potential hire meets eligibility standards. In sum, based on the plain language of Section 1701.451, and
considering the statute as whole, we conclude that individual officers may be disciplined under Section 1701.501 for failing to properly vet potential hires. Consequently, the Officers failed to plead facts demonstrating that the Commission officials acted ultra vires by reprimanding them for hiring Cortez, and the trial court did not err in granting the Commission Parties’ plea to the jurisdiction on this claim. The Officers’ first issue on appeal is overruled.
Procedural Due Process
Next, we consider the Officers’ alternative claim that Chapter 1701’s
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disciplinary scheme, as applied through Commission “rules, procedures, and
regulations” is unconstitutional. The Officers assert that the warning and reprimands “adversely affect their licenses” and that to the extent Chapter 1701 does not provide any mechanism for challenging the reprimands, the statute
violates procedural and substantive due process rights. See Mex. Am. Leg. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d at 698.
The U.S. Constitution prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV., § 1. The Texas Constitution similarly protects “a citizen of this State” against the deprivation of “life, liberty, [or] property . . . except by the due course of law of the land.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. Courts have recognized that the terms “due course of law” and “due process” do not have any meaningful distinction. Mosley v Tex. Health & Hum. Servs., 593 S.W.3d 250, 264 (Tex. 2019).
When analyzing a due process claim, we must first determine whether the
claimant has a liberty or property interest that is entitled to procedural due process protection. Id.; Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dept. v. RW Trophy Ranch, Ltd., 712
S.W.3d 943, 954 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025, no pet.) (quoting Honors Acad., Inc. v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 555 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Tex. 2018). Here, the Officers contend that they have a constitutionally protected interest in their peace officer licenses, and for purposes of this opinion, we assume that they do. See Mosley, 595 S.W.3d at 264 (“Included among the protected liberty interests is the right ‘to engage in any of the common occupations of life.’” (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972))); see also Scally v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Examr’s, 351 S.W.3d 434, 446 (Tex App.—Austin 2011, pet. denied)
(recognizing constitutionally protected property right in medical license, “subject to the state’s power to impose conditions upon the granting or revocation of the
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license for the protection of society”).
If the government deprives an individual of a property right, we must
determine what process is due. Mosely, 593 S.W.3d at 264. Here, the Officers’ undisputed allegations establish that they were not provided with an opportunity to be heard and to challenge the reprimands, before or after they were issued. See Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Hous. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995)
(explaining that “[d]ue process at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”). As a result, the Officers were not provided with any process in connection with the reprimands. Nevertheless, the Commission argues that the Officers have failed to allege a viable due process claim because the “reprimands had no effect on their peace officer license.” In effect, the Commission argues that the reprimands do not constitute deprivations of the Officers’ protected property rights because the Commission has not formally sought to suspend or revoke their licenses. In the Commission’s view, until formal action is instituted to suspend or revoke a peace officer license, an officer cannot be deprived of his license, and thus no process is due.
We agree with the Commission Parties’ assertion that the issuance of the
warning and reprimands did not deprive or seek to deprive the Officers of their property interest in their peace officer licenses. We recognize, as the Officers point out, that the reprimands may cause the Commission to suspend their licenses in the future under Rule 223.15. That Rule provides that “[t]he [C]ommission may suspend the license of a person who has previously received two written
reprimands from the [C]ommission.” See 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 223.15(g) (Tex. Comm’n on Law Enf’t, License Suspension). There is no dispute, however, that if the Commission seeks to suspend their license under Rule 223.15, the Officers
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would then be statutorily entitled to a SOAH hearing under Section 1701.504. That provision, titled “Hearing,” provides that, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, a person is entitled to a hearing conducted by SOAH if the Commission proposes to (1) suspend their license; (2) revoke their license, or (3) refuse to renew their license. Tex. Occ. Code § 1701.504. Presumably, at that SOAH hearing, the Officers could challenge the underlying reprimands, and to the extent they are not provided with a meaningful opportunity to do so, the Officers could then challenge Rule 223.15, as applied, on grounds that it violates due process. However, at the reprimand stage, we cannot conclude that due process rights attach. See Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs v. Messonnier, No. 15-24-00102-CV, 2026 WL 114254, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Jan. 15, 2026, no pet.) (concluding that due process right did not attach at informal-conference stage because conference committee could not revoke license and appellant’s license was not at risk unless formal complaint was made). Consequently, the Officers have failed to allege facts that, if true, show that they have been deprived of any property interest in their peace officer license. As a result, Officers have failed to plead a valid due process claim or due course of law claim, and the trial court did not err in granting the Commission’s plea to the jurisdiction on these claims.
Right to a Hearing under Section 1701.504
In a related issue on appeal, the Officers assert that the trial court erred in concluding that the Officers were not statutorily entitled to a hearing to challenge the reprimands under Section 1701.504. Although the Officers acknowledge that Section 1701.504 “does not explicitly provide a procedure for reprimands,” they argue that the trial court erred in concluding that a “reprimand” is not a
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“suspen[sion] or revo[cation],” as those terms are used in Section 1701.504. In the Officers’ view, the trial court’s interpretation of Section 1701.504 results in a violation of their right to due process. Because we conclude that the reprimands— standing alone or when considered in conjunction with Rule 223.15—did not
“deprive” the Officers of their property rights in their licenses, we likewise conclude that the trial court’s interpretation of Section 1701.504, which is consistent with its plain language, does not violate the Officers due process rights. We overrule the Officers’ fourth appellate issue.
Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection
The Officers also contend that the trial court erred in dismissing for want of jurisdiction their substantive due process claims and equal protection claims. To establish a substantive due process deprivation of property, a party must prove (1) he had a constitutional protectable property right, and (2) the government deprived him of that interest arbitrarily. County of Dallas v. Wiland, 216 S.W.3d 344, 360 (Tex. 2007) (explaining that if claim challenges non-legislative action and property interest being deprived is “fundamental” under Constitution, “then substantive due process protects the plaintiff from arbitrary or irrational deprivation” (quoting Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142 (3rd Cir. 2000)). While property interests are protected by procedural due process, “not every [property] right is entitled to the protection of substantive due process.” Tex. S. Univ. v. Villarreal, 620 S.W.3d 899, 909 (Tex. 2021) (citing Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)); Wiland, 216 S.W.3d at 360 (explaining that if interest being asserted is not “fundamental,” then “the government action is entirely outside the ambit of substantive due process”).
Assuming without deciding that the Officers have a property interest in their
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peace officer licenses that is protected by substantive due process, we cannot conclude that the Officers have sufficiently pleaded a valid substantive due process claim. As previously discussed, the Officers have failed to allege facts that show that the warning and reprimands deprived them of any property interest in their peace officer licenses. In addition, the Officers have failed to allege any facts suggesting that the Commission acted arbitrarily in issuing the reprimands. See Wiland, 216 S.W.3d at 360.
To establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show that he or she was treated differently from others similarly situated. Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Employees Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 13 (2015). When neither a suspect classification nor fundamental right is involved, a claimant must also show that the challenged decision is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Id. Here, the Officers have failed to allege any facts that, if true, would demonstrate that they were similarly situated to others but were treated differently. That is, the Officers have failed to allege any facts that, if true, show that other officers were not, but could have been, reprimanded for failing to conduct
background checks or for hiring an officer with a disqualifying criminal history.
Because the allegations in the Officers’ pleading fail to demonstrate that
they have a valid substantive due process claim or a valid equal protection claim, the trial court did not err in granting the Commission Parties’ plea to the jurisdiction on these claims. We overrule the Officers’ second and third appellate issues.
Judicial Review under Section 1701.506
Finally, the Officers assert on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing their claims because they are entitled to appeal the reprimands under Section
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1701.506. That provision provides that “[a] person dissatisfied with an action of the commission may appeal the action under Chapter 2001, Government Code.”
Tex. Occ. Code § 1701.506. Chapter 2001 of the Government Code, also known
as the Administrative Procedure Act, provides that a person is entitled judicial review when he or she has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and is “aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.171 (emphasis added). Here, even assuming that the warning and
reprimands constitute “final decisions,” they are not final decisions in a contested case. The Officers have failed to plead facts that, if true, demonstrate a waiver sovereign immunity under Section 1701.506. The trial court did not err in granting the Commission Parties’ jurisdictional challenge on this claim. 7 We overrule the Officers’ fifth appellate issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of the Officers’ issues on appeal, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
/s/ Scott K. Field
Scott K. Field
Justice
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In their appellants’ brief, the Officers argue in the alternative that even if they failed to plead facially valid ultra vires and constitutional claims, the trial court should have given them an opportunity to amend their pleadings before dismissing their claims. See Tex. Tech Univ. Sys. v. Martinez, 691 S.W.3d 415, 419 (Tex. 2024) (explaining that if pleadings lack sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate jurisdiction “but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to amend”). The jurisdictional issues presented—whether the Officers can be reprimanded under Chapter 1701 for failing to conduct an adequate background check and whether the reprimands deprived the Officers of their peace officer licenses—give rise to defects that cannot be cured by pleading additional facts. As a result, we conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing their suit without first giving them an opportunity to amend.
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Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.
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