10/06/2026
DA 25-0183
Case Number: DA 25-0183
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 234
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
ELIAS WILLIAM YUSTE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. CDC-23-003
Honorable John A. Kutzman, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Tammy A. Hinderman, Appellate Defender Division Administrator,
Charlotte Lawson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Thad Tudor, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Michele Levine,
Matthew Robertson, Deputy County Attorneys, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 19, 2026
Decided: October 6, 2026
Filed:
Clerk
Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Elias William Yuste appeals the Eighth Judicial District Court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We address the
following issue:
Whether the District Court erred by denying Yuste’s motion to dismiss for violation
of his right to a speedy trial.
We conclude it did and reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Law enforcement arrested Yuste on December 19, 2022, initially in connection
with an alleged partner or family member assault against his girlfriend, Shawna Giachello.
Later that day, Giachello found partially used boxes of condoms and raspberry-flavored
sexual lubricant among Yuste’s belongings. Because she and Yuste had not used those
items in their relationship, Giachello asked her teenage daughter, G.L., whether Yuste had
harmed her. G.L. alleged that Yuste had subjected her to repeated sexual acts beginning
when the family lived in Wyoming and continuing after they moved to Montana.
On January 3, 2023, the State sought leave to file an Information charging Yuste with
one count of sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC) against G.L., in violation of
§ 45-5-503(1), MCA. The court maintained bail at $150,000. Yuste pleaded not guilty on
January 19, and the District Court set trial for April 17, 2023.
¶3 On March 1, 2023, the State moved to continue the April trial because discovery
remained incomplete. Defense counsel took no position on the motion, and the District
Court reset trial for June 12. Four days later—seventy-six days after his arrest—Yuste sent
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three jail kites to the District Court. In one, he invoked his speedy-trial right, objected that
the trial had been continued without his consent, and reported that appointed counsel had
met with him only once. Yuste could not post bail and remained at the Cascade County
Detention Center.
¶4 Officers had seized electronic devices from Yuste’s former residence on
February 7, 2023. On May 30, the State moved to continue the June 12 trial because
discovery remained ongoing and the State was “still waiting for forensic analysis of the
electronic devices.” Defense counsel did not object, and the District Court reset trial for
August 14. At the time of the motion, however, the electronic devices remained in local
evidence storage, officers had not obtained a warrant authorizing examination of their
contents, and no analyst had received them. Detective Angel Creech obtained the
content-search warrant and delivered the devices to Homeland Security Investigations
Agent Andrew Remington on July 18, 2023.1
¶5 On June 8, 2023, the State again moved to continue, stating that the forensic
analysis was incomplete and that the assigned prosecutor would be out of state during the
week of August 14. Defense counsel did not object, and the District Court reset trial for
October 2. In an August 16 omnibus memorandum, the parties stated that October 2 was
not viable and that the State remained awaiting forensic discovery. Four days before the
October setting, the State sought another continuance. The record contains two copies of
1
In its answer to a motion to compel, the State listed July 18, 2024, as the date on which Creech obtained the content-search warrant and delivered the devices for analysis, but Creech’s report and both parties’ chronology identify July 18, 2023, as the date those events occurred. We use the date on which the parties litigated the issue.
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the proposed order but not the motion. The State later represented that the continuance
accommodated a district-wide suspension of jury trials while the clerk and sheriff
addressed irregularities in forming the term jury pool. The District Court reset trial for
January 8, 2024.
¶6 On December 19, 2023, Creech received notice that the devices contained adult
pornography, computer-generated pornography, apparent child erotica, and apparent child
sexual abuse material involving children other than G.L. The discovery prompted a
separate investigation and referral of some images to the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children. Two days later, the State moved to continue the January trial because
forensic analysis remained underway and discovery remained incomplete. Defense
counsel did not object, and the District Court reset trial for April 15, 2024. The State later
explained that it had selected a federal analyst because the devices might contain evidence
of federally prosecutable crimes and that Remington’s deployments and other federal
assignments delayed his work.
¶7 Yuste continued to object personally. In a December 2023 letter, he stated that the
case had been continued repeatedly without his consent and that he had not heard from
counsel for approximately ten months. In February 2024, he filed a federal habeas petition
alleging ineffective assistance and denial of a speedy trial. On March 29, original counsel
Michael Kuntz moved to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Kuntz also moved to continue
the April 15 setting because discovery remained incomplete and requested a representation
hearing. At the April 4 hearing, Kuntz stated that Yuste wanted the speedy-trial motion
filed, that Kuntz believed the motion had merit, and that their relationship had reached an
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irretrievable breakdown. Yuste agreed. The District Court allowed Kuntz to withdraw as
Yuste’s counsel and continued trial to June 17 so the Office of State Public Defender could
appoint replacement counsel.
¶8 The Office of State Public Defender appointed Molly Woodman on May 1. On
June 3, Woodman moved to continue the June 17 trial because she needed time to review
the file, consult witnesses and experts, investigate potential issues, and prepare motions.
She acknowledged Yuste’s desire for a speedy trial but explained that the seriousness of
the charge required meaningful preparation. The District Court reset trial for September 9,
2024.
¶9 On August 27, Woodman moved to compel the forensic material that the State had
cited repeatedly in support of its continuance requests. At the September 4 motions
hearing, Woodman advised the District Court that the State had produced three clothed
photographs of G.L. during the preceding week and had produced the broader Homeland
Security material the day before. The newly produced material included approximately
1,100 images involving children other than G.L., about 150 pages of internet-search
history, and a small amount of material the State considered relevant to the SIWOC charge.
The State explained that Remington had worked over the preceding weekend to finish his
analysis and that Creech delivered the material as soon as she received it. The State offered
to proceed without the search history rather than risk another continuance. The District
Court excluded the search history because the timing did not permit the defense to prepare
and maintained the September 9 trial date.
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¶10 The District Court then heard the speedy-trial motion. Kuntz testified that he had
wanted the device evidence because geolocation information or photographs might assist
the defense. Yuste testified about the duration and conditions of his confinement. He
described chronic overcrowding; sleeping on a floor pad; recurring lockdowns; limited
access to showers, laundry, outdoor recreation, telephones, and tablets; temperature
problems; inadequate food; difficulty obtaining medical and mental-health care; and
interference with legal mail and attorney contact. Lieutenant Steve Grubb confirmed that
the jail was “always overfull,” that every general-population cell held three people, that
some detainees slept on floor pads, that the jail lacked a tablet for every detainee, and that
outdoor recreation occurred on a schedule. Grubb also testified that detainees received
three daily meals and had access to medical personnel, telephones, showers, laundry, and
day-room exercise. Creech testified that the discovery of suspected child sexual abuse
material caused a separate investigation, that Remington’s federal deployments caused
delay, and that she communicated with him frequently.
¶11 The District Court denied the motion. It found that 630 days had elapsed, attributed
483 days to the State and 147 days to the defense, and classified all eight periods as
institutional delay. The court found that Yuste sincerely wanted an earlier trial. It also
found that the jail remained overcrowded, that the pod where Yuste spent most of his
confinement operated ten to twenty detainees over capacity, and that some detainees slept
on floor pads. The court nevertheless concluded that the conditions were no more
oppressive than the “baseline prejudice” of pretrial detention because Yuste had not been
held in solitary confinement or denied visitation or exercise. It found no delay-related
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anxiety and no impairment of the defense. The court concluded that Factors Two and Four
of the Ariegwe analysis favored the State strongly enough to outweigh the length of delay
and Yuste’s sincere desire for trial.
¶12 Trial began on September 9, 2024. The jury found Yuste guilty of SIWOC and
found that G.L. was younger than sixteen and Yuste was at least four years older when the
offense occurred. The District Court sentenced Yuste to 100 years at the Montana State
Prison, with none suspended, and awarded 752 days of credit for time served. Yuste timely
appealed the speedy-trial ruling.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13 A claimed speedy-trial violation presents a question of constitutional law. State v.
Larson, 2026 MT 55, ¶ 9, 427 Mont. 153, 586 P.3d 264; State v. Velasquez, 2016 MT 216,
¶ 6, 384 Mont. 447, 377 P.3d 1235. We review the District Court’s underlying factual
findings for clear error but review de novo whether the factual circumstances, evaluated
under the four-factor balancing test, establish a speedy-trial violation and whether the
District Court correctly interpreted and applied the law. Larson, ¶ 9; Velasquez, ¶ 6; State
v. Zimmerman, 2014 MT 173, ¶ 11, 375 Mont. 374, 328 P.3d 1132; State v. Ariegwe,
2007 MT 204, ¶ 119, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815.
DISCUSSION
¶14 Whether the District Court erred by denying Yuste’s motion to dismiss for violation
of his right to a speedy trial.
¶15 Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution guarantees an accused “the right
to a speedy public trial.” The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
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Constitution provide a corresponding federal guarantee. Our analysis, however, rests on
the Montana Constitution. Although Ariegwe drew guidance from Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), Montana’s test is grounded in Article II, Section 24,
of the Montana Constitution, which provides protection independent of the federal
minimum. Ariegwe, ¶ 35. Because Yuste prevails under the Montana Constitution, we
need not separately analyze his federal claim.
¶16 Under Ariegwe, we balance four related considerations: (1) the length of delay;
(2) the reasons for delay; (3) the accused’s responses to delay; and (4) prejudice to the
accused. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 34, 112–13; State v. Burnett, 2022 MT 10, ¶ 17, 407 Mont. 189,
502 P.3d 703. No factor decides the case alone, and the weight of each factor depends on
the record. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 102, 105. The analysis is not mechanical. It must preserve the
constitutional force of the right in light of the particular delay, the State’s diligence, the
accused’s conduct, and the prejudice the delay produced.
Factor One: Length of Delay
¶17 The first factor asks whether the interval between accusation and disposition
reached 200 days and, if so, how far the delay extended beyond that threshold. Ariegwe,
¶¶ 43, 107. The parties agree that 630 days elapsed between Yuste’s arrest and trial—430
days beyond the trigger. Fault does not reduce that calculation. Ariegwe, ¶ 62. The
defense-attributable periods matter under Factor Two, but the entire 630-day interval
determines the magnitude of the State’s burden.
¶18 As delay lengthens, the presumption of prejudice intensifies, the State’s obligation
to justify delay grows heavier, and the quantum of proof expected from the accused
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decreases. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 49, 56, 61–62. A delay approximately twice the trigger requires
“particularly compelling” justification under Factor Two and a “highly persuasive”
showing of no prejudice under Factor Four. Ariegwe, ¶ 123; Larson, ¶ 13. Yuste’s delay
exceeded the trigger by more than twice the amount at issue in Ariegwe. Factor One weighs
strongly in his favor.
Factor Two: Reasons for Delay
¶19 Under Factor Two, we identify the periods that postponed trial, attribute each
period to the responsible party, and weigh the period according to its cause and motive.
Ariegwe, ¶¶ 63–67; Burnett, ¶¶ 21–22. The State bears the burden of explaining pretrial
delay. Burnett, ¶ 21. Delay defaults to the State unless the accused caused it or
affirmatively waived the right for the period at issue. Burnett, ¶ 21. Deliberate delay
weighs most heavily against the State. Ariegwe, ¶ 67; Burnett, ¶ 22. Negligence or lack
of diligence receives less weight than bad faith but remains an unacceptable reason for
delay. Ariegwe, ¶ 69; Burnett, ¶ 22. Institutional delay—delay inherent in the justice
system and largely beyond the parties’ control—also weighs against the State, though less
heavily. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 67–72; Burnett, ¶ 22. We consider only conduct that caused a trial
setting to move. Larson, ¶ 14.
¶20 The State argues that Yuste’s counsel conceded that all State-attributable delay was
institutional. The transcript does not support that reading. Woodman described the delay
associated with replacing counsel and preparing for trial as institutional. Her separate
statement that she saw no evidence of intentional State delay did not concede that the State
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had acted diligently. Negligence or lack of diligence remains a distinct, unacceptable
reason for delay. Burnett, ¶ 22.
¶21 The first 119 days, from arrest to the April 17, 2023 trial setting, constitute ordinary
institutional delay attributable to the State. The next fifty-six days, from April 17 to
June 12, also constitute State-attributable institutional delay caused by incomplete
discovery. Yuste does not challenge those classifications. The combined 175 days weigh
lightly against the State.
¶22 The third period—the sixty-three days from June 12 to August 14—does not
qualify as ordinary institutional delay. When the State moved on May 30 to continue trial
because it was “still waiting” for forensic analysis, it had possessed the devices for 112
days but had neither secured the content-search warrant nor delivered the devices to an
analyst. The State offered no explanation for that inaction. The resulting continuance did
not stem from an analyst’s unavoidable processing time. It stemmed from the State’s
failure to begin the process.
¶23 Our precedent distinguishes delay inherent in forensic processing from delay
caused by the State’s failure to initiate or pursue processing diligently. In Ariegwe, we
treated delay as lack of diligence when the State failed to deliver evidence for testing in a
timely manner. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 129, 154. In Velasquez, we held that a generalized reference
to a laboratory backlog did not justify delay when the State knew the accused wanted trial
and made no record that it investigated alternatives. Velasquez, ¶¶ 18–20. Yuste invoked
his right before the May 30 motion, and the State supplied no reason why the devices
remained unsubmitted for more than five months after seizure from February 7 until
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July 18, 2023. Period Three resulted from lack of diligence and weighs materially against
the State. The record does not establish bad faith, and we do not find it.
¶24 The fourth period—the forty-nine days from August 14 to October 2—also belongs
to the State. The June 8 motion again cited the incomplete forensic analysis, but it
identified an independent reason that the August 14 trial could not proceed: the assigned
prosecutor would be out of state that week. The record does not establish that the
incomplete analysis alone caused the entire forty-nine-day postponement. We therefore
treat the period as mixed State delay and assign it little weight.
¶25 The fifth period—the ninety-eight days from October 2, 2023, to January 8, 2024—
constitutes State-attributable institutional delay. The District Court found that a
district-wide jury-trial stand-down addressed defects in forming the term jury pool. The
omnibus memorandum also referenced the unfinished forensic work, but the stand-down
independently prevented a jury trial. Because the record supports the District Court’s
historical finding and the institutional cause actually prevented trial, we assign this period
little weight against the State.
¶26 The sixth period—the ninety-eight days from January 8 to April 15, 2024—also
constitutes State-attributable institutional delay but warrants separate consideration. By
December 19, 2023, the State knew that the forensic work had identified apparent child
sexual abuse material involving children other than G.L. and had generated a separate
investigation. Two days later, the State sought another continuance of the SIWOC trial
because the broader forensic examination remained unfinished. The State ultimately
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acknowledged that most of the material concerned other children and would not be offered
in this prosecution.
¶27 The State established that forensic analysts were scarce and that Remington had
competing federal assignments. Unlike Period Three, however, the State had obtained the
necessary warrant, transmitted the devices to Remington, and initiated the forensic
examination. Creech testified that Remington’s competing federal assignments delayed
his work and that discovery of suspected child sexual abuse material generated additional
investigative work. The record does not establish that transferring the partially completed
examination to another analyst or obtaining a partial report would have accelerated
completion. We therefore treat Period Six as institutional delay attributable to the State.
¶28 Kuntz had a legitimate strategic interest in potentially exculpatory geolocation or
photographic information, and his nonobjection tempers the weight assigned to the period.
His interest did not transfer the State’s constitutional obligation to move the prosecution
diligently or amount to Yuste’s affirmative waiver. Yuste continued to object personally.
Period Six nevertheless remains attributable to the State and weighs against it, although
less heavily than negligent delay. We need not and do not decide whether the State used
delay as plea leverage; the record does not establish intentional delay.
¶29 The District Court properly attributed the seventh period—the sixty-three days
from April 15 to June 17—to the defense. Kuntz sought the representation hearing, Kuntz
and Yuste agreed that communication had broken down, and the District Court could not
try Yuste with counsel who had been relieved days before trial. We generally attribute
delay resulting from substitution of defense counsel to the accused, absent evidence of a
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systemic breakdown in the public-defender system. State v. Kirn, 2023 MT 98, ¶¶ 29–30,
412 Mont. 309, 530 P.3d 1; State v. Redd, 2026 MT 30, ¶¶ 47–49, 426 Mont. 276, 584 P.3d
124. This record shows no gamesmanship by Yuste, and Kuntz—not Yuste—formally
initiated the representation hearing after acknowledging Yuste’s consistent desire for trial.
We therefore assign the period to Yuste but give it little adverse weight.
¶30 The District Court also properly attributed the eighth period—the eighty-four days
from June 17 to September 9—to the defense. Woodman had represented Yuste for
approximately one month when she moved to continue. Her motion cited the need to learn
the file, consult witnesses and experts, investigate issues, and prepare motions. It did not
identify Remington’s outstanding forensic report as the cause of the requested continuance.
New counsel’s preparation needs would have required a later setting regardless of the
report, and the late production did not move the September 9 trial because the District Court
excluded the search history. See Larson, ¶¶ 14, 20 (considering only conduct that caused
postponement). The period remains attributable to the defense, but counsel’s legitimate
preparation request receives little adverse weight.
¶31 The proper allocation thus remains 483 days to the State and 147 days to the
defense. The proper weighting does not. The sixty-three State-attributable days in Period
Three resulted from lack of diligence rather than ordinary institutional causes. The balance
of the State’s delay remains institutional or mixed and still weighs against the State, though
lightly. The defense periods arose from necessary counsel replacement and preparation,
not an effort to avoid trial. Factor Two favors Yuste.
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Factor Three: Yuste’s Responses to Delay
¶32 Factor Three examines the totality of the accused’s responses to determine whether
the accused actually wanted a speedy trial. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 80, 85, 110. We consider the
timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of objections; the reasons for any acquiescence;
whether counsel represented the accused; and the accused’s pretrial conduct. Ariegwe,
¶ 80. An assertion of the right carries strong evidentiary weight and guides the weight
assigned to the other factors. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 78, 110; Velasquez, ¶ 21.
¶33 Yuste invoked the right on Day 76, before the 200-day trigger and before the State’s
forensic-based continuances. He objected that the first continuance occurred without his
consent, repeated his objections in December 2023, sought federal habeas relief in
February 2024, pressed Kuntz to file the motion, and continued to request trial after
Woodman’s appointment. The District Court expressly found that he sincerely wanted an
earlier trial.
¶34 Kuntz’s interest in potentially exculpatory device evidence does not negate Yuste’s
response. Counsel had a duty to investigate evidence that might help the defense. An
accused does not surrender the speedy-trial right by demanding both timely prosecution
and competent preparation. The accused also bears no duty to advance the State’s
prosecution. Velasquez, ¶ 20; Zimmerman, ¶ 24. Yuste’s conduct differs from cases in
which the accused asserted the right late, repeatedly vacated priority settings, or engaged
in conduct inconsistent with a sincere desire for trial. See Redd, ¶¶ 54–57; Larson,
¶¶ 26–30. Factor Three weighs strongly in Yuste’s favor.
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Factor Four: Prejudice to Yuste
¶35 Factor Four assesses prejudice in light of three interests: preventing oppressive
pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern caused by unresolved charges, and
limiting the possibility that delay will impair the defense. Ariegwe, ¶ 88. These interests
are independent. Although impairment of the defense receives particular importance, its
absence does not defeat a claim when the record establishes oppressive incarceration or
undue anxiety and disruption. State v. Kurtz, 2019 MT 127, ¶ 41, 396 Mont. 80, 443 P.3d
479. Because the delay extended 430 days beyond the trigger, the State had to make a
highly persuasive showing that delay did not prejudice Yuste, while Yuste’s required
quantum of proof was correspondingly lower. Ariegwe, ¶ 123.
Oppressive Pretrial Incarceration
¶36 Whether incarceration became oppressive depends on all the circumstances, with
duration foremost. Ariegwe, ¶ 90. We consider the complexity of the charge, misconduct
by the accused directly related to confinement, the circumstances of bail, and the conditions
of incarceration, including overcrowding, recreation, food, climate control, medical care,
cleanliness, and legal-research capabilities. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 90–93; Velasquez, ¶ 28. The
longer the confinement, the more likely it becomes oppressive. Kurtz, ¶ 32.
¶37 Yuste remained incarcerated for all 630 days. No separate sentence or unrelated
detainer would have confined him regardless of this prosecution. The SIWOC charge was
serious and factually demanding: G.L. alleged repeated conduct over an extended period,
in multiple residences and two states. The bail record also contained contemporaneous
evidence concerning the charge’s seriousness, firearms, safety, and possible flight. Those
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considerations support substantial bail and reasonable preparation time. They do not
eliminate the prejudice caused by prolonged pretrial confinement when the accused could
not post bond.
¶38 The conditions add substantial weight. The District Court expressly found that the
jail remained overcrowded throughout Yuste’s stay; that the pod where he spent most of
his confinement operated ten to twenty detainees over capacity; that some detainees slept
on floor pads; that Yuste experienced temperature problems and found the meals
insufficient; that outdoor recreation was limited by scheduling; and that the jail did not
have enough tablets for every detainee. Grubb confirmed that the jail was always overfull,
that every general-population cell housed three people, and that detainees without beds
received floor pads. These were not isolated conditions during a brief detention; they
formed the setting of Yuste’s 630-day confinement.
¶39 The State presented evidence that the jail provided three meals a day, blankets,
showers, laundry, medical and mental-health personnel, telephones, some tablet access,
and day-room exercise. We do not disregard those services or accept every disputed detail
of Yuste’s testimony. We need not do so. The District Court’s express findings, together
with the undisputed duration, establish confinement materially more burdensome than
ordinary short-term detention.
¶40 The District Court used an unduly demanding benchmark when it emphasized that
Yuste had not experienced solitary confinement, a total denial of visitation, or a total denial
of exercise. Our precedent does not make any of those extreme conditions a prerequisite.
The question is oppression, not whether confinement independently amounted to cruel and
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unusual punishment. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 93–94. The court’s conclusion that “nothing in the
record” supported oppression also cannot be reconciled with its own express findings of
sustained overcrowding and floor sleeping. The State urges us to infer that the court
disbelieved Yuste categorically, but the court made specific findings drawn from both
Yuste’s testimony and Grubb’s corroboration. We rely on those findings rather than infer
a blanket credibility determination that would negate them.
¶41 The record is closer to Velasquez and Kurtz than to the cases on which the State
relies. In Velasquez, 309 days of confinement, combined with restricted outdoor access
and other jail conditions, established oppression under an intensified presumption.
Velasquez, ¶¶ 34–36. In Kurtz, 422 days in an overcrowded unit, together with other
personal consequences, established oppression even though the defense was not impaired.
Kurtz, ¶¶ 32–41. By contrast, the accused in Ariegwe spent only four days in pretrial
custody and conceded that it was not oppressive. Ariegwe, ¶ 144. In Redd, the accused
caused 455 of 613 days; his initial federal custody was inevitable because of his own
probation violation, and his conduct caused most of the remaining delay. Redd, ¶¶ 53,
59–60. In Larson, the State caused no negligent or deliberate delay, the accused identified
no harsh conditions, and a separate Department of Corrections commitment limited the
confinement attributable to the pending case. Larson, ¶¶ 30, 34, 38. Yuste endured 630
days attributable to this prosecution, under conditions the District Court found chronically
overcrowded. His incarceration was oppressive. We do not hold that overcrowding, floor
sleeping, or any other identified condition, standing alone, renders pretrial incarceration
oppressive. We consider those conditions together with the extraordinary duration of
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Yuste’s confinement and the intensified presumption of prejudice resulting from the
430-day post-trigger delay.
Anxiety and Concern
¶42 The second interest asks whether delay unduly prolonged the disruption of the
accused’s life or aggravated the anxiety inherent in a serious criminal accusation. Ariegwe,
¶ 97; Zimmerman, ¶ 32. Yuste testified that confinement prevented him from working,
disrupted workers’ compensation and medical care, complicated access to his property and
ability to retain counsel, limited communication with counsel and the outside world, and
caused extraordinary stress. Some of those consequences flowed initially from the
accusation, the bail decision, or actions by third parties rather than from prosecutorial
delay. The delay nevertheless prolonged those disruptions for nearly two years. Yuste’s
repeated demands for trial also provide objective evidence that the ongoing delay itself
concerned him. This interest weighs modestly in his favor.
Impairment of the Defense
¶43 The impairment interest favors the State. At the September 4 hearing, Yuste did
not identify a witness who became unavailable, evidence that disappeared, testimony that
changed because of delay, or a particular defense that the passage of time foreclosed.
Although excessive delay can compromise reliability in ways difficult to prove. Ariegwe,
¶¶ 99–100. The hearing record does not establish concrete impairment here. We do not
rely on memory lapses in testimony given after the District Court ruled; appellate review
of a speedy-trial ruling rests on the record before the court when it decided the motion.
Velasquez, ¶ 42.
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¶44 The absence of concrete defense impairment does not end the prejudice inquiry.
Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution protects against oppressive
incarceration and undue anxiety as well as impairment of the defense. Ariegwe, ¶ 88;
Kurtz, ¶ 41. The State made a persuasive showing on the third interest and established that
substantial bail had contemporaneous support. It did not make the highly persuasive
showing of no prejudice required after a 430-day post-trigger delay because the record
affirmatively establishes 630 days of oppressive pretrial incarceration and prolonged
personal disruption. Factor Four weighs in Yuste’s favor.
Balancing
¶45 We balance the factors together and in light of the surrounding circumstances.
Ariegwe, ¶¶ 112–13, 153. Factor One weighs strongly in Yuste’s favor because the delay
extended 430 days beyond the trigger. Factor Two weighs in his favor because the State
caused 483 days, including sixty-three days through lack of diligence, while the 147
defense-attributable days arose from legitimate counsel-replacement and preparation needs
and receive little adverse weight. Factor Three weighs strongly in Yuste’s favor because
he invoked the right on Day 76 and persisted. Factor Four weighs in his favor because the
State did not overcome the prejudice of 630 days of oppressive detention, although Yuste
did not prove concrete impairment of the defense.
¶46 Ariegwe does not support affirmance on this record. There, significant State lack
of diligence accompanied a 408-day delay, but the accused spent only four days in custody
and conceded no oppression. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 144, 154–55. That decisive absence of prejudice
is not present here. The conditions of confinement in Velasquez and Kurtz were more
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severe than those established here. Those cases nonetheless confirm that oppressive
incarceration depends on the totality of the circumstances, including duration and the actual
conditions of confinement, rather than on any single condition. Velasquez, ¶¶ 28, 35–36,
51; Kurtz, ¶¶ 32, 40–43.
¶47 Our recent decisions in Redd and Larson do not require a different result. In Redd,
only 158 of 613 days belonged to the State. Redd, ¶ 53. Redd’s initial federal custody
arose from his own probation violation, his conduct caused most of the remaining delay,
and his conduct undermined the sincerity of his demand. Redd, ¶¶ 53–63. In Larson, the
State caused no deliberate or negligent delay, the accused’s conduct reflected
gamesmanship, and the record contained no evidence of harsh or unusual confinement.
Larson, ¶¶ 30, 34, 38. Here, the State caused more than three-quarters of the delay, the
record establishes lack of diligence, Yuste demanded trial early and persistently, and he
remained incarcerated throughout under materially burdensome conditions.
¶48 The State deserves credit for choosing on September 4 to forgo the late-produced
search history and preserve the September 9 trial setting. That choice prevented further
delay. It does not erase the earlier period of State inaction that occurred before the forensic
examination began or the continuances the unfinished forensic work already had caused.
The strength of the accusation and the jury’s later verdict likewise cannot substitute for the
constitutional analysis. The speedy-trial guarantee protects the process by which the State
brings an accused to trial; it does not depend on the eventual verdict.
¶49 We decide this case narrowly. The record does not establish prosecutorial bad
faith, and we do not adopt Yuste’s contention that 443 days resulted from unacceptable
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State delay. We hold that the District Court misapplied Ariegwe when it treated all 483
State-attributable days as institutional, failed to recognize sixty-three days caused by lack
of diligence, treated institutional delay as favoring the State, and used extreme deprivation
as the benchmark for oppressive incarceration. Applying the heightened burden required
by this extraordinary delay, the balance establishes a violation of Yuste’s right under
Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution.
CONCLUSION
¶50 We reverse the District Court’s order denying Yuste’s motion to dismiss, reverse
the judgment of conviction, and remand with instructions to dismiss the charge.
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ JIM RICE
Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson, concurring.
¶51 I concur with the Court’s Opinion and disposition of this matter. I write separately
to urge the State to receive this outcome as a wake-up call for how it analyzes digital
evidence in prosecutions.
¶52 Nearly every adult, most teenagers, and too many children walk around with a small
but sophisticated computer and communication device on their person. These smart
phones, not to mention the personal computers and tablets in many homes and offices,
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record an incredible amount of data about our personal lives. Their photographic and video
capabilities are truly impressive. They record and generate evidence of criminal activity
on a daily basis. Every investigator and prosecutor in Montana knows we will continue to
have criminal cases which require someone to download and analyze data from these
evidence databases.
¶53 Yet the State has chronically under-invested in the hiring and training of personnel
to conduct such analysis, and in the acquisition of software for this purpose. The very
skillful investigators at the Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force cannot
keep up with the deluge of investigation requests, producing a backlog which often gets
referred out to other agencies for analysis. Many law enforcement agencies, large and
small, have software and trained personnel to analyze digital data, but they are not keeping
up. Even if they can handle routine cases, they may not be specially trained to handle child
sexual material, which this case apparently contained.
¶54 Hence the unfortunate decision to outsource this case’s analysis to a federal agent.1
Such a decision may be necessary and advisable in a long-running investigation before
anyone has been arrested or charged. But here, Yuste was arrested and subsequently
charged, and therefore the speedy-trial clock was ticking the entire time the parties waited
for the digital evidence. In such a situation, referring the evidence to a federal analyst, who
has other job duties, surrenders the case timeline to someone outside of the prosecutor’s
1
The State also indicated it was initially aware of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) on the device, and suspected the case might be eligible for federal prosecution. ICAC routinely conducts investigations that are eligible for federal prosecution, so such a possibility does not require surrendering active case evidence to a federal agency’s timeline.
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control. Once the federal agent has received and begun the analysis, the state has very few
viable options to speed up the evidence’s return.
¶55 But that was the second problem with the evidentiary timeline. The first problem
was the delay in obtaining a search warrant and referring it to any analyst, state or federal.
The device was seized on February 7, 2023. The State did not obtain a search warrant and
send the devices for analysis until July 18, over five months later. At two prior court
hearings, the state prosecutor communicated to the district court that forensic analysis of
the devices was incomplete. It had not yet begun.
¶56 There are two plausible reasons for the delay. The first is that the prosecutors were
under the mistaken impression the devices had been submitted months earlier, when in fact
they were still in the local agency’s evidence locker. The second plausible reason is that
the federal analyst informed the State she had a backlog of other cases ahead of this one,
and asked the State not to submit the device and search warrant until she was ready to
initiate work on it. This theory would comport with the statutory requirement to serve a
search warrant within 10 days of issuance. Section 46-5-225, MCA. We held in State v.
Bao, 2024 MT 308, ¶ 15, 419 Mont. 388, 560 P.3d 1207, that when a digital analyst
received the electronic device and the search warrant within 10 days of the warrant’s
issuance, the warrant was served when the analyst began “[t]he process of accessing
electronic devices” even if it took longer than 10 days to complete the analysis.
¶57 But that is merely a theory, not necessarily what happened. We are left wondering,
because the State never provided an explanation to the District Court for its delay. Having
heard no justification, such as an investigative backlog, we determine the delay was due to
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lack of diligence in bringing Yuste to trial. The investigative delay led to a year and half
postponement of trial, most of which was attributed to the State.
¶58 We assess all of the Ariegwe factors together in analyzing speedy trial claims. For
such a long delay when the accused was in custody the entire time, the State was required
to provide substantive reasons for the delay. Its failure to do so produced an outcome that
some people, particularly the child victim, will have a hard time accepting. The record
indicates, however, that the second case pending against Yuste was dismissed without
prejudice. If the State is concerned about Yuste presenting a danger to the community, it
has an opportunity to refile those charges as it deems appropriate.
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
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