2026 IL App (1st) 240529
FIRST DISTRICT
SECOND DIVISION
October 6, 2026
No. 1-24-0529
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 21CR10369
)
SHAUNE SPIVEY, ) Honorable
) Steven Jay Rosenblum,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice D.B. Walker and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a bench trial, defendant Shaune Spivey was convicted of multiple counts of
manufacturing child pornography, criminal sexual assault by a family member, and aggravated
criminal sexual abuse by a family member. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to an
aggregate term of 63 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the State failed to
prove the “family member” element of his criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse
convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court failed to properly admonish him
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) before defendant waived his
right to counsel and proceeded pro se.
¶2 In August 2021, defendant was charged by indictment with 12 counts of child
pornography, 4 counts of criminal sexual assault, and 3 counts of aggravated criminal sexual
abuse. He was initially charged in three separate cases arising from the sexual assault and abuse No. 1-24-0529
of the three teenage daughters of Kimberly P., his former romantic partner: E.D. (born in 2001),
M.D. (born in 2004), and J.D. (born in 2005). The State elected to proceed to trial on the case
involving J.D. and moved to admit evidence of the alleged assaults of the other two girls as
propensity to commit sex crimes. The court granted the motion over defendant’s objection.
¶3 At a pretrial hearing, the trial court reviewed a plea offer from the State in which
defendant would receive a total sentence of 25 years to be served at 50%. The court admonished
defendant regarding the potential sentences for each offense from a document prepared by the
State. Defendant indicated that he understood the potential sentences he faced if he proceeded to
trial. He then rejected the plea offer.
¶4 Defendant also informed the trial court that he wished to represent himself and proceed
pro se. The court then admonished defendant about choosing to waive counsel and represent
himself. During the discussion, defendant disclosed that he graduated from high school and
completed two years of junior college but had no formal legal training. The court explained the
risks of defendant representing himself and defendant responded that he understood. The court
asked defendant if he understood the following: the difference between a jury trial and a bench
trial, the judge’s role is that of a neutral arbitrator and the judge cannot help defendant with his
case, the prosecutor has formal legal training and has experience with the procedures and rules at
trial, defendant would have to follow the judge’s rules at trial, defendant would be responsible to
request any jury instructions he wished to include, and defendant would not be allowed to
complain on appeal about his own ability to defend himself. Defendant responded to the court
that he understood each of these admonishments. The court also asked defendant if he would be
prepared to proceed to trial in a month to which he agreed. The court then found that defendant
made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.
2
No. 1-24-0529
¶5 Immediately prior to trial, defendant waived his right to a jury and elected to proceed
with a bench trial. The State proceeded on four counts of manufacturing child pornography, four
counts criminal sexual assault by a family member, and one count of aggravated criminal sexual
abuse by a family member. Directly following is the evidence presented at defendant’s trial.
¶6 J.D. testified that she was born in 2005. She had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), as well as speech and language problems. She participated in a communication
development program in high school to help with her learning issues. In December 2019, J.D.
lived with her aunt; her two sisters, M.D. and E.D.; her brother; and a male cousin. J.D.’s
biological mother passed away when she was less than a year old and she was raised by her aunt,
Kimberly. She considered Kimberly to be her mother.
¶7 Defendant moved in with them around January or February 2020. Defendant was in a
relationship with Kimberly. J.D. identified defendant in court. The first day defendant moved
into the residence, he “patted” J.D. on her buttocks. J.D. was 14 years old at this time. J.D.
shared a bedroom with her sisters, her brother and cousin shared another bedroom, and Kimberly
and defendant used the third bedroom.
¶8 Defendant later told J.D. that he wanted her to “suck his penis.” He asked her to lift her
shirt for him to ejaculate on her breasts, which she did. This occurred in the basement of the
house when no one else was present. The next incident occurred when Kimberly was in the
bathroom and defendant called J.D. to the basement. He wanted J.D. to lie down on the floor for
him to perform oral sex on her, which he did.
¶9 J.D. described another incident in which defendant put her against a ledge in the
basement, pulled down her pants, and placed his fingers insider her vagina. He called her “his
3
No. 1-24-0529
b***.” Later, defendant tried to place his penis into J.D.’s anus, but he stopped when he was
unable to do so.
¶ 10 J.D. also engaged in a game of “Truth or Dare” with defendant and her sisters, M.D. and
E.D. Defendant had the girls remove their clothing and run back and forth in the basement.
During these games, defendant touched the breasts and buttocks of all three girls.
¶ 11 While J.D. was attending Zoom classes during the pandemic, defendant would come
downstairs and expose his penis to J.D. He would position himself so others on Zoom could not
see him, but he would try to get J.D.’s attention. At defendant’s direction, she put sleeping pills
in her mother’s drink to make her mother feel sleepy on more than one occasion.
¶ 12 J.D. testified that this sexual contact with defendant occurred more than once and he
recorded these incidents. She saw a camera in the basement “every time” defendant engaged in
sexual contact with her. The prosecutor showed J.D. a camera as exhibit 1 and she identified it as
the camera she saw in the basement, and it belonged to defendant. She also identified a USB
drive that contained images and videos of her with defendant. The images and video clips were
then admitted and played in court. The State introduced 15 individual exhibits in both video and
image form and J.D. identified each of them and described the sexual acts depicted.
¶ 13 Exhibit 2-A was a video recording. J.D. identified herself in the video. She then provided
a detailed description of what occurred in the video. In the first clip, defendant had J.D. pull her
pants down “so he could see [her] butt,” and then he “had [her] get down on [her] knees to suck
his penis.” She confirmed that his penis was inside her mouth at this time. Her knees were on the
ground while defendant was standing up. The video clip next showed defendant “trying to insert
his penis into [her] butt.” She testified that she was “bent over” and her pants were down with
defendant positioned behind her. She stated that defendant’s penis made contact with her anus.
4
No. 1-24-0529
She then testified that the video showed defendant “fingering [her] vagina,” with defendant
inserting his fingers into J.D.’s vagina. Later in the video, J.D. testified that defendant’s “penis
was in [her] mouth” while she was on her knees and defendant was standing up. Exhibit 2-B was
a shortened version of exhibit 2-A and showed defendant “inserting his penis in [J.D.’s] butt.”
¶ 14 As the prosecutor began to introduce exhibit 2-C, the trial court stopped her to document
the dates for exhibits 2-A and 2-B on the record and stated, without objection, that the date listed
on the bottom was “6-13-21.” The prosecutor then proceeded with exhibit 2-C.
¶ 15 Exhibit 2-C was a video and J.D. stated that the video showed her changing her clothes
and removing her pants. Later, the video showed defendant “lift up” her skirt. Exhibit 2-D, dated
June 13, 2021, depicted J.D. changing her clothes. She testified that it was common for her to
change her clothes down to her underwear in front of defendant.
¶ 16 J.D. testified that exhibits 2-E and 2-F, dated June 12, 2021, were pictures of defendant in
the basement taken by the same surveillance video camera. She also identified exhibits 2-G and
2-H, dated June 13, 2021, as photographs of herself and defendant in the basement. Exhibit 2-I,
dated June 2, 2021, showed J.D. and defendant and she stated that her pants were down so
defendant “could see [her] butt.” J.D. testified that exhibit 2-J, dated June 6, 2021, showed her
and defendant with J.D. in her underwear because defendant “told [her] to get naked.”
¶ 17 J.D. further testified that defendant also took pictures of her on his phone and identified
exhibit 2-K as an image of her with her “vagina showing.” She identified exhibit 2-L as a
photograph taken by defendant on his phone with her hand on her vagina depicting her
masturbating.
¶ 18 Exhibit 2-M was a video and J.D. stated it was taken by defendant on a physical camera.
She testified that it depicted her “masturbating.” Another individual entered the frame, who J.D.
5
No. 1-24-0529
identified as defendant. She stated that the video showed defendant pouring oil on her vagina.
J.D. also stated that exhibit 2-N depicted her “masturbating,” but this image was taken from
defendant’s phone. For exhibit 2-O, the State introduced a screenshot from exhibit 2-M and J.D.
identified herself and defendant in the image. She testified that defendant was “pouring oil” on
her. When asked if the screenshot “truly and accurately” depicted what happened to her that day,
J.D. answered, “Yes, it does.” J.D. stated that all of the sexual incidents detailed from these
exhibits occurred when she was between the ages of 14 and 15.
¶ 19 J.D. testified that defendant resided in the house continuously until July 2021, when he
left to help a friend. After he left, Kimberly asked J.D. and her sisters if defendant had touched
the girls inappropriately. J.D. overheard her mother talking to E.D. about this contact, and J.D.
decided to tell her mother everything. She did not tell her mother earlier because she was afraid
of defendant. She explained that defendant would sometimes take a knife and poke her with it,
and he also put his hands on her neck. J.D. testified that the sexual contact with defendant
occurred continuously from approximately January and February 2020 until July 2021. When
defendant returned to the house, Kimberly called the police.
¶ 20 Kimberly testified that she is the biological aunt of J.D., M.D., and E.D. Her sister was
the children’s biological mother and died when the children were between 11 months and 5 years
old. All three of the girls have learning disabilities: E.D. is developmentally delayed and has an
intellectual disability, M.D. is autistic and is also developmentally delayed with an intellectual
disability, and J.D. is developmentally delayed with language impairment and an intellectual
disability. In January 2020, E.D. was 18, M.D. was 15, and J.D. was 14.
¶ 21 Kimberly grew up in the same neighborhood as defendant, and they knew each other as
children. They reconnected on Facebook and rekindled their friendship. He moved into her home
6
No. 1-24-0529
in February 2020 and remained there consistently until June 2021. Kimberly had mobility issues
from an injury and spent most of her time in her bedroom on the third level of the home.
Defendant spent the majority of his time in the basement. During their relationship, defendant
was aggressive with Kimberly, and he was “belittling” and “hurtful.” She considered ending
their relationship before he moved out, but she was afraid to do so.
¶ 22 Defendant left in June 2021 to help a friend out-of-state and said he would return when
he finished. Later that day, Kimberly was in her bedroom when she noticed a red light flashing
on defendant’s laptop. She looked closer and found a camera. She removed the wires and had a
conversation with J.D. Kimberly learned that defendant had been watching Kimberly in her room
for “quite some time.” She was “very alarmed.” She then spoke with E.D., followed by
conversations with all three girls. Kimberly learned that defendant had been touching the girls
“inappropriately” in a sexual manner. Kimberly then called the police and filed a report.
¶ 23 Kimberly was told by one of the girls that defendant had another camera in the basement.
The police subsequently came to the home and recovered the memory card from the basement
camera. The police contacted her to identify images of the girls from the recovered memory card.
¶ 24 Kimberly subsequently obtained an order of protection against defendant. When
defendant returned to Kimberly’s home in July 2021, she called 911. She reported that defendant
had returned to the residence and was driving a black SUV. Defendant, though, was gone by the
time the police arrived.
¶ 25 M.D. testified that, in December 2019, she was 15 years old. She stated that defendant
used to live with her family and she identified him in court. While defendant was living at her
house, he engaged in inappropriate actions with her in the basement. She testified that defendant
told her to perform fellatio on him and he would suck on her breasts, buttocks, and vagina. He
7
No. 1-24-0529
had M.D. and her sisters play “Truth or Dare” in the basement. She stated that if she picked dare,
she would take her clothes off and run back and forth in the basement while naked. He also told
M.D.’s sisters to touch M.D.’s breasts and body. M.D. stated that she performed fellatio more
than once with defendant’s penis in her mouth. Defendant also touched her vagina with both his
mouth and fingers.
¶ 26 Defendant also took pictures and videos of M.D. He told her to lift her bra and lower her
pants before taking a picture of her nude. In her testimony, she then identified nude photographs
and a video of her. M.D. observed defendant touch J.D. inappropriately, including placing his
mouth on her vagina and breasts. She did not tell anyone about this abuse earlier because
defendant told her not to tell anyone.
¶ 27 Oak Forest Detective David Lowisz testified that on July 8, 2021, he was a patrol officer
and responded to a domestic disturbance on Beth Court in Oak Forest. As he approached that
location, he observed a black Chrysler Aspen SUV, which was similar to the vehicle described
leaving that location. He recognized the driver from prior information given to the officer.
Detective Lowisz then “effected” a high-risk traffic stop of that vehicle. In a high-risk traffic
stop, the driver and/or occupants are removed from the vehicle with the officers’ weapons drawn.
He identified defendant in court as the individual who exited the vehicle. Defendant was then
taken into custody. Detective Lowisz admitted that there was no warrant for defendant’s arrest,
but he was wanted for questioning.
¶ 28 Oak Forest Sergeant David Devries testified that he was previously assigned to the
investigation division of the Oak Forest Police Department. In June 2021, he was assisting
Detective William Engle, the officer in charge of investigating defendant. He attended the
forensic interviews for J.D., M.D., and E.D. During the interviews, defendant was identified as
8
No. 1-24-0529
the offender. On July 8, 2021, he was made aware of a call related to defendant and then
proceeded toward the location of the call. While en route, he observed an SUV driving in front of
an Oak Forest patrol car with its lights on. Sergeant Devries then positioned his vehicle behind
the patrol car. He saw defendant exit the SUV and identified him in court. The sergeant
recognized defendant from photographs in his investigation. He searched the vehicle and
recovered a cellphone and a tablet, which he later learned belonged to defendant.
¶ 29 Sergeant Devries, along with Detective Engle, interviewed defendant at the police station.
Defendant was given his Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)),
which he waived and agreed to speak with the officers. Defendant told them that he had a
recording of one of the girls, stating that another male family member had abused them.
Defendant then unlocked his phone to play the audio recording. Sergeant Devries stated that
during the forensic interviews the victims identified defendant as the perpetrator.
¶ 30 Oak Forest Detective Engle testified that he was assigned to investigate a sexual assault
case in June 2021. On June 18, 2021, he met with Kimberly at her residence. She gave the
detective two surveillance cameras, two SD cards for the cameras, a silver laptop, a black laptop,
and a Samsung Galaxy Note 5 cell phone. Based on the information he learned from Kimberly,
he arranged for forensic interviews of J.D., M.D., and E.D. Detective Engle explained that a
forensic interview is conducted by a specially trained forensic interviewer. These interviews are
conducted for children under 18 but can include people with mental disabilities. He viewed the
live stream of the forensic interviews of all three victims.
¶ 31 Based on the statements in the interviews as well as Kimberly’s statement, Detective
Engle obtained search warrants for the SD cards and the silver laptop. The data was then
extracted, and he reviewed the evidence. He observed images and video files related to J.D. He
9
No. 1-24-0529
also saw a male individual in the files and identified defendant in court as the male depicted.
Some of the files were taken to the Chicago Regional Computer Forensics Laboratory to help
enhance the files for identification of the individuals depicted. Detective Engle later obtained a
search warrant for the cell phone recovered from defendant’s vehicle. He also observed images
of J.D. on defendant’s cell phone.
¶ 32 Oak Forest Detective Adrian O’Donnell testified that he was previously a member of the
Internet Crimes Against Children task force. There, he received training on examining electronic
devices. Detective O’Donnell was asked to perform digital forensic extractions on a “cellular
device” and two SD cards. He identified the digital forensic extraction from each of the items he
was assigned.
¶ 33 Jordan Graves testified that he was employed as a senior digital forensic examiner with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. With no objection, the trial court declared Graves as an
expert in the field of digital forensic video and imaging enhancements. In November 2021, he
was asked “to observe and identify images and videos that had been marked as important or
relevant or of interest and then to apply enhancements or attempt to apply enhancements to those
files.” These enhancements were “to aid the case agent in obtaining more information or
understanding more about the pictures and videos.” He explained that it was easier to view
videos on a frame-by-frame basis to “observe it exactly as it is.” Graves then identified the
enhanced images.
¶ 34 Defendant testified that he met Kimberly in grammar school but reconnected in 2019 and
began a relationship with her. He stated that he moved into Kimberly’s house in March 2020.
When he moved into the home, he found out that the children were being neglected and
Kimberly’s son was “beating” the girls. Defendant saw E.D. being sexually assaulted by
10
No. 1-24-0529
Kimberly’s son. When defendant asked E.D. about this, she told him that it had been going on
since she was 14, and she was then 20 years old. She also told him that the contact was not
consensual. Defendant then spoke with the “other children,” and they confirmed what E.D. had
said. He confronted Kimberly with this information, and Kimberly responded that her son was
“just playing.” After this confrontation, defendant ended his relationship, moved into the
basement, and decided to pay rent until he found another residence. Defendant presented audio
recordings in which defendant had the girls discuss the alleged abuse of E.D. by Kimberly’s son.
¶ 35 Defendant left in June 2021 to help a friend paint a family bed and breakfast. Afterwards,
defendant decided to move out and returned to the home on July 8, 2021, with a friend and a UHaul to pack his belongings. When his key did not work to open the front door, he knocked but
no one answered. He left and was subsequently pulled over by the police. He stated that he
contacted the Department of Children and Family Services about Kimberly’s son and the
condition of the home, but no one ever contacted him. He testified that he “wound up in jail”
because “Kimberly did not want anyone to find out any of the things her son was doing to the
kids in the house,” especially E.D.
¶ 36 Defendant denied that the surveillance camera from the basement was his. Defendant also
denied that he was the individual in an image in which J.D.’s vagina was exposed. He did admit,
however, that M.D. took her clothes off in front of him.
¶ 37 Following arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of the following: four counts
of criminal sexual assault based on J.D. being under 18 years of age when it was committed and
defendant was a family member who resided in the same household continuously for at least six
months, one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse based on J.D. being under the age of 18
and defendant having resided in the same household continuously for at least six months, two
11
No. 1-24-0529
counts of child pornography based on moving images, and two counts of child pornography
based on still images. In its findings, the court stated that it had viewed the videotapes,
photographs, and enhanced photographs, as well as the extractions from the SD cards. It was
“very clear” to the court after hearing the testimony from J.D. and M.D. that they have “some
mental disabilities.”
¶ 38 The court discussed the video evidence, noting that defendant admitted some images
were him. Defendant denied being present in a video of J.D. masturbating, but the court found
“[i]t could not be clearer who that is in the video. Out of all of the shots of the defendant
throughout this case it is the clearest that it is the defendant in that video.” The court observed
that the video “speaks for itself.” The court also found the other crimes evidence involving M.D.
corroborated J.D. The court specifically found that visual evidence depicted “the sex acts as clear
as day that were occurring” with M.D. and there was “no ambiguity.”
¶ 39 Further, the court found defendant’s testimony about the alleged assault of E.D. was not
relevant to this case and was “not a defense to the child pornography charges against the
defendant.” The court listened to defendant’s audio recording with the children and found them
to have been “choreographed by” defendant. The court also observed that defendant never denied
having sex with the victims. The court concluded that the evidence was “extremely
overwhelming” and it was obvious that J.D. was in one video and M.D. was in another, with both
girls identifying themselves.
¶ 40 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging the following: (1) he was arrested
without a warrant or probable cause in violation of his fourth amendment rights, (2) the police
did not have a search warrant when they seized his belongings from Kimberly’s house, (3) the
State withheld discovery from him in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
12
No. 1-24-0529
(4) Kimberly and J.D. provided perjured testimony, (5) the State failed to show a chain of
custody of defendant’s belongings. (6) the ineffective assistance of counsel during preliminary
proceedings, (7) Kimberly illegally videotaped defendant, and (8) the State failed to prove
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court subsequently denied defendant’s
motion.
¶ 41 At the February 2024 sentencing hearing, the State argued in aggravation and J.D. read
her victim impact statement, while defendant denied there was any video of him sexually
assaulting J.D. The court concluded that the child pornography convictions were required to be
served consecutively, as well as the criminal sexual assault convictions. Then, after reviewing all
the evidence, as well as defendant’s presentence investigation report, the court imposed an
aggregate sentence of 63 years, which included two consecutive terms of 15 years for each count
of child pornography based on moving images, two consecutive terms of 5 years for the child
pornography based on still images, four consecutive terms of 5 years for the criminal sexual
assault convictions, and a 3-year term for aggravated criminal sexual abuse to be served after
defendant completed the terms of his other convictions. The child pornography and aggravated
criminal sexual abuse convictions were to be served at 50% while the criminal sexual assault
convictions were to be served at 85%.
¶ 42 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a family member.
Specifically, defendant contends that the State did not prove that he was a “family member”
residing with J.D. for at least six months prior to committing the alleged offenses. The State
responds that it established a continuing course of illegal sexual conduct with J.D. during the
entire time defendant resided in the home, which included the period satisfying the statutory
13
No. 1-24-0529
definition of “family member.”
¶ 43 “Where a criminal conviction is challenged based on insufficient evidence, a reviewing
court, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, must
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the
essential elements of the crime.” People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48 (citing Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to “fairly ***
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. Accordingly, the reviewing court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of the evidence
or the credibility of the witnesses. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. While these findings by the
trier of fact are entitled to deference, they are not conclusive. A court of review will reverse a
criminal conviction when the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to
justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Id. This standard of review is applied
regardless of whether the defendant opted for a bench or jury trial. Id.
¶ 44 Defendant was convicted of four counts of criminal sexual assault by a family member.
That statute provides:
“(a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an
act of sexual penetration and:
***
(3) is a family member of the victim, and the victim is under 18
years of age.” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3) (West 2020).
The term “sexual penetration” is defined in the Criminal Code of 2012 as:
“any contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person and an
14
No. 1-24-0529
object or the sex organ, mouth, or anus of another person, or any intrusion,
however slight, of any part of the body of one person or of any animal or object
into the sex organ or anus of another person, including, but not limited to,
cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal penetration.” Id. § 11-0.1.
¶ 45 The term “family member,” as applicable here, is defined as the following: “an accused
who has resided in the household with the child continuously for at least 6 months.” Id.
¶ 46 Defendant was also convicted of one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. That
statute provides: “A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits an
act of sexual conduct with a victim who is under 18 years of age and the person is a family
member.” Id. § 11-1.60(b). “Sexual conduct” is defined, in relevant part, as: “any knowing
touching or fondling by the victim or the accused, either directly or through clothing, of the sex
organs, anus, or breast of the victim or the accused ***, for the purpose of sexual gratification or
arousal of the victim or the accused.” Id. § 11-0.1.
¶ 47 The indictments for criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse all
alleged that J.D. was under 18 years of age when the act was committed and defendant was a
family member who “resided in the same household continuously with J.D. for at least 6
months.” See id. §§ 11-1.20(a)(3), 11-1.60(b).
¶ 48 Defendant limits his claim to whether the State proved that he was a family member
residing with J.D. for at least six months “prior to the conduct that he was convicted of
committing.” According to defendant, the State failed to provide the specific dates when these
acts took place. He asserts that it is “impossible” to determine if any of the charged sexual
conduct occurred more than six months after he moved into the home, as required under the
statute.
15
No. 1-24-0529
¶ 49 The State responds that it was not required to prove a specific date of the sexual acts
because defendant was charged with a continuing course of conduct for the entire time that he
resided in the home. The State further argues that it was not required to prove defendant was a
“family member” prior to the start of the sexual contact with J.D.
¶ 50 Defendant cites People v. Turner, 2024 IL App (3d) 220473-U, ¶ 17, to support his
assertion that “an accused must reside with the victim for six months previous to unlawful
conduct in order to qualify as a family member.” However, the reviewing court in Turner
specifically rejected defendant’s argument that the State was required to prove defendant was a
“family member” before he began his sexual contact with J.D.
¶ 51 In Turner, the defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual assault and two
counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Id. ¶¶ 4, 11. The indictments alleged that the acts
occurred during a three-month period and that the defendant was a family member of the victim.
Id. ¶ 4. The defendant was in a long-term relationship with the victim’s mother and moved into
the victim’s home in the winter of 2014 and lived there continuously until January 2016. The
victim testified that beginning in November 2015, the defendant initiated sexual intercourse with
her, and they continued to have sexual intercourse every other week until January 2016 when she
informed the defendant that she was pregnant. Id. ¶¶ 5-7. The victim was unable to specify the
exact dates on which the sexual penetration occurred. Id.
¶ 52 The defendant argued on appeal that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt because the State did not establish he was a “family member” residing in the
home continuously for at least six months “prior to the onset of the sexual assaults.” Id. ¶ 13. The
Turner court specifically rejected this argument and found that the defendant had been living
with the family for at least 10 months prior to the beginning of the sexual relationship with the
16
No. 1-24-0529
victim. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
¶ 53 The reviewing court also rejected the defendant’s argument that “the State must prove
that he was a ‘family member’ of the victim before the onset of his sexual conduct with the
victim.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 19. After reviewing the relevant statutes, the court observed
that “[t]he plain language of the applicable statutes prohibits an individual who has resided with
a child continuously for at least six months from committing an act of sexual penetration on a
victim under the age of 18.” Id. The court concluded “[n]othing in the statute indicates that the
onset date of the initial sexual assault must occur after the defendant becomes a ‘family
member.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. The Turner court held that any time after a defendant has
lived with the victim continuously for six months, acts of sexual penetration constitutes criminal
sexual assault by a family member. Id.; see 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3) (West 2020).
¶ 54 We agree with the analysis in Turner and reach the same conclusion. The onset of the
sexual contact does not affect when defendant qualifies as a “family member” under the statute.
Accordingly, after a defendant has lived with the minor victim continuously for six months, he
commits criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse through any act of sexual
penetration or sexual conduct, respectively. See 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3), 11-1.60(b) (West
2020).
¶ 55 Here, it is undisputed that defendant resided continuously in the home with J.D. for at
least 15 months, from March 2020 at the latest to June 2021. Even if we use defendant’s
timeframe and his own testimony that he moved into the home in March 2020, he became a
statutory family member by October 2020. After that October, he continued to reside
continuously in the home for another eight months. J.D. explicitly testified that the sexual
conduct with defendant, including oral, digital, and anal penetration, continued the entire time
17
No. 1-24-0529
defendant resided in the home. J.D. was 14 and 15 years old during this time period. M.D.’s
testimony also corroborated J.D.’s account of the ongoing sexual contact with defendant. No
contrary evidence was presented to dispute this ongoing course of sexual contact between
defendant and J.D.
¶ 56 Despite this unrebutted testimony, defendant asserts that J.D.’s account is “too vague” to
establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, defendant fails to cite any authority to
support his assertion that the State was required to present evidence of the specific dates on
which the sexual contact occurred. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)
requires an appellant to adequately develop his argument with citation of relevant authority. It is
well settled that conclusory contentions unsupported by argument violate Rule 341(h)(7) and are
deemed forfeited. People v. Fretch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 132; see People v. Rosalez,
2021 IL App (2d) 200086, ¶ 170. The reviewing court is not a repository into which an appellant
may foist the burden of argument and research. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651,
¶ 29. Defendant fails to offer any relevant authority holding that the State is required to establish
the dates of the sexual contact, including cases involving a continuous course of conduct. Thus,
this argument is forfeited.
¶ 57 Forfeiture aside, in cases involving child sexual abuse, the precise date of the offense “is
not an essential factor” and the State is not required to prove it. People v. Guerrero, 356 Ill. App.
3d 22, 27 (2005). “The inability to remember exact dates and times merely affects the weight to
be given the testimony and, taken alone, does not create reasonable doubt.” People v. Foley, 206
Ill. App. 3d 709, 715 (1990); see People v. Letcher, 386 Ill. App. 3d 327, 333 (2008) (noting that
a victim of repeated abuse by an individual inside the home is typically “unable to furnish many
specific details, dates or distinguishing characteristics as to individual acts or assaults” (internal
18
No. 1-24-0529
quotation marks omitted)).
¶ 58 Moreover, when the State has proceeded under a continuous course of conduct theory,
the offense is not complete until the last act has concluded. People v. McDade, 345 Ill. App. 3d
912, 915 (2004). In that case, the defendant was convicted of one count of predatory criminal
sexual assault based on numerous assaults that occurred between December 1997 and June 1999.
Id. at 913. The issue on appeal was whether the defendant was eligible for the harsher restrictions
on sentencing credit that became effective in June 1998. Id. at 914. This court determined that he
was eligible, reasoning that the defendant was charged under a theory that he engaged in a
continuous course of conduct that did not end until 1999, after the effective date of the relevant
statute. Id. at 915-16.
¶ 59 Here, the State did not need to establish the dates on which the sexual contact occurred.
J.D. detailed multiple types of sexual penetration, i.e., digital, oral, and anal, and defendant was
only charged with one count of criminal sexual assault for each type of penetration. Similarly,
defendant was only charged with one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. J.D.’s
testimony established that these sexual acts occurred many times while defendant resided in the
home. Under the continuous course of conduct, as charged, the offenses were not complete until
defendant left the home in June 2021. See id.
¶ 60 Additionally, Illinois courts have rejected a similar argument requiring proof of an exact
date in cases involving general jury verdicts. In each of these cases, the defendant argued on
appeal that he was denied his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict because the verdict
form did not require the jurors to agree on which specific instance of a sexual act constituted the
guilty verdict. See People v. Reynolds, 294 Ill. App. 3d 58, 70-71 (1997); People v. AlvaradoMorales, 2025 IL App (1st) 240134-U, ¶¶ 61, 68; People v. Dean, 2026 IL App (5th) 240201-U.
19
No. 1-24-0529
While the basis of these cases was juror unanimity, the crux of the claims related to an ongoing
course of conduct of criminal sexual assault. For this reason, we find the reviewing courts’
analyses relevant to our discussion.
¶ 61 In Reynolds, the defendant was charged with multiple counts of criminal sexual assault,
aggravated sexual abuse, and child pornography arising from his sexual relationship with a 16-year-old victim for over a year. Reynolds, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 60-61. The criminal sexual assault
charges alleged that the defendant “ ‘held a position of trust, authority or supervision in relation
to the victim.’ ” Id. at 64 (quoting 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(4) (West 1994)). The jury received
general verdict forms for each offense and returned a guilty verdict for each of the charges. Id. at
63.
¶ 62 The defendant argued on appeal that the jury should have been given separate verdict
forms for each type of sexual penetration and for each identifiable instance of sexual contact to
ensure a unanimous jury verdict for the specific conduct. Id. at 70. The Reynolds court found that
the jury was not required to agree on the specific type of penetration or the specific incident of
sexual interaction because the State proceeded on a theory of a continuous course of criminal
conduct. The court concluded that the general verdict forms were proper because the evidence
“established an ongoing sexual relationship” between the defendant and the victim. Id. at 71.
¶ 63 The reviewing court in Alvarado-Morales similarly rejected a defendant’s argument that
his right to a unanimous jury verdict had been violated. Alvarado-Morales, 2025 IL App (1st)
240134-U, ¶ 61. There, the defendant was convicted of the predatory criminal sexual assault of
his stepdaughter over the course of 3 years when she was under the age of 13. Id. ¶¶ 2-4. The
defendant argued that his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict had been violated because
the jury instructions and verdict forms did not require the jurors to agree on a specific instance of
20
No. 1-24-0529
sexual contact for each of his convictions. Id. ¶ 55. Relying on Reynolds, the reviewing court
observed that no separate verdict forms were required when the trial testimony established a
continuous course of conduct. Id. ¶ 61. The Alvarado-Morales court held that because the
defendant was not charged with multiple counts of each type of sexual contact, the jury was not
required “to pinpoint which specific instance” of contact supported their guilty verdicts. Id. ¶ 68.
¶ 64 Recently, the Fifth District in Dean likewise considered this issue and reached the same
conclusion. Dean, 2026 IL App (5th) 240201-U, ¶ 94. In that case, the defendant was convicted
of the predatory criminal sexual assault of his autistic daughter. Id. ¶¶ 2-6. He argued on appeal
that his convictions should have been vacated because the jury instructions did not require the
jury to unanimously agree on a specific occurrence of the sexual act underlying each of his
convictions. Id. ¶ 85. The reviewing court agreed with that court’s analysis in Alvarado-Morales.
Id. ¶ 86. The Dean court concluded that “the signed verdict forms show that the jurors
unanimously found defendant guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault” based on separate
counts for oral, vaginal, and anal contact between the defendant and the victim. Id. ¶ 94. The
court also observed that because the defendant was not charged with multiple counts on any
specific type of contact, the jury was not required to determine a precise instance of that contact.
Id.
¶ 65 While the present case does not involve an issue related to jury instructions, we find the
reasoning in these cases to be instructive to our analysis. The State pursued a theory that
defendant committed numerous sexual assault offenses against J.D. based on a continuous course
of conduct. The indictment for each count set forth a time frame of “on or about January 01,
2020 and continuing on through July 08, 2021.” The criminal sexual assault counts varied by
alleging a different type of sexual penetration over the same continuous time period, i.e., oral,
21
No. 1-24-0529
anal, and digital penetration. Similarly, the aggravated criminal sexual abuse count alleged
contact between defendant’s hand and J.D.’s breast for sexual arousal or gratification over the
same time frame. As in the above cases, the State did not charge defendant with multiple counts
for each type of sexual contact, but rather each count set forth a continuous course of conduct for
each type of sexual penetration. Since the State presented evidence of an ongoing course of
conduct, it was not required to “pinpoint” which specific acts occurred after defendant became a
qualifying family member.
¶ 66 After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude a
rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of criminal sexual assault by a family member and aggravated criminal sexual abuse by a
family member. As noted above, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony rests solely within the province of the trier of fact. People v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810,
¶ 36. Further, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to convict if the testimony is positive
and credible. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36. Here, J.D.’s testimony established numerous
ongoing sexual offenses committed against her throughout the entire time defendant resided in
her home. M.D. provided further testimony corroborating these assaults and ongoing sexual
abuse by defendant.
¶ 67 In addition to the live testimony, the State presented the documentary evidence of this
sexual contact between defendant and J.D. in the videos and photographs recovered from the
cameras placed in the basement of the home, as well as defendant’s cell phone. In her testimony,
J.D. thoroughly detailed what each exhibit depicted. She described videos and images in which
defendant placed his penis in J.D.’s mouth, inserted his fingers into J.D.’s vagina, and had his
penis make contact with J.D.’s anus. She further described instances in which she was unclothed
22
No. 1-24-0529
and masturbating that defendant photographed and recorded. She identified an image in which
defendant was seen pouring oil onto her vagina. These images and videos were dated between
June 2, 2021, and June 13, 2021, more than a year after defendant moved into the home. This
evidence clearly depicted all of the charged sexual assaults and corroborated J.D.’s testimony
that the sexual misconduct continued the entire time defendant resided in the home.
¶ 68 Defendant attempts to avoid the evidence of the date stamps by arguing for the first time
in his reply brief that these dates were inadmissible hearsay and lacked a proper foundation. We
find, however, that this claim is specious for multiple reasons. To begin, this claim violates Rule
341(h)(7). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and
shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”). Thus,
defendant has forfeited this argument on appeal.
¶ 69 Even if this claim was not forfeited, defendant did not object at trial to the admission of
these images and videos on any grounds, nor did he raise this claim in his posttrial motion. A
defendant must both specifically object at trial and raise that claim again in a posttrial motion to
preserve any alleged error for review. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. Defendant
forfeited his objection to the dates for this reason as well.
¶ 70 Further, “[i]t is well established that when hearsay evidence is admitted without an
objection, it is to be considered and given its natural and probative effect.” People v. Banks, 378
Ill. App. 3d 856, 861 (2007) (citing People v. Akis, 63 Ill.2d 296, 299 (1976)). Even if the listed
dates were hearsay, which we do not find, the trial court properly gave this evidence its proper
probative effect. The court did not err in considering the dates to establish the sexual assaults
were committed after defendant became a statutory “family member.”
¶ 71 Additionally, forfeiture is “particularly appropriate when a defendant argues that the State
23
No. 1-24-0529
failed to lay the proper technical foundation for the admission of evidence, and a defendant’s
lack of a timely and specific objection deprives the State of the opportunity to correct any
deficiency in the foundational proof at the trial level.” Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 470. Here, defendant
cannot now assert that the dates on the documentary evidence lacked a proper foundation when
his failure to object denied the State the chance to cure any issues. We reject his belated
argument challenging this evidence.
¶ 72 After our thorough review of the trial record, we find the evidence of defendant’s guilt
was overwhelming. Even though the State is not required to pinpoint the exact date of the sexual
assaults, there is overwhelming evidence that defendant was sexually assaulting J.D. as late as
June 2021. Significantly, these sexual assaults occurred more than eight months after defendant
was considered a “family member” under the statute. The trial court’s findings were not so
unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s
guilt. See Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 36. Given this substantial evidence, the trial court reasonably
found defendant guilty of criminal sexual assault by a family member and aggravated criminal
sexual abuse by a family member. We affirm these convictions.
¶ 73 Defendant next contends that the trial court failed to properly admonish him prior to
waiving his right to counsel in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. Jul. 1, 1984).
Specifically, he asserts that the court failed to admonish him about the nature of the charges
against him and misinformed him that the sentence for aggravated criminal sexual abuse would
be served concurrently rather than consecutive to his other sentences. The State responds that
defendant forfeited this claim because he failed to allege a violation of Rule 401 or any error in
the court’s admonishments in his motion for a new trial.
¶ 74 As previously observed, to preserve an error for appeal, a defendant must object to the
24
No. 1-24-0529
error at trial and raise the error in a posttrial motion. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. Defendant
argues that he preserved this claim when he made an objection before the trial court. During the
sentencing hearing, the court explained that the sentences for the child pornography and criminal
sexual assault convictions were required to be served consecutively. The court observed that the
sentence for the aggravated criminal sexual abuse conviction did not trigger a consecutive
sentence but was required to be served consecutively because the other offenses triggered
consecutive sentences. When the court asked defendant if he agreed with the court’s reading of
the law, defendant stated that he did not agree. Defendant then stated that prior to trial the State
had given him a “contract” about sentencing guidelines and the State was changing these
guidelines. The court explained that there was no contract from the State, but rather the State had
offered a plea agreement, which defendant rejected. The court then asked defendant if he had an
objection to the sentencing range or the consecutive nature of the sentences. No objection was
made regarding the potential sentences. Rather, defendant asked about credit for time served and
requested standby counsel, which the court denied. Defendant also failed to raise this claim in a
posttrial motion. Thus, this claim has been forfeited.
¶ 75 Despite defendant’s failure to preserve this issue, he asks this court to review his claim
under the plain error rule. Rule 615(a) states that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial
court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). The plain error rule
“allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or
obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone
threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the
25
No. 1-24-0529
seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is
so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the
integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.”
People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007) (citing People v. Herron, 215
Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005)).
However, the plain error rule “is not ‘a general saving clause preserving for review all errors
affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial
court.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978)). Rather,
“Illinois’s plain error rule is a narrow exception to forfeiture principles.” People v. Jackson, 2022
IL 127256, ¶ 18.
¶ 76 Defendant carries the burden of persuasion under both prongs of the plain error rule.
People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2009). Defendant contends that this claim is reviewable
under both prongs of the plain error doctrine. However, our supreme court has previously held
that a Rule 401 violation “is not akin to structural error, such a violation, if not raised in a
postplea or posttrial motion, is not cognizable as second-prong plain error but only as first-prong
plain error.” People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 46; see People v. Williams, 2025 IL App (1st)
230584-B, ¶¶ 37-41 (holding that this court is bound by the pronouncement in Ratliff that Rule
401 errors cannot be raised under the second prong of plain error). Accordingly, defendant can
only assert plain error under the first prong.
¶ 77 Turning to the first prong, defendant argues that the evidence was closely balanced based
on the “family member” element of his criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual
abuse charges. However, we have already rejected this claim. As the trial court observed, the
evidence of defendant’s guilt was “extremely overwhelming.” In addition to the testimony from
26
No. 1-24-0529
J.D. and M.D., evidence of sexual contact was presented in both video and photographic form
from defendant’s own cameras in the residence. Since any error in the Rule 401 admonishments
would not have tipped the scales of justice against defendant, he is not entitled to relief under the
plain error rule, and we need not address the merits of his claim.
¶ 78 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.
¶ 79 Affirmed.
27
No. 1-24-0529
People v. Spivey, 2026 IL App (1st) 240529
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 21-CR10369; the Hon. Steven Jay Rosenblum, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Timothy Liam Kelly, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Eileen O’Neill Burke, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (John E. for Nowak, Brian K. Hodes, and Lee Farbman, Assistant State’s Appellee: Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
28