10/06/2026
DA 23-0726
Case Number: DA 23-0726
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 235
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
BRANDON MICHAEL BECKMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. DDC 2022-41
Honorable Christopher D. Abbott, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Gregory E. Paskell, Attorney at Law, Lynnwood, Washington
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie Schulz, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Kevin Downs, Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Kathleen Jensen,
Deputy County Attorney, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 2, 2026
Decided: October 6, 2026
Filed:
Clerk
Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Brandon Michael Beckman appeals the October 24, 2023 judgment of the First
Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, entered after a jury convicted him of
deliberate homicide under the felony-murder provision of § 45-5-102(1)(b), MCA, and
tampering with physical evidence under § 45-7-207(1)(a), MCA. Beckman argues that the
State failed to present sufficient independent evidence to corroborate the testimony of
Robert John Harvel, who faced charges for the same offenses.
¶2 We address the following restated issue:
Whether the District Court erred by denying Beckman’s motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence at the close of the State’s case.
We conclude it did not and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 After cashing a $12,610.60 check in Great Falls on January 10, 2022, Michael Biggs
returned to East Helena early the next morning. Over the next two days, he spent time with
Beckman and Darcy Norris, a friend of Biggs who was staying at Beckman’s trailer. Biggs
supplied money for gambling and other purchases. Casino surveillance recordings showed
Biggs and Beckman gambling together on January 12.
¶4 Shortly after 8:00 a.m. on January 13, Biggs, Beckman, and Harvel arrived in
Harvel’s Saturn at Magic Diamond Casino. Beckman wore a distinctive stocking cap with
green and black mohawk fringe. Surveillance recordings showed the three men leaving
together at 9:14 a.m. Harvel drove, Biggs occupied the front passenger seat, and Beckman
sat behind him. This was the last recorded sighting of Biggs alive.
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¶5 Later that morning, Bill Brewer, his wife, and their son helped two men free a car
stuck in the snow on the access road near Moose Creek Campground off Rimini Road.
Brewer described the passenger as wearing shorts and a distinctive mohawk-fringed
stocking cap. That man paced and communicated with the driver while the family helped
with the car. Brewer described the men as edgy and in a hurry. After the family pulled the
car free, the two men drove away quickly despite the icy conditions.
¶6 Later, on January 13, Beckman purchased James Cooper’s Nissan Xterra. Cooper
testified that Beckman paid $1,000 in cash and promised another $500. Norris later rode
with Beckman in the vehicle. She testified that Beckman said he had “done a lick”
involving what she described as a “jewelry heist type thing.” She understood him to be
describing an illegal way to obtain money. Beckman bought her clothing, supplied her
with gambling money, and told her that he had about $4,000 left.
¶7 Around noon on January 14, two people looking for snowmobile trails discovered
Biggs’s body near the same access road. Biggs lay face down, partially covered by a
blanket and snow. Investigators found a large pool of blood beside the road. Drag marks
and a blood trail led across the road toward the body. Tire tracks showed places where a
car had been stuck in the snow.
¶8 Biggs had died from a close-range gunshot to the back of his head. One boot had
been removed and lay apart from his body, and his left front pants pocket had been pulled
inside out. Because the body was frozen, the medical examiner could not determine the
date or time of death.
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¶9 Officers interviewed Beckman on January 16, and the State played an edited audio
recording of that interview at trial. Beckman initially said that Harvel and Biggs had
dropped him at his trailer after they left the casino. When asked when he last saw Harvel,
Beckman identified that morning’s drop-off and said Harvel had not returned. After the
officers described the roadside encounter and distinctive cap, Beckman acknowledged the
trip and the family’s help freeing the car. He said he had not realized that the location was
Rimini and thought it was near Broadwater. He maintained that Biggs did not accompany
them on that trip. According to Beckman, Harvel first dropped him at home, later returned
alone, and said he had dropped Biggs off elsewhere. Beckman eventually described
additional stops with Harvel and seeing him at the casino later that day. He denied
witnessing the killing or helping conceal Biggs’s body.
¶10 Officers recovered Beckman’s mohawk-fringed cap and a stick from Harvel’s car.
DNA testing of material from the stick matched Beckman. Officers also recovered $1,640
from Harvel, including a bloodstained $100 bill. Testing of material from the bill yielded
a mixed DNA profile with a partial major profile consistent with Beckman. Officers
recovered $455 from Beckman when they detained him.
¶11 The State charged Beckman and Harvel with deliberate homicide or, alternatively,
felony murder with robbery as the underlying felony, and with tampering with physical
evidence. On the State’s motion, the District Court ordered Harvel to testify at Beckman’s
trial and granted him use immunity for his compelled testimony and information directly
or indirectly derived from it. Harvel’s charges remained pending when he testified at
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Beckman’s trial, which began on July 31, 2023. He acknowledged that he initially had
denied going to the area where investigators found Biggs.
¶12 Harvel testified that Beckman directed him to drive to the access road to meet
someone who would supply methamphetamine. According to Harvel, the three men used
methamphetamine after arriving. Beckman asked Biggs to switch seats with him. Harvel
testified that the two got out of the car and Beckman shot Biggs in the head. When asked
to describe what he saw and heard, Harvel said he heard a loud bang and saw Biggs fall.
Harvel also testified that Beckman took cash from Biggs’s sock or boot.
¶13 Harvel further testified that the car became stuck as they attempted to leave.
Beckman directed Harvel at gunpoint to help move Biggs’s body. Harvel described
carrying the upper part of Biggs’s body while Beckman carried his legs and directed where
they should go. Harvel testified that Beckman then covered the body with a blanket from
the car and that he believed Beckman pushed snow onto the blanket. After further efforts
to free the car, Harvel flagged down the passing family. Harvel testified that, after they
left, Beckman bought the Xterra and gave him some of the money taken from Biggs.
¶14 At the close of the State’s case, Beckman moved for a directed verdict, arguing that
Harvel’s testimony lacked sufficient corroboration and that the remaining evidence could
not support a conviction. His written motion invoked §§ 46-16-403 and -213, MCA, and
challenged the independent evidence connecting him to the offenses, including the
evidence of when Biggs died. The District Court distinguished the corroboration question
from the question whether the State could prove the offenses without Harvel’s testimony.
The court nevertheless set Harvel’s testimony aside and concluded that the remaining
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evidence, viewed in the State’s favor, would allow a rational jury to find Beckman guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. It relied on the surveillance recordings, the roadside encounter,
the discovery of Biggs’s body, the evidence concerning money and Beckman’s subsequent
expenditures, and Norris’s testimony about a “lick.” The court denied the motion.
¶15 Beckman presented no additional evidence. On August 9, 2023, the jury acquitted
him of deliberate homicide under § 45-5-102(1)(a), MCA, but found him guilty of felony
murder and tampering with physical evidence. For felony murder, the jury found that
Beckman committed or was legally accountable for a robbery during which Beckman,
Harvel, or both caused Biggs’s death. The District Court sentenced him to 100 years at the
Montana State Prison for felony murder and a concurrent ten-year term for tampering, with
no time suspended.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶16 A motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case is a motion to dismiss
for insufficient evidence under § 46-16-403, MCA. We review its denial de novo,
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Kirn, 2012 MT 69, ¶¶ 8-10, 364 Mont. 356, 274 P.3d 746. The
jury determines the credibility of witnesses and the weight of conflicting testimony. State
v. McWilliams, 2008 MT 59, ¶¶ 36-37, 341 Mont. 517, 178 P.3d 121.
¶17 Whether independent evidence sufficiently corroborates an accomplice’s testimony
presents a question of law, which we review for correctness. We consider the corroborating
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evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Tollie, 2022 MT 59, ¶ 12,
408 Mont. 129, 506 P.3d 1021.
DISCUSSION
¶18 Whether the District Court erred by denying Beckman’s motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence at the close of the State’s case.
¶19 Section 46-16-213, MCA, prohibits a conviction based on the testimony of a person
responsible or legally accountable for the same offense unless other evidence, considered
independently of that person’s testimony, tends to connect the defendant with the offense.
The parties do not dispute on appeal that Harvel’s testimony required corroboration.
Instruction 32 told the jury that, if it found Harvel legally accountable, it should view his
testimony with distrust and require independent corroboration. Proof merely showing the
offense or its circumstances would not suffice. We must determine as a matter of law
whether the evidence supplied the required connection to each offense of which Beckman
was convicted.
¶20 Beckman relies on State v. Paulson, 250 Mont. 32, 46, 817 P.2d 1137, 1145-46
(1991), overruled on other grounds by Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, ¶ 20, 343 Mont. 90,
183 P.3d 861. Paulson requires corroborative evidence that is independent, points toward
the defendant’s guilt, and supplies a legally sufficient connection between the defendant
and the offense. Those substantive requirements remain applicable. Beckman argues that
the evidence the District Court identified did not satisfy them. Our review concerns the
ultimate ruling on the motion to dismiss, and we decide the corroboration question de novo.
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See Tollie, ¶ 23. We therefore consider whether the independent evidence satisfied the
statutory requirement.
¶21 Independent evidence that merely establishes that a crime occurred, describes its
circumstances, or raises only a suspicion of the defendant’s involvement or opportunity to
commit it does not suffice. But corroboration need not independently establish a prima
facie case or prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It may be circumstantial, may come
from the defendant’s own statements, and does not fail merely because it is disputed or
possibly consistent with innocent conduct. State v. Burkhart, 2004 MT 372, ¶ 24,
325 Mont. 27, 103 P.3d 1037. The required connection must arise from the independent
evidence itself rather than from the accomplice’s explanation of otherwise unconnected
facts. Tollie, ¶ 15.
¶22 The corroboration inquiry and the ultimate sufficiency inquiry thus serve different
purposes. To decide whether the State satisfied § 46-16-213, MCA, a court considers the
other evidence without using the accomplice’s testimony to supply the missing connection.
Although the jury resolves competing factual explanations, we must first determine as a
matter of law whether the independent evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, tends to connect Beckman to each offense. The possibility that the jury could
disbelieve Beckman’s account does not substitute for that independent connection. Section
46-16-213, MCA; Tollie, ¶¶ 12, 15; Burkhart, ¶ 24. Once sufficient independent
corroboration exists, however, the court considers the accomplice’s testimony along with
the other evidence when deciding whether a rational jury could find guilt beyond a
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reasonable doubt. Requiring the independent evidence alone to establish every element
would demand more than the corroboration statute requires. Burkhart, ¶ 24; Kirn, ¶ 10.
¶23 Here, the independent evidence did more than place Beckman in Biggs’s company
at some unspecified time before Biggs died. The surveillance recordings established that
Biggs was alive when he left the casino with Beckman and Harvel on the morning of
January 13. Later that morning, Brewer encountered the two men at the access road where
investigators found the blood pool, drag marks, and concealed body the next day. The
distinctive cap and Beckman’s own description of becoming stuck and receiving help
connected him to that encounter without any reliance on Harvel’s testimony. Beckman’s
account of his continued contact with Harvel also changed materially. He first identified
the morning drop-off as their last contact and said Harvel had not returned; he later
acknowledged the trip to the access road and described further activities with Harvel that
day. The inconsistency appeared in Beckman’s own statements and concerned his
movements during the period surrounding Biggs’s disappearance, not a collateral matter.
We consider that material inconsistency together with the independently established
sequence of events in deciding whether the State satisfied the corroboration requirement.
¶24 The evidence concerning money added a connection to the robbery. Biggs had
recently cashed a substantial check and had supplied Beckman with gambling money.
After the roadside encounter, Beckman paid $1,000 in cash for a vehicle, funded purchases
and gambling for Norris, and described having approximately $4,000 remaining.
Investigators found Biggs with a fatal gunshot wound, one boot removed, and a pocket
turned out. Considered together, these circumstances supported an inference that Beckman
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participated in taking Biggs’s money in connection with his death. That inference arose
from the sequence of independently established events and the physical evidence, not from
Harvel’s explanation of otherwise unrelated conduct.
¶25 The laboratory evidence did not establish when or how Beckman’s DNA reached
the bloodstained bill or whether the bill belonged to Biggs. The independent connection
rests on the combined evidence of the men’s movements, the condition of Biggs’s body
and clothing, Beckman’s subsequent access to and use of cash, and his changing account
of his contact with Harvel.
¶26 Beckman correctly points out that Norris’s account of his reference to a “lick”
involved jewelry, not an express admission to robbing Biggs. She repeatedly testified that
Beckman described something involving jewelry. We therefore do not treat the word
“lick” as an admission to the charged robbery or use the claimed illegal conduct involving
jewelry as proof that he committed this offense. Beckman also attributed his money to
gifts, gambling winnings, savings, loans, and sales of property. Our conclusion does not
depend on an assumption that he had no money before the trip. Those explanations did not
require the court to disregard his expenditures and his statement that approximately $4,000
remained, considered with the other corroborating circumstances. A possible alternative
explanation did not eliminate the connection supplied by the combined independent
evidence. Burkhart, ¶ 24. The State retained the burden of proving the charged offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt; Beckman had no burden to prove an alternative source for the
money.
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¶27 The medical examiner’s inability to determine a date or time of death likewise did
not defeat corroboration. The State did not establish the time of the shooting through the
autopsy, and we do not assume that it did. The surveillance recordings, the roadside
encounter later that morning, and the discovery of the body the next day supplied a
circumstantial sequence independent of Harvel. Beckman maintained that Biggs did not
accompany him and Harvel on the trip to the access road. We do not treat his interview as
an admission to the contrary or adopt the premise that the travel-time estimates ruled out
every intervening stop. Those limitations did not require the court to disregard the
sequence, the physical evidence, and the evidence of Beckman’s conduct afterward.
Considered together, that evidence tended to connect him to the robbery and death without
a medically established time of death.
¶28 Beckman also emphasizes the absence of a recovered firearm, eyewitness testimony
from a non-accomplice to the shooting or robbery, and forensic evidence identifying him
as the shooter. Section 46-16-213, MCA, does not require corroboration in any one of
those forms. Circumstantial evidence may supply the necessary connection. Burkhart,
¶ 24. Similarly, the State did not have to recover an amount equal to the check Biggs had
cashed. Biggs had spent and distributed money before his death, and Beckman made
expenditures after the roadside encounter. The difference between the check amount and
the cash later recovered did not negate the connection supplied by the combined evidence.
¶29 Our decision in State v. Matt, 2025 MT 264, 425 Mont. 30, 579 P.3d 530, illustrates
the distinction. There, the defendant’s presence in another person’s car, association with
that person, and activities shown in surveillance recordings did not independently connect
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him to the drugs found in the car. The incriminating significance of those circumstances
depended on the accomplice’s account. Matt, ¶¶ 24-27. Beckman’s presence and
association, standing alone, likewise would not suffice. Here, however, the independent
evidence connected his departure with Biggs, his subsequent activities at the location of
the shooting and concealment, physical indications of a taking from Biggs, Beckman’s use
of substantial funds afterward, and his changing account of his continued contact with
Harvel. Those facts supplied a connection to the charged robbery without Harvel’s
account.
¶30 The tampering conviction requires its own consideration. Proof that Biggs’s body
had been moved from the blood pool and covered with a blanket and snow established
circumstances of concealment, but that proof alone did not identify Beckman as a
participant. Likewise, corroboration of the robbery did not automatically corroborate every
other act Harvel attributed to him. We must consider whether the independent evidence
also tended to connect Beckman to the concealment.
¶31 Ward testified that Beckman asked whether the body was buried in snow and that
Ward had not supplied that information during the interview. The question requires its
context. Before Beckman asked it, the officers had told him that Biggs had been shot in
the head near Rimini, that his body was close to where the car had been stuck, that a blood
trail was visible, and that the body had been dragged. While asking where the body had
been in relation to the car, Beckman asked, “Was he in - buried in the snow?” He also
asked whether Biggs had been in front of or beside the car and denied seeing the body.
Investigators had found snow placed over the body, but Beckman’s question was not an
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admission that he moved or covered Biggs. We do not characterize the question as
establishing knowledge available only to a participant in the concealment. Beckman’s
question about burial in snow was a circumstance the jury could consider with the other
evidence, including the information the officers already had supplied.
¶32 The independent connection to concealment rests on the circumstances together, not
on the snow question alone. Beckman left the casino with Biggs and Harvel and was at the
access road later that morning. Investigators found evidence there that Biggs had suffered
the fatal injury beside the road and that someone then moved his body away from it and
covered it. Brewer described Beckman’s pacing, the men’s edginess, and their hurried
departure. Beckman thereafter had substantial cash available, and his own account initially
omitted the trip and denied further contact with Harvel before he acknowledged both.
These were not merely facts confirming Harvel’s description of the scene. The blood trail
linked the location of the fatal injury to the place where someone moved and covered
Biggs’s body. The evidence of Beckman’s departure with Biggs, his conduct at that
location, his subsequent access to cash, and his materially changing account connected him
to the episode involving the fatal injury and taking. Viewed in the light most favorable to
the State, those circumstances, together with his question about burial in snow, supported
a further inference that Beckman participated in concealing the body before he and Harvel
left. That inference rests on the sequence of independently established events and the
physical evidence, not on an assumption that participation in the robbery necessarily
established participation in the concealment. The corroborating evidence need not
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independently establish every act of moving or covering the body. Burkhart, ¶ 24. The
State satisfied the corroboration requirement for tampering as well as felony murder.
¶33 With sufficient independent corroboration for each offense, we consider Harvel’s
testimony together with the other evidence in reviewing the denial of the motion to dismiss.
His inconsistent accounts and claim that Beckman threatened him gave the defense grounds
to challenge his credibility. Corroboration did not resolve those credibility questions; the
jury still had to assess his testimony and determine whether the State proved the offenses.
The question on the motion to dismiss was whether the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, allowed a rational jury to find the elements of the offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt. Kirn, ¶ 10.
¶34 Under § 45-5-102(1)(b), MCA (2021), a person commits felony murder when the
person commits or attempts to commit robbery or is legally accountable for its commission
or attempted commission, and the person or another person legally accountable for the
crime causes a death in the course of the felony or flight afterward. Robbery includes
inflicting bodily injury in the course of committing a theft. Section 45-5-401(1)(a), MCA
(2021). Harvel’s account of the shooting and taking of Biggs’s cash, considered with the
independent evidence, permitted a rational jury to find that the fatal shooting supplied the
force by which Biggs’s money was taken and that Biggs died in the course of a robbery in
which Beckman participated. If the jury found that Beckman committed or was legally
accountable for the robbery, it did not also have to identify Beckman, rather than Harvel,
as the person who fired the shot.
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¶35 Section 45-7-207(1)(a), MCA (2021), prohibits a person who believes an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to begin from altering, destroying,
concealing, or removing a thing with the purpose of impairing its verity or availability in
that proceeding or investigation. Instructions 20 and 21 required the State to prove that
Beckman believed an investigation or proceeding was about to begin and acted with that
purpose. Harvel’s testimony that Beckman helped move Biggs’s body and covered it with
a blanket, together with the scene evidence and the other corroborating circumstances,
allowed a rational jury to find those elements. The jury could infer from the killing,
robbery, and efforts to hide the body that Beckman anticipated an investigation and
intended to impair the body’s availability as evidence.
¶36 The District Court reached the correct result when it denied Beckman’s motion. We
may affirm a correct result without adopting every part of the court’s reasoning. State v.
Fredericks, 2024 MT 226, ¶ 16, 418 Mont. 220, 557 P.3d 32. Because sufficient
independent evidence corroborated Harvel’s testimony, and the evidence as a whole
supported submission of both offenses to the jury, we need not decide the State’s alternative
contention that the evidence would have supported both convictions without Harvel’s
testimony.
CONCLUSION
¶37 Independent evidence tended to connect Beckman to the robbery resulting in
Biggs’s death and to the concealment of his body. With that corroboration, Harvel’s
testimony and the other evidence were sufficient to permit a rational jury to find Beckman
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guilty of felony murder and tampering with physical evidence. The District Court did not
err by denying the motion to dismiss.
¶38 Affirmed.
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ JIM RICE
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